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Technical Reviews in Complex Development Programs

Technical reviews in major complex defense and space projects are high-stakes events
that technically assess programs costing up to billions of dollars, probing the work of hundreds
of engineers. These technical reviews evolved since the 1960s into an industry-standard systems engineering process. Prior research argues that technical reviews at the subsystem level
are the most technically important—conflicting with other work positing that mission-level
technical reviews critically contribute to failures of government programs. Reviews are important, but research on reviews is inconsistent, fragmented, and lacks supporting data.
To understand the practice of technical reviews and the alignment between practice
and literature, this research was split into three related questions: (1) How do technical reviews impact subsequent project engineering and management activities? (2) How do technical reviews affect participant views and self-reported knowledge of the project? (3) How do
the findings from the above questions compare with literature or extant theory?
The research found, unexpectedly, that system-level reviews are fundamentally different from subsystem reviews in what they do for stakeholders: subsystem reviews better
meet the technological needs of the design team, while system-level reviews better meet the
v

system-level integration and external stakeholder needs. Stakeholders have strong preferences for the reviews that meet their needs; thus, design team members prefer subsystem
reviews, and stakeholders external to the project prefer system-level reviews. This preference
explains the conflicts in prior research on “what is important about reviews”: it depends on
who you ask. It also points to a problem in current “best practice”: almost all industry standards treat subsystem reviews as “system-level reviews but smaller.” Ignoring the key differences of subsystem reviews is a significant misunderstanding and gap in the literature.
The author of this report used a case-based qualitative research approach. Six specific
cases of DoD / NASA spacecraft technical reviews were studied, covering two key dimensions
of expected variability: phase of design and level of review. Project data and review observations were used to develop questions for 25 interviews of project members about technical reviews. Interview respondents were solicited to span a third study variable of participant role.
Interview data were analyzed using standard qualitative analysis methods to develop common findings on how reviews impact project work and participant knowledge. A follow-on
systematic literature review and analysis developed a literature database of over 300 sources
on reviews. An assessment was conducted of the relevant support in the literature for the research findings.
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In regione cæcorum rex est luscus.
In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king.
—Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam
(1508, Adagiorum Chiliades; 2396. III, IV, 96)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces this research on how engineers conduct technical reviews of
complex systems. First, a summary of the work and results is provided. Illustrative vignettes
show the motivation for the research, along with key definitions. Research questions are presented to frame the research program, followed by an outline of the dissertation.

1.1 Brief highlights of the research
Technical reviews in major complex defense and space acquisition programs are highstakes events—“critical milestones” in design efforts—and provide direct technical support
for major decisions involving scope and success or failure of programs costing many millions
or billions of dollars. Technical reviews are used throughout development programs at the
system level down through subsystem reviews and below.
This research found, unexpectedly, that mission-level reviews are fundamentally different from subsystem reviews in what they do for stakeholders: subsystem reviews better
meet the technological needs of the design team, while mission-level reviews better meet the
system-level integration and external stakeholder needs. Moreover, stakeholders have strong
preferences for the reviews that meet their needs; thus, design team members strongly prefer
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subsystem reviews, and stakeholders external to the project prefer mission-level reviews. This
preference explains a conflicting set of prior research on “what is important about reviews”:
it depends on who you ask. It also points to a problem in current “best practice”: almost all
industry standards (e.g., IEEE 2015; NASA 2017b) treat subsystem reviews as “mission-level
reviews but smaller.” Ignoring the critical differences in the role of subsystem reviews represents a significant misunderstanding and gap in the literature.
This research program was unique in that it examined reviews in an authentic and situated way. The research covered six cases of major NASA/DoD design projects (each over
$200 million) and interviewed 21 engineers who attended 17 reviews. The research design
spanned the expected theoretical variables by case selection and broadly sought informants
with different roles rather than “convenient” or “expert” informants. This approach links research data to research conclusions and allows stronger and better-supported new findings.
No prior study on reviews studied multiple major projects, interviewed multiple stakeholder
types, or used qualitative analysis to extract what is important about reviews. This strong set
of empirical data and careful linkage to study variables provides a deeper understanding of
key issues in reviews.

1.2 Motivation
Technical reviews are major meetings such as Critical Design Reviews (CDRs), which
review technical outputs for an entire engineering design program. Technical reviews often
involve dozens or hundreds of engineers and managers. Reviews are critical events separating major phases of the design of complex systems. The processes for technical reviews have
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evolved over the last 50 years in the United States Department of Defense (DoD) and National
Air and Space Administration (NASA), with the primary stated intent being to support major
development decisions with technical insight.
Despite the near-universal use of technical reviews over decades across the entire US
development portfolio—currently $54 billion for NASA’s 18 major programs and over $1.4 trillion for DoD’s 80 major programs (GAO 2015b)—there is a significant gap in the theory base
behind technical reviews and their role in systems engineering and engineering management
of complex government acquisition. The systems engineering theory behind technical reviews is fragmented and is not consistent with real-world practice in technical reviews. Existing writing on technical reviews focuses largely on immediate “how to” methods rather than
the purpose and outputs of technical reviews. Examples of “how to” documents on reviews
include industry standards such as Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
15288.2 (IEEE 2015), government process documents such as the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAU 2013), and a few academic works on technical reviews (e.g., Wasson 2005).
In the theoretical logic levels that Keating (2005) uses to describe research, current
knowledge on technical reviews in systems engineering is largely at the lowest “system method”
level of knowledge: baselined techniques and processes to facilitate aspects of engineering
application. There is little in the standards and texts on technical reviews at the “methodological level” of knowledge: general frameworks on how technical reviews are actually conducted.
The limited frameworks and concepts that exist in the literature focus on technological aspects
and are silent on key socio-technical issues such as seeking stakeholder agreement and understanding.
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This lack of understanding of engineering activities in technical reviews hampers the
improvement of the practice of engineering (Valerdi and Davidz 2009). Because there is limited empirical evidence and no common research approaches, higher-order systems engineering theory at the “systems axiomatic” level (Keating 2005) cannot be developed to explain
principles, concepts, and laws.
Therefore, there is a need for rich descriptive research to find and confirm extant writing and thoughts related to engineering design and technical reviews with empirical evidence
from engineering practice. Developing an empirically-based understanding of technical review practice can point toward follow-on work to develop theories in systems engineering.

1.2.1 Motivating vignette: Pre-launch review prior to Space Shuttle Challenger disaster
Below is a chilling vignette from Vaughan (1996) when engineers and managers missed
a chance to avoid the Challenger spacecraft disaster in a technical review:
NASA personnel at the Cape became concerned about cold temperature at approximately 1:00 p.m. on January 27 [the day before the re-scheduled launch]. . . .
In response to [NASA Marshall rocket motor manager] Wear’s inquiry [about cold
effects on O-rings on prior launches], Thiokol [the rocket motor contractor] convened a meeting at the Utah plant. The Thiokol engineers expressed concern that
the cold would affect O-ring resiliency: the rings would harden to such an extent
that they would not be able to seal the joints against the hot gases created at ignition, increasing the amount of erosion and threatening mission safety. . . .
A three-location telephone conference to discuss the situation [formally, a Delta
Level III Flight Readiness Review between key NASA and contractor engineers
and managers] was set for 5:45 p.m. . . . Thiokol expressed the opinion that the
launch should be delayed until noon or after. A second teleconference was arranged for 8:15 p.m. . . .
Thiokol Vice President of Engineering Robert Lund presented the Thiokol engineering conclusion to teleconference participants: O-ring temperatures must be
equal to or greater than 53 ◦ F at launch [based on a technical argument pointing
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to the coldest prior launch in January 1985—which itself actually had significant
O-ring damage]. . . .
. . . Immediately, Marshall managers in Huntsville and at the Cape began challenging Thiokol engineers’ interpretation of the data. Mulloy stated that since no
Launch Commit Criteria had ever been set for booster joint temperature, what
Thiokol was proposing to do was to create new Launch Commit Criteria on the
eve of a launch. Mulloy then exclaimed, “My God, Thiokol, when do you want me
to launch, next April?” [Shuttle Project Manager] Reinartz asked George Hardy,
Marshall’s Deputy Director of Science and Engineering who was in Huntsville, for
his view. Hardy responded that he was “appalled” at the Thiokol recommendation. . . .
. . . [Thiokol Vice President] Kilminster requested a five-minute off-line caucus for
Thiokol managers and engineers. . . .
. . . [After a 30-minute internal technical debate and vote by Thiokol managers,]
the second teleconference resumed. The people at Kennedy and Marshal came
back on line. Thiokol’s Joe Kilminster announced that Thiokol had reconsidered.
They reversed their first position, recommending launch. . . . Subsequently [before midnight] Mulloy and Reinartz telephoned Aldritch [NASA Director, Space
Shuttle program], discussing the ice that had formed on the launch pad. . . . They
did not inform Aldritch about the teleconference and Thiokol engineers’ concerns
about the effects of cold temperature on the O-rings. . . .
. . . STS 51-L was launched at 11:38 a.m. [the morning after the teleconference].
The ambient temperature at the launch pad was 36 ◦ F. The mission ended 73 seconds later as a fireball erupted and the Challenger disappeared in a huge cloud of
smoke. (Vaughan 1996, 286–322)

1.2.2

Motivating vignette: Airbus UK pump Preliminary Design Review
Below is a second vignette, extracted from a transcript in Huet (2006).
In the technical review, the fuel pump subcontractor (developer) admits his company

made an error in design—in using a legacy component when they shouldn’t have. The lead
aircraft contractor engineers for the fuel subsystem (acquirer) try to understand what went
wrong with the pump. The subcontractor lead engineer is “forced to admit” his engineers
made the assumption that created the problem. The Airbus prime contractors press until they
understand the issue and then move on, stating what they want to see before CDR.
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IB: (UK Airbus quality engineer) So what’s the logic of using a more robust pin in the no thrust
condition, when the loads appear in the high thrust?
TS: (Nichols Airborne subcontractor chief engineer) Well, there was no logic there, ha-ha, it
was a hmm . . . that’s a good question hmmm, I hate to give you this answer but unfortunately the design of the thrust washer and the pin arrangement here, unfortunately was
carried over for another design and although we’ve never had problems with the design
it doesn’t seem to go near enough hours as foreseen . . . so hmm we’ve learnt our lesson
here that legacy designs aren’t always acceptable . . . very important painful lesson . . .
I think in this case here we had certain diameters and bearing elements . . . At this end
down here, part of it was legacy same bearing, same thrust washer—
GW: (UK Airbus materials and process engineer) The pin itself has a material change, it’s currently the—
TS: Well, sorry, we will change that also, that pin doesn’t carry any load. . . .
[two minutes of review discussion skipped]
TS: I think that another issue is that hmm . . . when we went back to some of the earlier analysis
. . . the thrust loads in the worst case were higher than what we’d expected and that’s why
we really pushed for a change—
GW: Does that mean that that’s genuine because if we back up to the number, to the speed at
which we accumulate dust, we’d expect failures in a very very short time, perhaps two
fold of the magnitude chart that you’ve got here!
TS: That’s right but, but . . . the hmm . . . I guess we’d lose in thrust load and still hold those
stresses . . .
TS: I think those were all the slides I had for this particular presentation. . . . I believe the major
open issues at this time are the . . . defining of a test plan that is acceptable. . . . We need to
consider the length of that test plan I guess the question I have is: does it seem reasonable
to expect a preliminary approval of the change to allow us to forward a full testing?
IB: The CDR will give / the full—
JL: (UK Airbus team lead) Yeah but you’re at QTP . . . We can only end up pushing the program—
IB: —That’s right, sure exactly—
JL:—I would like to see some testing first to begin with—
RF: (assistant systems engineer) —A side by side comparison. (Huet 2006, 274–75)

1.3 Key concept: Technical reviews
Technical reviews are a major event in the development of major defense and space
programs acquired by the US Government. There have been recurring efforts to prescribe
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and describe which technical reviews should be held and how they fit in the development
cycle in government and industry process standards. Two major process standards relevant
to this research are IEEE 15288.2 (IEEE 2015), which is the newest process standard for DoD
technical reviews, and NPR 7123.1B (NASA 2017b), which gives current process requirements
for NASA technical reviews.
Although technical reviews have similar roles in both defense and space development,
there is no uniform terminology used in defense and space process documents. As an example, the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook (NASA 2007, 20) uses seven different terms for
the same meeting (e.g., a CDR) : “major review” (21), “technical and programmatic review”
(59), “major project review” (67), “engineering design review (68), “audits and technical review” (91), “formal review” (208), and “technical milestone review” (223). A prior dissertation
examining reviews (Chao 2003, 20–21) also notes a variation in terms.
In order to avoid this terminology confusion, key concepts and terms are described
here and used uniformly throughout this work. More details on the role of specific technical
reviews studied in this research are provided in Chapter 2.
The focus of this work is technical reviews, which is defined for this research as:
technical reviews: A series of system engineering activities by which the technical
progress on a project is formally assessed relative to criteria based on standards,
technical or contractual requirements, and stakeholder needs.
There are two types of technical reviews in relation to project work: (1) summative
technical reviews are conducted at logical transition points in the development
effort to identify and correct problems in work completed before such problems
can impact project progress in the next design phase. (2) interim technical reviews
(also called peer reviews or tabletop reviews) are conducted in the middle of a
design phase to review and improve the technical effort.
Technical reviews can be held at several levels within a design, often termed (a)
system-level or mission-level, (b) subsystem-level, or (c) component-level (or assembly, breadboard, etc.). Reviews can also be held at other levels, such as system7

of-systems-level reviews, which are at a design level above the system-level review
(Dahmann 2014).
The technical reviews provide a method for the system developer and the acquirer
and stakeholders in the design effort (e.g., the design organization or interfacing organizations or sibling systems/subsystems) to determine that the development of the system meets contract requirements and acquirer needs. Note that
some technical reviews are planned to provide technical input to subsequent programmatic reviews such as milestone decisions, but technical reviews in DoD and
NASA are separate events from programmatic reviews. Generally, the focus of
technical reviews is on the technical artifact and the associated design effort, but
some reviews do permit examining programmatic issues that directly impact technical work, such as resources or project plans. Source: adapted from Wasson
(2005, 712) adaption of MIL-STD-973 (DoD 1992).
Note that the technical review is considered in this research as part of a larger series of
systems engineering activities and preparation efforts, not just a single long meeting.
This work focuses on technical reviews at two levels from the above definition:
1. System-level (summative) reviews: capstone examinations of the overall integrated artifact
being designed, such as a spacecraft. NASA often calls these mission-level reviews; DoD
usually calls them system-level reviews. Some variant terms include major review, life-cycle
review, and major project review.
2. Subsystem-level (summative) reviews and subsystem peer reviews (interim reviews). These
reviews are often called “subsystem reviews” rather than “subsystem-level reviews” in spacecraft projects. These focus on a subsystem or lower component of the spacecraft, such
as the propulsion system. A propulsion subsystem review happens at the end of a design
phase. A peer review may happen earlier in a design phase (and/ or it may be less formal
than a subsystem review, which will be discussed in the research).
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Mission-level technical reviews rely on a larger sequence of subordinate prior technical reviews of subsystems under design. The study of such subsystem reviews helps understand the larger process as well as how they differ and contribute to mission-level reviews. In
addition, reviews themselves may be a larger extended activity, where reviewers take days or
weeks to examine technical documents and data. The mission-level reviews studied in this
project were typically one- to four-day-long meetings, while the subsystem reviews were typically half-day or one-day meetings (with some exceptions). This work will state which level
and type of technical review we are examining.
The following three contra-examples are concepts related to technical reviews that need
to be treated separately:
programmatic review: A recurring or one-time review of a development effort
that is focused on decisions by program leadership and insight into development
status (as compared to a technical review, which is primarily focused on technical
criteria but may examine programmatic issues as a secondary topic). Programmatic reviews can include milestone reviews, decision point reviews, and periodic
budget and oversight reviews. Source: adapted from NRC (2009, 16–17).
gate review, milestone review, or key decision point: A specific type of programmatic review in a development project, where senior management decides if the
project can transition from one design phase to another, or another major project decision (such as initiating a project). NASA calls these Key Decision Points
(KDPs); DoD calls these Milestones; some commercial firms call these stage gate
reviews. Source: adapted from NASA (2014b, 7).
configuration audit: Formal examination of a work product or set of work products from a developer to assess compliance of a designed system and its technical
documentation with specifications, standards, contractual agreements, or other
criteria set by the acquirer and the developer. Configuration audits may be reported at or associated with (or combined with) a specific technical review or the
audit may be a separate event. Configuration audits are usually formally associated with establishment or verification (by the acquirer) of a configuration baseline. Source: adapted from MIL-STD-973 (DoD 1992).
Finally, there are three concepts related to technical reviews that arise in this research:
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peer reviews: Peer reviews are a type of technical review for the purpose of this
research. Peer reviews are formal or informal reviews of an engineer’s or an engineering team’s work products by knowledgeable subject matter experts. Peer
reviews are usually more an interim review than a summative review: held before a summative technical review like a Preliminary Design Review (PDR) (although this is not universal). Peer reviews are often less formal than other technical reviews (although formal peer review methods exist, particularly in software).
Source: adapted from Wasson (2005, 711) and Chao (2005, 53).
inspections, code reviews, walkthroughs, [software] peer review, [software] formal review: This research treats the larger literature and terms of software development or coding-level reviews (such as code reviews of a single piece of code) as
potentially different from the mission-level and subsystem reviews defined above.
These terms are commonly used in software engineering (e.g., Gilb and Graham
1993; Wiegers 2002; Freedman and Weinberg 1990).1 It causes academic and process confusion that there are overlapping terms such as peer review and technical
review: the term is used for a low-level two-hour software-level meeting involving
a thousand lines of code with two to four reviewers, and the same term is used for
a week-long technical review meeting for a spacecraft involving a billion-dollar
development with hundreds of engineers. Both meetings may share some issues,
but other issues are fundamentally different due to the participants, topics, and
scale.
delta technical review: This is an incremental or follow-on review associated with
completing the entire set of objectives of a technical review. A delta technical review can be considered a form of “tailoring” the review, by breaking it into several sessions. In some cases, delta technical reviews allow concurrency, where selected activities continue into the next engineering phase while actions are being
completed to “close out” and complete desired technical criteria for the technical review. Delta reviews are sometimes desired to split a technical review over
programmatic actions such as milestone decisions or contract actions. Sometimes delta reviews are directed by the review panel or milestone decision authority if exit criteria are not met, actions are not complete, or the system design has
changed enough that a subset of the technical review needs to be repeated. Other
times, delta reviews are planned as part of the development, in order to split a
challenging design effort into lower-risk increments.

1. Even within the software engineering literature, there are disagreements on definitions
for these terms (see overview in Wiegers 2002, 31–41). Although some space subsystems are
software-intensive, this research studies systems engineering reviews of defense and space complex systems, not code component-level software reviews. There are software reviews such as architecture reviews that are similar to systems engineering reviews (see Maranzano et al. 2005).
Where there are common issues, this research leverages software research, but software reviews are generally considered to be different from systems engineering reviews in this study.
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1.4 Problem statement and research questions
Current normative standard documents and other writing on technical reviews (such
as IEEE 15288.2 (IEEE 2015)) do not reflect the full set of complex activities of engineers in
projects, and how they use technical reviews in their engineering and management activities.
This has led to a lack of theory on how reviews and associated engineering activities impact
the projects and organizations.
To better understand the practice of technical reviews and analyze the level of match
between empirically observed practice and current standards and literature, this research is
split into three related research questions:

Research Question One (RQ1) How do technical reviews impact subsequent project engineering and management activities?
RQ1 examines how technical reviews impact the design project itself and the larger
design enterprise.
Prior research (Huet 2006) claims that engineers primarily value the action items as
outputs of the technical reviews. This research question goes further to seek an understanding of the story behind recorded action items from participants’ perspectives. Some review
actions may be directed at project stakeholders rather than the project development team.
RQ1 also examines how technical reviews impact the project beyond the action items
alone. The execution of technical reviews can shape the engineering effort, or there may be
direct impacts on the program from the technical review that are not captured in actions or
formal engineering documents.
11

Research Question Two (RQ2): How do technical reviews affect participant views and selfreported knowledge of the project?
RQ2 examines the internal changes in the minds of participants—as opposed to the
external impact on the project work of RQ1. The focus is on what participants say, as a result
of the technical review, that they learned about the artifact in development and the design
effort. This explores how participants’ views change on the viability and soundness of the
project and how stakeholders’ views about each other and their roles change.
As will be discussed later, this research question explores a “sensemaking” aspect to
technical reviews (Weick 1995) that is suggested in prior research on communications in technical reviews (Huet 2006; Huet, Culley, McMahon, Fortin, and Sellini 2007)— but is ignored
in most literature on technical reviews (e.g., Chao 2005; IEEE 2015) in favor of more direct
artifact-related technological issues impacting design team work.
Research Question Three (RQ3): How do the findings from Research Questions One and Two
on the purpose and output of technical reviews compare with literature or extant theory?
RQ3 examines the differences between the rationales for technical reviews, output actions, and knowledge gained from reviews derived from research data (in RQ1 and RQ2), and
the rationales, actions, and knowledge changes from reviews in the literature. The analysis
will point to gaps and conflicts in literature for later research. The analysis also documents
where there is academic support for key behaviors in reviews.
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1.5 Research topic
This research seeks to develop a body of rich empirical evidence on technical review
outputs—both external outputs for design team work and internal changes to the views of
technical review participants. The research will also examine how current literature supports
the key issues observed with technical reviews.
As will be discussed more fully in Chapter 2, current literature focuses heavily on simple method-level (Keating 2005) “how-to and what” direction for technical reviews, with little
higher-level theoretical writing. What little higher-level theoretical work does exist focuses on
technological issues such as risk identification and quality improvement. Theoretical works
on reviews do not connect with key relevant works on organizational processes such as sensemaking (Weick 1995; Maitlis and Christianson 2014) and stakeholder influence (Mitchell and
Agle 1997). Langley argues that such a fragmented theoretical landscape and complex organizational process phenomena are best suited to strategies of sensemaking and theory building
from deeper case study observations (Langley 1999).
The intent of this research is to use accepted methods of qualitative empirical research
to examine the practice of technical reviews in a set of real-world complex engineering efforts. This will find gaps in theory based on internal process knowledge developed in large
engineering organizations. This research seeks out initial theory and correlations in findings
and makes suggestions for follow-on theoretical work to support more complete theories.
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1.6 Organization of the dissertation
Chapter 1 introduces the gap in knowledge to be addressed with motivating vignettes,
key definitions, research questions, and a summary of research contributions.
Chapter 2 provides a general review of the literature related to technical reviews.
Chapter 3 describes the research approach, including case selection, data acquisition,
and data analysis methods. Threats to validity and study limitations are examined.
Chapter 4 reports the results of the analysis from interviews and documents for Research Questions One and Two.
Chapter 5 reports the results of the literature analysis for Research Question Three.
Chapter 6 provides higher-order interpretations of research data against study variables, summaries of theoretical gaps, and other observations from the research.
Chapter 7 presents the conclusions and major contributions of the research and suggestions for further study.
Several appendices have additional data related to the research:
• Appendix A provides Human Subject Research documentation.
• Appendix B provides sample interview questions.
• Appendix C describes the pilot study that refined the research plans.
• Appendix D gives a data inventory of collected data.
• Appendix E lists all detailed findings from interviews and documents.
• Appendix F lists major literature on technical reviews from a systematic review.
• Appendix G provides longer tables and reference data.
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter discusses current research and theories generally related to technical reviews. This chapter provides a critical review of prior research and explores the literature for
foundational ideas related to this research.
Note that Chapter 5 provides a more detailed but narrowly focused analysis of literature. Chapter 5 extends the literature discussed in this chapter for specific research findings.

2.1 Role of technical reviews in DoD and space acquisition
Technical reviews are a key part of a larger decision structure in the development of
major systems by DoD and NASA. Technical reviews are critical decision gates in system development; as a result, the role and timing of technical reviews are directly linked to the phases
of development. Figure 2.1 shows the typical sequencing of DoD technical reviews in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, the major DoD normative process guidance (DAU 2018).
Examples of key DoD and NASA technical reviews that support major program decisions are the System Requirements Review (SRR), which checks if the requirements are mature enough to proceed into the design phase, and the CDR, which checks for engineering
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sufficiency at the end of the detailed design phase before moving into product production
(for hardware) or final coding integration (for software-intensive systems).
Note that each technical review is associated with a development phase in Figure 2.1.
Often the technical reviews are direct technical inputs to a major program decision following
the review. For example, the Alternate Systems Review (ASR) is the main technical review in
the DoD Material Solution Analysis phase, and the ASR provides “Initial system performance
established and plan for further analyses [that] supports Milestone A” (DAU 2013, 189), which
is the program-level decision point on moving to the next phase of Technology Development.
NASA, similar to DoD, has a sequence of design phases and associated technical reviews that give technical input to major programmatic decision points, shown in Figure 2.2.
NASA has several variant processes (NASA 2018) with varying degrees of coupling (singleproject, uncoupled, loosely coupled, or tightly coupled). The largest and most complex programs are generally the single-project programs (NASA 2017b), which have technical reviews
supporting decision points as shown in Figure 2.2. For example, the Mission Concept Review
(MCR) supports NASA KDP A and the start of the project (NASA 2014b, 18). Although DoD
and NASA have slightly different phases and decision points, they have similar decision structures of technical reviews supporting major programmatic decision points (Walden et al. 2015,
29). For example, NASA’s MCR is similar but not identical to DoD’s ASR discussed earlier: an
MCR leads to the NASA KDP A, while an ASR leads to a DoD Milestone A.
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Figure 2.1: Technical reviews in DoD acquisition lifecycle.
Source: Figure from DAU (2018, Ch. 3, fig. 7).
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Figure 2.2: Technical reviews in the NASA project lifecycle.
Source: Figure from NASA (2017b, fig. 5-3).
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2.2 Historical connections to the technical review concept
Like systems engineering, technical reviews evolved as a process to meet stakeholder
needs (at a resource cost in engineering staff-hours paid for by government clients and developers). Examining the historical development of the technical review concept illuminates
what is critical about technical reviews from the perspective of design stakeholders.
The development of design processes like technical reviews parallels the general development of the systems engineering field. This work does not attempt to provide a history
of systems engineering; unfortunately, the academic literature on the history of systems engineering is fragmented (see Emes et al. 2005; Brill 1998). This section looks at key historical
events that influenced the practice of technical reviews. A longer discussion of the history of
technical reviews is given in Section G.2.
Briefly, technical reviews are considered as having developed in the US as part of the
early development of systems engineering concepts in the late 1950s and the 1960s. Reviews
are linked to the early development of the “program office” relationship between contractors
of complex defense systems (Gorn 1989). There is primary evidence that technical reviews
were developed with early systems engineering concepts by the Minuteman Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) management team of Boeing and the Air Force Western Division under General Schriever and others (Johnson 2002a). Section G.2 gives a first-person statement
from General Phillips, who was directly involved in bringing practices like technical reviews
into government program management. From the Air Force ICBM program, management
processes such as design reviews were brought to NASA and then spread throughout government and contractors in the US over the 1960s and 1970s.
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Acquisition reform in the late 1970s and 1980s led to a push for broader government
use of design reviews. An influential Defense Science Board panel in 1982 strongly recommended the standardization of technical reviews and requiring that reviews be on-contract
for all programs (DSB 1983). The Air Force technical review standard from the early 1970s was
subsequently updated as MIL-STD-1521B (DoD 1985) and became the de facto standard for
DoD reviews for the next 30 years. This influenced defense and space contractors across the
US; the reviews from MIL-STD-1521B, such as SRR, PDR, and CDR, were required for most
defense programs and thus became common US industry practice (Wasson 2005, 711–13).
Technical reviews have historically been linked to multiple subfields of study within
systems engineering (as defined by references such as the International Council on Systems
Engineering (INCOSE) Systems Engineering (SE) Guide (2015)). Technical reviews were seen
from the 1960s as important to configuration management (Gelbwaks 1967, 9), engineering
management or technical management (6), as well as quality management (Juran 1988, 19.2).
Technical reviews and evaluation between design phases are discussed as a key part of design
in early systems engineering textbooks (e.g., Chestnut 1967, 36–39; Kossiakoff 1960, 82–87).

2.3 Key normative process standards for technical reviews
Since technical reviews are driven by organizational practice, formal process standards
are influential, particularly for space and defense contractors working for the DoD and NASA.
High-level government process standards often set overall policies on how reviews interface with phases of design and support government milestone decision gates. For example,
DoD’s IEEE 15288.2 (IEEE 2015) is a standard developed by an industry working group under
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DoD funding. Prior DoD capstone technical review standards were MIL-STD-1521B (DoD
1985), and the “proposed draft MIL-STD-1521C” (Peresztegy and O’Connor 2009a, 2009b),
which was based on an Aerospace Corporation and Air Force Space and Missile Command
(SMC) standards-writing effort. There is also technical review guidance for DoD in the Defense Acquisition University (DAU)’s Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAU 2018). High-level
policy on DoD milestone reviews and the few technical reviews directly mandated by DoD are
in the DoD 5000-series documents (DoD 2018b, 2018a). There is significant discussion on reviews in systems engineering textbooks authored by DAU professors and contractors (DSMC
and Lockheed 1983; Kockler et al. 1990; DAU 2001). These DAU texts are reported by DoD
program managers to be useful references on reviews (Bennett 1987, 86).
The high-level process guidance on technical reviews for NASA is split between several
documents. The NASA Senior Review Board (SRB) Handbook (NASA 2016) has guidance, as
does the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook (NASA 2017a; Hirshorn 2016, 2017) and Program Management Handbook (NASA 2014b). High-level policy on development phases and
mandated reviews are in NPR 7120.5 (NASA 2018), and NPR 7123.1 (NASA 2017b).
Below the official agency-level guidance, there are lower-level process documents that
often are more detailed—but are less accessible for academic study. For DoD, there typically
are Program Executive Office (PEO)-level process documents, giving guidance for all program
offices within a military development area, such as SMC-S-21 (AFSPC 2009) for Air Force
spacecraft development and the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) Systems Engineering
Technical Review (SETR) Handbook (NAVAIR 2015) for Navy aircraft development.
For NASA, detailed guidance for conducting reviews is typically in “Center-level” documents, such as NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) GSFC-STD-1001 (GSFC 2009),
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GPR 8700.4 (GSFC 2012), and GPR 8700.6 (GSFC 2014). For example, the structure of GSFC
reviews is shown in Figure 2.3, with details on lower-level subsystem and peer reviews.
For design teams, their design organization also typically has local process documents
on how to conduct reviews. As will be described later, the design teams in the study cases follow processes from two contractors: ContractorA and ContractorH. Process documents from
those contractors are generally proprietary. Contractor process documents that were used in
this research are listed in Section D.2 (CtrA.1, CtrA.4, CtrA.4, CtrH.3).
Although they were less relevant for the cases studied in this research, there are commercial industry process standards for design reviews, such as International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) 61160 (IEC 2005), which is part of the greater International Organization
for Standardization (ISO) 9001 family of standards for design. Similarly, there are some more
general “consultant-developed” published methods for commercial new product development, such as Cooper’s Stage-Gate method (Cooper 2001; Edgett 2018) and PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Product and Cycle-time Excellence (PACE) method (McGrath 1996; Sweden 2013).
Commercial standards and methods documents tend to be far less detailed on the contents
of technical reviews or gate decisions than US government standards.

2.4 Theories of new product development and portfolio management
Design process models are an active area of research. Many product development
models focus on a process view of the design project, also known as solution-oriented design process models (Wynn and Clarkson 2005, 36–37; Gericke and Blessing 2012, 174). Many
depict the design space gradually narrowing as the design effort progresses through various
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Figure 2.3: Sample review structure, NASA GSFC. Source: Figure from Savage (2011, sl. 3).
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standardized phases of design—although the exact phases of design vary between authors
and organizations.
Some phased new product development models, such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2007) model in Figure 2.4, see development as a “funnel,” with critical
decision points at key “gates” that select successful projects and kill less viable projects.
Other academic New Product Development (NPD) portfolio theories (e.g., Wheelwright
and Clark 1992, 6) argue for firms managing complexity and risk in categories like project type
(e.g., “breakthrough project,” “new platform,” and “derivative project”) in portfolio decisions,
which aligns more with DoD and NASA practice than GAO’s “funnel.”
The most influential NPD theory on technical reviews is Cooper’s Stage-Gate model
(Cooper 1990, 1994, 2001; Cooper and Edgett 2009). Cooper and his colleagues conducted a
series of empirical studies of commercial companies to model process variables associated
with project success (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1986, 1995; Cooper et al. 2004). Cooper then
developed the Stage-Gate model, implementing their analytical findings in recommendations
for companies in developing products (Cooper 2001). Cooper’s recommendations focus on
improving gate decisions and development processes as well as pulling strategy and portfolio
management into the gate decisions. Cooper (1994, 4) argues that the Stage-Gate model is
a modification of NASA and DoD’s “first-generation scheme for product development” (the
technical reviews such as PDR and CDR). Cooper asserts that his “second-generation” process
(top of Figure 2.5) goes beyond DoD and NASA processes by adding cross-functional and firmwide decisions.
The process models of Cooper (2001) and GAO (2007) share three major validity issues that make these models less appropriate for DoD and NASA. First, both Cooper and GAO
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Figure 2.4: Generic commercial portfolio funnel with gates.
Source: Figure from GAO (2007, fig. 2).
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collect data from much simpler developmental environments than those of DoD and NASA.
Cooper and GAO only report data from reviews conducted by single firms. Some of GAO’s
cases such as Ford cars and Boeing airplanes likely had subcontractors, but GAO does not
discuss the role of subcontractors in gate reviews (see GAO 1998). Cooper is similarly unclear
on the characteristics of firms that provide the data for the studies supporting the Stage-Gate
model. Cooper’s major supporting analysis in the 1980s (1986, 73–74) examines many firms
rather than deeply analyzing individual firms: interviewing representatives of hundreds of
“industrial product manufacturers” in Canada. Cooper’s work does not examine cases with
teaming, subcontracting, or acquirer/developer environments—the dominant development
environments in DoD and NASA major projects.
A second related major validity issue with extending the models of Cooper (2001) and
GAO (2007) is the decision setting. DoD and NASA gates are structured as two-step decisions.
As described in Section 2.3, they have a preceding but separate technical review, which gives
technical inputs to the milestone/KDP gate decision by senior government agency decisionmakers. In contrast, GAO describes gates using comparison cases like Motorola radio projects,
Eli Lilly drug projects, and Procter & Gamble consumer goods projects (12–18)—all of which
have a single-step (and single-company) gate decision process. Like GAO, Cooper (2001) uniformly discusses a single-step decision gate and focuses on decisions by a single firm. For
example, Cooper (1994, 5) appears unaware in his discussion of DoD and NASA that they actually do include non-technical factors in their gate decisions but largely not in their technical
reviews. GAO and Cooper’s focus on a singular gate meeting is counter to the basic paradigm
in DoD and NASA of having two decision meetings—technical review and milestone review—
and makes it difficult to apply their work to technical reviews. In addition, GAO and Cooper
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neglect the organizational forces in the governmental acquirer/contractor developer relationship that gave rise to these two decision meeting types (see Section G.2).
A third major validity issue with extending the models of Cooper (2001) and GAO (2007)
is the scale, complexity, and risk of development. Most cases cited by GAO and all data reported by Cooper appear to be from “derivative projects” rather than “breakthrough projects”
or “new platforms” (Wheelwright and Clark 1992, 6). Cooper directly states (2001, 150–52) that
the “Stage-Gate process described above may be inappropriate for both types [new platform
and new technology projects].” Similarly, GAO’s development model source data appear to be
largely from “derivative projects,” as defined by Wheelwright and Clark (1992). Specifically,
GAO’s recommendations and process model are based on studies of commercial companies
(GAO 1998, 1999), but they mix observations from “new platform” developments like the Boeing 777-200 airliner or the Hughes HS-702 satellite with “derivative projects” like Chrysler car
model updates or Caterpillar construction equipment minor upgrades. This mixes in inappropriate comparison cases: a car “facelift” model update (Weber 2009, 2) is very different
from a new generation space telescope (GAO 2019, 47–48). Most DoD and NASA major developments are—for good reasons such as needing military superiority or seeking new science
discoveries—not relatively incremental “derivative projects” that leverage mature technology
and existing platforms. Therefore, the source data that includes many “derivative projects”
make the development models of Cooper and GAO less extensible to NASA and DoD.
Writings on commercial phase gates and decision points are relevant to the overall
structure of defense and space design reviews: development models mostly have major phases,
and the transition points between phases are the gates (and the precursor technical reviews
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that give inputs to the gates). These gates are major organizational decision points where the
acquirer and developer make hard decisions about projects.

2.5 Theories from process-focused design modeling
One major area of systems engineering theory related to design reviews is on the general structuring and phasing of engineering activities. One of the most influential phased design process models is that of Forsberg and Mooz’s Vee model (Forsberg and Mooz 1991; Mooz
and Forsberg 2001, 610). Forsberg and Mooz developed the Vee model to clarify “the role and
responsibility of system engineering to a project” (Forsberg and Mooz 1991, 57). They created
a new life cycle description that explicitly shows feedback loops as well as rigorous configuration management. The Vee model depicts relationships such as that between systems engineering and design engineering, between higher and lower-level configuration items, and
where processes can be concurrent or are limited by gated decision points (see Figure 2.6).
The Vee model is broadly used in systems engineering, including in the INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook (Walden et al. 2015, 34–36), and several systems engineering
texts (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2005; Buede 1999).
The Vee model links activities in the phases to “Control Gates” and depicts where reviews happen and who conducts them: government, contractor, or joint (see Figure 2.7). Forsberg and Mooz see the design reviews as key process controls: “While technical feasibility decisions are made in the offcore activities, only decisions at the core-level are put under Configuration Management at the various Control Gates.”
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Figure 2.6: Core Vee model.
Source: Figure reprinted by permission from Forsberg and Mooz (1991, Exh. 5).
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partitioning and integration sequence for subsystems as an inherent part of design. This complex process model is managed with technical reviews such as SRR and PDR, acting as control
gates internal to the design team, as opposed to the client control gates that Cooper describes.

2.6 Technical reviews filling quality and configuration management roles
Multiple works in the quality and configuration management literature describe how
design reviews contribute to the quality of processes and decisions in development projects.
First, some quality management textbooks and research see design reviews as fundamental for control of the design process and maintaining the quality of the output product.
Wesner et al. (1995) see the most basic design loop as being between a customer (parent designer of a higher order system) and a supplier (subordinate designer of a subsystem). They
see the design review as the fundamental process used to review the design, identify improvements, and ensure the design meets the customer needs. The design review is a “quality gate,”
“a point in the process at which certain criteria must be met before the user can continue” (44).
Quality specialists see the design review as a basic quality control method to control
errors, identify issues, improve the product, and align the design with user needs (Chao 2005,
40, 43, 48). Reviews also identify non-technical issues that can impact the quality of the design such as business needs, schedules, resources, planning, interdepartmental conflicts, and
management support needs (Gryna 1988, 13.10–11).
Another quality management role of technical reviews is that of structuring and focusing the design process, which is “a necessary step in enabling product development robustness” (Chao and Ishii 2005a, 1).
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Finally, both quality specialists and configuration management specialists see a “baseline setting” role of design reviews. Design reviews establish specific technical data baselines.
Configuration management baselines differ between DoD and NASA, with the relation between technical reviews and DoD baselines given in IEEE 15288.2 (IEEE 2015, 12) as:
1. The functional [requirements] baseline is established at SRR
2. The allocated [requirements] baseline is established at PDR
3. The product baseline is established at CDR
In this context, a design review functions as a “quality audit” because “it verifies the
prior design inspection or analysis . . . to uncover and correct design issues. . . . The design
is compared against the desired qualities and targets,” with “an independent, objective, and
nonbiased ethical group of trained auditors” (Sater-Black and Iversen 1994, 91). Clausing
(1994) similarly sees a key role of design reviews as quality control on both design decisions
and the design itself: “progressively freezing” design decisions to allow incremental decisionmaking as the work is completed and checked against established criteria (392).

2.7 Theories of reviews contributing to socio-technical and organizational processes
A few sources (e.g., Huet 2006) see key roles of design reviews as not purely technical meetings but also as social and organizational communication events. This observation
aligns with Bucciarelli’s major finding that design activities as highly socio-technical (Bucciarelli 1994). This section describes key socio-technical theories that relate to technical reviews.
Organizational sensemaking, as described by the seminal work by Weick (Weick 1995,
2001; Weick et al. 2005) is “(1) grounded in identity construction, (2) retrospective, (3) enactive
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of sensible environments, (4) social, (5) ongoing, (6) focused on and by extracted cues, (7)
driven by plausibility rather than accuracy” (Weick 1995, 17).
Weick’s seven “key properties” are core aspects in the important theory of sensemaking, “the process through which individuals work to understand novel, unexpected, or confusing events” (Maitlis and Christianson 2014). Design reviews support all of Weick’s seven
sensemaking properties.
Aligned with Weick’s first sensemaking principle of identity construction (Weick 1995,
18–24), a pre-research pilot study (see Appendix C) observes that technical reviews are a forum for identity formation of the engineering team. Often the major speakers are the leaders
of the project, and the review focuses on evaluating design team efforts and future work.
Reviews are strongly retrospective per Weick’s second sensemaking principle (Weick
1995, 24–30): focusing on understanding and assessing group work from months of work by
dozens or hundreds of engineers. Reviews seek an expert consensus on the design team’s work
quality and how it can be improved. Reviews thus create a retrospective assessment to inform
a prediction of future project outcomes. Reviews are weighted towards action, focused on
the “artifact” or “object of design” as well as the “design collective” in the usage of Bucciarelli
(2002). Engineers’ sensemaking desire for the concrete and action-focused is described by
Huet in noting the retrospective role of reviews. Huet finds “the results . . . are unequivocal:
engineers . . . only truly value the actions list, the practical side of minute taking” (Huet, Culley,
McMahon, and Fortin 2007, 244)—and not the assessment, description, and communication
aspects of the meeting minutes and other meeting products. This assessment role of reviews
also matches Weick’s third principle of enacting and sensing the organizational environment
(Weick 1995, 30–38).
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In keeping with Weick’s fourth sensemaking principle that sensemaking is social (Weick 1995, 38–43), design review meetings are a social and group-focused event. However, the
social interactions in technical reviews are not discussed in the literature except briefly in observational studies such as Chao (2005). In this research’s pilot study, key leaders and senior engineers were seated prominently as “panel members” and expected to speak authoritatively. Sometimes consensus was sought, as well as minority opinions. “Non-advocate”
experts, key leaders of the project, and technical specialists on the design team were asked to
brief and speak. Often, the review chair made declarations on actions and whether the design
review met the entry criteria (whether the review should have been held at all) as well as exit
criteria (whether it met minimal needs). In their seminal work, Burns and Stalker (1966) observe that organizations need decisions to have perceived social legitimacy and acceptance:
In working organizations decisions are made either in the presence of others or
with the knowledge that they will have to be implemented, or understood, or approved by others. The set of considerations called into relevance on any decisionmaking occasion has therefore to be one shared with others and acceptable to
them. (Burns and Stalker 1966, 118)
Weick’s fifth principle: that sensemaking is ongoing and helps people “chop moments
out of continuous flows [of time] and extract cues from those moments” (Weick 1995, 43) is
relevant for design reviews, as planned evaluation meetings between engineering phases. Reviews are “events which serve as focal points for the different streams of ongoing activity in the
organization” (Eccles and Nohria 2003, 48). Reviews can be emotional and stressful for members of the organization. Technical reviews act as boundary objects (Johansson 2014, 8) for
the work of hundreds of people over the years of a design project and “formally announce
beginnings, milestones, and ends, to trigger a change of course” (Eccles and Nohria 2003, 48).
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Design reviews align with Weick’s sixth principle and form a part of a greater set of cues
shaping the design effort: a “standard practice” for design work that allows efficient shaping
of effort within the design organization. Design reviews create contextual framing that allows
rapid filtering, classification, and interpretation of complex design decisions (Weick 1995, 51).
Weick’s seventh sensemaking principle—that sensemaking is driven by plausibility and
often satisficing rather than accuracy and details (Weick 1995, 55–61) appears to vary in design
reviews, as shall be discussed in this research. The error-finding, quality improvement, and
risk reduction aspects of design reviews argue for higher accuracy and detail. However, managerial and sensemaking needs push for lower detail: to create “plausibility, coherence, and
reasonableness,” to “filter, to separate signal from noise” (57), in order to adjust the project to
the situation and keep the development moving. There are often debates at design reviews on
how to balance correcting errors and understanding issues in detail against the need to execute the project. Some types of reviews focus on details, and other types focus on plausibility
and coherence, as this research will show.
There are other key organizational theories beyond sensemaking that appear to align
with technical reviews. Technical reviews can be considered as sites for organizational learning (Choo 1998, 1996) that allow organizations to “make sense of their environment, create
new information for innovation, and make decisions about courses of action” (Choo 1996,
329). Christiansen and Varnes (2009, 516) argue based on interview data that stage-gate processes (like design reviews) provide a ruleset and structure to the development process as
well as a sensemaking aspect—but that complex negotiation and modification of rules occurs. Grant sketches a knowledge-focused “emergent theory of the firm” (Grant 1996) for organizational learning in production firms. He suggests four major mechanisms for integrating
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specialized knowledge in complex production. All four mechanisms are present in the pilot
study design review and in reviews described in prior research (Chao 2005; Huet 2006):
1. Rules and procedural approaches to coordination
2. Organizing individual specialist inputs to production so that inputs are time-sequenced;
balancing coordination vs. efficiency (sequential vs. concurrent engineering)
3. Having routines to help guide and coordinate complex behavior
4. Supporting in-person group problem often in meetings, and balancing consensual or team
decision-making versus hierarchical or rule-based decision-making (Grant 1996, 114–15)
One final area of design review socio-technical activities is inter-organizational control. The complex systems that the DoD and NASA develop, sometimes involving dozens of
contractors, often force the government to manage the complexity by hiring “Lead Systems
Integrators” to monitor complex programs as well as more traditional “prime contractors,”
who manage individual projects (Gansler et al. 2009). Some of the most critical activities of a
program office are organizational: standing up the right structure and resources, planning for
acquisition and contracting within the program’s funding and span of control, and interacting
with the system developer (often prime contractor) and external agencies to create an effective system (Acheson et al. 2013). A formal design review is one of the few historically reliable
means that a government program office can mandate to obtain insight into their contractors’
plans and designs. This insight allows government programs to understand and manage the
risks of the project and to redirect the project to avoid issues.
Even absent a government program office’s need for design reviews, other observational data (O’Sullivan 2000) suggest that developers would hold meetings like design reviews
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simply to manage the design complexity and get products from subcontractors that work and
integrate into the greater design. Often, the capstone design reviews by the prime contractor
and government are part of a larger planned structure of interdependent design reviews, with
each subsystem having its own reviews that are sequenced to support the overall design effort.
O’Sullivan, from observing a major airplane firm, reports “unusually high resource, competency, and coordination demands” simply to integrate low-novelty aircraft components from
subcontractors. Thus, design reviews are important for design contractors as well as for acquiring government offices: design organizations need internal design coordination, internal
and external stakeholder agreement, and decisions on design so they can move on with their
projects, just as their client organizations do. However, many of these socio-technical stakeholder needs in reviews have not been discussed directly in the literature.

2.8 Decision theory and technical reviews
Design reviews are inherently focused on decision-making, like all design processes.
Cross describes the design process as an iterative series of decisions both on the problem
space and the solution space: “The designer relates what he knows of the design problem to
what is emerging as a solution. . . . Problem and solution are then both developed in parallel,
sometimes leading to a creative redefinition” (Cross 2000, 25). Ullman takes a more rationalist process view, that “The progression from the initial need (the design problem) to the
final product is made in increments punctuated by design decisions” (Ullman 2002, 24). Ullman describes the design processes as making decisions to narrow the decision space: “Other
constraints are added to further reduce the potential solutions to the problem, and potential
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solutions are continually eliminated until there is only one final design” (24). Cross and Ullman present two views of design that mirror a debate in decision theory: whether to describe
the complex and often iterative “reality” of the decision or design process that engineers conduct, or rather to state how it rationally “should be” from an abstract process or mathematical
perspective. This split in decision theory has been termed “descriptive” versus “prescriptive”
approaches (Bell et al. 1988, 1–2).
Descriptive decision theory is exemplified by the work of Kahneman and Tversky (Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Kahneman 2003), which focuses on the cognitive basis for common
human errors in decisions involving heuristics and biases. They conducted empirical studies
showing the impact of “framing effects”: how the presentation of a problem affects subsequent decisions (Kahneman 2003, 1458). Kahneman and Tversky’s work shows that biases
involve the “accessibility” of information when options that more easily come to mind are
preferentially selected by the decision-maker (1459). They studied other heuristics and biases such as attribute substitution (e.g., “Mary is highly skilled so likely all engineers in her
firm are highly skilled”) (1460). Biases and heuristics are evident in product development,
such as when decision boards act inappropriately on biases about people or design work.
Other descriptive decision theory studies conduct research on the practices of organizations such as Simon’s “bounded rationality,” (1957, 196–201) where decision-makers are not
ideally rational but must act within their cognitive limitations. Simon also examines common
“satisficing” heuristics where decision-makers make “good enough” decisions (Simon 1956,
129). Gigerenzer sees human “bounded rationality” as not being a decision flaw but rather
a set of effective heuristics that humans evolved to avoid the pitfalls of optimization and to
achieve effective and sufficient decisions (Gigerenzer 2002, 38). March describes descriptive
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theories of risk preference (March 1991a, 78–85) and power seeking (118–46). Freeman and
others have developed descriptive theories of stakeholder influence on organizations (Jones
et al. 2017). These issues arose in the pilot study for this research. Satisficing (vs. optimization) of design, stakeholder management, organizational power, and risk tolerance were all
concerns in the pilot study design review.
The prevention of poor decisions from decision flaws such as biases is the domain of
prescriptive decision theory, best exemplified by the work of researchers such as Keeney and
Raiffa (Bell et al. 1988; Keeney and Raiffa 1999; Keeney 1992; Hammond et al. 1999; Keeney
1996). Some of their key recommendations include that decision-makers understand their
own objectives and values to deal with inherently multi-attribute tradeoffs, that decisionmakers find independent advice to deal with biases, and that decision-makers watch out for
common decision traps such as framing effects. Keeney and Raiffa recommend making better
decisions by consciously acting against known biases using specific techniques such as seeking alternative advice and questioning approaches rather than being anchored in presented
information (Hammond et al. 1999). Some common practices in technical reviews reflect the
lessons of descriptive decision theory, such as having independent panel members and having reviewers question the underlying assumptions in design during the review.
A final relevant area of decision theory is organizational and group decision-making.
The insistence by normative decision theorists such as Hazelrigg (1998, 655–66; 2012, 8,15) on
a single, “rational” decision-maker adhering to a consistent set of value functions is strongly
argued against by theorists who focus on decision-making in organizations and groups. March
(1991b, 104–7) describes a “logic of appropriateness, implemented through a structure of organizational rules and practices” and how organizations evolve rulesets and rule-following
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behavior. This aligns with the design review processes discussed earlier in Section 2.3: they
serve as a formal ruleset that is both externally imposed on the organization (from stakeholders and funding organizations) as well as internally imposed rules (typically in internal process documents).

2.9 Empirical studies on commercial and government technical reviews
There are relatively few works of empirical research that focus on technical review practices of major government acquisition programs. There are more empirical studies of software
review practices, but those are different than technical reviews of complex defense and space
systems, as discussed in Section 1.3.
Table 2.1 summarizes major empirical studies on technical reviews, which are each
discussed in more detail in this section.
Ichida (1996a) surveyed Japanese industrial companies in 1976 and 1987 to examine
what design review practices were used and why. Ichida’s survey was sponsored by an industry group, the Union of Japanese Scientists and Engineers (JUSE). Ichida focuses on merged
results at the company and industry level, and reports responses from 91 Japanese companies
in 1976 and 352 companies in 1987. Ichida’s survey results provide data on the frequency of
use of reviews and the effort expended on reviews in several Japanese industry sectors. However, Ichida’s survey approach largely fails to answer “why and how” questions or give details
about reviews. For example, in response to the question of “what was your company’s original
reason for introducing design reviews?”, half the responses are “company president ordered
it” and “division chief ordered it”—to which Ichida fairly notes that the question “was not
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5. Sauser journal article: document analysis and interviews of
reviews relation to NASA projects
(2006)
6. Covington Aerospace Corp.
analysis of contractor failure data
(Covington et al. 2015; Covington
2015)
7. Johansson dissertation research on aerospace firm gate
processes (Johansson 2009, 2014;
Johansson et al. 2008; Johansson
et al. 2009)

4. Huet et al. at Univ of Bath
(Huet 2006; Huet et al. 2004;
Huet, Culley, McMahon, Fortin,
and Sellini 2007; Huet, Culley,
McMahon, and Fortin 2007);
dissertation related papers

3. O’Sullivan at McGill dissertation research (O’Sullivan 2000)

Researcher
1. Japanese industrial society
(JUSE Design Review Committee) and associated researchers
(Ichida 1996a)
2. Chao et al. at Stanford in dissertation (Chao 2005) and related papers)
Focus on industry (US and
Japan) and NASA; analysis of
NASA and 3 industry companies
(GE, Lucent, ABB)

Mixed methods; surveys engineers (n=50) from 12 US and
Japanese firms; interviews engineers on design and peer reviews; compares NASA vs. industry processes
Qualitative descriptive research:
grounded theory-building from
ethnographic observation, interviews, transcripts at one firm
Qualitative descriptive research
and analysis of cases: observation and transcripts of three
cases of design reviews: student
cases (Univ of Bath, Ecole Poly
Montreal), and two industry
cases (Airbus)
Analysis of six cases of NASA
failure boards; interviews of five
respondents from each of four
NASA case projects
Qualitative/Quantitative research: surveys of 49 firms, analysis of 121 “design escapes” and
root causes
4 multi-company group interviews; 4 semi-structured interviews at 2 companies; 9 interviews at 1 company

Understanding prospective success characteristics of project
reviews at NASA
Focus on finding root causes
and design review processes,
particularly at component level
Focus on understanding sociotechnical roles of gate processes,
knowledge maturity, negotiation
roles

Subcontractors (49) of major
government spacecraft office

Cooperating Swedish aerospace
companies

Focus on design practice: conflict, cooperation, and communication between designing
contractors
Study of transcripts and minutes to understand knowledge
capture in design reviews

Research Focus
General practice of design review
in Japan: when done, scope,
resources, practices, leadership;
industrial quality focus
Focus on peer-review and quality practices; formal technical
reviews discussed largely as contrast to peer reviews

NASA projects (from FasterBetter-Cheaper era)

(industry cases): Airbus UK
(commercial aircraft, part-level);
PDR of a pump redesign by a
contractor, SRR by Airbus for a
fuel leak detector part

One Canadian aircraft firm (“AeroCo”), along with some of its
subcontractors

Target Organization
Multiple industry sectors and
company-level practices for design review in Japanese industry

Study Design
Surveys (1976, 1987) of Japanese
companies in multiple industries

Table 2.1: Comparison of major empirical research on technical reviews

framed clearly enough. What we had wanted to know was why the company had adopted design reviews, not who had ordered it” (Ichida 1996a, 19–20). For finding details of practice
and understanding why reviews are conducted, Ichida’s survey method is ineffective, which
suggests using qualitative methods such as observations and interviews (Yin 2009, 9).
Ichida’s survey was followed up by the dissertation research by Chao at Stanford. Chao
et al. (2001) surveyed 10 companies in the US and Japan on how many hold technical reviews.
In subsequent research, Chao and associated Stanford and NASA researchers examine some
technical reviews at NASA programs (Chao et al. 2004, 2005b, 2005a; Chao and Ishii 2005a;
Chao and Tumer 2006) and three commercial companies (Chao and Ishii 2005a). Chao’s data
sources consist of documents, surveys, interviews, and some observational study. Although
this body of research presents some case-based qualitative empirical results on technical reviews, Chao’s research focuses on process support of quality management through peer review. Chao examines formal technical reviews largely in contrast to the lower-level peer reviews that are his primary theoretical focus.
Chao notes that socio-technical roles such as communication are a key part of technical reviews in design efforts:
Successful companies “lifecycle optimize” designs by employing well organized
design reviews and utilizing the culturally inherent communication between designers and engineers responsible for production and maintenance. (Chao 2005,
33)
Despite noting this socio-technical communication role, Chao sees the contribution of
technical reviews as primarily technological. Implicitly, Chao appears to consider communication as being important only where it contributes to design team work. Chao concludes that
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technical reviews are the dominant, if flawed, method of finding design errors and improving
the technical quality of major projects:
As the industry survey revealed, design reviews are the major practice in identifying and detecting errors during product development. However, the problem
with design reviews is that they can often miss problems. One manager at GE has
said that “design reviews are like 100% inspection with a so-so gage.” Often, there
is not time to review everything at a sufficient depth and breadth, and even if there
were, they cannot catch everything. (Chao 2005, 50)
Chao argues that peer reviews are better than mission-level reviews at what he views
as the purpose of peer reviews: finding errors.
Peer reviews at NASA are informal, in-depth technical reviews, usually held before major reviews like PDR and CDR as pre-reviews. There is strong sentiment at
NASA that peer reviews give the most benefit while cost the least amount of time
and effort in the lifecycle. Because these peer reviews are more or less “voluntary”
they can be done with more flexibility and cover the topics that are important to
the designers and not the reviewers. . . . While standing programmatic reviews like
the PDR and CDR are highly structured and formalized, the technical peer reviews
that are an important pre-review for them are not. It is in these informal reviews
that the engineers and managers must work out the details that can be missed in
formal reviews. (Chao 2005, 53–54)
As will be discussed in Section 6.1.1.1, Chao’s argument that informal peer reviews
“give the most benefit” compared to formal technical reviews is logically dependent on what
are seen as the benefits of technical reviews. Chao ignores many socio-technical needs met by
reviews in favor of purely technical needs. Further, Chao’s data sources apparently are mostly
project or program managers, which creates a validity threat because of the dependency of
his conclusions on review participant role, as will be explored in this research.
Chao (2005) makes a significant contribution by exploring the design process role of
technical reviews. He examines multiple cases of different design projects across NASA and
several industry firms with a qualitative empirical mixed-method approach.
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O’Sullivan’s dissertation research (O’Sullivan 2000) consists of over a year of on-site
observations and interviews at a commercial Canadian aircraft firm, where he attended over
100 meetings including design reviews throughout a major aircraft design and integration effort with multiple subcontractors. His research focuses on how a firm can manage complexity
and other technical challenges. O’Sullivan finds that the core of the aircraft firm’s efforts is on
“standardization of process . . . a form of managerial coordination” (2000, 255). O’Sullivan
views formal “phase reviews” such as PDRs and CDRs and their associated technical deliverables as critical in the process management that the aircraft firm focuses on: communication,
configuration management, and coordination of design:
The commercialization of complex products is crucially a problem of coordination. I found the design work to be coordinated primarily by progressively defining what to design and by when. Thus, the definition and pacing of design outputs
(schematics, reports, electronic models, etc.) was the primary means of coordinating the development work, i.e., a phase-review development model grounded
on the sequential delivery of a vast number of design outputs (called “deliverables”). The complexity of the technology—the great diversity of expertise it draws
upon and the multiple and unpredictable interactions across its components’ interfaces—limits the ability to define how to design it in detail. Rather, a good deal
of autonomous interaction between designers and other experts, and iteration of
designs, will be required; coordinating in terms of “what” and “by when” gives a
focus and structure to these interactions and iterations. (O’Sullivan 2000, 59)
A major contribution of O’Sullivan (2000) is in providing significant detail on the design
activities of the single case that it examines in ethnographic depth. This gives useful context
for the role that O’Sullivan sees for technical reviews in managing large complex commercial
design projects.
O’Sullivan (2000) focuses on the socio-technical managerial role of technical reviews
in coordinating design work in complex projects, perhaps because his academic discipline
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was management rather than engineering. O’Sullivan’s socio-technical and managerial focus
is a marked contrast to Chao’s focus on reviews improving technical quality (Chao 2005).
Huet’s dissertation research (Huet 2006; Huet et al. 2004; Huet, Culley, McMahon,
Fortin, and Sellini 2007; Huet, Culley, McMahon, and Fortin 2007) examines technical reviews in three cases. One case was of engineering student class-based technical reviews, and
the other two cases were of small (under 10 participants) aircraft industry technical reviews
of subcontractors developing components.
Huet’s first case on student reviews cannot provide insight on activities driven by workplace forces. The validity of conclusions from student-derived data is a common concern in
empirical software research (Feldt et al. 2018) and is even more problematic in systems engineering research. One can make some limited conclusions from observing students on the
role of reviews in technical design, but there are critical internal and external interactions in
real-world system development that are absent in student design work.
A significant limitation of Huet’s research is that the two industry (non-student) cases
are relatively small and lower-level technical reviews: a component-level Requirement Review of a fuel leak detector and a component-level PDR of a trim tank fuel pump, each with
under 15 participants and lasting less than three hours. This raises a validity concern on extending Huet’s results to major reviews: how do interactions change at higher levels in the
design with more complex technical issues and a larger set of stakeholders? A major defense
or spacecraft technical review often lasts two to four days, involving multiple contractors and
government organizations and over 100 participants (for example, see Koontz et al. 1991).
Thus, a major system-level review has different interactions than Huet observes at the two
small component-level reviews, as will be discussed in this research.
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However, Huet’s analysis of two industry review cases, with transcribed real-world industrial technical reviews, is a major contribution because it provides detailed case-based
empirical descriptive research on technical reviews. Huet (2006) focuses on ways to take better minutes to minimize design information loss from the technical review meetings. Huet
also discusses higher-order knowledge processes such as organizational learning and knowledge generation as a result of the technical reviews. Like O’Sullivan (2000), Huet sees a critical
role in technical reviews in supporting communication within the organization. Huet goes on
to link his observations on review meeting interactions to theories on sensemaking.
Sauser (2006) conducted mixed-methods research to find the important success characteristics of project reviews at NASA. Sauser first conducted a cross-case analysis of six failure
review boards of NASA projects, to seek out major trends. Then Sauser interviewed five participants from each of four NASA projects to find major trends in independent project reviews.
Sauser makes a strong case for the importance of technical reviews: “These reports represent a time span in NASA from 1986 to 2003, and each report specifically mentions the need
for independent reviews for program/project success” (Sauser 2006, 12). From an analysis of
interview data, Sauser makes key recommendations, including having smaller-size reviews,
technically competent reviewers, and independent reviewers. Sauser’s study provides useful
theoretical development but also notes two limits on its validity: (1) the interview data are retrospective, many years after the project, which may cause bias, and (2) the data are from a different development environment—NASA’s “Faster-Better-Cheaper” era in the 1990s. Sauser
calls for further research on the role of project reviews, the impact of reviews, the rationale for
reviews, and how reviews should be implemented. Finally, like Chao (2005), Sauser reports,
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“Each project identified peer reviews as critical to project success, and more important than
the formal phase reviews” (Sauser 2006, 16).
One recent study conducted by the Aerospace Corporation and some US aerospace
industry firms (Covington 2015; Covington et al. 2015) has a unique approach in analyzing
statistical subcontractor failure data to make empirical quantitative assertations about how
lower-level technical failures contribute to major spacecraft failures. Covington’s study was
commissioned by the National Reconnaissance Office, a US agency that procures complex
spacecraft. The study conducted surveys of 49 subcontractors and analyzed 121 “design escapes” — significant spacecraft failures detected in test or on-orbit.
One major assertion by Covington (2015) is that “the lower level [component] reviews
are where the leverage is, as opposed to the major milestone reviews, like CDR” (17). Covington (2015) argues that the majority (60%) of the analyzed design escapes are “due to inadequate design review” (21) and that 72% of the inadequate reviews are caused by reviewer
skillsets: not having the right review panel members (22). Other findings included that the
reviewer process is inconsistent (19,20), and that action item closure and discussion with the
originator are also inconsistent (20), leading to less effective reviews. Like Chao (2005), Covington (2015) largely focuses on the role of reviews in identifying technical flaws in the design.
A final major empirical work on technical reviews is a series of qualitative studies on
stage-gate practices at Swedish aerospace firms in dissertation research by Johansson (Johansson 2009, 2014; Johansson et al. 2008; Johansson et al. 2009). Johansson used initial workshop “group interviews” (Johansson et al. 2008) to develop issues for a subsequent qualitative
study. Johansson then conducted four semi-structured interviews at two companies (Johansson et al. 2009) and a final set of nine interviews at a single company (Johansson 2014).
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Johansson finds that real-world practices of gate decisions at aerospace companies diverge from the theories of Cooper (2001). Johansson argues that aerospace firms use gate
meetings more as “boundary objects” between firms in development teams (Johansson 2009,
22–23): reviews let firms learn about project status (39), trigger work (39), assess risk (31–32),
and negotiate (Johansson 2014, 32). Importantly, Johansson reports that firms seldom make
a simple “kill” decision: “The kill decisions, as prescribed by Cooper, on decision points that
do not meet the acceptance criterion, are rare in the gate decision making investigated” (Johansson 2009, 40). Johansson reports significant socio-technical activity at the gate meetings:
communication, knowledge development, discussion, and learning about status (42–43).
Johansson’s approach and conclusions differ from other empirical research on reviews.
Johansson (2009) uses a more focused case-study based qualitative research approach than
that of Chao (2005)—semi-structured interviews with transcript analysis to pull out “interesting areas and quotes” from company cases (Johansson 2014, 7). Johansson’s research design
is structured with cases at the design firm level, rather than focusing on projects or specific reviews. Therefore, Johansson’s work is not directly linked to project-related case variables such
as phase of design or level of review. Johansson does not examine or see a critical role of subsystem reviews, as was a major conclusion of Chao (2005) and Covington (2015). However,
Johansson’s work supports that of Huet (2006) and O’Sullivan (2000) in finding that technical
reviews have significant socio-technical and project coordination roles.
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2.10 Gap in body of knowledge
There are several theoretical strands that appear related to the socio-technical behavior seen in reviews in the literature. Some process models are widely accepted and embodied
in industry standards. These standards make normative assertions of what is done at reviews,
and hint at the needs met by the reviews. However, there is a lack of empirical descriptive data
revealing the details of the actual practice of technical reviews, and a matching lack of theory
explaining these needs and practices.
This chapter summarized a handful of studies with data from actual reviews or review
participants. In the studies that collected empirical data on large space and defense technical
reviews, there are limitations hampering their use in developing theory. Chao (2005) has a
significant validity issue: participants of only one type. Johansson (2009) makes some general
observations in a case-based qualitative study on socio-technical roles of technical reviews,
but Johansson does not examine cases related to projects or specific reviews.
There are varying opinions in the literature on the importance and role of subsystem vs.
system-level reviews. Some sources (Chao 2005; Covington 2015) see subsystem reviews as
more important than system-level reviews. However, these sources focus solely on the technological as opposed to the socio-technical roles of reviews. In contrast, the sources that do
examine the socio-technical roles of reviews such as Johansson (2009) do not examine subsystem reviews. No sources examine the socio-technical roles of reviews using empirical data
from both system-level and subsystem reviews, which is the focus of this dissertation.
Therefore, this research extends prior work by seeking common patterns in technical
reviews that can be linked to theory.
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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the research methodology and approach. It describes the case
selection, data acquisition, and data analysis methods. Threats to validity and methodologically driven limitations of the study are examined.

3.1 General research approach
The intent of this research, as discussed earlier in Section 1.4, is to better understand
the role of technical reviews in systems engineering and management activities. The general
literature of reviews discussed in Chapter 2 shows that the research questions involve complex
factors related to individuals’ views on how reviews impact engineering and management activities (RQ1) and how reviews affect participants’ views and knowledge of the project (RQ2).
A major objective of this research is to develop from empirical data an “initial theory” or set
of trends in a set of research findings, which is the focus of Chapter 4. Chapter 4 will then
contrast the research findings with extant literature to find gaps in theory (RQ3).
Qualitative research methods were chosen as most appropriate for the research goals.
Valerdi and Davidz argue that “many systems engineering problems are socio-technical issues” (2009, 5). They assert that social science methods including case study and qualitative
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research approaches are promising approaches for building systems engineering theory. The
goals of this research similarly call for a qualitative approach to build practice-linked understanding and details on the role and views of technical reviews. Similarly, Szajnfarber and
Gralla (2017, 497) push for the use of carefully-designed qualitative research “to make sense
of the human and contextual drivers of system design, development and operation.” In their
text, Corbin and Strauss (2008, 12) give reasons for a qualitative research approach including:
(1) getting at the inner experience of participants, (2) determining how meanings are formed,
and (3) discovering rather than testing variables. A qualitative research approach best supports this work’s three research questions.
The chosen research strategy is to study multiple case studies of technical reviews using a qualitative multiple-data-source approach. The primary data set is from interviews of
review participants in the selected cases, supported by observation and artifact (document)
data from case projects.
The high-level case structure is that of multiple (six) cases, where each case is a design project. Cases are selected to span the primary case variables of design phase and level
of review. Respondents are solicited from the case projects, and volunteers are interviewed.
Interview questions focus on issues relating to research questions RQ1 and RQ2.
A follow-on qualitative analysis develops research findings from interviews and project documents. Then a systematic literature review and analysis assesses how the research
findings match current literature (RQ3).
An initial literature review and pilot study of a single technical review were conducted
prior to the main study to develop research methods, aligned with recommendations for case
study research (Yin 2009; Miles and Huberman 1994). The pilot study focused on developing
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initial theories on reviews for case selection and study planning, examining potential questions, and developing interview and analysis methods (Bryman 2012, 263–64). More details
on the pilot study appear in Appendix C.
This case study approach grounds the data and results in the actual practice of systems
engineering (Valerdi and Davidz 2009, 5). As discussed earlier in Section 2.9, a qualitative
multiple-data-source multi-case approach was used in related empirical research on technical reviews (Huet 2006; Chao 2005). As a counter-example, prior research on technical reviews
using surveys (Bennett 1987; Ichida 1996a) was not particularly effective in explaining the role
of technical reviews in engineering, as discussed in Section 2.9.

3.2 Research setting and case selection
The overall case selection process is shown in Figure 3.1 and described in this section.

3.2.1 Analyzing research goals to generate case target population
The larger multi-case general behavior of interest—what Stake (2006, 5–7) terms the
“quintain” of the study—is the engineering and management behavior associated with technical reviews in large US defense and space government acquisitions. More specifically, the
behavior of interest centers on the two research questions on (RQ1) review impacts on project
engineering and management activities and (RQ2) review impacts on participant knowledge
and views of the project (see Chapter 1).
The population of potential technical review cases covering the study quintain is very
large in principle. At any given time, there are many major US defense and space acquisition
programs in development (for the purpose of this study, major is defined as over $100 million
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Figure 3.1: Process diagram for research case selection
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in total life-cycle program cost). As a standard industry process and DoD/NASA policy, every
major program conducts technical reviews. There are an estimated 20 NASA major programs
and 80 DoD major programs, a number that has stayed roughly stable for the last few decades
(GAO 2015a, 7; DoD 2014, 9–10; GAO 2016, 7).1
Each acquisition program proceeds through roughly 10 major system-level technical
reviews (concept review, SRR, PDR, CDR, etc.; see Figure 2.3) on a time scale of roughly one
review per year. This gives an estimate of roughly 100 cases each year of system-level technical
reviews within a major US space or defense program.
The research target population of subsystem-level reviews is larger. Pilot study discussions and document review suggest roughly six to ten subsystem reviews in support of systemlevel reviews at the observed spacecraft design firm (“ContractorA”), including mission design, power, thermal, ground hardware, ground software, etc. (see more details on observed
reviews in Chapter 4). These subsystem reviews repeat roughly every year of a project for the
“middle” three to four years of a program (see Table 3.3). This gives approximately 300 major
project subsystem reviews per year in the US.

3.2.2 Screening case target population for practical factors
From this notional target population of design reviews, study cases were further refined
with both practical and theoretical factors.

1. Counting major programs is complicated by several acquisition practices. First, there
are “pre-programs” in the “pre-program initiation/concept development” design phase that
still conduct technical reviews such as Mission Concept Review. Second, systems-of-systems
programs have multiple constituent development programs (e.g., the DoD’s Ballistic Missile
Defense System), each of which has technical reviews (DoD 2008, 71). A review of GAO annual
reports over a decade suggests approximately 20 NASA and 80 DoD major programs.
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On a practical level, the set of possible cases to study is limited by access and research
resources for a dissertation-level academic research program.
Access was the first driver for case selection. This is a known issue in systems engineering research; the difficulty of access to large projects and enterprises is one of the principal challenges to empirical research in systems engineering (Valerdi and Davidz 2009, 6).
In analogous qualitative research on corporate management and board meetings (Leblanc
and Schwartz 2007), access issues were similarly “extremely difficult” and drove case study
selection. In qualitative research, access issues are typical; having “a relatively small group
of accessible cases” is common in multi-case research (Stake 2006, 4). Having a small group
of cases is not necessarily a problem in a qualitative research program, since it must focus on
a few cases to develop sufficient depth of information to “gain traction on what is important
about a phenomenon” (Szajnfarber and Gralla 2017, 505).
The second case selection issue was academic reporting issues. Many DoD projects
restrict academic reporting due to access limitations. Other similar restrictions include proprietary developer issues and export controls. Access and reporting issues removed some
potential cases from consideration and motivated this work to focus on spacecraft designs,
which are relatively accessible to research. This decision to focus on spacecraft design cases
mirrors other empirical research on design processes (Szajnfarber 2011; Chao 2005).
Logistical issues also affected case selection. Although roughly 100 major system-level
technical reviews are held annually in the US, these reviews are conducted by a relatively small
group of contractors and government offices. The primary data need was for direct observation of reviews, access to artifacts such as meeting slides, minutes, action items, and project
plans, and access to interview the review attendees within six months of the review.
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3.2.3 Creating prioritized list of expected design behaviors affecting cases
Research resources required down-selecting cases to focus on cases relating to the research objectives. This down-selection was based on the anticipated theoretical variables of
interest. Szajnfarber and Gralla (2017, 501, 505–6) terms this case selection based on “intended dimensions of generalizability. . . . Qualitative researchers must utilize purposive samples . . . that seek analytical generalizability rather than statistical generalizability. This means
that cases are chosen to allow inference for theoretical, rather than statistical, reasons.”
The final case selection method matched what Bryman (2012, 419) terms “typical case
sampling”: cases desired to be typical of industry design behavior and thus generalizable.
In addition, cases are expected to show behavioral trends anticipated to be of interest to the
research—what Stake (2006, 25) terms a multi-case “typology.”
First, a list of dominant “intended dimensions of generalizability” was derived from
literature and interviews in a pilot study (see Appendix C). Second, the list was prioritized
based on the expected dominance of the dimensions in the design behavior of interest, as
shown in Table 3.1.
Prior systems engineering and management works have used factors that are similar
to those in Table 3.1 to evaluate cases (Friedman and Sage 2004, 88–89; Szajnfarber 2011, 29).
All five of the factors in Table 3.1 were observed in the pilot study as impacting technical
review behavior. The assessment from the pilot study was that factor #1 (design phase or type
of review) and factor #2 (mission-level vs. subsystem review) most impact the behavior of
review participants. As discussed in Chapter 2, factor #1 (design phase) has been built into the
definition of reviews since the 1960s (see Appendix G). Discussion in the literature on factor #2
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Level of review: system-, subsystem-,
component-level

Design organizational culture: domain of design (e.g., space, software);
acquirer and design organization type
(contractor or gov’t); specific acquirer
and design org
Scale of design itself: total cost; number of levels/systems impacted by
design

Technical complexity, novelty, and
risk of design: amount of key new
technologies; relative technical complexity; level of innovation/maturity

2

3

5

4

1

Predicted factor affecting review behavior in cases
Type of review/design phase (e.g.,
early design phase (SRR), test and
delivery) (ORR)

Priority
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Pilot study interviews indicate willingness to skip reviews or take
risks/save resources with less review
when there is less complex or less
“new” content

Pilot study and literature indicate
differences in practice between
gov’t acquirers (DoD, NASA, suborganizations), and design contractors.
Pilot study interviews indicate smaller
vs. larger projects at same design organization can have varying review
processes (within overall guidance)

Review content in process standards
(e.g., NASA 2017b; IEEE 2015) set by
design phase. Expectations, products, and outputs impacted by design
phase.
Chao (2005) main finding that
peer/subsystem reviews best at controlling technical quality, vs. projectlevel reviews.

Rationale for assessed priority

Design scale inherently smaller at
lower levels of review due to design
partitioning (i.e., subsystem review
has inherently smaller scope than the
system-level review)— thus, Factor #2
overlaps Factor #4.
May manifest in tailoring of reviews or
interactions within review

Expect subsystem-level has peer review aspects and system-level has
more acquirer presence. Many process documents (e.g., IEEE 2015)
silent on level of review.
Acquirer and designer organizational
culture often formally stated in process documents.

Type of review is directly
aligned/surrogate for phase of design.

Additional notes

Table 3.1: Prioritized list of predicted factors affecting review design behaviors in cases

(level of review) is less evident. Many standards such as IEEE 15288.2 (IEEE 2015) are silent on
how or why a subsystem-level review differs from a system-level review, and treat each level of
partition identically as the “system under design.” However, as discussed in Chapter 2, some
prior empirical work finds that “peer reviews [subsystem- or system-level informal reviews]
give the most benefit while cost the least amount of time and effort in the lifecycle” (Chao
2005, 53). Examining factor #2 (level of review) allows Chao’s research finding to be probed in
detail in a different research setting.
The other factors—#3 (design organizational culture), #4 (scale of design), and #5 (technical complexity, novelty, and risk)—were examined after data acquisition (see Section 6.1.1.2)
and appear to be weaker factors than the main two study variables. A study on the effects of
these other variables is discussed as potential follow-on research in Section 7.3.3.

3.2.4 Analysis of cases against prioritized behaviors of interest
Based on the expectation that factor #1 (design phase or type of review) and factor #2
(system- vs. subsystem-level review) would dominate the behavior of interest for the research
questions, the available research cases were re-examined. Cases were sought that would give
variability and span a range of the two factors (Szajnfarber and Gralla 2017, 501) and thus give
some theoretical variation of results as well as some degree of controlled comparison.
Other dimensions that were predicted to affect design behavior were kept the same in
case selection (or noted as an accepted variation with possible impacts on the study). Specifically, factor #3 (design culture and organization) was purposely controlled by dropping cases
that were dominated by different design organizations (keeping all cases largely with one design organization). Factors #4 (scale of design) and #5 (technical complexity, novelty, and
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risk) could not be controlled given the available projects and selecting for dominant factors,
so are recommended for a follow-on study.
The chosen set of research cases is given in Table 3.2. Note that, per Institutional Review Board (IRB) privacy protection plan (see Appendix A) and common practice in similar qualitative research (Thomson et al. 2005), the names of designing organizations, design
projects, and individual informants have been replaced with pseudonyms throughout this
dissertation. In the six cases, there were more than six reviews attended because two of the
cases consist of multiple reviews: Case B has two reviews, and Case E has eleven reviews.
However, they are grouped into six review cases based on the two study variables (1) phase
of review, (2) level of review as well as (3) specific design project, which correlates with other
discussed variables such as size and client.

Table 3.2: Listing of selected cases
Case
A

Program Name
NASASpaceProgram2

Type of Review
Pre-Environment Review

B

NASASpaceProgram4

C

NASASpaceProgram5

D

DoDSpaceProgram1

E

NASASpaceProgram4

System Readiness Review/
Mission Design Review (2
reviews)
Propulsion (major subsystem) Preliminary Design
Review
Operational Readiness Review
subsystem Preliminary Design Reviews (11 reviews)

F

NASASpaceProgram4

Preliminary Design Review
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Case Variable Notes
Developer=CtrA;
Size=large/ flagship
Developer=CtrA;
Size=small-med; 1 by design org, one by client
Developer=CtrA; acquirer=CtrH; subsystem
within large project
Developer=CtrA;
Size=small, DoD acquirer
Developer=CtrA;
Size=subsystems of smallmed; one subsystem has
subcontractor
Developer=CtrA;
Size=small-med

A diagram of how the research cases span the two dimensions of interest—design phase
and review level—is given in Table 3.3.
Natural “quasi-experiments” among the factors and cases were used for controlled
comparison of the effects of the research variables (Szajnfarber and Gralla 2017, 501). Three
cases (B, E, F) from one project (NASASpaceProgram4) span two values of the research variables phase of review and level of review, allowing for cross-case comparison.
There are some comparison reviews within single points in the two axes of study variables, as shown in Table 3.3. This allows replication-like intra-case comparisons of reviews,
which also helps in forming theory (note that Eisenhardt (1989, 545) terms these “mini-cases”).
Two of these mini-case comparisons are in the research design. First, Case B (NASASpaceProgram4 SRR/MDR) has two SRR reviews: one review was a combined Mission Definition
Review (MDR) and SRR with a panel from the design firm, and the second review was an
SRR with a panel from the client. A second mini-case comparison is within Case E (NASASpaceProgram4 subsystem Preliminary Design Reviews (sPDRs)), which has 11 individual
reviews, allowing comparison across design domains such as propulsion and mechanical design (and teams within the design team). A third replication case is between Case C (NASASpaceProgram5 sPDR) and Case E (NASASpaceProgram4 sPDRs), which allows for a comparison of subsystem reviews across projects.
In this research, there is a third study variable, respondent role, which is an attribute of
the individual interviewed. This corresponds to a second sampling level below case level in
“who to talk to or observe within the chosen focal unit” (Szajnfarber and Gralla 2017, 501–2).
In this study, respondents were interviewed from three of the major respondent roles seen
within the review (see Table 3.5). Another role (external stakeholder representative such as
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Var2: Level of
Review

62

B.
Subsystem
Level

A. System
Level

Var1:
Phase of
Design

N/A

2

1

SDR/
MDR
3

B. NASASpaceProgram4
SRR/MDR (2)

SRR

MCR

Concept

E. NASASpaceProgram4
sPDRs (11)
C. NASASpaceProgram5
sPDR

F. NASASpaceProgram4
PDR

4

PDR

Prelim Design

5

CDR

N/A

6

SIR

Final Design
& Fab

8

ORR

N/A

N/A

A.
D.
NASASpace DoDSpace
Program2 Program1
PER
ORR

7

PER

N/A

9

FRR

Assembly, Int, Test, Flight

Table 3.3: Selected cases against case variable range

client or interfacing contractor) could not be studied due to IRB restrictions and is suggested
for follow-on research in Section 7.3.1.
The selected number of six cases (with multiple reviews in some cases, and natural
quasi-experiments) was assessed as providing sufficient variability to span the study variables
(Stake 2006, 25–26) and meet the research needs. Recommendations for the number of cases
for multi-case studies in qualitative research are relatively inconsistent (Onwuegbuzie and
Leech 2005). However, Eisenhardt (1989, 545) suggests four to ten cases are sufficient to draw
theoretical conclusions that are convincingly empirically grounded. Eisenhardt notes situations where fewer than four cases can be convincing, such as when multiple mini-cases are
used within cases. Stake (2006, 22–24) also suggests four to ten cases, noting that many studies
have good reasons to have less than four cases.
The author has worked in defense and space engineering for over 20 years and has
worked with engineers in some of the cases, so he is situated in the socio-technical design
project context. This matches what Singleton and Straits (2004, 330) term a “peripheral member” observer role: the researcher participates by observing quietly but overtly. In two cases
(A/ DoDSpaceProgram1 and D/ NASASpaceProgram4), the author has an internal “active
membership” role (331) since he participated in engineering work on the case project. This
meets a key objective in participant research (Bryman 2012, 432): to see through the eyes and
use the language of the people being studied. Long-term immersive “ethnographic study”
(432) was not attempted since it was deemed unnecessary to address the research questions.
However, the author attended reviews and examined project documents prior to conducting
interviews to understand the project context and develop interview questions.
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3.3 Data acquisition
To examine the first two research questions—RQ1 on effects of the technical review
on design activities, and RQ2 on participant changes in knowledge and views of the project—
qualitative data was sought from the review cases discussed in Section 3.2. For each technical
review, multiple forms of extensive qualitative evidence were sought to enhance understanding and rigor when combined (Creswell 2012, 285; Eisenhardt 1989, 534–535). The qualitative
data sources sought for each review were:
1. researcher observation and field notes of verbal interactions at technical reviews
2. review documents including technical review slides, minutes, action items
3. recorded semi-structured interviews with technical review participants
4. project documents such as schedules, planning documents, and other design documents
5. design organization and client process documents and other official “archival records”
(Szajnfarber and Gralla 2017, 502)
Bryman terms the use of multiple methods or sources of data to investigate social behavior “triangulation” (2012, 390–92), and suggests that triangulation improves the reliability
and validity of qualitative research. Szajnfarber and Gralla (2017, 502) similarly recommend
complementary types of data to understand the phenomenon under study, support insights,
and avoid bias from a single source.
Triangulation was employed in this study by using interview data as well as observations and documents. Interview data was the primary data source for the reported research
findings. Project documents were used for additional analysis and additional confirmation of
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Data Acquisition

Data Analysis
Issues for follow-up

3. Review slides /
minutes / notes for specific
and follow-on interview
questions

6. Initial coding of
anonymous transcript

1. Attend Review / take
field notes

4. Conduct interview

7. Higher-order analysis:
Re-coding and memoing,
cross-case, cross-finding

2. Create interview target
list, solicit volunteers,
coordinate interview

5. Data processing,
transcribing, anonymizing

8. Documentation/ writing
of observations / trends

0. Coordinate access and
approvals

Figure 3.2: Process diagram of interview data acquisition and analysis

research findings. Review observations and project documents were used to prepare interview questions and understand the case projects.
Figure 3.2 gives a process diagram of interview data acquisition and data analysis.
A high-level summary of major data artifacts (interviews and documents) is given in
Table 3.4. A detailed inventory of the collected data artifacts is given in Appendix D.
The collected data were used for several purposes for each technical review case. Project documents such as prior technical review slides, project meeting slides, and project calendars were used prior to the technical review to understand the general design effort. Technical review meetings were attended either in-person or using teleconference audio to take field
notes on interactions between participants and organizational and social context. Technical
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1.
Field notes
Observations
a. Slide sets
2.
b. Formal
Documents
docs (e.g.,
minutes)
c. Other internal docs
a. Role:
3.
Board
Interviews
Member
b. Role:
Presenter/
Lead
c. Role:
Working
Engineer
d. Role:
Other (in
DesignOrg)

Type
Data Source Data SubType
type
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2

4

0

0

2

0

0

4

5
2

Obs:3,1 days
19,7 hrs
50
3

B (NASASpaceProgram4
SRR/ MDR)

Obs:3 days
20 hrs
46
2

A (NASASpaceProgram2
PER)

0

1

1

2

7

Obs:4 days
28 hrs
19
6

C (NASASpaceProgram5
sPDRs)

1

3

3

2

7

Obs:1 day
8 hrs
8
1

D (DoDSpaceProgram1
ORR)

Data Collected for Each Case

1

1

3

4

13

Obs: 7 days
38 hrs
130
15

E (NASASpaceProgram4
sPDRs)

1

0

3

3

9

Obs:3 days
18 hrs
36
3

F (NASASpaceProgram4
PDR)

Table 3.4: Summary of major data artifacts collected, by case

review slides, field notes, and other review artifacts such as action items and minutes were
used to identify interview topics on key interactions and items relevant to study variables.
Recorded semi-structured interviews of review participants were the primary data source
for the study. The interviews probed participant views aligned with the research questions and
helped examine the major issues discussed in the review. The interviews also helped decode
the methods, jargon, and organizational context of issues.
The unit of analysis for the interviews was a single review participant (typically an engineer or technical manager working in the design team or larger design organization). A listing
of the roles that interviews were sought from and linkage of roles to research questions is given
in Table 3.5; these roles were developed in the pilot study (see Appendix A).
One participant role, external stakeholder representative (such as a representative of
the client organization, an interfacing contractor, or a user of the system), is shown for completeness in Table 3.5. External stakeholder representatives were observed in review interactions, and their roles were discussed in some interviews, but respondents in this role could
not be directly interviewed due to IRB restrictions. This external stakeholder role is significant,
but a deeper study of their role was deferred for later work (see Section 7.3.1).
Interview respondents were sought using “stratified purposeful sampling” (Bryman
2012, 418): sampling of individuals within pre-identified subgroups of interest, without seeking probabilistic representativeness. Subgroups sought, as discussed earlier, were representatives of key “participant roles” for each design review. Interview respondents were sought
to be “typical” participants within that subgroup.
For recruitment, attendee lists of review participants were used to seek volunteers within
the organization, with an objective of each case having at least one representative from each
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Table 3.5: Listing of key participant roles
Key Participant Role at Technical Review
1. Technical Review Board member

Rationale and Research Focus
Observed from pilot study: dominant set of
speakers is the review board itself. Likely key
decision-makers and targets for gain in knowledge and views of project (RQ2).
Observed from pilot study: many interactions
and speech in review are by presenters. May
have most knowledge about work caused by
review (RQ1).
Likely impacted by work caused by review in
their design area (RQ1). May be indirect targets for changes in knowledge/views of overall
program (RQ2).
Similar to presenters, likely have insight into
work caused by review (RQ1). May be indirect
targets for changes in views of project (particularly project status) (RQ2).
Not explored in this research but included for
completeness. May have affected activities of
project (RQ1). May have gained knowledge or
changed views of project (RQ2).

2. Presenting team member or design lead

3. Working-level engineers on project

4. Other observer from design organization

5. (Not interviewed) External stakeholder representative, such as client, interfacing design
contractor, or subcontractor

participant role listed in Table 3.5. Attendee lists were developed from available project documentation, such as sign-in lists, minutes, Outlook meeting invitations, review slides, and
review action item documents (see Section D.2). Roles of attendees (review board members
and presenters/leads) were taken from documentation and then confirmed in interviews.
Respondents were volunteers solicited by email from a central organizational representative, using the researcher-developed attendee list for each review. This solicitation method
was required by organizational rules for seeking academic research volunteers. Details of
the solicitation email and process are available on request from the University of Alabama in
Huntsville (UAH) IRB. The recruitment response rate was approximately 6% of review attendees from ContractorA, ranging from 4% to 15% response depending on the case. The overall
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response was four to seven respondents per review case, which was considered sufficient for
breadth and to gauge variability of responses. The total response was 25 interviews, with 21
unique respondents; several respondents volunteered for follow-up interviews. Several interviews covered multiple cases (i.e., an interview could have data for more than one case); see
Section D.1 for more details.
The interviews followed a responsive interviewing model, with initial questions developed prior to each interview and follow-up questions sought and explored during the interview. The interview method was aligned with qualitative semi-structured short interview
techniques in Rubin and Rubin (2004) (see Appendix B). Specific interview questions were developed for an individual respondent based on review artifacts (slides, minutes, action items)
and field notes on specific interactions at the review involving the respondent or their work
area of focus. Interviews ranged from 20 to 68 minutes (see Section D.1).
Interviews were recorded in digital audio since the pilot study found that recording was
necessary to acquire needed detail and accuracy of respondent responses. Interviews were
reviewed and transcribed by the researcher due to access agreements to screen for restricted
content. Researcher transcription provided the additional benefit of increasing familiarity
with interview data prior to detailed analysis and providing insights for follow-on interview
questions (Taylor et al. 2015, 170).
Per IRB data protection plan protocols (see Appendix A), raw audio recordings were
encrypted and archived after transcribing. Following transcription, names of individuals and
companies, easily identifiable terms, and other terms restricted by organizations (due to release control, proprietary or other issues) were re-coded to anonymize the transcripts. The
requirement to anonymize data was a further reason requiring the researcher/transcriber to
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be conversant with design program/company requirements as well as aerospace practice. An
encrypted reference database of substitute codes was developed to allow post-research and
during-research confirmation of any questions against original transcripts or raw recordings.
Any data that identified volunteers were encrypted and archived. Design project documentation relevant to the study (design review slides, minutes, and other relevant documentation)
was archived in a research database on an information system at the design organization, to
meet access agreements and restrictions. Follow-on analysis (see Section 3.4) was conducted
with anonymized interview transcripts.

3.4 Data analysis
For each case, a set of interviews were recorded, transcribed, and anonymized, as discussed earlier in Section 3.3. Interviews were the primary data source for analysis, but other
document data were used as a secondary source.
The general approach for analysis of interview data followed standard methods of iterative qualitative data analysis, generally aligned with the “computer-assisted Noticing, Collecting, Thinking (NCT)” method (Friese 2014, 12–21; Seidel 1998), which is an adaptation of
the general grounded theory conceptual approaches of Corbin and Strauss (2008).
Coding and management of interviews were conducted using standard social science
data analysis software (ATLAS.ti), which is a commonly used qualitative data analysis package
that allows coding, memoing, and higher-level analysis (Drisko 1998). The typical lowest level
of analysis was an individual interview.
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Aligned with the NCT approach, the coding of interviews started during data collection as part of initial descriptive coding (Friese 2014, 17–18). Initial codes were developed
and iteratively adjusted as the data collection phase progressed. Initial cross-case findings
that started to emerge were probed with follow-up interview questions. Codes were used as
“heuristic tools” (Seidel 1998, 13–14): the fundamental data element remained the interview
statements by participants, and codes were used as “signposts” to point to common terms.
The development of initial coding was part of initial theme finding—thinking about trends
and emerging theories as part of considering labeling methods (Taylor et al. 2015, 180). The
initial coding objective was to “link what the respondent says in his or her interview to the
[emergent] concepts and categories that will appear in the report” (Weiss 1995, 134).
Intermediate re-coding continued through the end of data acquisition. Intermediate
re-coding involved re-examination of cross-case trends, trends across study variables, and
collection of key observations. Higher-level memoing and collection of observed behaviors
were conducted in order to align the codes with the research questions, which Friese terms
“research question memos” (Friese 2014, 165–68). These research question memos linked
interview quotes to key common trends. These views were iterated on and eventually recoded into specific “detailed findings”—trends from analysis with substantial support from
participants (see Appendix E). Detailed findings were combined into larger common findings, which are reported in more detail in Chapter 4. Design organization process documents
and project documents were analyzed to check findings that weren’t robustly supported by
interview responses.
Some findings were commonly held views of reviews, while some findings described
trends in views with study variables level of review, phase of review, and respondent role. The
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findings were reported with standardized metrics and sample quotes to indicate the strength
of the finding among interview participants and project data (see Section 4.1.1 for more details
on the method of reporting on findings).
A second method of coding analysis was used in a separate qualitative study focused
on action item documents. More details of specific analysis steps and results are separately
reported in Section 4.2.1.3. Importantly, the action item coding analysis used an “objectivist
coding approach” (Seidel 1998, 14–15): codes were created using a formal rule set applied to
the analyzed documents. Follow-on analysis was then conducted on the codes themselves as
“surrogates for the text they identify” (14) to examine trends in action item attributes (action
item actor and action item focus), to seek higher-order conclusions on the contents and trends
in action items. Statistical analysis and statistical modeling of codes for action items were
conducted to seek rough estimates of the strength of trends in these coding categories (see
Section 4.2.1.3 for a brief discussion of the statistical analysis and results).

3.5 Method of analyzing case-derived findings against literature
RQ3 (what the literature says is the purpose and output of technical reviews, and how
this compares to findings from RQ2 and RQ3) requires a different analytic approach than that
of the other two research questions. A review of recommended analysis methods suggested
a “systematic review” methodology to seek a repeatable and relatively thorough literature
search and analysis on the specific findings on technical reviews.
The methods literature on formal literature reviews suggests (1) documenting an explicit search strategy to maximize comprehensiveness and reduce replication and omission
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(Timmins and McCabe 2005, 42), (2) conducting concept-related search rather than authoror chronological-related search (Levy and Ellis 2006, 184), and (3) stating search words (Harvard 2007). Aligned with these suggestions, software engineering and management research
(Tranfield et al. 2003; Kitchenham 2004; Biolchini et al. 2005) recommends a more formal
“systematic review” to increase validity by stating protocols prior to retrieval so others can
reproduce results and assess the search adequacy. In fields such as health where systematic
reviews are common, they are considered “the most powerful and useful evidence . . . to systematically search, critically appraise and synthesize the world literature on a specific issue”
(Sackett et al. 2000, 133).
This section describes an analysis process aligned with systematic review guidance
(Tranfield et al. 2003, 215): identification of search terms from pilot study and literature; reporting search strategy in sufficient detail for replication; and use of published journals in
bibliometric databases as well as conference proceedings.
The focus areas for this literature search are: (1) seeking process references that respondents may use in conducting technical reviews and related activity and (2) seeking literature that reflects current thought on technical reviews, so as to identify potential gaps between
observed behavior and current literature. A final focus area is (3) using current software-based
search and analysis tools to improve the quality and repeatability of the analysis.
In order to meet these objectives for this research design, a new modified method for
systematic review was developed—a two-step systematic review. This is a new approach to
systematic review for repeated searches in a single focus area (see also Section 7.2).
Without a two-step method, the systematic review process would be as shown in Figure 3.3. Standard systematic reviews conduct a single search (repeated for multiple databases
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and multiple search terms). Then the researcher reviews the search results to screen spurious
or less-germane results, by manually examining the source titles and skimming sources that
seem promising to confirm that they are on-topic. These screening steps are the most timeconsuming part of a literature review—there are often hundreds of search results from a single
search.
The primary issue with the standard systematic review process for this research is that
there are multiple (M=6) source literature databases (e.g., Scopus and World of Science), and
multiple (N=13) research findings, each of which has a set of L search terms (with L averaging
5 in our case). Since each search is conducted for each finding against each database, that requires in this research analysis M x N x L = 6 x 13 x 5 or approximately 400 screening steps. This
standard method thus would require manually screening many tens of thousands of sources,
and is therefore not practical for this analysis.
Therefore, a modified “two-step systematic review” process was developed to reduce
the screening time by creating an intermediate database—making two consecutive process
loops instead of two nested process loops. The high-level concept is sketched in Figure 3.4.
Step one of the two-step systematic review method developed a primary database: a
set of screened sources on “technical reviews” as a general topic. The development of the primary database is described in Section 3.5.1, and the resultant database is listed in Appendix F.
In step two of the two-step systematic review method, each finding was split into smaller
subfindings, which were analyzed against the primary database, with a set of search terms
for each subfinding (e.g., “ASSESS DESIGN”). This two-step process decreases the number of
time-consuming screening steps from (M x N x L) to [M + (N x L)], or from 390 to 71 screening
steps. This results in a significant reduction of effort by roughly a factor of five. This method
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Figure 3.3: Process diagram, one-step systematic review
(looped over findings and source databases)
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Figure 3.4: Process diagram, two-step systematic review
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also enhances search consistency: searches against the main literature databases are not repeated, which removes a source of variability.
In addition, the intermediate primary database on technical reviews is a useful literature list for other researchers. A standard literature review process would yield many small
and specific literature sets against each finding (e.g., “10 sources that discuss error identification in technical reviews”), while the two-step process yields a more general set of primary
literature on technical reviews from the first step (i.e., the 322 major references on technical
reviews per Table 3.9), which is arguably more useful for follow-on research.
This two-step process is faster and more consistent for a large set of search terms than
a standard single-step systematic review process. For a small number of findings, a standard
single-step process may be preferred, due to lower process complexity.
Finally, this entire two-step process was conducted twice: once during the primary
analysis stage of the research, and a repeat analysis prior to final research completion (May
2019). The second analysis was required to check for any sources that were published shortly
before the final reporting of this research. The two-step process allowed a relatively quick
repetition of the analysis.

3.5.1 Primary literature database development
The initial database started with the sources from the general literature review (see
Chapter 2) and the pilot study (see Appendix C). This initial database was managed with documents and metadata using the document/citation management software Zotero (Trinoskey
et al. 2009; GMU 2017). A “data conditioning” step was used to complete metadata and add
search material for hard-copy sources (e.g., scanned tables of contents).
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The initial database was screened with search terms designed to ensure that the source
related to “technical reviews,” as shown in Table 3.6.

Table 3.6: Search terms: Initial screening of primary database
Search Title
Initial
Screening

Search Target
Initial dissertation
Zotero database
(1500 sources)

Search Terms
ANY OF {DESIGN REVIEW; TECHNICAL REVIEW; STAGEGATE; SOFTWARE REVIEW; PEER REVIEW; PROJECT
REVIEW; DECISION REVIEW; ENGINEERING REVIEW;
READINESS REVIEW; MILESTONE REVIEW}

Result
251
sources

This initial screened database was supplemented by “step one” of the two-step systematic review. This used preset search terms to seek results from major databases. One benefit
of standardized search terms is ensuring that a wide and thorough search is conducted. A
second benefit is making the analysis repeatable (Kitchenham 2004).
A set of searches using standardized terms aligned with the general topic of “technical
review” was conducted against three major general research databases that have wide coverage over time across many disciplines (Harzing and Alakangas 2016, 788): (1) Google’s Google
Scholar, (2) Thompson Reuters Web of Science, and (3) Elsevier’s Scopus. In addition, a second
follow-on method beyond pure database search extended the search: a “backward snowball”
search was conducted by reviewing the cited works from each accepted source and adding in
relevant cited sources (Wohlin 2014, 3). A third “forward snowball” search was not attempted
due to its reported relative inefficiency (6). Search terms and results are provided in Table 3.7.
Beyond the core three databases discussed above, four additional databases were examined that have heavier representation of conference papers in systems engineering and
design, and government works by NASA and DoD: (4) IEEE’s Xplore, (5) INCOSE’s conference
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Table 3.7: Search terms: Step one general topic search of major source databases for
primary database
Search Title
Supplemental
General
Search

Search Target
Google Scholar (top
1000); Scopus (top 400)

Search Terms
ANY OF {DESIGN REVIEWS; TECHNICAL REVIEWS} plus “backwards snowball”

Result
added 76
sources

Web of Science

ANY OF {DESIGN REVIEWS; TECHNICAL REVIEWS; DESIGN REVIEW; TECHNICAL REVIEW;
STAGE-GATE} plus “backwards snowball”

added 52
sources

database on Wiley Online, (6) DoD’s Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) repository,
and (7) NASA’s NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS). Such use of topic-specific secondary
databases is aligned with best practices for systematic reviews to reduce “publication bias”
(Kitchenham 2004, 13). Search terms and results are shown in Table 3.8.

Table 3.8: Search terms: Step one general topic search of professional society and
government databases for primary database
Search Title
Supplemental Professional
Society/ Government Database Search

Search target
IEEE Xplore; INCOSE,
DTIC, NASA NTRS
databases

Search Terms
ANY OF {DESIGN REVIEWS;
TECHNICAL REVIEWS} plus
“backwards snowball”

Result
added 124
sources

As a final step, sources were screened for relevance: sources that had at least one pageequivalent of text discussing “technical reviews” were tagged as a “major reference.” This database of 322 “major references on technical reviews” is a significant output of the systematic
review and appears in Appendix F. Summary statistics of the primary database are given in
Table 3.9.
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Table 3.9: Summary statistics of the primary technical review literature database
Literature Data Type
Thesis/ Dissertation
Book/ Book Section
Report
Journal Article
Conference Paper or Presentation
Other (magazine, web page, etc.)
TOTAL

Total
9
81
45
79
75
33
322

3.5.2 Secondary literature analysis method
This primary database was later analyzed with a second search for each subfinding,
“step two,” as shown in Figure 3.4. For each subfinding, a set of search terms was chosen to
match key issues in the finding. This second search resulted in a set of literature related to
each subfinding, and this literature was then analyzed to assess the level of novelty of the subfinding. Key quotes and a discussion of the detailed match between the literature and each
subfinding is given in Section 5.4. Reporting methods and more details on the assessment
categories for the second search are shown in Section 5.2
An overall summary of novel parts of findings is reported in Section 5.3. A higher-level
discussion of the gaps in literature appears in Section 6.1.

80

3.6 Generalizability and limitations
In this study, threats to validity2 were controlled in the chosen study method where
possible. This section assesses threats to validity and study limitations for the two data acquisition and analysis methods: Questions 1 and 2 used a multi-case qualitative analysis (see
Sections 3.3 and 3.4), and Question 3 used an analysis of the multi-case findings against a
dataset of literature and standards (see Section 3.5).
The tactics used to control threats to generalizability for the multiple case-study analysis are summarized in Table 3.10. Tactics were chosen from recommendations from case
study methods literature (Yin 2009, 41; Eisenhardt 1989).
Multiple data types were used to iteratively build theory directly from case-based interview data, which helps establish “construct validity”: the internal validity of the theoretical
constructs (Eisenhardt 1989, 542; Yin 2009, 40–41, 117–118) and the presence of logical and
defensible relationships between measures and data and variables (Babbie 2009, 154).
Trends against variables were developed from interview data rather than first developing trends for each case and then studying variation across cases. Data were not sufficient
(four to seven interviews) to create strong findings on each case separately. This is a study limitation that would require a different research design to overcome: there could be variations
in research variables that can only be found with more data to build single-case results and
then extend case data to theory (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007, 25).
2. There is a long-standing debate in qualitative research on the use of modified research
quality metrics such as “credibility,” “transferability,” and “dependability” (Lincoln and Guba
1986), rather than more common validity terms. This report uses the terms from sociology references such as Babbie (2009) and Miles and Huberman (1994). Most modified
qualitative-research-specific terms that align with the author’s critical realist research philosophy (Maxwell 2011) seem equivalent to the common validity terms (see Seale 1999, 43–44).
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Reliability

External Validity

Internal Validity

Construct Validity

Case validity test

Recommended tactic (source)
Use multiple sources of evidence (Yin, Eisenhardt)
Establish chain of evidence linked to constructs
(Yin, Eisenhardt)
Comparison with of constructs and theory with
similar literature (Eisenhardt)
Pattern matching (Yin) and hypothesis building
(Eisenhardt)
Development of logic models (Yin)
Use replication logic in multiple-case studies
(Yin)
Specify the target population (of
cases/individuals) under study (Eisenhardt)
Use case study protocol (Yin)
Documentation of evidence (Yin)

Data acquisition; documentation of method
Maintenance of encrypted/raw evidence and
anonymized database in Atlas.ti

Finding analysis linked to respondent and document data
Examining finding and study variable trends
Case selection based on initial theory / case
factors
Case selection and informant recruitment

Literature analysis (RQ3) on findings

Phase of research & method
Data acquisition (multiple data types, multiple
cases)
Data acquisition (Atlas.ti database)

Table 3.10: Methods to control multi-case study validity threats

Another recommended practice used to enhance construct validity was the maintenance of a chain of evidence between data and conclusions. Construct validity is also enhanced by the examination of findings by literature analysis (the validity of which is discussed
later in this section).
“Internal validity” measures whether “the findings make sense,” given the evidence
presented (Miles and Huberman 1994, 278), and whether a causal relationship has been established (Yin 2009, 40). The selected method of developing patterns in detailed findings and
then reporting the link between quotes and findings supports internal validity by documenting the linkages between evidence and findings (42–43).
“External validity” measures if “the conclusions of a study have any larger import. Are
they transferable to other contexts?” (Miles and Huberman 1994, 279). External validity defines the domain that findings can be generalized to (Yin 2009, 40). Setting interviews in project cases enhances external validity because it formally examines how projects span typical
case/project factors. Interviews were also sought to span participant roles (a predicted theoretical respondent-level variation) to enhance external validity (43–44). The target population of technical reviews and the degree of coverage of that population were discussed in Section 3.2. There was reasonable coverage across most case variables. Suggested future work to
analyze other case variables is discussed in Chapter 7.
Finally, the reliability of a study measures “whether the operations of a study—such as
the data collection procedures—can be repeated, with the same results.” (Yin 2009, 40). This
is a common challenge in interview-based qualitative research since the exact interview conditions cannot be replicated in a follow-up interview—even with the same interviewer and
respondent. However, the interviews were all recorded along with respondent information,
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questions, and responses, which provides a degree of “credibility through transparency” (Rubin and Rubin 2004, 76–77). A “case study database” (Yin 2009, 45) of source documents,
interviews, and observations is documented in Appendix D. Anonymized versions of source
data are available from the research committee. The method was also documented to allow
potential replication by follow-on researchers.
In general, threats to validity and reliability for the multi-case analysis of RQ1 and RQ2
were reduced as far as possible in the study design within reasonable research constraints.
Given the results of RQ1 and RQ2 on cross-case findings, there are also threats to the
validity of RQ3 (whether the purposes and outputs indicated in the cross-case analysis findings matched those of standards and literature on technical reviews). Tranfield et al. (2003,
208) argue that the systematic review documentation process reduces bias over other means
of assessing the state of knowledge: “Systematic review methodology . . . will help in counteracting bias by making explicit the values and assumptions underpinning a review.”
The list of major threats to systematic review validity in Table 3.11 was constructed from
combined suggestions from two major reports on systematic reviews (Kitchenham 2004, 4, 7–
10; Thompson et al. 2012, A1–A2). Validity measures suggested but not implemented shown
with brief rationales.
In short, most suggested validity measures for systematic review were implemented.
The literature that may be missed is likely due to (1) the search terms not being in the literature (which seems relatively unlikely from reading the literature), (2) the literature not being
reflected in any of the databases or IEEE and INCOSE conference papers, which also seems
unlikely. However, there are academic papers such as theses/dissertations, less common
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If reported results differ from study-to-study, explore reasons for
differences (Kitchenham 2004; Thompson et al. 2012)

Validity Threat Recommendation and Source
Develop the search question up-front: state input databases, search
strings (Kitchenham 2004; Thompson et al. 2012)
Have outside researcher(s) review the search protocol (Kitchenham
2004)
Search major relevant bibliographic databases (Kitchenham 2004;
Thompson et al. 2012)
Search through reference lists from relevant studies (Kitchenham
2004; Thompson et al. 2012)
Search non-English language sources (language bias) (Kitchenham
2004; Thompson et al. 2012)
Scan gray literature [documents by government, academics, business
that are protected by intellectual property or where publishing is not
the primary activity of the producing body] and unpublished results
(Kitchenham 2004)
Reduce publication bias by seeking sources from conference proceedings and direct expert contact (Kitchenham 2004; Thompson et
al. 2012)
Document the search and maintain raw search results (Kitchenham
2004)
Describe how quality of each study was assessed (Thompson et
al. 2012)
Reduce study selection bias by stating selection criteria up front
(Kitchenham 2004; Thompson et al. 2012)
(For single researcher) document and discuss included and excluded
papers with an expert panel (Kitchenham 2004)

Partially implemented: second Zotero database with raw search results tagged with inclusion rationale codes. Exclusion criteria was
fairly concrete (i.e. no mention/passing mention and database large,
thus did not conduct external review
Not implemented. Research question did not seek to fully analyze
consensus/lack of consensus of literature/standards (meta-study) but
rather whether any literature or standards contained or reflected the
findings.

Implemented (Section 3.6)

Implemented: Zotero for final results and second Zotero database
without docs for raw search results
Implemented (Section 3.6)

Implemented: done in initial lit search and in backward snowball
step for later searches
Not Implemented. Study is on US Defense and Space design processes, so non-English sources not germane.
Partially implemented. Initial literature set pulled from wider search,
including government databases. IP-protected process documents
from cases considered. Study question focuses on extant literature
and standards, so unpublished documents largely outside scope.
Implemented—for IEEE and INCOSE conferences. (see Section 3.6)

Implemented (Section 3.6)

Implemented (review by dissertation committee members)

Implemented / Not Implemented and Rationale
Implemented (Section 3.6)

Table 3.11: Validity threats from systematic review method literature and implementation

journals, and unpublished academic papers or reports that may not be in any of the seven
databases used.
Positive results—that a finding was found in the literature—are relatively concrete and
have relatively little validity threat. The main issue would be a disagreement in the interpretation of the literature. However, a reviewer of this research may examine the sample interview
quotes to assess the alignment of the cited literature with respondent views, which is an inherent advantage of qualitative research.
It is intrinsically difficult to come to a strong conclusion on negative results from a literature search: that “this finding is definitely not present in the literature.” There always will remain some possibility that there is a difficult-to-locate work that reflects a finding, which was
not located with the chosen search method. However, best practices for systematic reviews
were used, the literature search was relatively wide, and the search method is documented
and repeatable. Therefore, the author believes there are relatively few relevant sources that
were missed.
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CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

This chapter provides the results of the research and analysis from interviews and documents for RQ1 and RQ2.

4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents findings for two research questions (RQ1 and RQ2), which are
discussed in more detail in Chapter 1:
RQ1: How do technical reviews impact subsequent project engineering and management activities?
Section 4.2 gives findings from interviews and project documents about RQ1.
RQ2: How do technical reviews affect participant views and self-reported knowledge of the project?
Section 4.3 gives findings from interviews and project documents about RQ2.
Findings and analysis for RQ3—a systematic review-based literature analysis on the
findings of this chapter on RQ1 and RQ2—are reported separately in Chapter 5.
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4.1.1 Findings reporting method
The methodology for the collection and analysis of interview data was described earlier in Chapter 3. This chapter presents research assertions as summaries of common trends
and views from the interview respondents. Interviews were conducted with technical review
participants from spacecraft design cases selected to cover two variables of interest, with a
third study variable coming from the respondent characteristic. The study variables are: (1)
phase of review, (2) level of review, and (3) role of participant. Project document analysis is a
secondary triangulating data source for research assertions.
The structured reporting approach used in this chapter is based on methodological
references in the qualitative research literature. For each research assertion in this chapter,
the relative level of support from interviews is indicated by stating the count of respondents
with interview quotes supporting that research assertion, for example, “11 of 21 respondents
saw this aspect of design reviews as critical.” The specific interview quotes (quotes from 11
respondents, in our example) that are consistent with that research assertion are documented
in an Atlas.ti research database as described in Chapter 3. The relative frequency is reported
to show how relatively often a research assertion was mentioned by respondents. The relative
frequency is also used to set a minimum threshold on whether a view is sufficiently common
among the participants to report, as a method of creating meaning from qualitative data:
Counting [of qualitative data] is integral to the analysis process, especially to the
recognition of patterns in data and deviations from those patterns, and to making analytic or idiographic generalizations from data. Pattern recognition implies
seeing something over and over again in one case or across a selection of cases.
Finding that a few, some, or many participants showed a certain pattern, or that
a pattern was common, thematic, or unusual in a group of participants, implies
something about the frequency, typicality, or even intensity of an event. (Sandelowski 2001, 231)
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Following recommendations on reporting qualitative research (Sandelowski 2001, 230–
231; Bloomberg and Volpe 2016, 211), a relative frequency descriptor term or “verbal counting” is reported using the standard terms shown in Table 4.1. Thus, our example above would
be reported as: “Most respondents (11 of 21) saw this aspect of design reviews as critical.”

Table 4.1: Relative frequency descriptors for detailed findings
Descriptor
“few”
“some”
“most”
“all”

Frequency range
above 0% to below 20%
20% to 50%
above 50% to below 100%
100%

Example
1–4 of 21 respondents
5–10 of 21 respondents
11–20 of 21 respondents
21 of 21 respondents

The minimum threshold of support for reported findings in this chapter was set at the
“some respondents” level: over 20% of respondents made interview statements supporting
each research assertion. With additional corroborating data such as project or design organization documents, a finding may be reported at the lower “few respondents” threshold (more
than 0% but less than 20% of respondents).
A sample interview quote is typically given for each finding, to “be representative of a
group of people who share the same sentiment” (Bloomberg and Volpe 2016, 211).
If any participants disagreed with a finding, then that counter-opinion is described as
well (notwithstanding the relative frequency of the disagreeing participants).
Interviews and project documents cited in this chapter are listed in Appendix D.
Since the interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format, as described in Section 3.3, respondents were generally not asked the same questions. This necessarily resulted
in wider topic coverage and authentic dialogue that explored the respondents’ views, at the
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price of lower response counts against specific issues. Therefore, an assertion with 11 of 21
respondents sharing a view does not mean that the other 10 respondents disagreed with that
assertion (unless a counter-opinion is reported). Rather, it means that the other 10 respondents didn’t comment on that particular issue. Given the research format, for “some” (e.g.,
5 of 21) participants to independently raise an issue or give a similar response to a question
suggests a relatively supported sentiment. For “most” (e.g., 11 of 21) participants to independently voice a sentiment suggests a more widely held sentiment.

4.1.2 Summarized findings and criticisms
Summarized findings are shown in Table 4.2, along with the section(s) where supporting detailed findings are given. Some summarized findings are shown in two parts (RQ1 and
RQ2) when the summarized finding relates to both research questions. The linkages between
detailed findings and summarized findings are shown in Appendix E.

Table 4.2: Summarized findings
#
F1

F2

F3

F4

Finding
Role of action items and minutes in reviews: RQ1: Useful action items signify review success. Action items are used to assess whether review criteria are met, and action items identify critical issues. (§ 4.2.1.1) RQ2: Review minutes act as a formal organizational record and overall assessment.
(§ 4.3.1.1)
Contribution of subsystem reviews: RQ1: Subsystem reviews better than mission-level reviews at
technically detailed problem finding. (§ 4.2.1.2) RQ2: Subsystem reviews better for learning about
design details, but mission-level reviews broader in scope. Peer reviews have highest level of technical
detail, but are relatively narrow in scope. (§ 4.3.3.5)
Contribution of mission-level reviews: RQ1: Mission-level reviews better than subsystem reviews at
finding dependencies on external actors and assessing the design effort. (§ 4.2.1.3) RQ2: Mission-level
reviews better than subsystem reviews at finding overlooked design issues, assumptions, and broaderscope issues across the system. (§ 4.3.3.1, § 4.3.3.5)
Socio-technical role of mission-level reviews: RQ1: Mission-level reviews support socio-technical
needs that subsystem reviews do not: forcing client decisions, supporting client and design organization gate decisions, checking on project progress, and checking if project is following institutional
processes. Interactions with clients happened largely at mission-level reviews. (§ 4.2.3.1, § 4.2.4.2,
§ 4.2.4.3)
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Table 4.2: Summarized findings, continued
F5

F6

F7
F8

F9

F10

F11

F12

F13

Variation of reviews with design phase: RQ1: Earlier reviews allow team to influence design more,
but design largely not open to change after CDR. Amount of review action items influencing the design decreases with design phase. Design phase directly drives specific review content, criteria, and
scope of gate decisions. (§ 4.2.1.2, § 4.2.3.1) RQ2: Level of detail and expected design and process
maturity increase with design phase. Openness to changes in design decreases with design phase.
Design phase directly drives and expected baseline content. (§ 4.3.3.3, § 4.3.3.4, § 4.3.3.5)
Resource cost of reviews: RQ1: Pre-review work has high resource cost due to preparing data and
conducting dry runs. However, pre-review work helps project as a forcing function for work and forcing team communications, re-examining work, and creating a complete baseline. Tailoring reviews
can reduce review resource cost for small and risk-accepting projects, with client and organizational
negotiation and agreement. (§ 4.2.2.1, § 4.2.2.2)
Variation in resource cost of reviews: RQ1: Resource costs for review and formality lower in subsystem and peer reviews than mission-level reviews. (§ 4.2.2.1)
Review impact on decision gates and project progress: RQ1: Assessments and concerns from reviews are an input to decision gates, but not the sole consideration. Decision gates are typically “hard
gates”: significant impact to not passing a review and several common outcomes, including postponing reviews, additional work, delta reviews, liens, and cancellation. (§ 4.2.3.1, § 4.2.3.2, § 4.3.1.1)
Review contribution to project control: RQ1: Reviews act as a key project control measure by forcing
work and aligning development within the project schedule. Reviews allow control and insight between contractors, by providing communication and identifying process issues. (§ 4.2.2.2, § 4.2.4.1,
§ 4.2.4.4)
Review panel desired traits: RQ2: Important to have review panel members with expertise on the
system-under-design and independence from design team. Careful selection of reviewers is a critical
task for review organizers. (§ 4.3.2.1)
Information learned in reviews: RQ2: Reviews let reviewers and participants learn about project errors and issues, risks and risk management, design and process maturity, configuration management
and baselines, the design itself, project team competence, and project status. (§ 4.3.3.1, § 4.3.3.2,
§ 4.3.3.3, § 4.3.3.4, § 4.3.3.5, § 4.3.3.6)
Design team views on contribution of reviews at different levels: RQ1: Design team members believe subsystem-level reviews are better than mission-level reviews for getting directly useful actions,
technically influencing the design, and integrating the design. (§ 4.2.1.2) RQ2: Design team members
believe mission-level reviews do not impact their technical understanding of the design. (§ 4.3.3.5)
Panel member views on interactions at reviews: RQ1: Panel members see process of assigning and
modifying actions as a negotiation. (§ 4.2.1.4) RQ2: Panel members see the interactions and discussions at the review valuable for learning about design rationale, and finding assumptions and
overlooked design issues. (§ 4.3.2.3, § 4.3.3.1)

There were some common criticisms of reviews that met the reporting standards of
“findings.” Criticisms differ from findings primarily in that they are negative views of reviews.
These common criticisms are summarized in Table 4.3. These criticisms will be discussed in
the context of the main findings in Chapter 6.
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Table 4.3: Summarized criticisms of reviews
#
C1
C2
C3
C4

Criticism/Finding
Excessive review preparation: RQ1: Design team members see the amount of time spent on review
preparation as excessive. (§ 4.2.2.1)
Actions not meaningful: RQ1: Design team members feel that mission-level reviews don’t give them
meaningful action items, or actions are “work that they would have done anyway.” (§ 4.2.1.2)
Dog-and-pony shows: RQ2: Mission-level reviews can be “dog-and-pony shows,” with insufficient
detail. (§ 4.3.3.5)
Lack of panel preparation: RQ2: Review package often not reviewed by the panel prior to reviews,
reducing effectiveness. (§ 4.3.2.2)

4.2 Findings on how technical reviews impact project engineering and management
activities
This section gives detailed findings from interviews and documents on RQ1: how technical reviews impact project engineering and management activities.

4.2.1 How action items impact project work
This subsection gives findings from interviews and case project documents on how
action items impact project work.
Topics in this subsection include findings on the importance of action items from technical reviews, how action item work is technically useful for designs, document analysis on
what action item work focuses on, and how actions are managed and executed.
Summarized findings and criticism reported in this subsection appear in Table 4.4.
The finding text is modified from what was provided in Table 4.2 to clarify which part is being
reported.
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Table 4.4: Summarized findings and criticism: How action items impact project work
#
F1 (part)
C2
F12 (part)

F2 (part)
F5 (part)

F3 (part)
F13 (part)

4.2.1.1

Finding
Useful action items signify review success. Action items are used to assess whether review
criteria are met, and action items identify critical issues. (§ 4.2.1.1)
Design team members feel that mission-level reviews do not give them meaningful action
items, or actions are “work that they would have done anyway” (§ 4.2.1.2)
Design team members believe subsystem-level reviews are better than mission-level reviews
for getting directly useful actions, technically influencing the design, and integrating the design. (§ 4.2.1.2)
Subsystem reviews better than mission-level reviews at technically detailed problem finding.
(§ 4.2.1.2)
Earlier reviews allow team to influence design more, but design largely not open to change
after CDR. Amount of review action items influencing the design decreases with design phase.
(§ 4.2.1.2)
Mission-level reviews better than subsystem reviews at finding dependencies on external actors and assessing the design effort. (§ 4.2.1.3)
Panel members see process of assigning and modifying actions as a negotiation. (§ 4.2.1.4)

Views from interviews: What is the most important role of action items
In interviews, respondents often implied that they valued the action items more than

other outputs of reviews, such as minutes or discussions. When asked how successful they
thought the review was for the project, some respondents (10 of 21) discussed unprompted
whether they considered the action items useful.
Int: What did you think about that review? . . .
. . . The {NASASpaceProgram4} PDR, yes. Did it do what we needed?
EngLdr16: Yes. Yes. I think it met all of its review criteria. Having sat in the meeting, I think the
actions that were written were all reasonable, given the information that was presented.
And they were all relevant, in terms of things that really needed to be addressed. So,
yeah, I think it was a very successful review, in terms of the review itself being useful and
meeting its stated purpose. (EngLdr16, Interview #17)
Most respondents with the role of review board member (7 of 8) described action items
as a record of critical issues they found within their area of expertise during the review.

93

EngLdr33: [W]hat I do for a review is, I look over the charts ahead of time. I try to flip through
all of them. At some of the reviews, when you get into stuff like software, things like that,
that I really add no value, I may not pay much attention to that stuff. But I focus on the
mechanical stuff, which can be—mechanical design, thermal, structural analysis. I look
at those things, usually before the review. Spend some time thinking about it. And then
I come up with some questions. . . . I have a list of questions that I go through, and then,
typically in reviews, I do assign action items. If you get an answer that you’re not quite
happy with, you think they need to do some more work, that’s what action items are for.
(EngLdr33, Interview #12)
Some respondents with the role of review board member (3 of 8) referred to overall
review success as passing higher level review criteria, which were themselves assessed based
on the action items. The importance of review criteria is discussed later in Section 4.2.3.2.

4.2.1.2 Views from interviews: How action item work is technically useful for design
Most respondents (12 of 21) saw significant value in the technically detailed problemfinding in subsystem reviews. Subsystem reviews were an opportunity to “make detailed suggestions on how you might change the design” (Eng22, Interview #2).
Most respondents with the role of design team member in reviews held during phases
with subsystem reviews (4 of 7) said they received more directly useful action items from
subsystem-level reviews compared to mission-level reviews.
Int: So, the action items, or the [mission-level] review itself didn’t really change the work that
you were doing in the mission design team, in the subsequent phase, up to PDR.
EngLdr24: Right. Right.
Int: I guess the requirements were approved, and they were sufficient, and that was what you
needed.
EngLdr24: Right. Now if we’re including the subsystem PDR, I got a lot more action items out
of that. And that has been—I won’t say it’s driving, but that highlighted the places where
we needed to spend more time. That I kind of thought we had covered, but it was clear
that we needed to think through more deeply. (EngLdr24, Interview #4)
Some respondents within the design team (5 of 14) saw the action items at subsystem reviews as a way to technically influence other parts of the design and make it better94

integrated. These tended to be team members with a “linking pin function” (Likert 1961, 113):
systems engineers, subsystem leads, and leads for later phases like integration and test:
Int: So, what did you get out of those subsystem PDRs? They were, probably, hugely useful. I
notice you went to, like, all of them.
MSE2: Yeah.
Int: And you were kind of the linchpin in the middle who—you’ve been to them all, so you’re
saying—
MSE2: Sometimes things come up [at subsystem reviews] which the subsystem engineer can’t
deal with, so they flow up to me, to work across the system. And sometimes I’m there as
a reviewer myself, going, “I think we need to look at this a little more closely.” So, actions
come to me, actions come from me. (MSE2, Interview #20)
Some respondents on the design team (6 of 14) saw that design-impacting action items
varied with the case variable phase of review. Some respondents in the design team (4) noted
that they preferred reviews that were at earlier design phases because they could influence
the design more and there was less resistance to changes.
EngLdr35: On this project, I’m going to inherit most of my GSE from what they’re using to test
the {NASASpaceProgram5 subsystem/module electronics}. So, I am particularly interested in the design of the {NASASpaceProgram5 subsystem/module electronics} Ground
Support Equipment (GSE), because it’s going to become my GSE later.
Int: And hopefully, you can influence the design—
EngLdr35: And I want to influence the design, so they don’t have to make as many changes
later. Or it has the functionality that I need.
Int: And, do you find that you can influence it more, at the subsystem reviews, than at the project
reviews? Or is it different?
EngLdr35: Well, it’s different. I can influence more, early. It’s more early, as opposed to later—
than level.
Int: Than level of review. So, you want to be at the PDR—
EngLdr35: I want to be early, yes.
Int: Because at CDR, your ability to change the design might be—
EngLdr35: People are more resistant to making changes. (EngLdr35, Interview #11)
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Similarly, a few other respondents on the design team (2 of 14) said they received the
most action items changing the design at subsystem PDR, with less design-impacting actions
at subsystem CDR.
EngLdr22: But in terms of the actual feedback from the [mission-level] reviews, I didn’t get
anything that was worthwhile. Now the lower-level reviews, we do. We got a lot of action
items, there [at subsystem reviews]. The requirements [review], CDR, PDR—not so much
the CDR, a lot in the PDR—but we got a lot of action items there that we needed to resolve,
that ended up changing our design. (EngLdr22, Interview #3)
Although there were fewer action items at CDR, as discussed later in Section 4.3.3.5,
there was a higher level of detail presented on the design at CDR.
The other case variable affecting the influence of actions was review level, but respondents mentioned it less frequently than phase of review. Some respondents on the design team
(4 of 14) said they could influence the design with internal action items more at the subsystemlevel reviews than at the mission-level reviews:
EngLdr35: I probably ask more questions, and have more action items and get more interactions, at the lower-level reviews. Because at the higher-level review, it’s mostly a presentation of “here’s what it is” [taps table] and there isn’t much opportunity to affect the
system design, at that level. At least, I don’t find that. (EngLdr35, Interview #11)
A review criticism related to actions as a function of review level was that mission-level
reviews had less work impact on projects than subsystem-level reviews. Some (7 of 14) respondents on the design team said that mission-level reviews didn’t give them meaningful
action items, or that the action items were “work that they would have done anyway.”
Int: Were there any actions or work coming out of the [ORR] review, that influenced what you
as a team lead did, in the following spring? Or was it pretty much separate?
EngLdr36: I don’t recall anything. To be honest with you. Because virtually all the discussion items were things we were already planning to do, right? We had a test plan. Then
we were going to begin, once we got on orbit, working down the technical performance
measures. . . .
96

Int: So, you were briefing them on the status of things that you intended to do, and it wasn’t like
what they said during the review really deflected your plans or changed your plans.
EngLdr36: Not at all. (EngLdr36, Interview #19)
One direct counter-opinion to this assertion, discussed later in Section 4.3.3.4, was,
“The work would have been going on, but the design review . . . forces the work to be documented.” (EngLdr5, Interview #5)
As discussed later in an action item document analysis (Section 4.2.1.3), there are many
more action items at subsystem-level than at mission-level. For a set of two cases studied
where a near-complete set of action items were analyzed (E. NASASpaceProgram4 sPDR compared to F. NASASpaceProgram4 PDR), 10 of 12 subsystem PDRs had 329 action items. In
contrast, the mission-level PDR had only 29 action items. In this example, there were over ten
times as many action items from subsystem reviews than from the corresponding missionlevel review. Section 4.2.1.3 also presents data on how, at mission-level reviews, the focus of
the action items shifts from the design itself to more focus on the design effort.

4.2.1.3

Trends from documents: What action item work focuses on
A coding analysis was conducted of action items from the studied technical reviews;

see Section 3.4 for an overview of the analytic approach. The coding analysis examined the
frequency of attributes of action items. The analysis studied over 500 action items across all
reviews (see the inventory in Section D.2).
The attributes examined were:
1. whether the Action Item Focus was on the “artifact under design” vs. “the design effort”
2. whether the Action Item Actor was solely the design team, vs. having an “external” actor
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The first Action Item Focus coding category of “artifact under design” vs. “design effort”
was operationalized by developing the sub-codes in Table 4.5 to indicate the assessed primary
focus of each action item.

Table 4.5: Action Item Focus: Operationalization with sub-codes
Action Item Focus

Focused on artifact under design

Focused on design effort

Action Focus Subcode
Design below subsystem level
Operations concept or design concept
Spacecraft design, system-level
Subsystem design briefed at review
Subsystem design outside review brief
Budget
Design documentation
Design team or design org roles
Design team staffing
Development plan
External interfacing system
Failure reporting
General margins and technical budgets process
General requirements and documentation process
General technical design process
General test approach
Operator documentation
Process documentation
Procurement documentation
Project risk, general process
Project risk, resource
Project risk, schedule
Project risk, technical
Project scope
Reviews or review board composition
Schedule
System modeling
Test equipment

The second Action Item Actor coding category of “solely involving the design team” vs.
“having at least one external actor” was operationalized with the sub-codes in Table 4.6, which

98

were applied to all actions. If more than one external actor was involved in an action, then the
primary actor for that action was used.

Table 4.6: Action Item Actor: Operationalization with sub-codes
Action Item Actor

At least one
external actor

No external actor

Action Actor Subcode
Review board, entire
Board member
Client org
Design org
External interfacing design team, but not a subsystem
External, a non-interfacing team
External, a vendor of an external subsystem
External, a vendor of an external subsystem (action completely external)
Experts, within the client org
Experts, independent
No external actor (action to design team)
No external actor (action for internal design team coordination)

Action item documents from 15 technical reviews were examined, each with varying
study case variables (5 at mission level; 10 at subsystem level; 2 in Phase A, 11 in Phase B, 2 in
Phase D), with a total of 439 action items coded.
Data from one of the available eleven subsystem reviews were excluded from analysis because its case characteristics were significantly different from the others, and that review had correspondingly different data. Specifically, 57 action items from a subcontractorran (i.e., non-ContractorA) propulsion subsystem review (Doc E.12.2) were excluded. Analysis of these actions indicated that, as expected, there were relatively high numbers of “nonContractorA” actions as well as process-related actions, compared to reviews run internally
to ContractorA. The action item data from non-ContractorA reviews were insufficient to study
as a separate category, so that review was excluded from this analysis.
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A follow-on stability analysis was conducted to estimate the variation due to coding.
Coding stability (i.e., an estimated probability of the coder assessing that code in the same
way when re-examining an action) ranged from 80-97% for each code, as shown in Table 4.7.

Table 4.7: Coding stability rates for coding types against level of review
Review Level
Mission level
Subsystem level

Action Item Actor
87%
97.3%

Action Item Focus
80%
96.0%

A statistical model was developed to calculate maximum likelihood estimators and
confidence intervals on population proportions of actions with the above two sets of code
types, given variation from coding stability and sampling. The model used the binomial distribution to calculate statistics of small-sample estimates of a population proportion, given
error rates corresponding to the stability rates in Table 4.7 (i.e., the error rate is 100% minus
the stability rate).
Results from the statistical model for the first coding category (Action Item Focus), are
shown in Table 4.8. There was a significantly higher proportion (at the 95% confidence level) of
action items that focus on “the design effort” at mission-level reviews compared to subsystem
reviews. The majority of actions at mission-level reviews (estimated to be 65%) focus on the
“design effort.” At subsystem reviews, by contrast, the majority of actions (estimated to be
73%) focused on the “artifact under design.”
Results for the second coding category (Action Item Actor), are shown in Table 4.9.
There was a significantly higher proportion (at the 95% confidence level) of action items with
external actors at mission-level reviews compared to subsystem-level reviews. The majority
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Table 4.8: Variation in Action Item Focus with level of review
Level of review

95% CI on proportion of
action items focused on
design effort
0.53–0.77 (n=109, p̂=0.65)
0.21–0.33 (n=73, p̂=0.27)

Mission Level (m=5 reviews)
Subsystem Level (m=10 reviews)

95% CI on proportion of
action items focused on
artifact under design
0.23–0.47 (n=76, p̂=0.35)
0.67–0.79 (n=181, p̂=0.73)

Table 4.9: Variation in Action Item Actor with level of review
Level of review

Mission Level (m=5 reviews)
Subsystem Level (m=10 reviews)

95% CI on proportion of
action items with at least one
external actor
0.15–0.33 (n=56, p̂=0.23)
0.05–0.13 (n=26, p̂=0.08)

95% CI on proportion of
action items with no external
actor (only design team)
0.67–0.85 (n=129, p̂=0.77)
0.87–0.95 (n=228, p̂=0.92)

of actions only involve the design team at both mission level (estimated to be 77%) and subsystem level (estimated to be 92%).
Proportions of both types of codes for action items from reviews at different phases of
review were not significantly different at a 95% confidence interval. This suggests that action
items vary more strongly with level of review than with phase of review.
One finding from document coding analysis aligns with interview comments discussed
later: actions from mission-level reviews had more focus on external stakeholders than actions from subsystem-level reviews (Section 4.2.4.3):
EngLdr22: At these [mission-level] reviews, I don’t really get any benefit, but I’m sure that {EngLdr11} and NASA and the reviewers get a benefit.
Int: So, what do you think they get out of it?
EngLdr22: . . . If they see a technical flaw [taps table], it’s a good opportunity to do something
about it. I don’t think Flight Software reaches, or Ground Software or any of the software
[reviews] really, reaches the level where you’re going to see a technical flaw. . . . If you
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have any major problems, . . . at least you’re aware of those. Whether or not you can do
anything about them, I don’t know. (EngLdr22, Interview #3)
There were also interview comments aligned with the second finding from document
coding analysis: mission-level review actions had more focus on the design effort and processes, while subsystem-level reviews focused more on the artifact under design itself:
Int: When you look at the action items that get assigned [from the mission-level Pre-Environmental Review] . . . they tend to be procedural, you know, “When I was looking at the
SVP, I didn’t think there was a procedure to do XYZ.”
SrEngLdr1: Right.
Int: I didn’t see anything like, “Oh, you calculated this thing wrong”—
SrEngLdr1: Right.
Int: —but more, it seemed like, actions where, for example, {PanelMember1} said “I don’t think
you have a procedure to safe your high voltage lines in case there is a spike.” And so,
they’re technical, but they’re almost procedural-technical.
SrEngLdr1: Right, yes. Although you’ll find too—and I guess this is consistent with your interpretation [of procedural issues] here—issues with respect to some of the [test] failures
that have occurred. Like the PRTs, the temperature sensing resistors: platinum resistors
that are on the solar array. Where that hadn’t really been driven to ground yet, and it
was still an open issue. So that was flagged, and there was an action item on completing
and reporting back the results of that failure analysis and trying to understand if there
were any risks that remained against the project. For proceeding [to the next phase].
(SrEngLdr1, Interview #2)

4.2.1.4 Views from interviews and documents: How actions are managed and executed
There was evidence from interview comments, ContractorA process documents, and
technical review documents that the action items required a great deal of project work.
Some panel member respondents (3 of 8) discussed the negotiation and modification
of action items. The results of this negotiation were evident in multiple action item documents
from the cases (e.g., Doc A.3, B.2, B.3, B.7, B.10). Following mission-level reviews at ContractorA, there was significant negotiation on action items between project leadership and the
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review board. Typical agreements focused on the final scope of the actions and merging actions, as well as whether the actions were to be considered required work or downgraded to
optional “recommendations.”1
Sometimes the negotiations would result in an action item being withdrawn or dropped
completely in the weeks following the review, although more typically an action item was relabeled as a recommendation. At ContractorA, this negotiation typically happened between
the design project leadership and the Review Board Chair, but sometimes individual review
board members were involved and agreed to modify or withdraw their action. Two considerations whether to “accept” an action item were, first, the resource costs for action item-related
work, and, second, the benefit vs. added risk to the project. The final decisions on accepted
action items and agreed-to work were documented in official action item lists, which were
typically appended to the signed review minutes document (see Section 4.3.1).
EngLdr5: I’m a big believer that, when a review panel provides action items, the review panel
should make an effort to say: “This is an action; you will do this, will track it. This is a
recommendation; we think you should do it.” The program should get a chance to go
through and say: “Hey, that action, we think it’s a recommendation. That recommendation, you know, that’s really important, we’re going to do it anyway.” . . . But at the
end of the day, I think that the review panel has the right to say, “No, that’s not a recommendation,” [thumps table], “That’s an action. We expect that.” But there’s a back and
forth that—being on both sides—that I was always passionate about. So, there were a
number of times when I was being reviewed, where I’d say, “Yeah, that’s a recommendation, we’re kind of planning it anyway, it’s not mainlining. Here’s the rationale for why
I think it’s not an action, it’s a recommendation.” Often, that was accepted, sometimes
it wasn’t.
Int: And that’s a negotiation that you as PM [Program Manager] would do with, like {Panel
Chair} or the panel, or . . . ?
EngLdr5: Yeah. Yeah. (EngLdr5, Interview #5)
1. The terms for action items vary among organizations. ContractorA used “Action” for
mandatory actions, “Recommendation” for optional actions, and, less frequently, “Concern”
for issues not requiring action (Document CtrA.1, p. 35).
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As a counter-opinion, one panel member (1 of 8) had negative opinions about the negotiation and down-grading of his proposed action items. He felt that, due to resources and
schedule, his concerns were not being taken seriously by the project: “I did not see that they
were willing to take a lot of advice.” (MSE3, Interview #1)
Process documents internal to ContractorA (Document CtrA.1) and a few respondents
(3 of 17) described how action items were tracked and worked.
Actions were assigned to a particular individual and tracked to completion. Typically,
team leads were responsible for the actions within the project. They usually coordinated directly with the action item originator on the board—to provide information, conduct work, or
do whatever was necessary to close the action. Members of the larger team were sometimes
asked to help on action items.
The monitoring of action items was usually conducted by the design team management, usually by the Mission Systems Engineer. For subsystem reviews, action items were
generally managed by the subsystem team lead. Action item status was periodically briefed
to the client for mission-level action items. The design team briefed the status of action items
at subsequent technical reviews to show the timely completion of action items and to report
action items that were deferred or incomplete. (Document CtrA.1, 32–33)

4.2.2 How pre-review work affects design team
This subsection provides findings from interviews and case project documents on how
work to prepare for technical reviews affects design teams.
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Interviews indicated that there was considerable work required from design teams in
two major areas: (1) work to prepare for the review presentation, and (2) work to create a
complete design baseline to present.
A listing of the summarized findings reported in this subsection is shown in Table 4.10.
The finding text is truncated from the text in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 to show which part of the
finding is being reported.

Table 4.10: Summarized findings: How pre-review work affects design team
#
C1
F7
F6

F9 (part)

4.2.2.1

Finding
Design team members see the amount of time spent on review preparation as excessive.
(§ 4.2.2.1)
Resource costs for review and formality lower in subsystem and peer reviews than mission-level
reviews. (§ 4.2.2.1)
Pre-review work has high resource cost due to preparing data and conducting dry runs. However, pre-review work helps project as a forcing function for work and forcing team communications, re-examining work, and creating a complete baseline. (§ 4.2.2.1, § 4.2.2.2)
Reviews allow control and insight between contractors, by providing communication. (§ 4.2.2.2)

Views from interviews: How design teams prepare and what are resource costs of
review
Most respondents (12 of 21) noted the high resource cost in project time and attention

to prepare for the review.
EngLdr22: All the coordination that you have to put together, just to get one of these [reviews]
in place, is astronomical. I don’t know how much time {ProgramManager} spends on
something like this. It must be phenomenal. Again, at the end of the day, it’s sort of like,
“Well, we did all this, now we can keep moving. We lost some amount of time, because we
had to all sit down and do this.” [laughs] You know, it’s not quantifiable [taps table], how
much time we waste, or lost, because we had to all sit down and do these presentations.
(EngLdr22, Interview #3)
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The first major type of pre-review work was described by some respondents (6 of 21) as
preparing data for the review, either because data wasn’t documented that way in the project
or because it took time to communicate it well.
EngLdr22: So, it’s stuff that we already do [thumps table]. It’s just that we do it, not necessarily
all written down to that degree. Because we have tools, so we use the tools actively to
track things, as opposed to printing them out in PowerPoint, so they fit in a PowerPoint
slide. I don’t know how much time, if you could accumulate all the time that everybody
spends trying to fit something into a PowerPoint slide, in the space that’s available. I
don’t even want to put a dollar figure on that. [laughs]
Int: [Laughs] Right, as opposed to the guts of the brief.
EngLdr22: Yeah, right, imagine. I could just bring up Excel and show you: here’s my results,
here’s an Excel file. . . .
Yeah, but on the other hand, you know, if you wanted to see something like that, there’s
no permanent—Like, you, as an individual, looking at this project as a whole, that’s the
only way that I could convey that information [pointing at the slide]. You wouldn’t be
looking at the [internal] tool. So, I guess there’s plusses and minuses. It [the review] does
give you a product that if somebody outside the project wants to look at it, they have
something they could look at. (EngLdr22, Interview #3)
The second major type of pre-review work was described by some respondents (8 of
21) as conducting dry runs and preparations. Some respondents who were not on any review
boards (4 of 12) had negative views about the amount of work spent on dry runs. One of the
respondents said work on dry runs was both annoying and helpful:
EngLdr35: We almost stop work, two to three months before a PDR, a CDR—in order to prepare
for the PDR or CDR.
Int: Wow.
EngLdr35: And I find that disconcerting. But it’s almost become necessary.
Int: Are there dry runs, or do they want your documents early?
EngLdr35: It starts with initial—you start with when the review is [taps table], and you back
up. And so, you’ve got to have the package out a week, maybe two weeks before that.
And you want to have a final, a walk-through, before you say that they’re all done. And
we’ve got, we’ve come to a, [taps table] a series of three reviews, where you have a dry
run, a walk-through, and a flip-through. So, it’s almost two to three months before a
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review, where you have to have your first package ready. And then do a flip-through
with program people about it. (EngLdr35, Interview #11)
Finally, tailoring was noted as a way for projects to reduce the amount of pre-review
work or even to skip or combine reviews (internal process given in Doc A.1, p. 9). A few respondents (4 of 21) said they were allowed at ContractorA to tailor reviews for projects that
were smaller or accepted risk. The ability to tailor was conditional on an agreement between
the client and design organization.
Int: And do you think the level of depth and the time spent on reviews—as a Mission Systems
Engineer, someone who’s run a program—do you think it’s appropriate, or do you think
there is too much, too little?
MSE3: I think {ContractorA} does a good job of being able to tailor that as well. So, the program
that I’m on now, we’re not going to have as much in-depth reviews, as big panels, as long
reviews. But we’re a smaller program. We’re not a billion-dollar program. A billiondollar program, you should spend a little more time, probably. (MSE3, Interview #1)
As a counter-opinion, a few respondents (2 of 21) felt that tailoring was not a reality in
their ContractorA projects: reviews always required essentially the same amount of preparatory work because “no-one has been comfortable doing less than what they’ve done in the past”
(EngLdr24, Interview #4).
Some respondents who attended subsystem reviews (4 of 16) noted that the resource
cost of review preparation was lowest at internal “peer reviews,” “board reviews,” or “tabletop reviews,” the least formal type of review. Process document guidance for “peer reviews”
aligned with this view, suggesting a lower level of formality and relaxed requirements for documents, read-ahead material, and external representatives (CtrA.1, pp. 12, 25–26; CtrH.3, pp.
6, 10–11, 15). As discussed in Section 4.3.3.4, peer reviews were seen to have the highest level
of detail and narrowest focus:
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Int: How were those peer-level, board-level reviews different from a full-up subsystem review?
Eng24: They’re much less formal. So, the idea was, that the preparation work for these has
gotten to be a week long.
Int: You mean like prepping slides?
Eng24: For the big ones [formal subsystem reviews]. Yes. And dry runs and reviews has gotten to
be onerous. And that’s what the schematic-level reviews were turning into. So, to avoid
that, they said, “No, no, no, it’s not supposed to be that hard. We’re just going to go over
the schematics [at the tabletop/schematic-level review].” . . . So, having a board review—
you’re just looking for obvious problems. You can’t tell much about the functionality. . . .
. . . The idea of the tabletop review is, it limits the scope. (Eng24, Interview #23)

4.2.2.2

Views from interviews: How pre-review work benefits design technically
Most respondents (11 of 21) saw significant technical value in work done to prepare for

reviews:
SrEngLdr1: We’ve acknowledged to ourselves for years, in this business, that one of the main
benefits of these reviews is that it’s a forcing function for the project. That when the engineers sit down and start to do their slides and review graphs, they realize: “Oh, here’s a
gap that we haven’t closed yet. Here’s something that we ought to sit down and discuss
and agree on before we get to the review.” So, that serves a pretty important function in
itself. (SrEngLdr1, Interview #7)
Respondents noted several ways projects benefit technically from pre-review work.
One technical benefit noted by some (5 of 21) was the forced internal communication during dry runs:
EngLdr35: And usually you find that—those things [review dry runs] are annoying, but it turned
out to be good. Because it’s almost the first time where everybody sees everybody’s stuff.
And you find where the inconsistencies are. And you catch up on decisions that have
been made, that you haven’t incorporated in [taps table], either in your charts, or designs, or thoughts. And—so you’ve got something like solar arrays. And they say, [taps
table] “Oh, well, we’re not building them here anymore. We’re getting the contract [a
subcontract].” And they’re changing that.
Int: So, you got something out of that—or there’s a little bit that you get out of that.
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EngLdr35: I get almost more out of the dry run, than out of the real presentation, personally.
Because of the team review of the whole design. (EngLdr35, Interview #11)
A second technical benefit of pre-review work cited by some respondents (6 of 21) was
forcing “the whole design” (EngLdr35, Interview #11) to be created in the first place. Reviews
force the design team to stop and make necessary design decisions to create and document a
consistent baseline for the review:
MSE2: Everybody tells me, and I think it’s true from experience, that 90% of the value of the
[mission-level] review is: getting your ducks in a row to get into the review. So, it’s not
the review itself. (MSE2, Interview #18)
A few respondents (4 of 21) described a different process on internal design baselining
for subsystem-level reviews compared to mission-level reviews. For mission-level reviews,
the internal interactions to converge on the design baseline happened largely during the dry
runs:
Eng22: It’s again a thing that is standard {ContractorA} practice. You can be as critical as you
like [taps table] in the dry run, and in the flip-through [taps table], but when it gets to
the presentation with external people, you don’t be critical. . . .
External to the [design] group [but within ContractorA], you can say what you like. You
can say, “Oh, I think that’s a rubbishy way to do it. Why did you do it this way?” And
people do. [laughs] But when you’re doing this presentation, with a review board, and
people from NASA and so on, you don’t do that. You’ve already done that. (Eng22,
Interview #22)
For subsystem-level reviews, there were discussions and actions within the design team
during the review to converge on a baseline and solve issues.
Int: What do you get out of it [subsystem reviews], as a Mission Systems Engineer?
MSE2: We have so many discussions about what we’re doing. What we could do if something
[changes]—if this happens, we do this; if that happens, we do this. The subsystem PDRs
were really important for baselining. “Okay, this is our story. This is what we’re saying
we’re doing. We know there are other things we could do, but now we’ve picked one as
the baseline, and it’ll be a change from that. It’s not open [as a design trade] anymore.” I
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think that helps the entire team in that process. It also helps me, to go, “Okay, this is the
story. This is what we’re doing. Now I know.”
Int: “Let’s not wander around trade-space. What is our one—”
MSE2: “We’re picking this.” And that means that everybody else’s story has to be consistent with
that one, not, “If they do this, I’m doing this.” So, you have to start pinning things down,
saying, “This is what we’re doing.” [taps table] You always want [to have], in the back
of your head, “If that doesn’t work, how do I adjust?” But a big part of getting through
the review, and therefore into the next phase of the design and moving on, is figuring out
what is your baseline, not as, “Here are all the things we could do.” That was a big thing
I got out of it. MSE2, Interview #20)
A third technical benefit of pre-review work that a few (4 of 21) respondents cited was
that individual designers were forced to examine and question their own work in preparation
for facing an external review of their design. This forced re-examination improved their design
technically:
Eng22: The actual preparation [for the subsystem PDR] is valuable within reason. [laughs] If
it’s things like, “Yes we met this requirement; yes, we met that requirement,” that is not
valuable to the person presenting. It’s valuable to the people reviewing, but not to the
person presenting. But then, when you start to lay out what the design was, and why
it was, and how it met the requirements, that is actually a useful exercise even for the
presenter. Because it makes them put their thoughts in order and think about how other
people will understand the explanation. And you often pick things up, when you’re doing
that. You find little holes, that you haven’t thought about, and you can [taps table] fill
them in, even before it gets to the review. (Eng22, Interview #22)

4.2.3 How reviews and gate activities affect project work
This subsection gives findings from interviews and case project documents on how
technical reviews and their associated gate activities affect project work.
First, technical reviews affected project work in supporting “decision gate” activities,
both inside the design organization and by external organizations. Second, project work was
affected by the outcomes of decision gate activities when the gate was not a complete success.
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A listing of the summarized findings reported in this subsection is shown in Table 4.11.
The finding text is truncated from the text in Table 4.2 to show which part of the finding is being
reported.

Table 4.11: Summarized findings: How reviews and gate activities affect project work
#
F5 (part)
F4 (part)
F8 (part)

4.2.3.1

Finding
Design phase directly drives specific review content, criteria, and scope of gate decisions.
(§ 4.2.3.1)
Mission-level reviews support socio-technical needs that subsystem reviews do not: supporting
client and design organization gate decisions. (§ 4.2.3.1)
Assessments and concerns from reviews are an input to decision gates, but not the sole consideration. Decision gates are typically “hard gates”: significant impact to not passing a review and
several common outcomes, including postponing subsequent reviews, additional work, delta
reviews, liens, and cancellation. (§ 4.2.3.1, § 4.2.3.2)

Views from interviews: How reviews support decision gates
Some respondents (8 of 21) discussed, often unprompted, how the content of reviews

and scope of gate decisions at a particular review were driven by which review it was: the
design phase.
Int: I’m really focused on—how do [reviews] change and how do they add value . . . ?
MSE3: No problem and, basically, I have the same mindset that all those reviews are—these
are, in my mind, gates. And looking ahead is just as important as reviewing behind. So,
understanding at SRR how you’re going to get to PDR is just as important as showing
why you have this set of requirements. . . .
Looking back for that review [Pre-Environmental Review] in particular, you are supposed to be showing: we have a sound baseline, we’ve tested it thoroughly, and we’re
ready to go. (MSE3, Interview #1)
Some respondents (5 of 21) outlined the role of client-mandated reviews compared to
internal reviews managed by the design organization alone.
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There is a complex hierarchical structure of reviews led by client and client-nominated
board, reviews led by the design organization, and design-project-managed reviews. Some
mission-level reviews support decisions by the client organization, such as MDR, SRR, PDR,
CDR, System Integration Review (SIR), and ORR. Some “internal” mission-level reviews support decisions by the design organization, such as Mission Operations Review (MOR), PreEnvironmental Review (PER), Pre-Ship Review (PSR), and Flight Operations Review (FOR)
(CtrA.1, pp. 10, 13). Subsystem-level reviews and peer reviews support design team work on
major spacecraft subsystems in preparation for upcoming mission-level reviews (CtrA.1, pp.
11, 23–25).
MSE2: The things you have to present [at NASA technical reviews]— [NPR] 7123 [taps table]
defines it, 7120 defines—
Int: Right, I saw a spreadsheet you made, where you march through [NPR] 7123, and said, “yep,
yep, yep, yep.” [making check off motion]
MSE2: Yes.
Int: And, so, you’ve got to make sure that you’ve scratched the client’s needs, because you know
this is going to get looked at, at KDP B.
MSE2: Exactly. So, NASA [taps table] NPR 7120 and 7123 define all these things that you’re
supposed to do for SRR and MDR, and we [ContractorA] combine them. We have, in
our {process document CtrA.1}, what we expect to see done.
Int: So, you moosh those two together—
MSE2: So, I looked at all of them, and made sure we were ahead. (MSE2, Interview #18)
Some respondents in leadership roles (3 of 15) as well as case documents (B.6, B.7,
B.12) described the relation between technical reviews and major NASA milestone gate decisions. For these client-level decision gates, the technical review results were reported but were
not the sole consideration. In other words, the technical review board does not make the gate
decision, but it supports the client gate decision-maker with information on technical status
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and technical risk, to be weighed alongside other programmatic considerations such as cost
and government priorities:
MSE2: By the time you get to these KDPs with NASA, it’s not about any of this [technical] stuff.
You’d have to do really, really awfully on the [technical] review. You probably won’t go
to KDP until you’ve cleaned up that story, coming out of your review. So, at that point,
it’s: “Here’s what the mission is. We think this is interesting enough that we should do it.
Here’s how much it costs. Are you ready to sign up for the next step, in the process?” So,
it’s mostly a programmatic—
Int: Like, does the client, does NASA, as a government agency, want to fund you—
MSE2: Want to do this. Right.
Int: And, so they’re getting their own decision straight, internally.
MSE2: That’s right. . . .
So, this [ KDP] is the [NASA] senior management getting inputs from [the design organization], which is us [ContractorA] in this case. From the program office, and from
{NASA Office}, all saying: “We think the ducks are in a row in order to do this.” And running it through their own process. “Has the office of safety and mission assurance signed
off on it? Do the finance folks sign off on it? Did they do their cost estimates right; do
we accept this?” All that stuff [taps table] is: they [NASA] are going through their own
process, getting their own ducks in a row, so that [NASA] senior management will say,
“Yes, everything’s been checked off. Let’s go ahead to the next phase.”
(MSE2, Interview #18)
For one project studied—three cases: B (NASASpaceProgram4 SRR/MDR), E (NASASpaceProgram4 sPDR), and F (NASASpaceProgram4 PDR)—there was considerable debate
on risk posture and review panels for the mission-level reviews. Due to the small scale of the
project, the project and design organization leadership debated whether to tailor its reviews
and other technical processes as a small “Small Category 3, Class D project” (NASA 2014b,
118), or whether it was a “Class C” project and thus needed a full external NASA SRB. This
issue of how to tailor the processes and negotiating what the client and design organization
wanted was seen as significant by most respondents who attended reviews for the project (8
of 10).
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EngLdr5: At the first one [MDR/ SRR], we did not have a formal SRB, because frankly they were
still wrestling with [taps table] we want to be cost effective; we want to follow {ContractorA} processes with some mass of context for that. And ultimately, it will [be] tailored
against the NASA process. But part of that process means things like—our design review
chair from {ContractorA} and that’s okay, that he’s from the same organization. Our
mission assurance lead isn’t outside the program looking in; they are part of the program. . . .
So, the first review [MDR/ SRR] was almost purely {ContractorA} process, while the program was negotiating with NASA: “Okay, we understand you have SRB requirements,
and we’re going to follow that, but we still want to keep as much of {ContractorA} efficiency as possible.” By the second one [SRR update with SRB], that had been solved.
That’s why I showed up [and joined the SRB panel]—
Int: Solved in terms of—we found what NASA wanted.
EngLdr5: NASA agreed—we came to agreement with NASA. They were able to sell it up their
chain, from their program side up to formal NASA. . . .
“This is how we’re going to do it: we’re going to have an SRB. We’re going to allow people
on the SRB from the organization that’s the primary performer. But we’re calling them
consultants.” Things like that. (EngLdr5, Interview #5)
Some of the process negotiations were described as being within the design organization, as well as with the client, on how to handle reviews, documentation, and other technical
processes for a small project, and whether the design organization was willing to accept higher
risk levels associated with such reduced processes:
EngLdr34: We don’t typically do Class D missions. We usually do Class B missions. NASA
doesn’t typically do Class D missions, and so their documents are very thin on guidance. . . .
The most significant one I found, in terms of guidance, was from the acting [NASA] administrator, in which he said that it’s expected that projects will tailor the NASA guidelines, as appropriate for Class D. . . . He wants NASA to do more quick, instead of these
multi-billion-dollar missions that take 10 years and may or may not work. [laughs]
Int: But when you presented your plan to do that [at the review], it seemed like there were some
questions.
EngLdr34: Yeah, I think {ContractorA}’s nervous with that. And {EngLdr16} was representing
that, I think. Because we have our reputation to protect. And, despite NASA’s attitude, a
failure to {ContractorA} is a failure. The fact that it was a failure [taps table] on a low-cost
mission doesn’t really ease the pain much of that; a failure is a failure. [laughs] We’re
very sensitive to that. (EngLdr34, Interview #10)
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4.2.3.2

Views from interviews: How project work is impacted by failed or deferred gates
Many respondents discussed the consequences of failure (or near-failure) of a review.

Some respondents (6 of 21, no counter-opinions) said it was relatively rare to not pass a review
at ContractorA or NASA/ DoD, but it did happen:
EngLdr22: My question, sort of, in how all of these things [reviews] are: it’s always nice when
at the end, they say “You passed, and everything’s great.” I don’t know any that didn’t
pass, except for a handful. I’m aware of a handful. Not at {ContractorA}, a handful.
Int: Of subsystems, or systems?
EngLdr22: Systems. NASA system reviews that actually failed. There’s a handful. And usually,
it’s about costing. The cost is astronomical, so they can’t— And then I know at least one,
there was a program called—I forget the name of it; it was a long time ago. . . .
Int: They actually failed the review?
EngLdr22: They canceled it right after it failed the review. They decided technically it was not
going to work. (EngLdr22, Interview #3)
Some respondents did indicate (5 of 21) that the decision gates at ContractorA were
generally “hard gates” and that work could not proceed without approval:
SrEngLdr1: Like I said, when they’re [the spacecraft] all on the shake table [vibration testing
equipment]—they don’t shake until they get the go-ahead from the Pre-Environmental
Review. But sometimes these things are timed right at the last—I won’t say at the last
minute. It’s just that the schedule is such that, and the work has proceeded such that—
they’re really anticipating success out of the review, and giving the go-ahead. And, usually, that’s the case. . . .
Int: Because they’ve got the thing on the table—
SrEngLdr1: The [design] organization has executed properly, and they are ready. But it is a
formal gate, to say: “Yes, you’re ready to go ahead, you can shake tomorrow.” {The project} did the right thing by having this [review] a couple of weeks ahead. They knew that
they weren’t ready on the day of the Pre-Environmental Review or at the conclusion of
the review to start it. But they had the plans in place. They were proceeding along to be
able to do what it was that they were trying to get to. (SrEngLdr1, Interview #2)
Some respondents on boards and design team management (5 of 14) discussed unprompted using entry and exit criteria as the definition of review success. No respondents
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with working-level roles (0 of 7) discussed review criteria. At the review board and team leadership level, the review criteria were seen as accepted metrics for whether the design project
passed the review. Contractor process documents (CtrH.3, pp. 34–39; CtrA.1, pp. 14–23) also
stated criteria for reviews and how they should be assessed by the board. Criteria items varied
and were all directly linked to phase of review (i.e., a specific review like SRR).
Int: So, what was your view, coming out of there [the ORR], of the project and the quality management of the project? Were you satisfied with where that project was going?
EngLdr16: Certainly. And, it’s one of my obligations if I’m not, to let that be known. All of the
technical reviews that we have here [at ContractorA], we have [taps table] pre-defined
entry and exit criteria. And almost always, unless it’s totally obvious that it was passing
with flying colors, the review board caucuses and each review board member is able
to speak to their assessment of—to what degree did the project meet the criteria for the
review, was the review successful, and bring up any action items of note that they may
have thought were necessary to satisfy the review criteria. (EngLdr16, Interview #17)
Respondents discussed several major classes of “non-success” review outcomes. Some
respondents (5 of 21) said the most common “non-success” outcome was postponing the review or having an “extended phase” if the project leadership or design organization leaders
thought that the design team couldn’t meet the review criteria before the review. This was
considered a serious thing if unplanned, because of the difficulty of arranging the review and
the impacts to the project plan of rescheduling the review.
A few respondents (2 of 21) said reviews that were “assessed poorly” (MSE2, Interview
#18) most commonly received many actions from the panel that took time to recover from. A
poor review board assessment would likely have to be recovered from before proceeding to a
client milestone decision or key decision point (KDP), which could have schedule impacts to
the project.
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Some respondents (5 of 21) discussed having delta reviews to recover from unsuccessful reviews, but that was said to be more common at subsystem level reviews than at missionlevel reviews for ContractorA. 2
Int: So, it’s rare for [ContractorA] to say “don’t proceed” [at a review]. . . .
Have you had times where you would re-convene the board or is it usually just: there’s a
slew of actions and those need to be met?
SrEngLdr1: Usually, there’s a “slew of actions,” and they have to be met, or maybe just one
subject area that was felt that it wasn’t up to the maturity of the rest of the project. And
usually the project realizes that going in. And so, they say, “We’re doing this, but we’re
going to have this review a month later, because this element is lagging.” So that happens.
Way, way back, we did have delta-reviews, delta-CDRs, red team reviews, and things like
that. But again, they’re just addressing deficiencies of the first review.
Int: Check.
SrEngLdr1: But not as comprehensive. You’re not repeating the stuff that basically was given
a passing grade the first time around. (SrEngLdr1, Interview #2)
A few respondents (4 of 21) described rarely being allowed a “lien” and allowed to continue work into the next phase despite not passing a review criterion. Typically, liens against
review criteria at ContractorA were done by exception, with discussion and acceptance of
the risk by the design organization, client, and review panel. Liens against review criteria
were much rarer than the more-accepted liens and waivers against design requirements (Doc
CtrA.1, pp. 21–22).
SrEngLdr1: The verification activity is part of the process that is not optional. And that’s what
I was telling them [the design team] to do. And I want to make sure that they have done
that. Now, should it be a lien against shipment? Well, we’ll have to see how things turn
out. There is still some work that is being done in certain areas. . . . Within the [space]
community, particularly for these complex types of projects and missions, it is not unusual to still be faced with a lot of work that you’ve got to burn down before you can say
you’re ready to launch. (SrEngLdr1, Interview #2)
2. There were two types of “delta reviews” discussed by respondents: (1) A planned delta
review, typically for small modifications from a prior design baseline (also called a “heritage
review,” per CtrA.1 p. 21), and (2) an unplanned delta review, typically as a result of not passing
review criteria (CtrA.1, p. 30).
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Finally, as discussed above, the rarest outcome mentioned by a few respondents (3 of
21) was an outright failure at the review followed by cancellation (or reassigning subsystem
design to another organization).

4.2.4 How reviews affect other project management work
This subsection provides findings from interviews on how technical reviews affect other
project management work.
Reviews affected multiple areas of project work: managing within the design team,
interactions between the project and the larger design organization, managing project interactions with the client, and managing project interactions with external stakeholders.
A listing of the summarized findings reported in this subsection is shown in Table 4.12.
The finding text is truncated from the text in Table 4.2 to show which part of the finding is being
reported.

Table 4.12: Summarized findings and criticisms: How technical reviews affect other project
management work
#
F9 (part)

F4 (part)

Finding
Reviews act as a key project control measure by forcing work and aligning development within
the project schedule. Reviews allow control and insight between contractors, by providing communication and identifying process issues. (§ 4.2.4.1, § 4.2.4.4)
Mission-level reviews support socio-technical needs that subsystem reviews do not: forcing
client decisions, supporting client and design organization monitoring of the project. (§ 4.2.4.2,
§ 4.2.4.3)

118

4.2.4.1

Views from interviews and documents: How reviews help manage the design
team
Reviews had roles in management internal to the design project. Some respondents

from the design teams (4 of 14) saw that design reviews acted as a “forcing function” on work
within design phases, helping focus effort by groups within the design team:
EngLdr24: So, around June or July, I think it sunk in, like: “In two to three months we’re having
a review. We need to put our heads in the game.” And there was a dramatic change, in
my opinion, of how the team operated.
Int: Was that because {MSE2} said “get going”? Did you all realize the SRR was really going to
happen?
EngLdr24: Yeah, it was because whether the mission goes forward or not, you’re about to stand
in front of your peers and show what work you’ve done.
Int: Three days [at the review] to show your work—?
EngLdr24: Yeah. And needing to have a design that closed. And so, a lot of the things before
when you couldn’t get ahold of somebody, or they would put you off for a few days, or—
there was an urgency that developed pretty quickly. . . .
. . . I think everybody was on the same page that we needed to have—charts needed to
be ready, three to four weeks in advance. There was a bunch of outstanding questions
and trades that needed to be run to ground. (EngLdr24, Interview #4)
Some respondents noted how design reviews helped to coordinate and communicate
internally to the team in dry runs and subsystem reviews, as described earlier in Section 4.2.1.2.
Technical reviews appeared to help manage the partitioned design by acting as mileposts aligning subsystem and component technical development within the overall project
schedule. There were several sets of evidence supporting the role of technical reviews in sequencing work.
First, project schedules (e.g., A.6) showed that spacecraft development was extremely
complex, with hundreds of subordinate efforts to develop components, managed in master
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schedules typically holding thousands of elements. A large fraction of the master schedule
elements was a hierarchy of subsystem and component technical reviews: one sample schedule (A.6) had approximately 300 different technical review schedule elements in a 3000-line
schedule for one design phase. These schedule elements rolled up and traced to phases of the
project, which were demarcated by the mission-level reviews.
Second, the alignment of work by reviews was also evident in action items analyzed
earlier (Section 4.2.1.3): 86 of 508 action items analyzed (17%) included text to conduct work
by a specific later technical review or design phase (and design phases are defined by milestones linked to technical reviews, as discussed in Section 4.2.3.1).
Third, interviews also supported the role of reviews in managing the design. Some
respondents (8 of 21) discussed how action items and project work was structured relative to
technical review dates.
Int: I noticed you had a whole campaign [of subsystem reviews]
MSE2: Mm-hmm.
Int: I mean, there were eight or ten of them. Did you choose which ones to have when, or was it
driven by—
MSE2: It was largely driven by the subsystem. They said, “When are you going to be ready?
What does your schedule mean you need to have had it?” And this one [project] was
a little different. For example, the structure / mechanical [subsystem PDR] was in July.
And the Mission PDR was in April. So, that’s—nine months? . . . We had it nine months
early, but that’s because the schedule dictated we had to go out and buy our structure,
in order to make schedule. Normally you wouldn’t start your long-leads [long-lead time
procurement of components] until after PDR. But, because of schedule, we went to NASA
and said, “We need to take this risk.” And they said, “Okay.” So, we held the review at a
reasonable time to do that. (MSE2, Interview #20)
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4.2.4.2

Views from interviews: How reviews help manage project interactions with
design organization
Reviews, particularly at mission-level, were seen by some respondents (6 of 21) as im-

portant for the larger design organization of ContractorA: checking on the progress and quality of the project and ensuring institutional processes were followed.
EngLdr36: What I would say is if we had completely and utterly failed the ORR, the [spacecraft
system] would still have launched on the same schedule. We [the review] had no effect
on that. What we did have an effect on was whether we met our {ContractorA} quality assurance, mission assurance, configuration management, and systems engineering
processes.
Int: Huh. And so, it was {ContractorA} as an organization, convincing yourself that you were
ready. The system was going to launch but—it was {ContractorA} as an organization,
checking that you were ready.
EngLdr36: Yeah. So that’s why the panel consisted of [the ContractorA] Chief Engineer and
{EngLdr16} in his role as, I guess, Mission Assurance [Lead] (EngLdr36, Interview #19)

4.2.4.3

Views from interviews: How reviews help manage project interactions with
client organization
One major role of design reviews noted by most respondents (12 of 21) was to give nec-

essary insight to the client organization into the project, so the client agrees with and supports
the project:
EngLdr5: Part of my view of all of these [reviews], and the way that I always approached programs was—I am giving my [government sponsor] champion the story they need to continue to say, “this is a compelling use of taxpayer money.” And if it isn’t, then we shouldn’t
spend the money. If that story isn’t true, isn’t coherent, can’t be explained at whatever
level—a one-chart summary to, you know, the Administrator of NASA or a four-star general, or a [Congressional] staffer—that: “Oh, okay, I get it, and there’s progress. This is
worth investing in.” Because at the end of the day, all these missions—that’s the [client’s]
decision: “Are we willing—if I’ve got another dollar, do I want to spend it on this mission,
or do I want to spend it on something else?” (EngLdr5, Interview #5)
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Some respondents (9 of 21) said that it was important not just to give insight at the
reviews but also to be open and honest with the client or review board in order to increase
their trust and confidence in the project.
EngLdr34: And you want to be as transparent as you can with these folks [client and SRB at
the review].
Int: So that they have a confidence in you?
EngLdr34: So that, yes, when you tell them that something’s okay, that—I’m assuming you
provide the data. But that they accept it. . . . If you’ve developed this confrontational
relationship [at the review], you could provide a terrific set of data, and they’re still not
going to believe it. [laughs]
Int: Because they’d say, “Oh, wait, these guys are holding [back]—” [laughing]
EngLdr34: Yeah, yeah. So, I think that developing that transparency, and sense of confidence
and trust [is important]. I think you’ve seen that on {NASASpaceProgram2}, with how
{EngLdr11} is running things. The government feels that he’s been very open and honest
with them about the problems that we’ve encountered. And what has happened? Well,
they opened up their purse and said, “Here’s some more money. Go fix it.” They have the
reserve they’ve set aside. . . . And when we identify a problem, they give us money out of
their reserve to address it. (EngLdr34, Interview #25)
From an analysis of attendee lists in review minutes (e.g., CtrA.E.1.1, E.2.2, A.3), interactions with client representatives appeared to happen largely at the mission-level reviews,
rather than at subsystem-level reviews. At more formal subsystem reviews (“subsystem PDRs,”
for example), external (non-ContractorA) observers such as SRB members were stated to be
“encouraged” per ContractorA process documents (Doc CtrA.1, p. 13). However, a few (4 of
21) respondents noted a counter-opinion against this process document formal position, that
external observers were less common and could hamper the free exchange of ideas, particularly at “internal tabletop” or “peer review” detailed subsystem reviews:
Int: So—if you [an external observer] come to the internal review, [ContractorA staff ] might
have an expectation of discretion, in terms of: we’re showing you an intermediate work
product.
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Eng22: I think we should have an expectation of that, maybe even formally. But I hope it just
won’t happen. We won’t do that [have external observers present], in general.
Int: Interesting.
Eng22: Because otherwise, it starts to defeat the purpose of that [internal tabletop] review,
which is that—anybody can say anything about anything. (Eng22, Interview #22)
As a counter-opinion– a few respondents (4 of 21) noted that on some projects (such
as case E. NASASpaceProgram4 sPDR), there was commonly an SRB representative present
at most of the subsystem reviews like “subsystem PDR” (as opposed to the less formal, more
internal “peer reviews”).
EngLdr34: We had people from outside the {NASASpaceProgram4} team [at the subsystem review]. But not outside {ContractorA}. Except for {DoDAgency1Manager1}. . . . And he
was there as a courtesy. He was not an official member of that review panel.
Int: Was he mostly there for insight, or did he actually—?
EngLdr34: He asked a few questions. He was mostly there for insight. And I think it makes sense
to invite them. It’s part of transparency; developing an open relationship with the SRB.
He can then go back and think about what he saw, and maybe come to the mission PDR
prepared to ask more detailed questions if he wants. So, I think that is a good benefit.
Int: Do you think it held any of the {ContractorA people} back on what they’d say, that there’s
this guy sitting there?
EngLdr34: Well.
Int: Or is that not how {ContractorA} engineers roll?
EngLdr34: Yeah, you know our culture. “We eat our own,” as the saying goes. We don’t hold
anything back, regardless of who is in the room. [taps table] I don’t think it caused anybody to hold anything back. (EngLdr34, Interview #25)
Some respondents who attended mission-level reviews (5 of 15) said an important role
of reviews is to identify issues that need client decisions and to force necessary client or external stakeholder action. This issue was not brought up by respondents who only attended
subsystem reviews.
EngLdr34: That {NASASpaceProgram4InstrumentB} idea has been kicked around now for quite
a while, and it is time to fish or cut bait on that. . . .
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And we’re going to need more money [to integrate the added instrument]. Because we’re
going to have to take trips to {SpecificCountry}. And interface with these folks, and a lot
of technical detail. . . .
Int: You know, that’s one of those useful things where it’s not necessarily a {ContractorA} decision. [ContractorA] can only cue it up so much. And so, you think that might have been
helpful for the board to highlight?
EngLdr34: I think so. Yeah. I think that was a big help, from the Mission PDR. To the project.
Recognize those areas where decisions need to be made quickly, decisively.
(EngLdr34, Interview #25)

4.2.4.4

Views from interviews: How reviews help manage project interactions with
external contractors
Reviews were used as a standard formal interaction to manage the design relation-

ship between ContractorA and other interfacing contractors (the other contractor was either
a subcontractor to ContractorA or a prime contractor that ContractorA was a subcontractor
underneath). Most respondents (12 of 21) discussed how reviews allowed insight and control
between contractors:
Int: What I thought was interesting, was more that part of [ContractorA] quality assurance,
when you subcontract, is going to their reviews. Is that left to the leads, or sometimes
does the mission assurance lead for the project go to these reviews, to help surveil the
subcontractors?
EngLdr16: So there, it varies. It does, admittedly, vary from project to project. Certainly, based
on the risk classification of the mission. But generally speaking, the safety and mission
assurance lead would go to the technical reviews and participate in the technical reviews
at all of our subcontractors.
Int: Wow. Which is a—pretty sizable chunk of time.
EngLdr16: Correct. So, they’ll do PDRs, CDR, Pre-Ship Reviews. They actually—generally
speaking, the safety and mission assurance involvement increases over time. We’ll actually usually be at the subcontractor’s facility a day or two longer than the rest of the
technical team, reviewing the end item data package, either before or after the Pre-Ship
Review. Typically, we like to confirm that everything is fully compliant before we accept
whatever the subcontractor has built or prepared. [taps table]
Int: Huh.
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EngLdr16: It sounds harsh, but it’s much easier to reject it, while it’s still at the subcontractor’s
facility . . . than—accept it, we get it here, and then we decide, “Oh, it’s non-conforming.”
And then, we’re faced with, “Do we try to fix it? Do we send it back? Is there a risk in
sending it back?” (EngLdr16, Interview #17)
In one of the cases (C. NASASpaceProgram5 sPDR), ContractorA was a subcontractor
developing a spacecraft subsystem and was expected to follow all of the prime contractor’s review practices (C.9, CtrH.3, CtrH.4). The prime contractor (ContractorH) was noted by most
respondents attending project reviews of Case C (4 of 6) as having participated strongly in
ContractorA’s reviews, and to have required ContractorA to follow the prime’s design processes:
Int: I noticed that, {NASASpaceProgram5} that was one of the things was, there was the whole
{ContractorA}/{ContractorH} thing, and {ContractorA} is almost acting like a sub [subcontractor]. So, how did that change [ContractorA] work, or what you saw in the review,
or how the review was done? Was it like other {ContractorA} reviews? I mean, it was four
days, which—
EngLdr33: Right. It was four days. And there were a lot of {ContractorH} reviewers on the
panel. . . .
. . . I would say that it was still pretty much a {ContractorA} review. We were doing
stuff, unfortunately—we’ve been trying to be teammates with {ContractorH}, and it’s
not working out. . . .
Just the attitude towards, rather than thinking of us as a place that could have some good
ideas, it’s more like, “We know what’s best. We’ll just tell you what to do.” That’s been an
issue, and, you know, how we have to do structural loads, we have to do it this way.
Int: So, you’re hearing this from the engineers, or was this something you saw in the course of
the review? Or you hear it during the work week, from {ContractorA} guys?
EngLdr33: I definitely hear it from the people on the team. It was obvious, though, when we
presented our structural stuff. They kept talking about doing it “the {ContractorH} way.”
And it was, “This is how {ContractorH} says we have to do it.” . . .
[taps table] . . . It was obvious from the review that we were having to do it their way,
because it was their spacecraft. (EngLdr33, Interview #12)
In another case, (E. NASASpaceProgram4 sPDR), the entire propulsion subsystem was
built by another contractor (ContractorL). Most respondents attending project mission-level
125

reviews of Case E (5 of 8) described how reviews highlighted communication and process issues between ContractorA and the other contractor, such as how to conduct reviews and priorities of work:
Int: I was surprised at the level of requirements discussions, at a [subsystem] PDR.
MSE2: They [ContractorL] were having a lot of staffing problems. And they had not gotten
enough work done [taps table]. And, we kept the PDR date, to force them to get work
done.
Int: So, for {ContractorA}, the [subsystem] PDR with {ContractorL} was a useful forcing function.
MSE2: Reviews are always forcing functions, yes. So.
Int: Both for your own team, and for subs [subcontractors]?
MSE2: Yeah. And also, for government, to make them make decisions. It’s another thing you
can use to manage upward. (MSE2, Interview #20)

4.3 Findings on how technical reviews impact self-reported views and knowledge of the
project
This section gives findings from interviews and project documents about RQ2: how
technical reviews impact self-reported views and knowledge of the project. Subsections give
findings from interviews and case project documents on how review minutes are a formal
view and assessment; how participants develop their views; and particular areas where participants develop views.

4.3.1 How review minutes act as formal assessment of design
Minutes were a permanent project document and a record of the design review. The
minutes were observed to have played several roles in recording formal views and assessments of the project.
126

A listing of the summarized findings reported in this subsection is shown in Table 4.13.
The finding text is truncated from the text in Table 4.2 to show which part of the finding is being
reported.

Table 4.13: Summarized findings: How review minutes act as assessment of design
#
F8 (part)
F1

4.3.1.1

Finding
Assessments and concerns from reviews are an input to decision gates, but not the sole consideration. (§ 4.3.1.1)
Review minutes act as a formal organizational record and overall assessment. (§ 4.3.1.1)

Views from interviews and documents: How minutes act as assessments and
documentation
According to some respondents who attended the project mission reviews (3 of 8) and

project KDP documents (B.6, B.7, B.12, B.13, B.14, F.7, F.8), assessments and “areas of concern” were the primary outputs of reviews briefed to the major NASA milestone (KDP) decision board. The review action items were briefed to the KDP decision authority as data supporting those assessments. NASA SRB-managed reviews had formal briefings acting similar
to minutes documents in recording action items and assessments (B.13, F.7).
Int: What was your expectation, walking out of that [SRR] meeting, on all these yellow [assessments against criteria], and the things you felt like that weren’t done?
SrEngLdr1: More of my expectation was—is that I think there was going to be a KDP—
Int: Okay, so you knew that there was a KDP—
SrEngLdr1: At [NASA] Headquarters. Yeah. And they were going to have to answer about
those [yellow assessments] for the KDP. . . .
I actually had to stand up at the KDP [taps table] at [NASA] Headquarters. . . .
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So, I gave my summary of the SRR/MDR that we had conducted internally [at ContractorA], and the outcome. And basically, my evaluation was on the progress that they had
made since then [taps table]. (SrEngLdr1, Interview #7)
For ContractorA subsystem-level reviews, the stated use of the minutes (CtrA.1, p. 12)
was to be documentation of the review. In keeping with this formal role of permanent review
records, the minutes documents were purposefully distributed and stored. First, most ContractorA minutes (9 of 14) were marked to be distributed to key people in the design organization: attendees and technical leaders (e.g., B.2, p. 4; E.1.1, p. 6). Second, most ContractorA
reviews studied (14 of 16) had minutes documents on available project document repositories
(e.g., A.3, B.2, E.1.2, E.2.3).

4.3.1.2

Views from interviews and documents: What are key contents of review minutes
The review minutes were a formal decision output of the review, according to inter-

views and process documents (CtrA.1, CtrH.1).
All of the contractor process documents governing technical reviews (A.1, pp. 11–12;
CtrH, p. 16) required minutes or review board reports for “formal” reviews. NASA SRBs had
the most formal reporting processes, with several levels of reporting, from snapshot reports
immediately following the review, to final formal briefings to the milestone decision authority
with project input (B.13, F.7).
The minutes examined held several standard data elements (CtrA.1, p. 12). First, as
discussed earlier in Section 4.2.1.4, all minutes (15 of 15) contained the action items or referred to them. The minutes held the “final” action items after the process of post-review negotiation of action items.
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Second, most minutes (12 of 15) stated a final overall assessment of the design, usually
in general terms. Mission-level reviews had more formal assessments, with most minutes
or outbriefs (3 of 4) having “stoplight” assessment charts against the criteria elements (B.13,
F.7), as discussed earlier in Section 4.2.3.2. The one subcontractor-held review (E.12.2) gave a
formal assessment against criteria, similar to mission-level reviews.
Int: What was your impressions of the first NASASpaceProgram4 SRR in August?
SrEngLdr1: Well, we rated them with a lot of yellow against the success criteria.
Int: Because you had a summary brief to the [NASA SRB] board in February, and then . . . [you
presented] here’s where we are at, in addition to your minutes.
SrEngLdr1: Right. Right. And, I heard from some of the project members [after] the [SRR]
outbrief. And some of them were pretty upset, at the outbrief.
Int: Because of getting all the yellows?
SrEngLdr1: Mmm-hmm. And, you know, yellow was not a fail. But it meant: here are some
issues. (SrEngLdr1, Interview #7)
Third, all (15 of 15) minutes documents had information on review panel members
and attendees, and most minutes (9 of 15) reported the review agenda.

4.3.2 How review participants develop views and knowledge
This subsection gives findings on how participants develop their views. One important
area is the selection of the panel to ensure they have existing expertise and independence to
enhance the review. A second area is how the panel prepares for reviews prior to the review.
A third area is how participants learn from interactions during the review.
A listing of the summarized findings reported in this subsection is given in Table 4.14.
The finding text is truncated from the text in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 to show which part of the
finding is being reported.
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Table 4.14: Summarized findings and criticism: How review participants develop views and
knowledge
#
F10
C4
F13 (part)

4.3.2.1

Finding
Important to have review panel members with expertise on the system-under-design and independence from design team. (§ 4.3.2.1)
Review package often not reviewed by the panel prior to reviews, reducing effectiveness.
(§ 4.3.2.2)
Panel members see the interactions and discussions at the review valuable for learning about
design rationale and overlooked design issues. (§ 4.3.2.3)

Views from interviews: How panel is chosen for expertise and independence
Careful selection of reviewers was seen as a critical task of the chair or design organi-

zation, from ContractorA process documents (CtrA.1, p. 11) as well as comments by some
respondents (7 of 21):
Int: How do you decide who should be the panel members?
SrEngLdr1: One of the first things I do for any review, basically, is look at: What are the hard
parts of this mission? What are the hard parts of what they’re doing? And then I make
sure that I have the right subject matter experts. (SrEngLdr1, Interview #2)
Most respondents (11 of 21) noted that a key component of views and knowledge of
the panel was the panel’s existing expertise on systems similar to those designed.
EngLdr5: They [the project] got—and this is key—they got direction and markers of where the
board was concerned. Not just to answer the board, but because the broader board at
the mission-level SRR brought a lot of experience. So, they were legitimately things to
look at.
Int: So, they had the expertise—
EngLdr5: They had the expertise on the board to say, “Hey, these are some of the things that
we would worry about.” And the team may have been planning to do that anyway, but
they got, I think, clear guidance that: “Hey, these are some concerns. You’ve got these
launch windows that are hard to explain. You’ve got a timeliness nature because of the
nature of the dynamics of this particular mission. These are some things you ought to
do.” (EngLdr5, Interview #5)
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ContractorA process documents (CtrA.1, p. 11) require that board members be independent of the design team, defined as not being directly involved in designing the item under review. Some respondents (7 of 21) commented that independent reviewers on the panel
were valuable:
Int: The people who are inside the team, I would think they know the software in more detail,
but you as an independent person, what did you see your role in the [subsystem PDR]
review?
EngLdr45: Well, I think that the key thing is that, they [project members] don’t develop myopic vision. And they get so focused in their work that they don’t consider alternative
solutions, or “gotchas” or problems that they may not foresee. So, by having that [panel
member] independence, it’s a fresh thought. So, folks, you know, who are not in on a
day-to-day basis, who don’t develop that myopic vision, and say, “Okay, they may not
be considering a larger problem.” And that helps. (EngLdr45, Interview #24)

4.3.2.2

Views from interviews and documents: How review package is used before and
after review
The ContractorA process document also mandated sending read-ahead packages to

panel members in advance for formal reviews but not for peer reviews (CtrA.1, p. 12). ContractorA had a formal process document expectation that panel members examine “the presentation material, reaching back to the drawings or the requirements or whatever it may be—in
advance of the meeting” (EngLdr16, Interview #17).
Despite this written process expectation, some respondents (7 of 21) said that reviewers did not always examine the package in advance. They varied in their views on the rationale
and consequences for review members not doing pre-review work. Some (3 of the 7) saw it
as a problem that not all reviewers were spending the time to review the package and that it
reduced the effectiveness of the review.
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EngLdr34: [taps table] I had one observation I wanted to share with you [about the missionlevel PDR]. And that is that I don’t think the official review panel had done their homework. . . . There were several times they asked a question of the speaker. And the answer
was on the next slide or on the next plus-two slide. . . . Telling me that they had not looked
at the slides at all in advance, and I think that should be an obligation if you agree to
serve on that panel. We’re required to send the package out at least a week, or maybe
it was 10 days in advance. . . . So, what’s the point of that, if they’re not going to look at
them?
Int: Right.
EngLdr34: I know they’re all busy, and they all have other jobs, but they shouldn’t agree to be
on the panel if they can’t devote that time.
Int: What do you think [was] the consequence of that? Did it waste your time, or did it reduce
the quality of the review?
EngLdr34: I would say both. Probably more of the second one. I think you reduce the quality
of the review. If they have looked at the slides—I know when I’m on a panel like that,
I’m old-fashioned. I print out a hard copy. And I write questions on the slides. . . . Then
when the real presentation is up, you’ve got your questions [taps table] there on the slide.
You’re following along, and you’ve got your questions. You can decide whether to ask
them. (EngLdr34, Interview #25)
As counter-opinions, some (3 of the 7 discussing pre-review work) said that reviewers
seldom had the time and, given the amount and technical detail of the material, they felt prereview wouldn’t be effective. One respondent said he preferred to go to dry runs rather than
read the package. One respondent said he didn’t need to prepare ahead of time because he
felt he knew enough to contribute.
Eng24: So, they’re supposed to give you [taps table] the package, a week in advance [of the
subsystem review]. That’s not often followed, and even then, all you’ve got is a bunch
of data sheets. And data sheets for processors, you know, now they’re a couple hundred
pages, right? So— [taps table] what do you do with that? That’s difficult. So, I get called
in [onto review panels] on a lot of LEON processor designs, because I’ve worked with
it—from 2009 to 2013 or something. So, I know the usual problems. And I know their
limitations. (Eng24, Interview #23)
Some respondents (6 of 21) discussed using the technical review package for learning
or communication after the design review. They discussed using review packages for people
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outside the design team to learn or reuse work (3), for their own later work or later project use
(2), in training new engineers (1), and technical coordination with external contractors (1).
Eng22: And the documentation in the [subsystem] PDR, if they come in after the PDR, that helps
get them started, too. But there really isn’t enough detail in the PDR [presentations] to
do more than get them going, but it’s good if you’re bringing in exchange [workers]—
Int: Right, they’re going to have to go to the circuit drawing level—
Eng22: They’re going to have to dig down, beyond that. But nevertheless, it’s a good— just
because the designer has made a presentation which discusses, even at a high level, what
it’s about. That helps somebody new to the program. So, we normally, if somebody comes
in, we give them PDR and CDR [presentations], and we often give them documentation
from previous instruments, just to give them an idea of what sort of thing we’re doing.
(Eng22, Interview #22)
As a counter-opinion, one respondent said that technical review presentations didn’t
have enough explanation of assumptions and other details of the work to act as engineeringlevel reference documents for new engineers (EngLdr3, Interview #14).

4.3.2.3

Views from interviews: How participants learn from review interactions
Most respondents who were panel members on the case projects or prior projects (8 of

10) discussed how they learned from and found value in the discussions at the review. Panel
members found various things of value in the review discussions. Some (5 of 10) said that the
questions from the review panel were critical and that questions that were not well-answered
would turn into actions. Some (3 of 10) said that they would ask about things beyond the
slides, such as the rationale behind design decisions and where it seemed the project could
be overlooking key issues.
Int: So, your questions [at the review]—are they to poke at their design, or there were things that
didn’t make sense to you in their design?
EngLdr33: Or, yeah—didn’t make sense one way or another. Usually there are two things. One,
if you are wondering [and] it seems like it is unusual what they’re doing. Ask a question
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about that. Or, if it looks like they haven’t looked into something that you think might
be a problem. Those would be the kind of questions you would ask.
(EngLdr33, Interview #12)
Some respondents who were panel members at subsystem- or peer-level reviews (3 of
6), said that the verbal interactions at subsystem reviews were mostly a detailed walk-through
and questioning of every item in the design:
Eng22: The [subsystem] PDR is when you could expect things which might change your design.
You don’t usually get them. But you get discussion around it, and that can help. Any sort
of discussion around the details can help because, you know, maybe you’ve not gotten
an interface just right [taps table]. And again, {ContractorA} is very good about letting
people cross interfaces to make sure everything’s all right. But the reviewers can do that
even more. So, you can get valuable feedback, definitely. Now, the [subsystem] CDR—
you really shouldn’t get any feedback, except: “good job.” (Eng22, Interview #22)
Some respondents (6 of 21) said that, beyond learning from other team members (see
Section 4.2.2.2), project members found value from hearing at reviews from stakeholders with
whom they didn’t normally interact, such as clients or users:
Eng9: That [ORR] was one of my main times to actually see what the customer was interested
in. What was concerning him; see whether or not any of that stuff might be related to
things that I was working on specifically. But, more importantly, just things that relate
to what he’s worried about, in terms of his operations.
Int: So, it was an opportunity for all of you, to all be present, and then I guess, you’d hear from
people—like you say, the clients that [project staff ] may not interact with a lot or hear
from.
Eng9: Yeah, I wasn’t personally interacting with a lot of them. And so, always want to know
what the customer wants. Again, {ContractorA} is a very customer-focused organization.
We can do lots of different things. But if you’re not doing what the customer wants, then
you’re not really providing products from {ContractorA}’s point of view.
(Eng9, Interview #13)
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4.3.3 What review participants learn about project and design
Respondents commonly identified several specific areas where reviews change views
and knowledge about the project and design. One area is learning about errors and issues in
the design. A second area is learning about risks to the project. A third area is learning about
maturity of the design. A fourth area is learning about design baselines and the associated
configuration management of the project. Another area is learning about the design itself and
views on the associated level of detail of the design. A final area is learning about design team
competence and project status.
A listing of the summarized findings reported in this subsection is shown in Table 4.15.
The finding text is truncated from the text in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 to show which part of the
finding is being reported.

Table 4.15: Summarized findings and criticism: What review participants learn about project
and design
#
F11

F3 (part)
F13 (part)
F5 (part)

F2 (part)

F12 (part)
C3

Finding
Reviews let reviewers and participants learn about project errors and issues, risks and risk
management, design and process maturity, configuration management and baselines, the design itself, project team competence, and project status. (§ 4.3.3.1, § 4.3.3.2, § 4.3.3.3, § 4.3.3.4,
§ 4.3.3.5, § 4.3.3.6)
Mission-level reviews better than subsystem reviews at finding overlooked design issues, assumptions, and broader-scope issues across the system. (§ 4.3.3.1, § 4.3.3.5)
Panel members see interactions and discussions at reviews useful for finding assumptions and
overlooked design issues. (§ 4.3.3.1)
Level of detail and expected design and process maturity increase with design phase. Openness to changes in design decreases with design phase. Design phase directly drives expected
baseline content. (§ 4.3.3.3, § 4.3.3.4, § 4.3.3.5)
Subsystem reviews better for learning about design details, but mission-level reviews broader
in scope. Peer reviews have highest level of technical detail, but are relatively narrow in scope.
(§ 4.3.3.5)
Design team members believe mission-level reviews do not impact their technical understanding of the design. (§ 4.3.3.5)
Mission-level reviews can be “dog-and-pony shows,” with insufficient detail. (§ 4.3.3.5)
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4.3.3.1

Views from interviews and documents: What review participants learn about
error and issue identification
Most respondents (13 of 21) discussed that reviews identified errors and issues, many

of which became action items. Terms used in interviews and documents varied from “mistakes,” “errors,” and “not being correct” (denoting errors in detailed design or analysis) to “issues,” which was often used to denote larger problems with design, design process, or the
design team. Particularly in assessment documents such as minutes and milestone briefings
(e.g., B.12), sometimes issues were called “concerns” or “areas of concern,” denoting major
problems: “things you ought to worry about” (EngLdr5, Interview #5). Other terms, “open issues” or “open items” were used (e.g., CtrH.3, pp. 31, 35; CtrA.1, pp. 29, 31) for things that
were known but “hadn’t really been driven to ground yet” (SrEngLdr1, Interview #2).
Some respondents noted (as discussed earlier in Section 4.2.1.1) that more detailed
actions and technical error identification happened primarily at subsystem reviews. As noted
earlier, technical issues could range in significance from major changes to fairly concrete “silly
mistakes” in the design itself:
Eng22: The PDR and CDR are sections of a larger review. So, the [subsystem] tabletop reviews
are very informal, very small group. People who will look at the design and say, “Well,
you should have connected this, and, and . . .” And that is valuable [taps table], because
it picks up silly mistakes. It sometimes goes off on a tangent, but it’s valuable. . . .
Int: So, did you attend the tabletop review, or the peer review that happened for this? . . .
Eng22: Yes. I did attend that, but I was partially presenting at that, so I was mixed [presenter
and reviewer] in that case. But it’s [the tabletop review] very informal, everybody talks
about everything.
Int: Now, is it a smaller group, or is it just—
Eng22: Yes. It’s usually a smaller group. It’s usually internal to {ContractorA}. Even if it’s a big
program.
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Int: Now, is there more opportunity to change the design then? Or is the main benefit the level
of detail that you have?
Eng22: It’s really the level of detail. And you can make detailed suggestions on how you might
change the design. (Eng22, Interview #22)
Some respondents who attended mission-level reviews (5 of 15) felt that mission-level
reviews could find issues where the design team “missed things” or had internal assumptions
that may not be true:
SrEngLdr1: You want review panel members who have the experience to be able to probe, to
find out what the project is not telling you. Or to make sure—and it may be an innocent
oversight on [the design team’s] part, that to [the design team], this issue is settled, so it’s
not worth any discussion. But that’s part of why you do reviews, is because the project
may be too close to an issue. [They may] think that something that has been settled is no
longer a risk, [but it] really isn’t settled. And there is still some risk out there. And so, you
ask those probing questions to find out if there are any deficiencies and what [the project
has] been doing. And I’ll say that projects do self-disclose some things. But you want
to make sure that there aren’t other things that for whatever reason they haven’t either
brought forward on their own, or they just did not realize the significance of something
and they thought that they could retire this [issue], and there was really still more work
to do. . . .
Int: . . . So, you’re saying that—it wasn’t so much, was there enough detail [in review slides], but
that you want to have the people on the panel that will see the unspoken assumptions
and poke at them.
SrEngLdr1: Yeah. (SrEngLdr1, Interview #2)
The prevalence of the view that mission-level reviews could find overlooked issues or
assumptions in the design varied with respondent role. Of the 5 respondents who felt that
mission-level reviews could find missed issues or assumptions, most (4 of 5) were on review
panels (4 of 8 review panel respondents), and only 1 was on the design team (1 of 14 design
team respondents). As a counter-opinion, some respondents on the design team (3 of 14)
viewed it as unlikely that mission-level review panels found something that the design team
missed.

137

Int: Was it really different at the peer review that you got to run, versus a big room full of people
[at the mission-level review]? . . .
EngLdr24: Mmm-hmm. I don’t think it was that different, big vs. small. [pause] I think people tend to take it pretty seriously, which I like. There is value there. I think that the
conclusions that I’m reaching, being new to it, are that—you know your material better
than any of your reviewers will. So, the value [of the mission-level review]: if they find
something that you didn’t think of, some inconsistency, that’s useful. But I was expecting that I would present and someone would say, “Oh, here’s this huge aspect you didn’t
even think about.” But I’ve been thinking about this for a year, and you’ve been thinking
about it for a week. Pretty unlikely that there’s something I’ve missed that you came up
with. (EngLdr24, Interview #4)
There was less discussion about finding “overlooked design issues” at subsystem reviews compared to mission-level reviews, but it was brought up by some respondents who
attended subsystem reviews (3 of 14).
EngLdr34: I think subsystem reviews [in the project] are working. Somebody says, “Every review is a requirements review,” and that’s true to some extent. So, subsystem reviews are
a good way to review the requirements and see if they’ve missed anything.
(EngLdr34, Review#25)
Other areas where reviews were seen to help identify issues include project risks, design maturity, baselines and configuration management, the design itself, team competence,
and project status.

4.3.3.2 Views from interviews and documents: What review participants learn about
project risks
Risks and risk management were often implicit and explicit topics at technical reviews,
from interviews and project documents.
Process documents stated that risk identification was a central role of reviews. In the
main ContractorA process document (CtrA.1), the only explicit discussion of risk was in riskrelated items required to be presented at reviews. However, the document stated that the
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purpose of reviews was to identify “potential problems” early (p. 9), which aligns with what
respondents called “risks” or “issues.” In contrast, the ContractorH review process document
stated that performance risk identification and problem identification were two of five objectives of a review (CtrH.1, p. 5).
Some respondents (6 of 21) discussed how the review board examined specific risks
and whether they were in the risk database or other methods like design margins:
EngLdr22: But for the project-level [reviews], generally all they’re [the panel] concerned about
is to make sure that you’re within your margins. And, we had some problems {with margin}. So that’s had a lot of visibility. It wasn’t really a specific action on that. Particularly
since we already had a risk on it. So, if we didn’t have a risk, maybe they would have
said “write a risk.” (EngLdr22, Interview #3)
Some respondents (8 of 21) discussed how the review checked whether the risk management of the project was effective:
Int: So, was it—the board wanted to understand the risks that were out there?
SrEngLdr1: Yes, and—you’re also looking for thoroughness on the part of the project to wrap
up all these loose ends. And to make sure that something important doesn’t remain
hanging that can come and bite them in the end. Which is a risk, you know, technical
and programmatic. (SrEngLdr1, Interview #2)
All three respondents who had experience as Mission Systems Engineers noted how it
was important that the design project get from the reviews an as-complete-as-possible view of
the risks to the project:
MSE2: We’ve been pushing them [subsystem subcontractor] on this, and they’re getting better.
But, for a long time, they were persisting in—“We’re only reviewing this piece. We’re
only reviewing this piece.” But both of those [pieces] had to come together in order to
get the {NASASpaceProgram4} solution. So, I need to make sure that when we do our
CDR, it is a review of the entire story. And [the subcontractor doesn’t] say, “Well, that’s
a {NASATechProgram1} project risk.” So, [at subsystem PDR] they had a separate set of
risks for {NASATechProgram1}. . . .
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And, that’s the way they’re used to working. It was a mind-set change. . . . They had
a NASATechProgram1 delivery risk, schedule risk on the NASATechProgram1 side. I’m
like: “Well, that’s not enough. We need, for {NASASpaceProgram4}, that there is a risk
that {NASATechProgram1} [subsystem] is delivered late to the {NASASpaceProgram4}
side of the house, and therefore—”
Int: Impacts your work under this [main/prime] contract.
MSE2: Right. I needed a full set of risks. (MSE2, Interview #20)
Risks were common issues raised in written action items from reviews. From the analysis of review action items discussed in Section 4.2.1.3, there were 140 references to “risk”
among the text of 508 action items. Risk-related actions were most commonly either (1) requests for risk analysis, (2) creation of a new formal project risk, or (3) modification of an
existing project risk.

4.3.3.3

Views from interviews and documents: What review participants learn about
project design maturity
Reviews also were a forum for assessment of whether the maturity of the design was

appropriate for the review.
The importance placed on maturity assessment in reviews varies among relevant process documents. ContractorA review process documents (CtrA.1) only appeared to mention
design maturity in passing. However, the corresponding ContractorH process document has
the board check on maturity as a primary success criterion for each review (CtrH.3, pp. 28–30,
etc.).
For the projects examined, the maturity at mission-level reviews was typically assessed
as one of several success criteria for the review, with wording directly matching NASA guidance. For example, one maturity assessment criteria from one review (CtrA Doc B.2, p. 9)
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was taken word-for-word from NASA’s MDR criteria element (NASA 2018, 31): “The maturity
of the project’s mission/system definition and associated plans is sufficient to begin Phase B,
and the mission can likely be achieved within available resources with acceptable risk.” As a
result, at mission-level reviews, the panel made an overall group assessment of the maturity
of the design (see Section 4.2.1.1).
Some respondents (7 of 21) discussed how they assessed the project’s level of maturity
of design or processes and whether it was sufficient for that review phase:
MSE2: Any time you’re running a project, there’s a balance between: here are my risk areas,
I want to focus more attention there, and keeping everything else moving, so that it all
stays at the schedule it needs to be on in order to get to flight. So, when these gate reviews
come up, typically a lot of what happens is: “We had all these risks that we worked really,
really hard on.” But there are all these other boxes we’re supposed to check, that you
have to go up and bring everything to a PDR level, not just the things that you were most
worried about. . . . The PDR forces you to stop, reassess everything, and bring everything
to close to a PDR level of maturity. Same thing with CDR. We’re going to come out of PDR
and go, “Here are the things we’re worried about. We’re going to hit those hard. We’re
going to try to keep other stuff moving.” But by CDR, we’ve got to have drawings. You’ve
got to go back and say, “Does all of my secondary structure have drawings, not just the
little pieces that I was most concerned with in modeling? I have to have drawings for
every bracket.” So, those sorts of things [reviews]—it forces you to do good engineering
hygiene. The discipline to go make sure that every piece of it has been addressed, not just
the ones that you’re most concerned about. (MSE2, Interview #18)
Finally, a few respondents attending mission-level reviews (3 of 16) discussed Technology Readiness Level (TRL) as a surrogate for the maturity of specific technologies at design
review time. One contractor document (CtrH.3) similarly had maturity expectations stated as
TRLs, However, in contrast, ContractorA process documents did not give specific guidance
on expectations of TRLs achieved at specific reviews. Respondents discussing TRL (3) simply
used TRL in discussions as accepted definitions (specifically: TRL 6 should be shown at CDR,
TRL 9 means the technology is flight-proven):
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SrEngLdr1: Around here [at ContractorA], we’ve tried to advance our avionics architectures
within the context of flight programs, because we don’t get a lot of money to do Internal
Research and Development (IRAD).
Int: So, you get the Non-Recurring Engineering [funds] (NRE) from the project and move the
state-of-art in your design along.
SrEngLdr1: Right. We have had some IRAD money to do some of the preliminary work in this
avionics architecture. But it’s never enough to take it to TRL 6, and then we can hand
the design over to the project and say, “Here, now you go ahead and take it the rest of the
way to flight.” So, there’s always some developmental work that we ask them [the design
project] to do. (SrEngLdr1, Interview #7)

4.3.3.4

Views from interviews and documents: What review participants learn about
project baselines and configuration management
As discussed earlier (see Section 4.2.2.2), the design reviews forced project work to cre-

ate a design baseline at the time of review. Most respondents (11 of 21) discussed that technical reviews involved a check on the documentation and configuration management of that
baseline.
EngLdr5: It [the SRR] drives the team, at a minimum, to get [taps table] all the things they’re
doing in some form of coherence so that the team, the systems engineering crew, the programmatic crew, can look at it all and say, “Is it all starting to form a piece of Jell-O that
might actually work?”
Int: So, it triggered some work? It triggered the project to get rolling . . .
EngLdr5: The work would have been going on, but the design review—it’s the double-edged
sword, right? It forces the work to be documented. In a way that can be explained [taps
table] in almost what amounts to an executive session. (EngLdr5, Interview #5)
There was a counter-position, discussed by one respondent: the purpose of reviews
for one case was supposed to be mostly communication and less documentation. This was
because the smaller project was meant to be tailored to reduce regular formal processes, but
the respondent wasn’t sure that tailoring was occurring. Separately, a respondent in a leadership role on that project noted that the tailoring for lighter documentation of reviews didn’t
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actually work out, and standard documentation and processes were required by the design
organization (see earlier discussion on review tailoring in Section 4.2.2.1).
Some respondents (8 of 21) discussed how the rationale for reviewing the document
baseline and specific focus items changed with phase of design:
EngLdr5: Typically, we do combined SRR/Concept Design Review (CoDR). My sort of view of
that [CoDR] is: I want requirements, and I want you to show me a concept that closes
[taps table] against those requirements. Doesn’t have to be the right one; doesn’t have
to be optimized. But I want to know that I have a feasible solution that can meet those
requirements, and how it would actually be built. The first meeting was quote-unquote
an SRR/CoDR, even though we hadn’t kind of finalized an SRB or any of that. So, a lot of
the discussion was on the CoDR side—the concept design side—rather than the requirement side. When we did the delta [SRR update review], we said, “Okay, we’ve worked
the concept,”—we did touch the concept [at the delta SRR update]—but we gave a little
more time to: “these are the requirements.” So that as every subsystem would stand up,
there was a trace back to the initial high-level requirements. Level 0 [needs-level], Level
1 [system-level] requirements—and they could say, “My driving requirements from Level
1 or Level 2 [spacecraft-level] are here. Here’s how I derive to my next level down.”
(EngLdr5, Interview #5)
Unprompted, some respondents (9 of 21) brought up the ContractorA process document guidance (CtrA.1) when discussing the scope and focus of the review. In respondent
comments, the expected baseline and specific contents presented for each type of review
seemed accepted and fairly well-known, as listed out in the ContractorA review process document (e.g., CtrA.1, pp. 14–15).
EngLdr33: But, you know, if I compare the peer reviews of the two [ContractorH and ContractorA], because I was also on {NASASpaceProgram5 subsystem/module} peer review.
Again, it probably has to do a little bit because it was {ContractorH} [as project prime
contractor]. It was a little more formal. [taps table] Because there were a lot more external people. There were external people even in the peer review. But, you know, the
requirements [for the review] are the same, right? We work to what is in the quality—
{ContractorA Quality Standard}, right? There’s a document there, that says what you’re
supposed to present at PDR. And you use that as an outline [taps table] of what you expect [at the review]. (EngLdr33, Interview #12)
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4.3.3.5

Views from interviews: What review participants learn about the design and how
level of detail varies in reviews
Some respondents who were not presenting at the review (7 of 14) discussed that they

learned a lot about the design from reviews and related activities:
Int: Are the reviews a convenient place for you to learn about the design? Where else are your
major venues to learn about {NASASpaceProgram5 subsystem/module}?
EngLdr35: It’s the reviews, and the precursor reviews. That is true. I do learn a lot about the
design at these reviews.
Int: Because you’ve got all the details all at once?
EngLdr35: Yes, and it’s in presentation form, that is easy to digest. I get most of the design [from]
the requirements and specification documents but find them hard to fit a picture of what
a thing really is. . . .
Int: And so, it helps you to have the slides, rather than the pure documentation of drawings and
specs.
EngLdr35: Yes. Yes. Yes. . . .
Int: What do you think about reviews and how they impact your work at {ContractorA}? Are
they doing what you need them to do, as a System Integration Lead? [pause] I guess you
said you get a fair bit out of the subsystem reviews.
EngLdr35: I do. I get a lot of information, understanding of what things are, out of them [reviews]. And a chance to impact designs of things that I care about. That affect me.
(EngLdr35, Interview #11)
Most respondents who presented at the review (5 of 7) had a different opinion about
mission-level reviews (in contrast to subsystem reviews). They said mission-level reviews
did not significantly impact their technical understanding of the design. They reported that
mission-level reviews either were not relevant to them or covered issues they already mostly
knew about:
Int: In terms of the review and learning about the rest of the project—did you learn? You’ve
been immersed in {NASASpaceProgram2} for years, so did you learn anything about the
wider project?
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EngLdr22: I still learn some things. I typically don’t sit in for the whole [mission-level] review,
though.
Int: Just because it’s three solid days?
EngLdr22: It’s three solid days, and it goes into areas that, honestly, I don’t even really comprehend. [laughs] Like, some of the instruments and the data collection . . . I’m not an
engineer. And that may be part of it. That’s not my interest or expertise, and so there’s
nothing I can add, and there’s nothing that I really gain. Especially when I have all these
issues [pointing at list of software issues in-work] that I’m trying to deal with. I’m not
a big meeting person, so that may be part of it too. If I don’t feel like I’m going to get a
benefit, I don’t go to the meeting. (EngLdr22, Interview #3)
Some respondents (9 of 21) noted that the review level affected what they could learn,
similar to the discussion about the level of detail of action items (see Section 4.2.1.2). Subsystem reviews had more details, while mission-level reviews were less detailed but broader in
scope.
MSE2: The mission PDR is caught up in all of the formalism of NASA. And it’s a huge deal,
because it determines whether you go to KDP-C or not. These [subsystem PDRs] were for
our own [design project] use. So, we could focus them. And there’s less risk. It’s better to
find these things out at the subsystem PDR, than it is at the mission PDR.
Int: So, there’s a different environment there [at subsystem PDRs]; you’re more free to make
changes in critical things, because it’s inside the team?
MSE2: I think so, that’s true. It’s also just—at the mission PDR, there’s much more programmatics, and risk, and interactions and high-level stuff that {NASA Office6} cares about. . . .
They [NASA] get much more, inherently [at mission-level PDR], because we excluded
programmatics from the subsystem PDRs, for the most part. (MSE2, Interview #20)
Most respondents who attended both subsystem- and mission-level reviews (6 of 7)
saw mission-level reviews as less effective for learning about details and identifying most technical problems compared to subsystem-level reviews. They said this was because of the lack
of review time and having external participants at mission-level reviews.

145

Peer reviews, also known as tabletop reviews (internal reviews below subsystem reviews), were noted by some respondents (8 of 21) to have the highest level of technical detail
but cover a relatively limited scope:
SrEngLdr1: There’s a difference in the level of technical penetration, if you will. The peer reviews are, I think, the most technically-oriented, and get into the deeper technical details of them all. That’s what you want. You want that good thorough review with people looking at the details of these implementations. And really giving a critical eye to
them. And that gets harder and harder as you go through that review hierarchy. And in
fact, . . . the major lifecycle review—like the mission-level PDR or something like that—
has almost become like a “meta-review”: a review of the reviews. You’re wanting to make
sure that they followed a good thorough process leading up to that lifecycle review. You
get a summary [at mission PDR] of the results of the peer and the subsystem-level PDRs,
and where the action items are, from answering that. (SrEngLdr1, Interview #2)
A related counter-opinion on the time constraints and panel ability to identify issues
was related to panel expertise. A few participants (3 of 21) indicated that if review attendees were from outside the design team then the time available during the review was simply
not sufficient to learn enough about the design and technology to meaningfully contribute—
unless they had existing expertise. This supports the importance of panel selection discussed
earlier in Section 4.3.2.1.
Respondents were more negative about mission-level reviews and their formalism and
relatively lower level of technical detail. One criticism by some respondents who attended
mission-level reviews (4 of 15) was that they sometimes are “dog-and-pony shows”: unable to
conduct true technical critique. One reported reason for this was to avoid argument: “Often
the leads start going: ‘I’d better make sure everything is smooth [at the review]. None of the real
issues come out; I want things addressed beforehand.’ ” (MSE2, Interview #20). Another driver
for lack of detail was reported to be lack of time:
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EngLdr33: [T]o be honest with you, at the peer review, is where you really see the details. Most of
our big PDRs and CDRs, the big [mission-level] reviews, are turning into dog-and-pony
shows.
Int: Because it’s just the slides, or no-one wants to change anything?
EngLdr33: No, it’s the fact that even in a three-day review, there’s not enough time to get into
the details of what you need to get into. So, that’s why the peer reviews are there. The peer
reviews allow you to sit down, and you spend four hours just talking about the structure
[taps table]. And you have one that you just talk about thermal [taps table]. And you
can really get into the nuts and bolts. Well, you don’t—you know, if Structure and Thermal, Mechanical Design, and Propulsion, each have four hours, that’s two days. And
you’ve got a lot more to do with a spacecraft PDR, right? You’ve got Software, you’ve got
Ops [Operations], you’ve got Ground Systems, you’ve got Integration and Test, you’ve got
Quality, you’ve got ah-dah-ah-dah. Just, to add—
Int: So, they could never go to the level—
EngLdr33: There’s no way, in a big review, that you could go into the kind of detail that you can
in the peer review.
Int: So, you couldn’t see [for example] the distances, and the fasteners [in the mechanical design].
EngLdr33: Nope. Nope. You couldn’t. You’d never see that. . . .
. . . But yeah, I think the real, the real engineering happens at the peer reviews, not at the
PDRs and CDRs. (EngLdr33, Interview #12)
Some respondents (5 of 21) noted a variation in detail level with phase (alongside level
of review variation). In general, CDR was seen as having the highest detail level on the chosen design. The CDR was an explanation of the chosen design and testing results (Eng22,
Interview #22). The PDR had a lower level of detail but was more open to design inputs (see
Section 4.2.1.2). Reviews before PDR had lower detail and presented the design at a high level.
Reviews after CDR were seen as having the design largely not open to change. These observations generally aligned with process documentation: ContractorA termed the CDR a review
of the “final detailed design” (CtrA.1, p. 18), and ContractorH termed CDR a “review of the
results of the detailed design” (CtrH.3, p. 56).
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Eng22: As a reviewer, most of what I do is pretty detailed stuff. I look at the requirement flowdown, but not much; there are systems engineers who do that much more than I do. What
I do is, look at the performance, and the schematics if they’re available, which they are,
for PDR. And go through and, in some detail, ask questions, relevant to that. So, at PDR,
I think—for me personally—it’s more valuable to the person preparing it, than it is to a
reviewer like me, because it’s not super-detailed.
Int: Is there a point where you get to see that level of detail?
Eng22: You see it at the tabletop review, in great detail. You see a little bit of it at the CDR,
because then they’ve done the prototype board, and the engineering model board, and
they present results. . . .
If you had them [detailed results], you want to present them, but it’s not required for
the PDR. And that part of it is of interest to me. But if they haven’t gotten far enough to
present that, it gets to be—talking about what they’re going to do, rather than what they
have done. And it’s hard to review that, in detail. . . .
So, PDR and CDR—for me, they are always useful for the presenter because they have
to organize things. But for the reviewer, my level, they’re probably not as useful as the
tabletop. (Eng22, Interview #22)
Finally, as discussed earlier in the context of review work (see Section 4.2.2.2), some
design team members noted that the review forced them to question and learn about the design as a result of preparing for the review.

4.3.3.6

Views from interviews and documents: What review participants learn about
project team competence and project status
Most respondents (12 of 21) said that design reviews were a forum for review partici-

pants to learn about project status and readiness:
Int: It seems like you typically go to a lot of the {ContractorA} reviews, because you’re the Quality
Assurance (QA) lead for {ContractorADept2}?
EngLdr16: Yes. Yes, to gain cognizance of what’s going on, and certainly, as the projects move
through the life cycle, to make sure I understand the status of development, the risks. And
in some instances, I go to the reviews with some level of awareness in hand, and I want
to make sure that the project . . . does an honest disclosure at the review. . . .
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. . . But I do try to attend them all [mission-level reviews], because they tend to be the most
useful way to understand what’s going on in a project, what the risks are, and where the
development stands.
Int: So, it’s good for you, as a management lead in {ContractorADept2}, to have all the project presented at once. Is it—both their technical and their plans, are you interested in,
or . . . ?
EngLdr16: I’m interested in both, but the technical reviews are definitely the venue where the
technical status gets discussed. Some of the other reporting activities that go on here,
seem to be more focused on the programmatics—schedule compliance, cost, things like
that. But the technical reviews are where the technical issues get discussed. Which is . . .
highly informative. (EngLdr16, Interview #17)
A counter-opinion appears in the ContractorA formal process document (CtrA.1, p.
12), which explicitly directs that technical reviews should focus on design, not status; that design reviews are not meant to be project status reviews; and that programmatic issues should
only be discussed to the extent that they affect design decisions. In contrast, ContractorH’s
process document explicitly states that assessing project status and plans and progress was
one of the primary purposes of technical reviews (CtrH.1, pp. 4, 5, 49).
Some respondents (7 of 21) expressed their opinions about the status and readiness
of a specific project to go into the next phase. They provided their perspectives about project
readiness from the review, as opposed to the formal group assessment against criteria discussed earlier in Section 4.2.3.2.
Int: Do you think they were mostly ready? How did you feel [after the review] about the readiness of the project and its likelihood of success?
MSE3: Ah— I think they had a lot of work ahead of them, but it was not an unreasonable
amount of work.
Int: It wasn’t something that you felt, as a panel member, that you needed to throw a flag and
say, “This isn’t going to work.”
MSE3: Correct. They passed the review. (MSE3, Interview #1)
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Most respondents (11 of 21) noted either that the review was a way to communicate
the competence of the design team or discussed whether they saw the team under review as
competent.
Int: So, what do you think they [NASA and other reviewers] get out of it [reviews]?
EngLdr22: Well, they get to see what the status of the program is, which I think is good. They get
an opportunity to ask questions of folks to make sure that everyone is headed in the right
direction. . . . I think that’s likely the main thing, is that they get a chance just to see what
the state of the program is, and can get a feel of—-I think you can get a feel, and that’s
probably the main thing. I think when you go through these, you get a sense of who the
person is that is presenting, and do they seem competent, confident, do they think they
know what’s going on. (EngLdr22, Interview #3)

4.3.4 Analysis and findings conclusion
This chapter presented the analysis and findings for RQ1 and RQ2. Summarized findings were presented earlier in Table 4.2 and common criticisms in Table 4.3.
A listing of all detailed findings from interviews and documents reported in this chapter appears in Appendix E, along with a notation of their linkages to the summarized findings
and criticisms.
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CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS AGAINST LITERATURE

This chapter provides results of the literature analysis for RQ3 and shows which parts
of the research findings from Chapter 4 are novel research.

5.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on RQ3, which was described in Chapter 1:
RQ3: How do the findings from Research Questions 1 and 2 on the purpose and output of technical reviews compare with literature or extant theory?
Some of the literature sources and concepts covered in this chapter are discussed more
generally in Chapter 2. However, this chapter compares the research findings in detail with
those and other sources in the literature.
Findings and data for RQ1 and RQ2 were reported in Chapter 4 (see Table 4.2).
In this chapter, the methods of analysis and reporting are covered in Section 5.2. A
summary of where the findings are novel relative to current literature is then discussed in
Section 5.3. Details of the literature analysis and relevant sources related to the research findings are provided in Section 5.4. Finally, a summary table of the literature assessment for all
findings appears in Section 5.5.
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5.2 Literature analysis and reporting method
This chapter’s analysis assesses the level of match between the current literature and
the research findings in a repeatable and thorough way.
The methodology for the literature analysis in this chapter was described in Section 3.5.
In brief: the general approach is that of a systematic literature review followed by a focused
search for the findings from Chapter 4. This search goes beyond the general literature survey
in Chapter 2 to examine specific terms related to each finding. The analysis assesses where
each finding supports, goes beyond, or conflicts with literature.
Each finding was split into subfindings that were discrete enough to be analyzed against
the literature. Search strings were developed for each subfinding. Then the primary database
of review literature (see Section 3.5) was searched using the search strings, and the resulting
literature was analyzed to check which sources match each finding.
For the literature that was identified, the degree of match between all the sources and
the subfinding is assessed as one of five categories. The assessment is whether a subfinding:
(A) is not found in current literature, or
(B) is a new extension of a finding stated in a source, or
(C) gives supporting data to an assertion from a source lacking empirical data, or
(D) establishes a data-supported position on an area where sources conflict, or
(E) matches an existing source with empirical data support.
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These literature assessment categories are roughly in order of novelty; subfindings that
are assessed “(A): not found in current literature” are most novel, and those that are “(E) match
an existing source with empirical data support” are not novel.
Category “(D): establishes a data-supported position on an area where sources conflict” describes a relatively complex relationship between the sources and the finding. There
may be multiple sources with varying matches with the finding, varying levels of empirical
data support, and sources that conflict with each other. This conflict in the literature is described in the detailed analysis for that subfinding in Section 5.4. Section 7.3.2 suggests followon research methods to study and resolve the conflicts in the literature.
Section 5.4 discusses subfindings in category “(E): match an existing source with empirical data support” that are therefore not reported as novel in Section 5.3. Those subfindings
are described to support research validation and to support follow-on scholarship.
For the purpose of brevity, reported details for each subfinding only include the most
significant sources. For example, subfindings assessed as category “(E): match an existing
source with empirical data support” have at least one source with empirical data—-but often
other sources assert the finding without data. In such cases, only the sources with data are
reported since they are the sources that drive the assessment. Further, when many sources
support the assessment of a subfinding, only a few relevant sample sources are described.
Selected quotes may be given from key sources to show where they align (or fail to
align) with the subfindings.
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5.3 Summary of novel findings for research questions from literature analysis
This section summarizes novel parts of the research findings. Novel parts of findings
are considered as categories A, B, or C as discussed earlier: (A) not found in current literature,
(B) new extensions of a finding stated in a source, or (C) give supporting data to an assertion
from a source lacking empirical data.

5.3.1 Summary of novel findings for Research Question 1
RQ1: How do technical reviews impact subsequent project engineering and management activities?
The following parts of findings relative to RQ1 are not found in current literature (A):
• Influence of design phase of reviews. Earlier reviews allow the team to influence the design
more, but the design is largely not open to change after CDR. The amount of review action
items influencing the design decreases with design phase.
The following parts of findings relative to RQ1 are a new extension of a finding stated
in a source (B):
• Importance of action items. Useful action items signify review success.
• Influence of level of reviews. Mission-level reviews are better than subsystem reviews at
finding dependencies of the design and project on external actors. Mission level reviews
support design programs by forcing needed decisions by clients and supporting client and
design organization gate decisions, and subsystem reviews do not.
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• Resource costs of reviews. The resource costs for reviews are lower in subsystem reviews and
peer reviews than in mission-level reviews.
• Project decision gates and reviews. There is significant impact on projects when not passing
a review.
• Project control and reviews. Reviews allow control and insight between contractors by identifying process issues.
• Design team view on reviews of different levels. Design team members see subsystem reviews as better than mission-level reviews for getting directly useful actions, technically influencing the design, and integrating the design.
The following parts of findings relative to RQ1 give supporting data to an assertion
from a source lacking empirical data (C):
• Importance of action items. Action items are used to assess if review criteria were met and
to identify critical issues.
• Influence of level of reviews. Subsystem reviews are better than mission-level reviews at
technically detailed problem solving. Mission level reviews are better than subsystem reviews at assessing the design effort and checking on project progress.
• Influence of phase of review. Design phase directly drives specific review criteria.
• Project control and reviews. Reviews act as a key project control measure by forcing work.

5.3.2 Summary of novel findings for Research Question 2
RQ2: How do technical reviews affect participant views and self-reported knowledge of the
project?
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The following parts of findings relative to RQ2 are not found in current literature (A):
• Influence of level of reviews. Mission-level reviews are better than subsystem reviews at finding overlooked design issues and finding assumptions of the design.
The following parts of findings relative to RQ2 are a new extension of a finding stated
in a source (B):
• Design team view on learning at mission-level reviews. Design team members see missionlevel reviews as not impacting their technical understanding of the design.
• Panel members view on review interactions. Review panel members see the interactions
and discussions at the review as valuable for finding assumptions in the design.
The following parts of findings relative to RQ2 give supporting data to an assertion
from a source lacking empirical data (C):
• Importance of minutes. Review minutes act as an overall assessment.
• Influence of level of reviews. Mission-level reviews are broader in scope than subsystem reviews, and better than subsystem reviews at finding broader-scope issues across the system.
Peer reviews have the highest level of technical detail and are narrowest in scope, compared
to mission-level and subsystem reviews.
• Influence of design phase of reviews. The level of detail increases with design phase. The
design phase directly drives the expected baseline content.
• Areas learned about at reviews. Reviews let reviewers and participants learn about configuration management and baselines, and the competence of the project team.
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5.4 Literature analysis details by finding
5.4.1 Literature analysis of Finding F1

Table 5.1: Subfindings, search terms, and literature assessment for Finding F1
#
F1.1

F1.2

F1.3

F1.4

F1.5

5.4.1.1

Subfinding

Search Terms

Source
States?
No (not
all)

Data
Support?
N/A

Useful action items
signify review success.
Actions used to
assess if met review
criteria.
Actions identify
critical issues.

ACTIONS and {REVIEW
SUCCESS; GOOD REVIEW}
ACTIONS and CRITERIA

Yes

No

ACTIONS and {CRITICAL
ACTION/ ISSUE; KEY ISSUE}

Yes

No

Minutes act as a
formal organizational record.
Minutes act as overall assessment.

MINUTES and RECORD

Yes

Yes

MINUTES and {OVERALL
ASSESS; ASSESSMENT}

Yes

No

Literature Support
Assessment
(B) Subfinding extends source assertions.
(C) Source states
without supporting
data.
(C) Source states
without supporting
data.
(E) Source states with
supporting data.
(C) Source states
without supporting
data.

F1.1: Useful action items signify review success (subfinding extends source
assertions)
The part of Finding F1 that useful action items signify review success is partially sup-

ported by current literature, but Finding F1.1 extends it. In particular, Huet’s survey results
show that engineers value review actions (Huet 2006, 195), but he does not correlate review
success with useful actions. An influential Defense Science Board study states that action
items are “crucial to the success of the project” (DSB 1983, 12)—but does not discuss “useful”
actions or the success of the review (as opposed to the overall project).
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Alternatively, Beiter et al. mention, as a single line in a functional diagram of a review,
that reviews should “create useful actions” (Beiter et al. 2007, 7)—but do not link useful actions
to review success.
Finding F1.1 extends other research by noting that action items must be considered
“useful” by the project team to be valued, and by linking those useful action items to perceived
review success.

5.4.1.2

F1.2: Actions used to assess if met review criteria (source states without
supporting data)
The part of Finding F1 that action items are used to assess whether review criteria are

met is stated in current literature, but the literature is not supported by data. Multiple standards documents and process guidance (JPL 1996, 5; NASA 2016, 48–49; AFSPC 2009, 18) assert without data that action items support review recommendations or overall assessments.
Finding F1.2 provides data support showing that actions are used to support criteria and review assessment decisions.

5.4.1.3

F1.3: Actions identify critical issues (source states without supporting data)
The part of Finding F1 that action items identify critical issues is partially supported

by current literature, but Finding F1.3 extends it. Multiple standards documents and process
guidance such as IEEE 15288.2 (IEEE 2015, 14) and GPR 8700.4H (GSFC 2012, 10) assert without supporting data that review teams should identify critical issues or critical actions. Finding
F1.3 provides data support showing that actions are used to identify critical issues in reviews.
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5.4.1.4

F1.4: Minutes act as a formal organizational record (source states with
supporting data)
The part of Finding F1 that review minutes act as a formal organizational record is

stated in current literature with supporting empirical data. Notably, Huet’s dissertation research (Huet 2006, 69) uses data from observed reviews to argue that minutes are a critical
form of design knowledge capture and act as organizational sensemaking by recording design decisions and agreements between organizations.

5.4.1.5

F1.5: Minutes act as overall assessment (source states without supporting data)
The part of Finding F1 that review minutes act as overall assessment is stated in current

literature, but the literature is not supported by data. Several academic works (Collofello 1998,
9; Sater-Black and Iversen 1994, 91–92) and standards (GSFC 2012, 10) assert without data
that review minutes (or a review report) should include assessment. Finding F1.5 provides
data support that minutes act as an overall project assessment from the review.

5.4.2 Literature analysis of Finding F2
5.4.2.1

F2.1: Subsystem reviews better than mission-level reviews at technically detailed
problem finding (source states without supporting data)
The part of Finding F2 that subsystem reviews are better than mission-level reviews at

technically detailed problem finding is stated in current literature, but the literature is not supported by data. The Goddard GPR 8700.6 standard asserts that subsystem/peer reviews “provide a penetrating examination of design” (GSFC 2014, 2). Similarly, the NASA SE Handbook
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Table 5.2: Subfindings, search terms, and literature assessment for Finding F2
#
F2.1

F2.2

F2.3

F2.4

F2.5

Subfinding

Search Terms

Subsystem reviews better
than mission-level reviews
at technically detailed
problem finding.
Subsystem reviews better
than mission-level reviews
for learning about design
details.
Mission-level reviews
broader in scope than
subsystem reviews.

{SUB-SYSTEM/ SUBSYSTEM / MISSION-LEVEL/
SYSTEM-LEVEL} and PROBLEM/ISSUE FINDING
{SUB-SYSTEM/ SUBSYSTEM / MISSION-LEVEL/
SYSTEM-LEVEL} and DESIGN DETAIL
{SUB-SYSTEM/ SUBSYSTEM / MISSION-LEVEL/
SYSTEM-LEVEL} and
BROAD SCOPE
{SUB-SYSTEM/ SUBSYSTEM/ MISSION-LEVEL/
SYSTEM-LEVEL/ PEER} and
TECHNICAL DETAIL
{SUB-SYSTEM/ SUBSYSTEM / MISSION-LEVEL/
SYSTEM-LEVEL/ PEER} and
SCOPE

Peer reviews were highest
level of technical detail,
compared to mission-level
and subsystem reviews.
Peer reviews were narrowest in scope, compared to
mission-level and subsystem reviews.

Source
Data
States? Support?
Yes
No

Literature Support Assessment
(C) Source states
without supporting data.

Yes

Yes

(E) Source states
with supporting
data.

Yes

No

(C) Source states
without supporting data.

Yes

No

(C) Source states
without supporting data.

Yes

No

(C) Source states
without supporting data.

asserts, “Peer reviews play a significant role as a detailed technical component of higher level
technical and programmatic reviews” (NASA 2017a, 85). However, neither of these standards
has supporting empirical research data.
He and Shull (2009, 6) state that a major purpose of peer reviews is the identification of
defects and specific suggestions for product improvements. However, all of their references
are standards that similarly lack supporting empirical research data. Finding F2.1 provides
data showing that subsystem reviews support detailed problem finding.
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5.4.2.2

F2.2: Subsystem reviews better than mission-level reviews for learning about
design details (source states with supporting data)
The part of Finding F2 that subsystem reviews are better than mission-level reviews for

learning about design details is stated in current literature with supporting empirical data.
Covington (2015, 12, 22) argues from empirical failure data analysis that “systems level reviews don’t always provide the level of detail required to prevent design escapes” and “lower
level reviews are where the leverage is, as opposed to the major milestone reviews.” Chao
et al. (2004, 10) conclude from case study observations of NASA projects and interviews that
the “formal [system] review process at NASA is strong, but due to the size of the projects and
limited time and resources, they must often concentrate largely on programmatic issues and
can only cover technical issues in a fairly shallow manner.” In his subsequent dissertation using the same data, Chao (2005, 54) asserts that “it is in these informal [peer] reviews that the
engineers and managers must work out the details that can be missed in formal reviews.”

5.4.2.3

F2.3: Mission-level reviews broader in scope than subsystem reviews (source
states without supporting data)
The part of Finding F2 that mission-level reviews are broader in scope than subsystem

reviews is stated in current literature, but the literature is not supported by data. Young describes subsystem reviews as “building up to a system review that deals with the design from
an integrative perspective” (Young 2013, 1454)—but she makes this assertion from her general experience, not specific data. IEEE 15288.2 similarly describes incremental reviews with
subsets of systems prior to “a summary system-level technical review” (IEEE 2015, 18)—but
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like many standards does not state supporting data. Finding F2.3 provides supporting data
showing that mission-level reviews are of broader scope than are subsystem reviews.

5.4.2.4

F2.4: Peer reviews have highest level of technical detail, compared to
mission-level and subsystem reviews (source states without supporting data)
The part of Finding F2 that peer reviews have the highest level of technical detail is stated

in current literature, but the literature is not supported by data. The NASA SE Guide states that
“peer reviews play a significant role as a detailed technical component of higher-level technical and programmatic reviews. For example, the peer review of a component battery design
can go into much more technical detail on the battery than the integrated power subsystem
review” (NASA 2017a, 85). Goddard’s GPR 8700.6C states that peer reviews “probe the details in order to confirm the approach” and that higher-level reviews “build upon the results
of a robust set of [peer reviews]” (GSFC 2014, 2, 7). Although these standards make assertions matching Finding F2.4, they lack supporting data. Finding F2.4 provides data specifically showing that peer reviews have a higher level of detail, followed by subsystem reviews
and then mission-level reviews.

5.4.2.5

F2.5: Peer reviews narrowest in scope, compared to mission-level and subsystem
reviews (source states without supporting data)
The part of Finding F2 that peer reviews are narrowest in scope is stated in the literature,

but the sources are not supported by data. IEEE 15288.2 (2015, 18) asserts that using multiple
reviews supports “an incremental approach that examines all the details of lower-level subsets
of a complex system’s hierarchy prior to a summary system-level technical review.”
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Several other standards assert that peer reviews have narrower scope implicitly, by describing in greater detail a narrower-scope component (e.g., NASA 2017a, 85). Although these
standards make assertions matching Finding F2.5, they lack supporting data. Finding F2.5
provides data support showing that peer reviews are narrower in scope.

5.4.3 Literature analysis of Finding F3

Table 5.3: Subfindings, search terms, and literature assessment for Finding F3
#
F3.1

F3.2

F3.3

F3.4

F3.5

Subfinding

Search Terms

Mission-level reviews
better than subsystem
reviews at finding dependencies on external
actors.
Mission-level reviews
better than subsystem
reviews at assessing the
design effort.
Mission-level reviews
better than subsystem
reviews at finding overlooked design issues.
Mission-level reviews
better than subsystem
reviews at finding assumptions.
Mission-level reviews
better than subsystem reviews at finding
broader-scope issues
across the system.

{SUB-SYSTEM/ SUBSYSTEM
REVIEW/ MISSION-LEVEL/
SYSTEM-LEVEL/ PEER} and
{DEPENDENCIES/ EXTERNAL/ STAKEHOLDER}
{SUB-SYSTEM/ SUBSYSTEM
/ MISSION-LEVEL/ SYSTEMLEVEL} and {ASSESS/ DESIGN
EFFORT}
{SUB-SYSTEM/ SUBSYSTEM
REVIEW/ MISSION-LEVEL/
SYSTEM-LEVEL} and {MISSING/ OVERLOOKED/ ISSUES}
{SUB-SYSTEM/ SUBSYSTEM
REVIEW/ MISSION-LEVEL/
SYSTEM-LEVEL} and ASSUMPTIONS
{SUB-SYSTEM/ SUBSYSTEM REVIEW/ MISSIONLEVEL/ SYSTEM-LEVEL} and
{BROADER/BROAD ISSUES/
SYSTEM/ SYSTEM-WIDE ISSUES}
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Source
Data
States? Support?
No
N/A
(not
all)

Literature Support Assessment
(B) Subfinding
extends source
assertions.

Yes

No

(C) Source states
without supporting data.

No

N/A

(A) No source
states subfinding.

No

N/A

(A) No source
states subfinding.

Yes

No

(C) Source states
without supporting data.

5.4.3.1

F3.1: Mission-level reviews better than subsystem reviews at finding
dependencies on external actors (subfinding extends source assertions)
The part of Finding F3 that mission-level reviews are better than subsystem reviews at

finding dependencies on external actors is partially supported by current literature, but Finding F3.1 extends statements currently in the literature. For example, the NASA SRB Handbook (NASA 2016, 38) asserts that mission-level review boards should assess if “external interfaces/ needs are defined” and “external resources are available”—but does not discuss external stakeholder presence at subsystem reviews. Many references similarly discuss stakeholders at reviews but do not indicate that stakeholders are mostly present at mission-level
reviews rather than subsystem reviews (e.g., Gandhi and Sauser 2008, 22; Oakes 2012, 29–32;
Johansson 2009, 32, 42–44; Huet 2006, 105).
One reference does hint in a stakeholder diagram (Chao 2003, 8, 41–43) that a process line connects formal review boards and “other organizations” (and there is no connection marked between other organizations and peer reviews)—but this is not discussed in the
text. Finding F3.1 extends other research by showing with data that interactions with external
stakeholders happen primarily at mission-level reviews rather than at subsystem reviews.

5.4.3.2

F3.2: Mission-level reviews better than subsystem reviews at assessing the design
effort (source states without supporting data)
The part of Finding F3 that mission-level reviews are better than subsystem reviews at

assessing the design effort is stated in the literature, but the sources are not supported by data.
Multiple standards documents describe the assessment of the design effort at mission-level
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reviews in comparison to subsystem reviews. For example, GPR 8700.4H states that a mission
review “assesses the results of activity to date, including those from a robust set of engineering peer reviews, to systematically evaluate technical and programmatic status” (GSFC 2012,
12). The NASA SRB Handbook describes assessment at mission reviews to identify whether
the program is “on track” or has “impediments to success” (NASA 2016, 21). IEEE 15288.2
similarly looks for “an integrated program viewpoint, including technical status and progress,
cost and schedule status, and impacts and risk assessment” at reviews (IEEE 2015, 10). Huet
analyzes whether review discussions focus on the design artifact or on the design effort (Huet
2006, 170), but Huet does not compare mission-level and subsystem reviews.
The standards that assert Finding F3.2 do not have supporting empirical research data.
Conversely, Huet (2006, 170) has supporting data on design effort assessment at reviews but
does not state all of Finding F3.2. Finding F3.2 provides data showing that mission-level reviews act to assess the design effort while subsystem reviews do not.

5.4.3.3

F3.3: Mission-level reviews better than subsystem reviews at finding overlooked
design issues (no source states subfinding)
The part of Finding F3 that mission-level reviews are better than subsystem reviews at

finding overlooked design issues is not stated in current literature. There is some related literature on identifying overlooked issues at reviews. Amer’s dissertation (2011, 1) asserts that
independent experts (at mission reviews) “provide a unique view that a [program or project]
may have overlooked as a consequence of their close involvement”—but she does not discuss subsystem reviews and does not have data supporting the assertion. Covington (2015,
11) similarly associates the independence of reviewers with identifying overlooked issues, but
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Covington does not discuss which review level supports identifying overlooked issues. None
of these sources discuss how overlooked issues are often identified more at mission-level reviews.

5.4.3.4

F3.4: Mission-level reviews better than subsystem reviews at finding
assumptions (no source states subfinding)
The part of Finding F3 that mission-level reviews are better than subsystem reviews at

finding assumptions is not stated in current literature. Some sources discuss identifying assumptions at reviews. Amer mentions examining assumptions at milestone reviews (2011,
19). Guerra (2008, 5) sees agreeing on assumptions as a benefit of baselining via technical reviews. EIA 632 states that checking the validity of assumptions is one of the tasks of technical
reviews (1999, 16). However, none of these sources discuss where assumptions are found nor
how assumptions are often identified more at mission-level reviews.

5.4.3.5

F3.5: Mission-level reviews better than subsystem reviews at finding
broader-scope issues across the system (source states without supporting data)
The part of Finding F3 that mission-level reviews are better than subsystem reviews at

finding broader-scope issues is stated in current literature, but the literature is not supported
by data. Young discusses evolutionary design reviews as “building up to a system review that
deals with the design from an integrative perspective” (2013, 1454). IEEE 15288.2 discusses
covering lower-level subsets of “the complete scope” of a project in subsystem reviews, prior
to having a “summary system level technical review” (IEEE 2015, 18). However, neither of
these sources is supported by empirical data.
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Two sources discuss special cases of “broader scope issues” at reviews. Burrowes and
Squair note that subsystem reviews are less likely to “discover emergent properties of the design” than system-level reviews (1999, 193)—but they focus on emergent properties rather
than the broad issues stated in Finding F3.5, and do not provide supporting data. Chao and
Tumer discuss system interactions, based on data from one interview: “Peer reviews often
don’t discuss system interactions as the system review takes place in the formal [system-level]
reviews” (2006, 18). However, Chao and Tumer do not discuss general “broader scope issues.”

5.4.4 Literature analysis of Finding F4

Table 5.4: Subfindings, search terms, and literature assessment for Finding F4
#
F4.1

F4.2

F4.3

F4.4

F4.5

Subfinding

Search Terms

Mission-level reviews
support forcing client
decisions, and subsystem
reviews do not.
Mission-level reviews support client and design organization gate decisions,
and subsystem reviews do
not.
Mission-level reviews support checking on project
progress better than subsystem reviews.
Mission-level reviews
support checking if project
is following institutional
processes better than
subsystem reviews.
Interactions with clients
happen more at missionlevel reviews than subsystem reviews.

{SUBSYSTEM/ MISSIONLEVEL/ SYSTEM-LEVEL}
and {DECISION /FORCING}
and {CLIENT/ ACQUIRER}
{SUBSYSTEM/ MISSIONLEVEL/ SYSTEM-LEVEL}
and DECISION and GATE

Source
Data
States? Support?
No
N/A
(not
all)

Literature Support Assessment
(B) Subfinding
extends source
assertions.

No
(not
all)

N/A

(B) Subfinding
extends source
assertions.

{SUBSYSTEM/ MISSIONLEVEL/ SYSTEM-LEVEL}
and {PROGRESS / STATUS}

Yes

No

(C) Source states
without supporting data.

{SUBSYSTEM/ MISSIONLEVEL/ SYSTEM-LEVEL}
and PROCESS

Yes

Yes

(E) Source states
with supporting
data.

{MISSION-LEVEL/ SYSTEMLEVEL} and {CLIENT / ACQUIRER}

Yes

Yes

(E) Source states
with supporting
data
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5.4.4.1

F4.1: Mission-level reviews support forcing client decisions, and subsystem
reviews do not (subfinding extends source assertions)
The part of Finding F4 that mission-level reviews support forcing client decisions, unlike

subsystem reviews is partially supported by current literature, but Finding F4.1 extends it. One
source discusses forcing decisions at reviews: O’Sullivan observes from ethnographic study
of an airplane design firm that “[meetings and reviews] were, of course, an important aspect
of the approvals cycle, which has particular significance for forcing closure on an issue and
making design decisions authoritative” (2000, 244). However, O’Sullivan does not state the
parts of Finding F4.1 on client decisions or subsystem reviews.
Finding F4.1 extends other research by noting that mission-level reviews support forcing client decisions and that forcing client decisions does not happen at subsystem reviews.

5.4.4.2

F4.2: Mission-level reviews support client and design organization gate
decisions, and subsystem reviews do not (subfinding extends source assertions)
The part of Finding F4 that mission-level reviews support client and design organiza-

tion gate decisions, unlike subsystem reviews, is partially supported by current literature, but
Finding F4.2 extends it.
Notably, an NRC study analyzes Air Force reviews and describes the larger DoD/ United
States Air Force (USAF) structure with “mandatory technical reviews at the program level”
supporting “6 MS [milestone] or MDA [Milestone Decision Authority] reviews in a typical program” (NRC 2009, 17–22, 36). NRC (2009) uses empirical data, including interviews and surveys, but does not discuss subsystem reviews or design organization decisions.
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Similarly, Johansson (2009, 38) describes from interviews at commercial firms that
technical reviews support gate decisions by the firm’s leadership. However, Johansson does
not discuss subsystem reviews and does not examine client vs. developer gate decisions.
Other sources (e.g., NASA 2016, 7, 21; IEEE 2015, 9; GSFC 2012, 3, 5) assert that reviews
support gate decisions, but those sources lack data support and do not discuss subsystem
reviews or design organization decisions.
Finding F4.2 extends other research by noting that mission-level reviews can force design organization gate decisions, and subsystem reviews do not support these decisions.

5.4.4.3

F4.3: Mission-level reviews support checking on project progress better than
subsystem reviews (source states without supporting data)
The part of Finding F4 that mission-level reviews support checking on project progress

better than subsystem reviews is stated in current literature, but the literature is not supported
by data. The SMC-S-21 standard asserts that a system review focuses on the results of peer
reviews and that “plans for development and testing form a satisfactory basis for proceeding
into detailed design and test procedure development” (AFSPC 2009, 77–78). De Boer and
Santema assert:
The purpose of the management review, in contrast [to peer review], is “to provide
higher level management with the appropriate visibility into the [design] process”
(CMU SEI 2006), evidently to decide on progress, [and] authorize the next stage.
(de Boer and Santema 2009, 2)
Neither of these sources has supporting empirical research data. Finding F4.3 provides
data showing that mission-level reviews are used to check on project progress.
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5.4.4.4

F4.4: Mission-level reviews support checking if project is following institutional
processes better than subsystem reviews (source states with supporting data)
The part of Finding F4 that mission-level reviews support checking if project is following

institutional processes better than subsystem reviews is stated in current literature with supporting empirical data.
De Boer and Santema assert without data that at gate meetings, “the process owner ensures that the prescribed development process is followed and takes note of possible process
improvements or innovations” (de Boer and Santema 2009, 6). Covington similarly observes,
using data such as surveys, that:
Independent reviews are generally conducted at the system level, and are often
aimed at ensuring compliance with product maturity standards and other work
processes or instructions. As such, they are not intended to be low-level design
reviews, but more of a work product maturity and design process compliance assessment. (Covington 2015, 22)

5.4.4.5

F4.5: Interactions with clients happen more at mission-level reviews than
subsystem reviews (source states with supporting data)
The part of Finding F4 that interactions with clients happen more at mission-level re-

views than subsystem reviews is stated in current literature with supporting empirical data.
Notably, Chao et al. (2003, 43) describe from interviews a design project where NASA as a customer could only attend “major reviews,” but “external customers” are “not involved deeply
[in] the peer review process” and are not always invited to peer reviews.
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Other references discuss that client representatives (i.e., Senior Review Board members) have the option but are not required to attend subsystem reviews (e.g., NASA 2016, 6;
Young 2013, 1454). However, these sources make this assertion without supporting data.

5.4.5 Literature analysis of Finding F5

Table 5.5: Subfindings, search terms, and literature assessment for Finding F5
#

Subfinding

Search Terms

Earlier reviews allow team to
influence design more, but
design largely not open to
change after CDR.
Amount of review action items
influencing the design decreases with design phase.
Design phase directly drives
specific review content and
criteria.
Design phase directly drives
scope of gate decisions.

PHASE and ABILITY TO
INFLUENCE

F5.5

F5.6

F5.1

F5.2

F5.3

F5.4

F5.7

F5.8

Source
Data
States? Support?
No
N/A

Literature Support Assessment
(A) No source
states subfinding.

PHASE and ACTIONS

No

N/A

(A) No source
states subfinding.

PHASE and {REVIEW
CONTENT/ REVIEW
CRITERIA}
PHASE and SCOPE OF
GATE DECISIONS

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Level of detail increases with
design phase.

PHASE and LEVEL OF
DETAIL

Yes

No

Expected design and process
maturity increases with design
phase.
Openness to changes in design
decreases with design phase.

PHASE and {EXPECTED
MATURITY/ MATURITY}
PHASE and CHANGE

Yes

Yes

N/A

Design phase directly drives
expected baseline content.

PHASE and BASELINE

No
(not
all)
Yes

(C) Source states
without supporting data.
(E) Source states
with supporting
data.
(C) Source states
without supporting data.
(E) Source states
with supporting
data
(E) Source states
with supporting
data.
(C) Source states
without supporting data.
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No

5.4.5.1

F5.1: Earlier reviews allow team to influence design more, but design largely not
open to change after CDR (no source states subfinding)
The part of Finding F5 that earlier reviews allow team to influence design more is not

stated in current literature. No sources were found that generally discuss the ability to influence design at reviews, let alone a phase dependence.
Finding F5.1 appears to be the first research statement that the ability to influence the
design at reviews increases with design phase until CDR, and the design is largely “locked”
after CDR.

5.4.5.2

F5.2: Amount of review action items influencing the design decreases with
design phase (no source states subfinding)
The part of Finding F5 that the amount of action items influencing the design decreases

with phase is not stated in current literature. No sources were found that discuss actions as
a function of review phase. For example, Chao and Ishii assert that “the two key system reviews are the PDR and CDR” (Chao and Ishii 2005a, 7)—but do not state why those reviews
are important and do not discuss actions. Huet analyzes actions from two reviews and classifies them by “exchange roles” and “impact on design” (Huet 2006, 133). Huet does examine
the design phase dependence of some review discussion topics such as “design” or “management” (159, 167–68), but Huet does not examine the phase dependence of the actions.
Finding F5.2 appears to be the first research statement that the number of designinfluencing actions decreases with design phase.
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5.4.5.3

F5.3: Design phase directly drives specific review content and criteria (source
states without supporting data)
The part of Finding F5 that design phase directly drives specific review content and cri-

teria is stated in current literature, but the literature is not supported by data. Chao et al.
describe major NASA reviews and summarize the review content for PDR and CDR, based on
interviews and documents (Chao 2003, 6–10). However, Chao et al. do not discuss decision
criteria.
Some standards and textbooks discuss expected review content and criteria for each
design phase (e.g., Wasson 2005, 711–12, 719–26; NASA 2017b, 106–32; IEEE 2015, 43–102).
However, these sources do not have supporting research data.
As a result, Finding F5.3 is the first to state, with supporting data, that the design phase
directly drives review criteria.

5.4.5.4

F5.4: Design phase directly drives scope of gate decisions (source states with
supporting data)
The part of Finding F5 that design phase directly drives the scope of gate decisions is

stated in current literature with supporting data. Chao and Ishii compare commercial gate decisions and contents to NASA gate decisions and contents, showing that these decision points
change with phase for various commercial firms (Chao and Ishii 2004, 2005a). Fox gives a
description of the DoD phases and milestone decision scope and how major reviews support
them (Fox 2012, 20–29). NASA standards state detailed criteria and decision levels for each of
six gate decision points (KDPs) (NASA 2018, 27; 2014b, 430–45; NASA 2016, 36–46).
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5.4.5.5

F5.5: Level of detail increases with design phase (source states without
supporting data)
The part of Finding F5 that the level of detail increases with design phase is stated in cur-

rent literature, but the literature is not supported by data. In particular, a DAU text notes that
“As the acquisition program moves through the life cycle, the reviews become more detailed
and definitive” (Kockler et al. 1990, 12-1). Craig implies that design detail level is specific to
phase when “managing an appropriate review team for that particular review”:
A very important part of the review preparation is the review remit. Tell the review
team what you want out of the review so they can concentrate their efforts towards
that. Equally important is to tell the team what is out-with their remit. You don’t
want a team delving into the science requirements at FDR [Final Design Review]
nor do you want to dwell on the nitty-gritty details at CoDR. (Craig 2010, 77380R-5)
Armstrong observes that engineers generally try to make all design reviews a Critical
Design Review, even when it’s not that design phase (Armstrong 2004, 1759). However, these
sources do not have supporting empirical data. Finding F5.5 provides data support showing
that the level of detail of reviews increases with design phase.

5.4.5.6 F5.6: Expected design and process maturity increases with design phase (source
states with supporting data)
The part of Finding F5 that the expected design and process maturity increases with design phase is stated in current literature with supporting data. The NPR 7120.5 NASA process
standard has details on the expected maturity state at each NASA review and decision point
as well as the expected maturity of plans and products (NASA 2018, 27, 31–36, 132–42). IEEE
15288.2 describes controlling and assessing design maturity in a disciplined sequence as a
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major outcome of reviews (IEEE 2015, 13–14). Covington argues from root-cause analysis
of design failures that increasing design maturity is the main benefit of reviews in different
phases (Covington 2015, 23). Burke finds from surveys that “PDR, CDR, and TRR [Test Readiness Review], . . . closely followed by SRR” are the most valuable technical reviews in “assessing
the technical maturity of the program” (Burke 2017, 46, 79–80).

5.4.5.7

F5.7: Openness to changes in design decreases with design phase (source states
with supporting data)
The part of Finding F5 that openness to changes in design decreases with design phase is

stated in current literature with supporting data.
Kamath and Liker describe, from interviews of Japanese suppliers, that there is a common expectation that significant change is only accepted in one phase’s milestone gates. In
later-phase reviews, change proposals from subcontractors are not acceptable to the main
design organization:
The suppliers we interviewed could explain precisely the milestone events, their
timing, and customers’ expectations. . . .
The supplier knows that there is a clear, though small, window of opportunity in
the concept stage, before the release of specifications, when it can suggest new
technology and try to introduce new methods. Outside that window, suppliers
must focus their overall efforts on incremental cost-saving improvements that will
not involve the redesign of mating parts and subsystems. . . . Japanese suppliers
know exactly where they fit in and when, and this arrangement allows them to be
innovative within clearly determined boundaries—to be creative without being
disruptive. (Kamath and Liker 1994, 166)
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5.4.5.8

F5.8: Design phase directly drives expected baseline content (source states
without supporting data)
The part of Finding F5 that design phase directly drives expected baseline content is

stated in current literature, but the literature is not supported by data. The INCOSE SE Handbook describes the relationship between configuration management and decision gates as:
Upon successful completion of a decision gate, some artifacts (e.g., documents,
models, or other products of a project life cycle stage) have been approved as the
basis upon which future work must build. These artifacts are placed under configuration management. (Walden et al. 2015, 27)
Other standards and guidance documents make similar assertions. IEEE 15288.2 asserts that reviews should be structured as “a comprehensive review (and in some instances
approval) of the program’s technical and cost baselines, and to provide confidence that each
technical or cost baseline is mature enough to progress to the next stage of the program” (IEEE
2015, 12–13). The Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAU 2018, 220–24), as well as EIA 649-1
and EIA 649-2 Configuration Management Standards for DoD and NASA (SAE 2014, 2016),
have additional details on the link between configuration management and design baselines
and technical reviews. However, these sources do not have supporting empirical research
data.
Finding F5.8 provides data supporting the assertion that expected baseline content is
directly linked to the specific review and phase of design.
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Table 5.6: Subfindings, search terms, and literature assessment for Finding F6
#
F6.1

F6.2

F6.3

F6.4

F6.5

F6.6

F6.7

Subfinding

Search Terms

Pre-review work has high
resource cost due to preparing data and conducting dry
runs.
Pre-review work helps project as a forcing function for
work.
Pre-review work helps project in forcing team communications.
Pre-review work helps project in re-examining work.

PREPARE/ PREPARATION/ PRE-REVIEW

Pre-review work helps project in creating a complete
baseline.
Tailoring reviews can reduce
resource cost for small and
risk-accepting projects.
Tailoring reviews requires
client and organizational
negotiation and agreement.

Source
Data
States? Support?
Yes
Yes

PREPARE/ PREPARATION/ PRE-REVIEW

Yes

Yes

PREPARE/ PREPARATION/ PRE-REVIEW

Yes

Yes

PREPARE/ PREPARATION/ PRE-REVIEW

Yes

Yes

PREPARE/ PREPARATION/ PRE-REVIEW

Yes

Yes

TAILOR and RESOURCE

Yes

Yes

TAILOR and {NEGOTIATION/ AGREEMENT}

Yes

Yes

Literature Support Assessment
(E) Source states
with supporting
data.
(E) Source states
with supporting
data.
(E) Source states
with supporting
data.
(E) Source states
with supporting
data.
(E) Source states
with supporting
data.
(E) Source states
with supporting
data.
(E) Source states
with supporting
data.

5.4.6 Literature analysis of Finding F6
5.4.6.1

F6.1: Pre-review work has high resource cost due to preparing data and
conducting dry runs (source states with supporting data)
The part of Finding F6 that pre-review work has a high resource cost due to preparing

data and conducting dry runs is stated in current literature with supporting empirical data.
Ahmadi and Wang discuss from cases at Rocketdyne how “design reviews are expensive because they usually consume a considerable amount of time in preparing, conducting, and
incorporating suggestions made during the review” (Ahmadi and Wang 1999, 237). Taylor
gives calendars and descriptions of Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) pre-review work on three
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major spacecraft system reviews (Taylor 2009, 4; 2010, 5–6; 2011, 5). Wells similarly describes
the sequence of work on pre-reviews for a major Raytheon project (Wells 2007, 266–67).

5.4.6.2

F6.2: Pre-review work helps project as a forcing function for work (source states
with supporting data)
The part of Finding F6 that pre-review work helps the project as a forcing function for

work is stated in current literature with supporting empirical data. Notably, Chao and Tumer
paraphrase an interviewed project manager at JPL as saying:
The value of peer reviews is not passing or failing them. It is to prepare for the
formal review. The PM has said that some of his best formal reviews have come
after failing several peer reviews. (Chao and Tumer 2004, 15)
Several software review references similarly note the value of reviews creating an imposed schedule deadline. Votta observed software reviews and interviewed 29 participants,
with 48% giving a reason for the review meeting as “schedule deadline—the inspection creates a planned event for people to work towards” (Votta 1993, 108–9). Other software review
texts assert without evidence that reviews create useful pressure on developers to make better
products on time (Strauss and Ebenau 1994, 73; Gilb and Graham 1993, 25; Galin 2018, 224).

5.4.6.3

F6.3: Pre-review work helps project in forcing team communications (source
states with supporting data)
The part of Finding F6 that pre-review work helps the project in forcing team commu-

nications is stated in current literature with supporting empirical data. Notably, one work
in the software development literature matches the assertion; no sources were found in the
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literature of systems engineering of complex defense and space systems. Fallan et al. see communication as a benefit in 30 hardware and software reviews examined from AT&T:
There is additional benefit [to projects from technical reviews] because the review
team is a catalyst that brings the entire project together for several days during
the preparation and review. Sometimes most of the questions are asked by other
project team members, not by the reviewers.(Fallan et al. 1991, 105)
Freedman and Weinberg similarly assert without evidence a major work benefit from
team member communication at software reviews in general—but do not specifically mention pre-review work (Freedman and Weinberg 1990, 8).

5.4.6.4 F6.4: Pre-review work helps project in re-examining work (source states with
supporting data)
The part of Finding F6 that pre-review work helps the project in re-examining work is
stated in current literature with supporting empirical data. Notably, Wells describes the review process used in a large project at Raytheon as “numerous pre-reviews that find and resolve issues prior to the milestone event” that incrementally demonstrate criteria and reduce
the risk for the review (Wells 2007, 259–60, 265–66). Colwell makes a similar assertion without supporting data: “A truism at Intel was that when we prepared a design review, we reaped
90 percent of the benefit before the executive ever appeared to conduct the review because
preparing the materials forced us to confront issues that otherwise fell between the cracks of
the everyday engineering process” (Colwell 2003, 9).
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5.4.6.5

F6.5: Pre-review work helps project in creating a complete baseline (source
states with supporting data)
The part of Finding F6 that pre-review work helps the project in creating a complete

baseline is stated in current literature with supporting empirical data. Notably, Fallan et al.
describe preparing a self-consistent set of technical review information—what systems engineering literature terms a design baseline—as the main benefit of 30 studied AT&T hardware
and software architecture reviews:
The primary benefit of the technical review is not the review itself, but the project
team’s preparation for it. To explain a problem to another person, information
about the problem must be presented consistently so the listener can understand
it. Often, the very act of collecting and organizing this information for the listener
will suggest a solution to the problem, without the listener having to say anything.
To describe the project problem and solution, the project team follows a methodology suited to the project environment. The output of this process is a consistent
set of requirements, architecture, and high-level design documents; that is, the assumptions in one document do not contradict the assumptions in or constraints
on a solution in another document. (Fallan et al. 1991, 104)

5.4.6.6

F6.6: Tailoring reviews can reduce resource cost for small and risk-accepting
projects (source states with supporting data)
The part of Finding F6 that tailoring reviews can reduce resource cost for small and

risk-accepting projects is stated in current literature with supporting empirical data. Notably,
McLellan and Shilling describe tailoring, resources, and project size from their case project:
The SETR [Systems Engineering Technical Review] process is intended to be tailored to suit each project, “right-sizing” to the needs of the customer. SETR defines an overall comprehensive process covering any project independent of size,
complexity, risk, and acquisition strategy. Challenges in tailoring the process include identifying components which are cost effective and value-added, while still
providing an operational design. (McLellan and Shilling 2018, 1)
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Burke similarly notes from surveys of “subject matter experts” that “time and resource
constraints are key reasons that tailoring [of reviews] is typically considered” (Burke 2017, 64).

5.4.6.7

F6.7: Tailoring reviews requires client and organizational negotiation and
agreement (source states with supporting data)
The part of Finding F6 that tailoring reviews requires client and organizational negoti-

ation and agreement is stated in current literature with supporting empirical data. Notably,
McLellan and Shilling describe from their case project a process where the client/developer
integrated team experts work on tailoring and then “the project systems engineer leads the
effort of evaluating the tailored [review] checklist questions and adjudicates any differences
of opinion” (McLellan and Shilling 2018, 3). Burke similarly recommends, based on surveys
of Navy experts, communicating with stakeholders before agreeing within the program on review tailoring (Burke 2017, 66, 70, 93).
Covington describes from surveys and analysis of reviews a different negotiation process:

Programs . . . are also allowed to tailor the [review] checklist for items that don’t
apply. Programs have to provide justification for excluded checklist items, however. The independent review team chair also is allowed to push back on excluded
items, if appropriate. (Covington 2015, 18)
Although these sources describe different process implementations, they all show with
empirical data that the tailoring of the review scope is negotiated between the client organization and the design organization.
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Table 5.7: Subfindings, search terms, and literature assessment for Finding F7
#
F7.1

F7.2

Subfinding

Search Terms

Resource costs for review lower
in subsystem and peer reviews
than mission-level reviews.
Formality lower in subsystem
and peer reviews than missionlevel reviews.

RESOURCE COST and
PREPARATION
FORMALITY

Source
Data
States? Support?
No
N/A
(not
all)
Yes
Varies
(conflict)

Literature Support Assessment
(B) Subfinding
extends source
assertions
(D) Sources have
conflicting positions, one with
supporting data.

5.4.7 Literature analysis of Finding F7
5.4.7.1

F7.1: Resource costs for review lower in subsystem and peer reviews than
mission-level reviews (subfinding extends source assertions)
The part of Finding F7 that resource costs for review are lower in subsystem and peer

reviews than mission-level reviews is partially supported by current literature, but Finding F7.1
extends it. In particular, Chao et al. state (based on a JPL document and one interview) that
peer reviews cost the least, but Chao et al. are unclear which reviews they are comparing, and
never mention subsystem reviews:
[JPL guidance] emphasizes that [peer] reviews should be “kept simple and informal to minimize the cost and effort” . . . There is strong sentiment at NASA that
peer reviews give the most benefit and cost the least amount of time and effort in
the life-cycle. (Chao et al. 2004, 3)
Oakes similarly asserts, without evidence, a lower resource cost for informal (software)
reviews, but Oakes but does not specifically describe subsystem reviews:
It can be seen that this [review] spectrum balances a trade‐off between rigour and
coverage for any given review. Formal reviews entail greater investment in preparation and review time, and in supporting training, metrics, and so on. However,
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they repay this investment through their greater effectiveness in uncovering defects. Less formal reviews are easier to set up and can cover ground quickly, but
are only likely to identify the more obvious issues. Thus, many organizations use a
mixture of approaches: formal inspections for critical or high‐risk work products,
with walkthroughs or desk checks for more routine artefacts. (Oakes 2012, 203)
Finding F7.1 extends other research by stating a higher resource cost for mission-level
reviews compared to subsystem reviews.

5.4.7.2

F7.2: Formality lower in subsystem and peer reviews than mission-level reviews
(sources have conflicting positions)
The part of Finding F7 that formality is lower in subsystem and peer reviews than mission-

level reviews has conflicting related statements in the current literature, and Finding F7.2 states
a position with supporting data.
A complication in discussing review formality is that references generally agree that
mission-level reviews are formal and peer reviews are often informal, but these references
define informal reviews in several conflicting ways:
1. not a contractual deliverable and with no external actors present (Wasson 2005, 712)
2. not strongly tied to the design schedule (Sauser 2006, 16)
3. simple; with less documentation, preparation, and requirements (Chao et al. 2004, 2–3)
4. less rigid in meeting processes and with a casual atmosphere (Chao et al. 2004, 7)
5. not directly associated with passing a major project checkpoint (Wiegers 2002, 27)
6. not delivering a report to management (Freedman and Weinberg 1990, 10–11, 71)
For the purpose of this dissertation’s finding based on observations of ContractorA, the
term informal review is aligned with the usage of Chao et al. (2004): being casual in setting
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and also requiring less documentation; external actors may be present, but review documents
are not a contractual deliverable to the client because the client is not verifying a checkpoint
(although the developer may be).
There is conflict in the literature whether subsystem reviews are relatively formal or informal. Wells discusses having in a Raytheon project a “series of informal working meetings
and formal reviews at various levels, culminating at the milestone review event. . . . Informal reviews, formal pre-reviews, and dry-runs are also important parts of the overall process”
(Wells 2007, 266). However, Wells describes subsystem reviews as “formal.” A conference paper by DAU instructors asserts without data that subsystem reviews can be formal or informal
depending on the designer decision: “Subsystem reviews below the CI [Configuration Item]
level on contract should not require government oversight and thus may be held as informal
reviews or internal reviews” (Fisher and Lake 1993, 581).
Goddard’s guidelines in GPR 8700.6 are one of the only references mentioning a hierarchy of reviews with increasing formality at mission reviews: “Engineering Peer Reviews are
an important element in an overall review approach aimed at providing efficient, timely, independent technical feedback to mitigate risks. They typically build on less formal engineering branch/tabletop reviews while supporting more formal . . . system reviews” (GSFC 2014,
2–3). Other Goddard guidance describes subsystem reviews as following the same process
as mission-level reviews (which do not have an SRB) (GSFC 2012, 1)—but does not directly
discuss the level of formality. Oakes describes varying formality of reviews, particularly peer
reviews (Oakes 2012, 20, 201–3), but Oakes does not discuss the level of formality of subsystem
reviews. Further, neither Goddard process documents nor Oakes has supporting data.
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Finding F7.2 provides a position based on supporting data in an area of debate: whether
subsystem reviews are formal or informal. Finding F7.2 states a range of formality of reviews,
with mission-level reviews highest in formality, followed by subsystem reviews, then peer reviews.

5.4.8 Literature analysis of Finding F8

Table 5.8: Subfindings, search terms, and literature assessment for Finding F8
#

Subfinding

Search Terms

Assessments and concerns from reviews are an input to decision gates,
but not the sole consideration.
There is significant impact to projects
when not passing a review.

GATES

F8.3

F8.4

F8.1

F8.2

5.4.8.1

Source
States?
Yes

Data
Support?
Yes

PASS

No (not
all)

N/A

Decision gates are typically “hard
gates.”

HARD GATE/
KILL

Yes (but
conflict)

Varies

Several common outcomes to reviews, including postponing subsequent reviews, additional work, delta
reviews, liens, and cancellation.

GATE/ OUTCOME

No (not
all, and
conflict)

N/A

Literature Support Assessment
(E) Source states
with supporting
data.
(B) Subfinding
extends source
assertions.
(D) Sources have
conflicting positions, some with
supporting data.
(D) Sources have
conflicting positions; subfinding
extends source
assertions which
exist.

F8.1: Assessments and concerns from reviews are an input to decision gates, but
not the sole consideration (source states with supporting data)
The part of Finding F8 that assessments and concerns from reviews are an input to de-

cision gates, but not the sole consideration is stated in current literature with supporting empirical data. Notably, Johansson (2009) finds from discussions and observations of aircraft
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developers that commercial gate reviews are supported by a preceding technical review as
well as other programmatic inputs:
Since the technical part can be very comprehensive, the evaluation process is divided into two meetings. A technical review is initially carried out, with various
experts from the company, external to the project, evaluating the technical solutions and progress. Their recommendation then serves as input to the gate meeting, and together with the other evaluation criteria are brought into the decision.
Usually, the only person from the project team attending the gate meeting is the
project leader, to represent and answer for the results of the project. If necessary,
experts answering for specific areas may participate in either the gate meeting or
the technical review meeting. (Johansson 2009, 38)
Several standards and guidance documents similarly assert without evidence that technical reviews are one of several inputs to government decision gates (e.g., NASA 2014b, 118–
20, 430–45; IEEE 2015, 9–10).

5.4.8.2

F8.2: There is significant impact to projects when not passing a review
(subfinding extends source assertions)
The part of Finding F8 that there is significant impact to projects when not passing a

review is partially supported by current literature, but Finding F8.2 extends it. In particular,
Johansson et al. describe from interviews at two aerospace firms that a common review outcome was a “catch up plan”:
It is very rare in both companies that projects in the product development phase
are stopped at the gates. . . . Both companies usually try to catch up as much as
possible during the course of the project, and still meet the final deadline. For instance, the project leader in Company A has to devise a detailed plan with actions
for catching up with the things that fall behind at a particular gate. (Johansson
et al. 2009, 8-201)
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However, Johansson et al. do not identify an impact to projects when conducting design rework to pass the gate criteria. Finding F8.2 extends other research by noting the negative impact and resultant risk to projects from this gate outcome.

5.4.8.3

F8.3: Decision gates are typically “hard gates” (sources have conflicting
positions, some with supporting data)
The part of Finding F8 that decision gates are typically “hard gates” has conflicting po-

sitions in the current literature, and Finding F8.3 states a position with supporting data.
Johansson et al. state from observing two commercial aircraft firms that gates are often
“soft” and allow passing gates without meeting criteria:
It is very rare in both companies that projects in the product development phase
are stopped at the gates. Projects in Company A are managed a bit softer due to,
for instance, contractual terms. . . .
One respondent at Company B said that they come from a tradition of very much
trusting their gut feeling. . . . In some cases, gut feeling may help bend the rules
slightly at the gate, where the project leader says that he/she has a feeling that
things will be ok for the next gate. (8-204)
Johansson et al. state from interviews (8-203) that both firms allow “Gate let-through
(i.e. without fulfilling [gate] criterion).” They note that this is in direct conflict with an influential source, Cooper (2008):
Further, it is interesting to see in the interviews that the gates seem to lack the
teeth or influence that Cooper (2008) prescribes. In these companies keeping the
projects running and not falling behind with deliveries is more important; thus,
only in extreme cases are projects stopped. . . . What is evident from our studies
is that reality is not as clear-cut as Cooper states. In practice HALT or KILL are
very rare, it is more that you try to appreciate the risk of going forward with a GO
decision that might not have full confidence and devise a suitable action plan for
how to catch up. (Johansson et al. 2009, 8-204)
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In his dissertation summary, Johansson observes a “conditional go-decision with actions” (Johansson 2009, 41). Johansson shows a figure with relative frequencies of various
gate decision outcomes, comparing his observations to Cooper (42)—but it is unclear how
Johansson obtains these relative frequencies since they are not given in the cited works.
Cooper does describe and recommend “hard gates” including “Go/ kill/ recycle/ hold”
in one work (Cooper 2008, 215, 220) and then recommending simply “Go/ Kill” in subsequent
work (Cooper 2009, 13; 2019, 41). However, in earlier work, Cooper recommends alternate soft
gates with “conditional go decisions” and “fuzzy gates” (Cooper 1994, 10). Cooper appears to
have changed positions over time, subsequently recommending hard gates as a best practice:
a “new product process that features tough Go/Kill decisions is a critical but often missing
success ingredient” (Cooper 1998, 8).
Chao et al. state, based on interview data, that killing projects is “infrequent”:
The PDR at the end of phase B is the last review to kill projects. However, it is
infrequent for projects to be terminated at that point. Usually at the least, there
is a delta-PDR where changes can be made. It is not unheard of for projects to be
restructured later in the life-cycle however. (Chao et al. 2005a, 3)
This conflicts directly with Johansson et al.’s statement that “it is very rare in both companies that projects . . . are stopped at the gates” (Johansson et al. 2009, 8-201). Chao et al.
(2005a) and Johannson et al. (2009) take different positions from interview data on the frequency of killing projects at decision gates. This study’s respondents from ContractorA stated
that it was rare, but it happened (see Section 4.2.3.2), similar to Chao et al. (2005a).
Guidance and standards documents have varying types of recommended gates, without supporting data. Several have a set of relatively hard gates: NASA guidance (NASA 2016,
49; NASA 2007, 19; 2014b, 11, 37) describes a process where allowed “corrective actions” or
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“liens” have specific time limits and a return to the decision gate. Alternately, the INCOSE
SE Guide and ISO 24748-1 describe a wide range of soft and hard decision gate outcomes,
including “proceed and respond to action items” (Walden et al. 2015, 54; IEEE 2018, 17).
Overall, there is significant conflict in sources on whether gates supported by reviews
are (and whether they should be) “hard” decision points or not (mostly hard: Cooper, Chao,
NASA; often soft: Johansson, INCOSE SE Handbook/ ISO 24748-1). One prominent author
(Cooper) has even varied his stated position over time on whether hard or soft (“fuzzy”) gates
are the best practice, and even whether “hold / recycle” hard decisions are acceptable.
Finding F8.3 provides a position based on supporting data in an area of debate: whether
decision gates are typically hard or soft decision points. Finding F8.3 states, based on observation of several NASA projects at ContractorA, that the decision gates are typically “hard gates.”
Proceeding past the gate and conducting next-phase work without meeting all gate criteria (a
“soft” decision) is rare and risk-accepting, but it may occur by exception with the agreement
of the client and design organization leadership.

5.4.8.4

F8.4: Several common outcomes to reviews, including postponing subsequent
reviews, additional work, delta reviews, liens, and cancellation (subfinding
extends source assertions)
The part of Finding F8 that there are several common outcomes to reviews, including

postponing reviews, additional work, delta reviews, liens, and cancellation is partially supported by current literature, but Finding F8.4 extends it with supporting data. The sources
also have conflicting positions on Finding F8.4.
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As discussed earlier in Section 5.4.8.3, sources make varying assertions about gate and
review outcomes—and very few have supporting empirical data. Chao et al. state in passing
based on interviews that review outcomes include killing projects, a delta-review, and project
restructuring (Chao et al. 2005a, 3). In Johansson’s dissertation and related papers, he describes commercial gate decision outcomes (which are related but not identical to technical
review outcomes) as go, halt, kill, as well as less concrete options such as “conditional godecision with actions” and rework of the development (Johansson 2009; Johansson et al. 2009,
8-204). Christiansen and Varnes observe a wide range of gate outcomes from interviews and
observations in a different design setting (portfolio decisions at a chemical company): “kill
project,” “conditional go,” “conditional launch,” “conditional closed,” “delay,” “acceleration
of project,” “stop but reformulate,” and “terminated before portfolio meeting” (Christiansen
and Varnes 2008, 92). No sources with supporting data discuss Finding F8.4’s “postponing
reviews,” although ContractorA respondents see this as a common outcome.
Several standards and guidance documents state without supporting data a range of
outcomes. NASA’s SRB Handbook and SE Handbook note, for major life-cycle reviews, that
the gate decision authority decides pass or fail of the review as part of the KDP decision. They
claim four possible outcomes of the gate review by the KDP decision authority:
1. pass and proceed to next phase;
2. pass with qualifications/liens (to be resolved in a determined period);
3. fail (and do not progress to next phase, with possibly a delta review); or
4. fail and have the project terminated (NASA 2016, 49; NASA 2007, 54)
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DoD review decision outcomes appear different than NASA’s and have less process
documentation. IEEE 15288.2 requires review chair approval of the technical review and completion of all action items and exit criteria in order to approve “formal closure documentation.” Unlike NASA, there is no “pass with liens” or “fail” in DoD’s IEEE 15288.2; a program
completes exit criteria, completes action items or has mitigation plans for outstanding risks,
and then finally the review chair approves review closure. (IEEE 2015, 15).
Tosney et al. similarly recommend three “review grades,” without supporting data: pass,
pass with actions and closure plans, and fail (Tosney et al. 2008, 14).
As discussed in Section 5.4.8.3, Cooper asserts a range of gate outcomes which change
over time, largely without clear supporting data: “Go/ kill/ recycle/ hold” (Cooper 2008, 215,
220) and “conditional go decisions” (Cooper 1994, 10).
Finally, the INCOSE SE Guide asserts a wide range of decision gate outcomes, again
without data. Note that #4 and #5 are not done by ContractorA in NASA and DoD projects,
from this study’s data:
1. Acceptable: proceed with the next stage of project
2. Acceptable with reservations: proceed and respond to action items
3. Unacceptable; do not proceed: continue stage and repeat review when ready
4. Unacceptable; return to a preceding stage
5. Unacceptable; put a hold on project activity
6. Unsalvageable: terminate the project (Walden et al. 2015, 27, 54)
Finding F8.4 extends other research and gives a data-supported position on an area
of conflicting literature, the outcomes of technical reviews (as differentiated from milestone
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gate outcomes) in government development. Finding F8.4 states that a poor technical review
often results in postponement of the gate decision—which was not found in current literature. Finding F8.4 also states that some outcomes from literature such as “hold” and “return
to previous stage” were not observed in this design setting.

5.4.9 Literature analysis of Finding F9

Table 5.9: Subfindings, search terms, and literature assessment for Finding F9
#

Subfinding

Search Terms

F9.1

Reviews act as a key project control measure by forcing work.

F9.2

Reviews act as a key project control measure by aligning development within the project
schedule.
Reviews allow control and insight between contractors, by
providing communication.
Reviews allow control and insight between contractors, by
identifying process issues.

PROJECT CONTROL
and {FORCE/ FORCING WORK}
PROJECT CONTROL
and SCHEDULE

F9.3

F9.4

5.4.9.1

PROJECT CONTROL
and COMMUNICATION
{CONTROL / SUBCONTRACTOR} and
PROCESS

Source
Data
States? Support?
Yes
No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No
(not
all)

N/A

Literature Support Assessment
(C) Source states
without supporting data.
(E) Source states
with supporting
data.
(E) Source states
with supporting
data.
(B) Subfinding
extends source
assertions.

F9.1: Reviews act as a key project control measure by forcing work (source states
without supporting data)
The part of Finding F9 that reviews act as a key project control measure by forcing work

is stated in current literature without supporting empirical data. Notably, Eisenhardt and
Tabrizi examine having frequent project reviews as a variable impacting development project
duration, arguing from literature analysis that frequent reviews may cause developer urgency:
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Frequent milestones (i.e., formal project review points) also accelerate product
development. . . .
Frequent milestones also shorten development time because they are motivating.
Their frequency creates a sense of urgency that keeps developers from procrastinating (e.g., Gersick, 1988). . . . In formal terms:
Hypothesis 9 (H9): Less time between milestones is associated with shorter development time. (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995, 93–94)
Eisenhardt and Tabrizi conducted a regression and modeling analysis from project
data from 72 development projects and found that the hypothesis associated with having frequent review points was one of their most significant variables impacting project development
time (100–2). However, it is unclear whether the issue they identified of reviews “forcing work”
was the main cause of this correlation between frequent reviews and shorter projects, or some
other attribute of reviews. Thus, although Eisenhardt and Tabrizi use empirical data, the link
between that data and reviews acting to force work was not established.
De Boer and Santema similarly assert without direct supporting data that design reviews act to force work, as “milestones which facilitate the manageability of the engineering
process by setting internal ambitions and/or representing external commitments” (de Boer
and Santema 2009, 3).
Unlike other sources, Finding F9.1 provides data support showing that reviews help in
project control by forcing project work.

5.4.9.2

F9.2: Reviews act as a key project control measure by aligning development
within the project schedule (source states with supporting data)
The part of Finding F9 that reviews act as a key project control measure by aligning de-

velopment within the project schedule is stated in current literature with supporting empirical
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data. Notably, Liker in several works (Liker et al. 1999, 253–54; Kamath and Liker 1994, 167)
notes from design firm data that design reviews provide discipline and deadlines to align efforts between suppliers and integrating design firms:

Key suppliers are given broad specifications and expected to go off and develop
products to meet those specifications. But they are also given strict targets for cost,
weight, performance, and timing that are monitored through prototype testing
and design reviews.
Design reviews and structured project development techniques impose discipline
on the design process. Design reviews affect the overall structuring as well as the
timing of project tasks. The key to structured product development is breaking
down the project into major activities with key milestones and design reviews
at those milestones, or gates. . . . Clear milestones and reviews make deadlines
meaningful and provide feedback on progress. (Liker et al. 1999, 253–54)
De Boer and Santema note without supporting data that reviews “facilitate the manageability of the engineering process” in that “the scope of each phase can be limited to manageable chunks, and that the pre-determined milestones can support consistent progress of
the project” (de Boer and Santema 2009, 3).

5.4.9.3

F9.3: Reviews allow control and insight between contractors, by providing
communication (source states with supporting data)
The part of Finding F9 that reviews allow control and insight between contractors, by

providing communication is stated in current literature with supporting empirical data. Notably, Huet’s dissertation largely focused on communication at observed commercial reviews
between companies, where he saw that
Engineering meetings and especially design reviews involve multiple stakeholders who see the object of design from different perspectives and ultimately use
different “dialects” to describe it (Bucciarelli 2002). The participants of a design
194

review effectively work in different “object worlds” (Bucciarelli 1994), and they
rely on artefacts to enable information sharing, negotiating, or making decisions
about the design and its process. (Huet 2006, 105)
Johansson observed from interviews that reviews can act as critical “boundary objects”
in negotiations and communications between partner firms in aircraft design teams (Johansson 2014, 5, 19). O’Sullivan’s dissertation observations of another aircraft designer noted that
design reviews were primarily meetings to deal with other companies, where things were coordinated and where rules between companies were set to allow “modularization” and independent but coordinated design work (O’Sullivan 2000, 100).
Eisenhardt and Tabrizi hypothesized that the shorter project durations they observed
of companies who used milestones and gates could be caused by improved communication,
that milestones “may promote coordination and communication among different parts of the
development” (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995, 94).

5.4.9.4

F9.4: Reviews allow control and insight between contractors, by identifying
process issues (subfinding extends source assertions)
The part of Finding F9 that reviews allow control and insight between contractors, by

identifying process issues is partially supported by current literature, but Finding F9.4 extends
it.
O’Sullivan observed at a commercial firm that reviews allowed some insight and issue
identification by the integrating firm, not design process control over subcontractors:
Suppliers and integrators alike emphasized that the integrator did not have design
authority, that the integrator could not approve but only “concur” (this was, in
fact, explicitly written into the TRD [Technical Requirements Document]). And
such integrity was important for everyone, for to a significant degree certifiability
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was as much of an imponderable to AeroCo as it was to suppliers, as the project
director emphasized:
“Then there’s certification—and that’s a question of interpretation. . . . At the end of
the day we [i.e. AeroCo alone] deal with the certification authority. There’s a review
process and a monitoring process—CDRs, PDRs. There are spectators there to listen.
Issues are raised and addressed. The rest is cross my fingers.”
. . . What the regulator is looking for, and what these measures help to achieve,
is evidence that AeroCo was always in control of what was going on: given the
challenges in auditing this complex product, such evidence is a reasonable proxy
that the design is worthy of certification. (O’Sullivan 2000, 196)
Finding F9.4 extends current literature by stating from supporting data that reviews can
act to establish process control as well as insight between contractors.

5.4.10

Literature analysis of Finding F10

Table 5.10: Subfindings, search terms, and literature assessment for Finding F10
#
F10.1

F10.2

F10.3

Subfinding

Search Terms

Source
States?
Yes

Data
Support?
Yes

Important to have review
panel members with expertise
on the system-under-design.
Important to have review
panel members with independence from design team.
Careful selection of reviewers
is a critical task for review
organizers.

PANEL and EXPERT
PANEL and INDEPENDENCE

Yes (but
conflict)

Varies

{PANEL MEMBER/
REVIEWER} and
SELECT

Yes

Yes

196

Literature Support Assessment
(E) Source states
with supporting
data.
(D) Sources have
conflicting positions.
(E) Source states
with supporting
data.

5.4.10.1 F10.1: Important to have review panel members with expertise on the
system-under-design (source states with supporting data)
The part of Finding F10 that it is important to have review panel members with expertise on the system-under-design is stated in current literature with supporting empirical data.
Notably, Sauser finds from interviews and reports from four NASA projects that:
The experience of the reviewers in performing project reviews was clearly identified by all projects as important to review success. . . . Boards for both of the
failed projects cited a failure to use adequate subject matter experts in project reviews and their involvement in the projects as contributing to the missions’ failures. (Sauser 2006, 16)
Covington similarly finds from analysis of spacecraft design failure data that “clearly,
relevant reviewer experience is required for a review to be meaningful and successful” (Covington 2015, 3, 10) and recommends that the government acquirer require that developers
define minimum panel domain expertise (5). Finally, Chao et al. report from interviews at
JPL that a critical issue for review panels is to have “the requisite skill set” of experts covering
needed issues, but that it is difficult for projects to get the experts’ time (Chao et al. 2004, 6–7).

5.4.10.2 F10.2: Important to have review panel members with independence from
design team (sources have conflicting positions)
The part of Finding F10 that it is important to have review panel members with independence from design team has conflicting positions in the current literature. Finding F10.2
states a position with supporting data. There is disagreement in the literature on whether
panel member independence is important, particularly at subsystem and peer reviews.
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Covington states from surveys of projects that even at subsystem level, independent
boards are more effective (Covington 2015, 10), further explaining:
A reviewer who is not fully independent may lose objectivity. They may overlook
important details of the design, how it is used, and issues relating to recurring
themes such as heritage re‐use since “it worked before.” (Covington 2015, 12–13)
Sauser (2006) similarly argues from a cross-case study that for “successful projects, the
use of people independent to the funding and management organization was viewed as being important to project success” and that failed projects used less independent review (16).
Kaslow argues from “red-team” findings that panels should be independent even at system
and internal subsystem level for maturity assessment, and reviewers “can be from within or
external to the company, but should not be from within the program” (Kaslow 1997, 590).
However, some sources state that not all reviews should have complete panel independence. Gandhi and Sauser (2008, 24) examine project review case studies and focus on
independence as a major issue, but find that reviewer independence was often a matter of
degree. They also find that using fully-independent experts increases costs and runs counter
to the objective of seeking high panel member expertise.
Oakes, without data support, creates a trade-off structure for review independence
(Oakes 2012, 20, 228). He argues that independence is less important for what he terms “formative” or “interim reviews” (in this research, peer reviews) compared to “summative assurance reviews” (in this research, subsystem reviews and mission-level reviews):
It can be seen that both approaches [independent assurance or peer review] have
benefits. The most important factor is probably whether we are focusing on formative or summative reviews. If a project begins to get off course, is it more important to get it back on course or to let other people know so they can adjust
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their plans? If the latter, they will need to focus more on summative reviews, and
a higher degree of independence is likely to be required. (Oakes 2012, 227–29)
Oakes (2012, 227–29) also argues, like Gandhi and Sauser (2006, 24), that strictly independent reviews are more expensive. He also suggests that review panels can be of “mixed”
independence: having members from other parts of the design firm, having a mixture of independent and peer members, or conducting a system of reviews where some are independent,
and some are not fully independent.
Finding F10.2 takes a position based on supporting data in an area of debate: whether
review panel members with independence are important. Finding F10.2 notes that at ContractorA, panel members who are independent from the design team are required at all reviews, even at subsystem and peer reviews.

5.4.10.3 F10.3: Careful selection of reviewers is a critical task for review organizers
(source states with supporting data)
The part of Finding F10 that careful selection of reviewers is a critical task for review
organizers is stated in current literature with supporting empirical data. Notably, Sauser finds
from a multi-source analysis, which included interviews and reports from four NASA projects,
that:
The experience of the reviewers in performing project reviews was clearly identified by all projects as important to review success. . . . All of the projects specified
that great effort was taken to handpick reviewers and when someone was identified as a good reviewer, great effort was taken to keep them as part of future project
reviews. (Sauser 2006, 16)
Covington recommends from surveys of spacecraft projects that “for whoever is responsible for selecting the review panel, they should evaluate what kinds of technologies are
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involved and select reviewers familiar with those technologies. . . . Identifying what is new
or difficult and matching the panel experience will provide far better outcomes” (Covington
2015, 16). Chao et al. similarly note from interviews “the importance of selecting appropriate
board members” (Chao et al. 2004, 4, 7).

5.4.11

Literature analysis of Finding F11

Table 5.11: Subfindings, search terms, and literature assessment for Finding F11
#
F11.1

F11.2

F11.3

F11.4

F11.5

F11.6

F11.7

F11.8

Subfinding

Search Terms
LEARN and ERROR

Source
States?
Yes

Data
Support?
Yes

Reviews let reviewers and participants learn about project
errors.
Reviews let reviewers and participants learn about issues.

LEARN and ISSUE

Yes

Yes

Reviews let reviewers and
participants learn about risks
and risk management.
Reviews let reviewers and participants learn about design
and process maturity.
Reviews let reviewers and
participants learn about configuration management and
baselines.
Reviews let reviewers and
participants learn about the
design itself.
Reviews let reviewers and participants learn about project
team competence.
Reviews let reviewers and participants learn about project
status.

{LEARN/ ASSESS}
and RISK

Yes

Yes

{LEARN/ ASSESS}
and MATURITY

Yes

Yes

{LEARN/ ASSESS}
and {BASELINE /
CONFIGURATION
MANAGEMENT}
{LEARN/ ASSESS}
and DESIGN

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

{LEARN/ ASSESS}
and COMPETENCE

Yes

No

{LEARN/ ASSESS}
and PROJECT STATUS

Yes (but
conflict)

Varies
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Literature Support Assessment
(E) Source states
with supporting
data.
(E) Source states
with supporting
data.
(E) Source states
with supporting
data.
(E) Source states
with supporting
data.
(C) Source states
without supporting data.
(E) Source states
with supporting
data.
(C) Source states
without supporting data.
(D) Sources have
conflicting positions.

5.4.11.1 F11.1: Reviews let reviewers and participants learn about project errors (source
states with supporting data)
The part of Finding F11 that reviews let reviewers and participants learn about project
errors is stated in current literature with supporting empirical data. Notably, Covington finds
from surveys and defect analysis that lower-level reviews can catch errors but not always:
The design defect survey indicated that 76% of the design defects should have
been caught at the assembly (box/unit) or lower level design reviews. This indicates that the highest return on investment is to focus on the sub-assembly and
lower level review. Additionally, many of the design defects at the assembly level
are found during initial test, thus indicating the value of test data. Unfortunately,
very small defects at the ASIC [Application Specific Integrated Circuit]/PWB [Printed Wire Board]/Unit level can be very challenging to detect by review alone. Engineering design tools and use of engineering best practices have made the design process more robust, but lack of knowledge about a specific process or part
can cause design defects. This Design Review topic team highly recommends that
equipment testing and supporting drawings be done to support reviews as soon
as possible. (Covington 2015, 13)
Chao et al. similarly find from interviews and surveys of firms that reviews are used to
identify errors, but reviews will always miss some errors:
For many organizations, design reviews are the only line of defense against errors
in the design process. Even if they are applied universally, they are still an imperfect gauge susceptible to human errors and will always allow some problems
through. Nonetheless, they will always be an essential part of any organization’s
efforts to error-proofing the development process. . . .
It is also important to regard design reviews as the first line of defense against errors and failures. In one representation of the different levels of error-proofing
against design errors (Chao and Ishii 2003), design reviews are a down-the-line
inspection activity, not as robust as an immediate prevention or detection. (Chao
et al. 2004, 10)

201

In addition, other sources assert without supporting data that design reviews allow
“checking of errors” (Wetmore et al. 2010, 113) and “uncover and correct design issues” (SaterBlack and Iversen 1994, 91), and both discuss learning about errors by review participants.

5.4.11.2 F11.2: Reviews let reviewers and participants learn about issues (source states
with supporting data)
The part of Finding F11 that reviews let reviewers and participants learn about issues is
stated in current literature with supporting empirical data. Covington (2015, 12) finds, from
analyzing spacecraft failures and reviews, that it is important for higher-level design reviews
“to review any open issues identified at the lower levels.” In contrast, the lower-level reviews
are described as better at learning about detailed issues. Wells sees Raytheon informal reviews
as having a “greater opportunity [than formal milestone reviews] to explore the design and to
identify and resolve issues” (Wells 2007, 266).
Nugent observes from analyzing artifacts from a defense project that more general
“technical issues” are often the focus of reviews rather than error and defect identification:
The quality control inspection model has become the basis for these kinds of [peer]
reviews. Therefore the explicit assumption of these reviews is that all of the technical issues have been resolved prior to the peer review so that the focus of the review
is on identifying “defects” before progressing from one phase of the SDLC [system
development life cycle] to the next. However this ideal state is rarely reached and
a significant portion of the peer review continues to dwell on technical issues (e.g.,
requirements, architecture, interpretation of baselines, etc.). (Nugent 2016, 3)
Finally, Maranzano notes that at AT&T hardware and software reviews, panel independence allows them to uncover serious issues: “Because independent experts conduct reviews
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and the organization’s management sanctions them, they’re a safe way to make a project’s
most serious issues known to the right management levels” (Maranzano et al. 2005, 41).

5.4.11.3 F11.3: Reviews let reviewers and participants learn about risks and risk
management (source states with supporting data)
The part of Finding F11 that reviews let reviewers and participants learn about risks and
risk management is stated in current literature with supporting empirical data. Notably, one
source (Chao 2003) briefly discusses, based on interview data, that reviews provide insight
and oversight to counter risks, depending on review level:
Another view of insight and oversight is not as a continuum but as two distinct
approaches that are both necessary to better mitigate error. Insight is not only
necessary when risk is low. Insight into the process and system are both necessary
before oversight can be implemented. . . . In the review process, the formal system
reviews aim to oversee the project, primarily from a programmatic standpoint.
Peer review should precede and complement those reviews and be used to gain
insight on technical risks. (Chao 2003, 37)
Several other sources assert without evidence a role of reviews in risk management and
learning about risks. De Boer and Santema argue that it is not possible for a review board to
“redo each project and catch all the glitches,” but rather reviews boards should examine “the
invested design effort and the associated risks” and understand fully the “potential up- and
down-side risks” before moving to another phase (de Boer and Santema 2009, 1, 3). Fisher
and Lake see technical reviews as “a principal means” to “identify and assess risks and deviations in cost, schedule and performance” (Fisher and Lake 1993, 1). Tosney et al. recommend
checking risk management processes at each review (Tosney et al. 2008, 29, 31, 39, 50).
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5.4.11.4 F11.4: Reviews let reviewers and participants learn about design and process
maturity (source states with supporting data)
The part of Finding F11 that reviews let reviewers and participants learn about design
and process maturity is stated in current literature with supporting empirical data. Notably,
Covington notes from analyzing spacecraft failures that a major purpose of independent reviews at the system level is “ensuring compliance with product maturity standards and other
work processes” (Covington 2015, 22). Covington also posits that reviews act to evaluate both
design and non-design products for maturity and risk:
Programs benefit from these independent reviews in several other ways as well.
The primary benefit is that it results in better and more mature program work
products, including designs, analyses, plans, and drawings. Because the reviews
cover all program phases, other non-design related elements like schedule, facilities, staffing, funding, tooling, and equipment are also evaluated for expected
maturity and risk. (Covington 2015, 18)
Kaslow similarly describes the role of system reviews from a failure analysis at Lockheed as “high level” and “structured to convince the customer that the design is mature”
(Kaslow 2003, 1001).

5.4.11.5 F11.5: Reviews let reviewers and participants learn about configuration
management and baselines (source states without supporting data)
The part of Finding F11 that reviews let reviewers and participants learn about configuration management and baselines is stated in current literature, but the literature is not supported by data and one source is in conflict with Finding F11.5.
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Fohn and Popick (2004, 14) assert, without data, a major benefit of reviews as: “formal
stakeholder agreement to baselines and acceptance criteria.” Young also asserts, without data,
a baselining and configuration management process linked to reviews:

The review process can only be completed once the baseline is formally established. The key consideration in this activity, to ensure effectiveness and efficiency, is to meticulously follow configuration management principles. It is imperative that a formal process and system be instituted in the organization and
that the process is adhered to. (Young 2013, 1454)
Mooz and Forsberg similarly assert without data a major role for “control gates and design reviews” as “disciplined events for approving the evolving baseline.” They go on to assert
that this baselining role is fundamentally for “business reasons rather than technical reasons”
(Mooz and Forsberg 2002, 3). Mooz and Forsberg’s latter statement is in conflict with data
from ContractorA interviews and other sources: as discussed earlier in Section 5.4.6.5, there
is a significant technical benefit to having a complete baseline, and at least one source asserts
with data that it is the “primary benefit of the technical review” (Fallan et al. 1991, 104).
A few standards and guidance documents also assert, without data, project baseline
assessment in reviews (e.g., IEEE 2015, 14–15; NAVAIR 2011, 10; Walden et al. 2015, 27).
Unlike other sources, Finding F11.5 provides data support showing that reviews support configuration management and baselining. Finding F11.5 also takes a data-supported
position contrary to the unsupported assertion by Mooz and Forsberg (2002) that the baselining role of reviews is primarily for business purposes.
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5.4.11.6 F11.6: Reviews let reviewers and participants learn about the design itself
(source states with supporting data)
The part of Finding F11 that reviews let reviewers and participants learn about the design itself is stated in current literature with supporting empirical data. From analyzing architecture reviews and conducting “more than 700 project reviews,” Maranzano et al. (2005,
41–42) find that the benefits of reviews include within-team learning about the design, design
issues, and decision rationales. Chao and Ishii observe from industry case study analysis that
“design reviews are an informal mechanism of transferring experience between projects and
members” and “fill in the knowledge gaps” (2005b, 6). Huet (2006) notes sensemaking and
learning about design at the two reviews he observes:
During design reviews, although no detail design activities actually take place,
feedback is nonetheless shared between participants leading to a general sense
making behaviour and retrospective learning processes. . . . Participants update
their information about the design and discuss the rationale leading to a collaborative plan of actions to take. Design reviews can therefore be considered as an
ideal event for in situ learning. (Huet 2006, 69)

5.4.11.7 F11.7: Reviews let reviewers and participants learn about project team
competence (source states without supporting data)
The part of Finding F11 that reviews let reviewers and participants learn about project
team competence is stated in current literature, but the literature is not supported by data.
One standard was found (GSFC-STD-1001) that recommends, without data, assessing
at several mission-level reviews that “the current and planned number, capability, and the
experience levels of the people assigned are sufficient” as well as “adequate assignment of
current and future staff” (GSFC 2009, 61, 66, 72, 78, 83–84)
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A few other sources make assertions, without data, on reviews assessing general project team staffing—which is related but not identical to competence (e.g., NAVAIR 2011, 28;
NASA 2016, 38, 40). Covington similarly denotes that reviews evaluate “non-design related
elements like . . . staffing.” Finding F11.7 provides data support showing that reviews are used
to learn about project team competence.

5.4.11.8 F11.8: Reviews let reviewers and participants learn about project status
(sources have conflicting positions)
The part of Finding F11 that reviews let reviewers and participants learn about project
status has conflicting positions in the current literature. Finding 11.8 states a position with
supporting data. Specifically, sources differ on whether reviews should cover “management
issues” such as schedules, plans, and progress.
IEEE 15288.2 states, without supporting data, that reviews should examine project status, schedule, and cost:
In order for a project’s technical management to have a balanced information basis on which to base any required project control actions, each technical review
or audit should be conducted from an integrated program viewpoint, including
technical status and progress, cost and schedule status, and impacts and risk assessment, to help ensure that technical review decisions do not create unrecognized and unacceptable future program impacts. (IEEE 2015, 10)
McLellan and Shilling (2018, 1, 4–5) similarly observe from one case project that a technical review “also offers insight into project progress while providing a layer of independent
review at programmatic milestones.” Fisher and Lake (1993, 579) also assert without evidence
that a key task of reviews is “to ascertain that progress is made according to plan.”
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In contrast, some sources argue that “management” issues such as project progress
should not be discussed in technical reviews. A NASA JPL Lessons Learned document asserts
without data that reviews help learn about “current work status” and “engineering status of
products and processes” but recommends the review focus on technical status rather than
overall project status: “include all relevant technical concerns and related cost considerations, but exclude management issues such as implementation plans, schedules, and work
breakdown structures” (JPL 1996, 1, 3, 5).
Young recommends, without supporting data, that “management or contract driven
design reviews” be treated separately from “engineering driven design reviews”:
From personal experience, management or contract driven design reviews may
focus on the efficiency of the creating system and divert attention away from the
real intent of a design review. This focus is better suited to a contract “gate” review
where the focus is on stakeholder and sponsor risk management. Such reviews
should be managed in accordance with project management principles, looking
at budget, schedule and the design-to specification. (Young 2013, 1450)
De Boer and Santema similarly claim, again without data, a difference between technical reviews and managerial reviews, and that technical reviews like peer reviews should not
cover project progress:
It is important to note that there is a difference between peer reviews and reviews
conducted with senior managers. The peer review is focused on verification of
selected work products (designs and end-product at various levels of completion)
against the stated requirements (CMMI 2006). . . .
The purpose of the management review, in contrast, is “to provide higher level
management with the appropriate visibility into the [design] process” (CMMI 2006),
evidently to decide on progress, authorize the next stage, and thereby facilitate the
objectives listed below. In practice, we encounter a confusion within companies
on this point, in which they presuppose that a peer review also does justice to the
objectives of a management review and vice-versa. As a consequence, either the
verification of the work-products is insufficient, or the objectives of the Design
Review are not achieved. (de Boer and Santema 2009, 2)
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Finding F11.8 takes a position based on supporting data in an area of debate: whether
technical reviews include (and should include) “project status.” Finding F11.8 observes from
interview data and documents that project status is commonly discussed in technical reviews.

5.4.12

Literature analysis of Finding F12

Table 5.12: Subfindings, search terms, and literature assessment for Finding F12
#
F12.1

F12.2

F12.3

F12.4

Subfinding

Search Terms

Design team members see subsystem reviews as better than
mission-level reviews for getting
directly useful actions.
Design team members see subsystem reviews as better than
mission-level reviews for technically influencing the design.
Design team members see subsystem reviews as better than
mission-level reviews for integrating the design.
Design team members see
mission-level reviews as not impacting their technical understanding of the design.

SUBSYSTEM and
DESIGN TEAM

Source
Data
States? Support?
No
N/A
(not
all)

Literature Support Assessment
(B) Subfinding
extends source
assertions.

SUBSYSTEM and
DESIGN TEAM
and {INFLUENCE/
IMPROVE}
SUBSYSTEM and
DESIGN TEAM and
INTEGRATE

No
(not
all)

N/A

(B) Subfinding
extends source
assertions.

No
(not
all)

N/A

(B) Subfinding
extends source
assertions.

SUBSYSTEM and
DESIGN TEAM

No
(not
all)

N/A

(B) Subfinding
extends source
assertions.

5.4.12.1 F12.1: Design team members see subsystem reviews as better than
mission-level reviews for getting directly useful actions (subfinding extends
source assertions)
The part of Finding F12 that design team members see subsystem reviews as better than
mission-level reviews for getting directly useful actions is partially supported by current literature, but Finding F12.1 extends it. In particular, some sources discuss having greater detail at
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lower-level reviews. Chao states, based on 12 interviews at NASA JPL and NASA Ames, that
lower-level (peer) reviews have more detail than formal (system-level) reviews.
There is no question that the formal review process at NASA is strong. However,
because of the scope of these projects and the limited time and resources of those
reviews, they must often concentrate largely on programmatic issues and can only
cover technical issues in a fairly shallow manner. It is the role of the engineering
peer reviews to identify the specific issues that can impact a project. (Chao 2003,
44)
Earlier, Chao states that “It is in these informal [peer] reviews that the engineers and managers
must work out the details that can be missed in formal [system] reviews.” (Chao 2003, 44)
The NASA SE Handbook states that peer reviews have a greater level of detail than lifecycle (system) reviews, though without supporting data:
Since internal peer reviews will be at a much greater level of detail than the lifecycle reviews, the team may utilize internal and external experts to help develop
and assess approaches and concepts at the internal reviews. . . .
Peer reviews provide the technical insight essential to ensure product and process quality. Peer reviews are focused, in‐depth technical reviews that support
the evolving design and development of a product, including critical documentation or data packages. (Hirshorn 2016, 302)
However, no source was found that discusses the usefulness of the actions, and no
source states that design team members value actions that are useful to the design. Finding
F12.1 extends other research by noting that action items must be considered “useful” by the
project team to be valued.
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5.4.12.2 F12.2: Design team members see subsystem reviews as better than
mission-level reviews for technically influencing the design (subfinding
extends source assertions)
The part of Finding F12 that design team members see subsystem reviews as better than
mission-level reviews for technically influencing the design is partially supported by current
literature, but Finding F12.2 extends it. In particular, some sources discuss improving the design at reviews in general or at peer reviews. For example, the NASA SE Guide asserts without
data that peer reviews improve design quality and getting suggestions for product improvements (e.g., Hirshorn 2016, 302)—but does not compare peer reviews to mission-level reviews. Drewein et al. (2015, 3) similarly assert without data that peer reviews can improve
quality and provide suggestions for improvement—but again do not compare peer reviews
with mission-level reviews. Goodden asserts without data that product improvement is a major function of design reviews, particularly during conceptual design:
The design review is the most important first step in a product’s lifecycle. It is
the ideal and least expensive time to recognize and propose changes or improvements to the conceptual design. (Goodden 2009, 115)
Although some sources assert without data that reviews can improve the design, Finding F12.2 provides data and extends these sources by stating that subsystem reviews are more
effective for influencing the design than mission-level reviews.
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5.4.12.3 F12.3: Design team members see subsystem reviews as better than
mission-level reviews for integrating the design (subfinding extends source
assertions)
The part of Finding F12 that design team members see subsystem reviews as better than
mission-level reviews for integrating the design is partially supported by current literature, but
Finding F12.3 extends it. In particular, some sources discuss in passing that reviews help in
integration. One DAU text asserts a major function of reviews is “providing a forum for communication, coordination, and integration across all disciplines and IPTs [Integrated Product
Teams]” (DAU 2001, 99). Wells similarly asserts that “periodic technical reviews are essential
for successful design control and integration” (Wells 2007, 7). However, neither source has
supporting data, and no sources were found that discuss which level of review better supports
design integration.
Finding F12.3 extends other research by showing from data that subsystem reviews
better support design integration than mission-level reviews.

5.4.12.4 F12.4: Design team members see mission-level reviews as not impacting their
technical understanding of the design (subfinding extends source assertions)
The part of Finding F12 that design team members see mission-level reviews as not impacting their technical understanding of the design is partially supported by current literature,
but Finding F12.4 extends it. A few sources discuss the role of reviews in improving participants’ understanding of the design. Based on his observations of aircraft component reviews,
Huet states that reviews generally enable participant learning and sensemaking about design:
212

During design reviews, although no detail design activities actually take place,
feedback is nonetheless shared between participants leading to a general sense
making behaviour and retrospective learning processes. Design management and
evaluation, the core activities of a design review, are substantial knowledge creating and decision making situations where participants update their information
about the design and discuss the rationale leading to a collaborative plan of actions to take. Design reviews can therefore be considered as an ideal event for in
situ learning. (Huet 2006, 69)
Other sources similarly describe reviews supporting learning about architecture and
decisions (Maranzano et al. 2005, 41–42) and “transferring experience between projects and
members” (Chao and Ishii 2005b, 6). However, no sources were found that discuss which level
of review better supports learning about the design.
Finding F12.4 extends other research by showing from data that subsystem reviews
better support team members learning about the design than mission-level reviews.

5.4.13

Literature analysis of Finding F13

Table 5.13: Subfindings, search terms, and literature assessment for Finding F13
#

Subfinding

Search Terms

F13.1

Panel members see process of assigning actions as a negotiation.

F13.2

Panel members see interactions
and discussions at the review
as valuable for learning about
design rationale.
Panel members see interactions
and discussions at the review as
valuable for finding assumptions.
Panel members see interactions
and discussions at the review as
valuable for finding overlooked
design issues.

PANEL and
{DISCUSSION/
NEGOTIATION}
RATIONALE

F13.3

F13.4

Source
States?
Yes

Data
Support?
Yes

Yes

Yes

ASSUMPTIONS

No (not
all)

N/A

OVERLOOKED/
MISSING

Yes (but
conflict)

Varies
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Literature Support Assessment
(E) Source states
with supporting
data.
(E) Source states
with supporting
data.
(B) Subfinding
extends source
assertions.
(D) Sources have
conflicting positions.

5.4.13.1 F13.1: Panel members see process of assigning actions as a negotiation (source
states with supporting data)
The part of Finding F13 that panel members see process of assigning actions as a negotiation is stated in current literature with supporting empirical data. In particular, D’Astous et al.
note conflict, negotiation, and argumentation to identify problems and recommend solutions
in their observed software review meetings (D’Astous et al. 2004, 632, 653).
Other sources make assertions matching Finding F13.1 but without supporting data:
the NASA SRB Handbook asserts that the review chair and the project’s representative “typically discuss each RFA [Request for Action] and reach agreement on its merit for official acceptance as an RFA” (NASA 2016, 47). An older DAU text similarly asserts a negotiation process
for action items:
At the end of each day, personnel should caucus to evaluate action items. Decisions, agreement, and approved action items should be recorded and signed. . . .
The co-chairmen should evaluate proposed actions to ensure that they are not out
of scope. (DSMC and Lockheed 1983, 13-9)

5.4.13.2 F13.2: Panel members see interactions and discussions at the review as valuable
for learning about design rationale (source states with supporting data)
The part of Finding F13 that panel members see interactions and discussions at the review as valuable for learning about design rationale is stated in current literature with supporting empirical data. Notably, Huet states, from observations of two industry reviews (Huet
2006, 69), that review discussions focus on learning about the design and rationale of actions
to take.
Huet, Culley, McMahon, and Fortin generally discuss participant learning in reviews:
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From the analysis of the literature related to KM [knowledge management] and
the specificities of design review activities, these meetings are predisposed for
substantial knowledge creating and decision making. Participants typically update their information about the design, discuss the rationale leading to a collaborative plan of action, and share past experiences. (Huet, Culley, McMahon, and
Fortin 2007, 251)
Kammerlind et al. (2000, 481–82) examine a case study of a peer review in a commercial plant and find that, despite the flaws they observed, the participants “are satisfied with
the [design reviews]. They have learnt more about other sub‐systems and they have had the
opportunity to discuss how changes affect sub‐systems and also the whole system.”
Johansson et al. also observe learning about design in reviewer interactions at aircraft
design firms: “Tacit knowledge plays an important role in the decision-making process [in
stage gate decisions], as reviewers ask for the design rationale and further evidence of what
has been done and why” (Johansson et al. 2009, 2).

5.4.13.3 F13.3: Panel members see interactions and discussions at the review as
valuable for finding assumptions (subfinding extends source assertions)
The part of Finding F13 that panel members see the interactions and discussions at the
review as valuable for finding assumptions is partially supported by current literature, but
Finding F13.3 extends it. Some sources discuss assumptions at reviews, but those sources
do not discuss participants finding assumptions at reviews.
Johansson observes from studying aircraft firms that assessing assumptions is a role
of reviews but argues that reviews are not good at it: “A challenge for decision makers at the
gates is to assess assumptions and judge their truthfulness” (2009, 56). Later, Johansson notes
confusion on assumptions at reviews: “The feedback was that it was difficult to differentiate
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assumptions from the proven facts [at reviews] because people wanted things so badly” (Johansson 2009, 117). Since Johansson sees problems with assumptions at reviews, he makes a
major dissertation recommendation (originally presented in Johansson et al. 2008) for a modified “knowledge maturity approach” to characterize key knowledge at technical reviews:
In conclusion, there are opportunities for the stage-gate [review] to utilise the
knowledge maturity approach as a boundary object to facilitate discussion and
communication of issues relating to ambiguity and uncertainty as well as dealing
with assumptions. (Johansson 2009, 33)
Johansson discusses assessing and discussing assumptions at reviews, but Johansson
does not link finding assumptions to discussions by review participants.
Turner asserts that “interrogation” at reviews can record the design assumptions:
The design review may be looked upon as a product liability preventer. . . . The
formal documentation and interrogation process involved in a design review ensures that companies maintain an accurate record of the design assumptions and
criteria throughout the design process. (Turner 1982, 117–18)
At odds with Finding F13.3, Turner asserts that the role of review discussions and documents is to record assumptions for legal liability reduction,1 rather than find assumptions—
and does not have a clear link to supporting data.
Finding F13.3 extends other research by stating from data that interactions and discussions by review participants help identify assumptions.

1. See Section 5.4.1.4 for a related finding on review minutes as an organizational record.
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5.4.13.4 F13.4: Panel members see interactions and discussions at the review as valuable
for finding overlooked design issues (sources have conflicting positions)
The part of Finding F13 that panel members see the interactions and discussions at the
review as valuable for finding overlooked design issues has conflicting positions in the current
literature, and Finding F13.4 states a position with supporting data.
Several works on software engineering state that lower-level software review panels
can identify overlooked errors through interactions between panel members that they would
not have identified acting alone. Wiegers asserts that when software peer reviews identify an
issue, it often leads to other reviewers having insights and finding additional defects (Wiegers
2002, 34, 95). Wiegers cites as support the influential description of formal software review in
Fagan (1976), termed “Fagan inspections” by other authors. Fagan, based on observed software reviews at IBM, notes a critical role in the review moderator’s “use of the strengths of
[review] team members” to “produce a synergistic effect larger than their number” (190). In
later work, Fagan uses the term “the Phantom Inspector” for this synergistic effect of being
able to find more issues from team review discussions:
[The software review moderator] is responsible for conducting the inspection so as
to bring a peak of synergy from the group. This is a quickly-learned ability by those
with some interpersonal skill. In fact, when participants in the moderator training classes are questioned about their case studies, they invariably say that they
sensed the presence of the “Phantom Inspector,” who materialized as a feeling
that there had been an additional presence contributed by the way the inspection
team worked together. The moderator’s task is to invite the Phantom Inspector.
(Fagan 1986, 747)
However, other software engineering references (Laitenberger 2002, 528; Votta 1993,
108) make findings that conflict with Fagan (1986). They find no “synergy effect” or “Phantom
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Inspector” in software reviews. There is an ongoing debate in software research whether there
is a “Phantom Inspector” effect and what are the best software review practices (Wiegers 2002,
34; Johnson and Tjahjono 1998, 9–10).
Finally, it should be noted that some of the software engineering sources cited above
(Laitenberger 2002; Johnson and Tjahjono 1998) make findings from student data rather than
data from actual development programs. This is a debated methodology due to validity concerns since it is not “sampling from the same population that one aims to generalize” (Feldt
et al. 2018, 3807). As a result, those sources’ claims of no observed Fagan “Phantom Inspector
effect” are weaker since they use data from “simulated development settings”—data from experiments with students—while Fagan used data from actual developmental settings (Fagan
1986, 747).
Therefore, Finding F13.4 provides a position based on supporting data in an area of
debate—that discussions at the review are valuable for finding overlooked design issues.

5.5 Summary of literature support level
A summary is presented in Table 5.14 of literature assessment codes—(A) through (E),
see Section 5.3—for subfindings within all findings. As discussed, subfindings are considered
“novel” for codes (A), (B), and (C), and the codes are in rough order of novelty: (A) having the
highest novelty, through (E), which has no assessed research novelty.
Table 5.14 summarizes the relative novelty within the findings. For example, Finding
F12 has all four subfindings assessed as “(B): new extension of a finding stated in a source,” so
all of the text of Finding F12 is a novel extension of current literature.
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Role of action items and minutes in reviews: Useful action items signify review success. Action
items are used to assess whether review criteria are met, and action items identify critical issues.
Review minutes act as a formal organizational record and overall assessment.
Contribution of subsystem reviews: Subsystem reviews better than mission-level reviews at technically detailed problem finding. Subsystem reviews better for learning about design details, but
mission-level reviews broader in scope. Peer reviews have highest level of technical detail, but are
relatively narrow in scope.
Contribution of mission-level reviews: Mission-level reviews better than subsystem reviews at finding dependencies on external actors and assessing the design effort. Mission-level reviews better
than subsystem reviews at finding overlooked design issues, assumptions, and broader-scope issues
across the system.
Socio-technical role of mission-level reviews: Mission-level reviews support socio-technical needs
that subsystem reviews don’t: forcing client decisions, supporting client and design organization
gate decisions, checking on project progress, and checking if project is following institutional processes. Interactions with clients happen largely at mission-level reviews.
Variation of reviews with design phase: Earlier reviews allow team to influence design more, but
design largely not open to change after CDR. Amount of review action items influencing the design decreases with design phase. Design phase directly drives specific review content, criteria,
and scope of gate decisions. Level of detail and expected design and process maturity increase with
design phase. Openness to changes in design decreases with design phase. Design phase directly
drives expected baseline content.
Resource cost of reviews: Pre-review work has high resource cost due to preparing data and conducting dry runs. However, pre-review work helps project as a forcing function for work and forcing
team communications, re-examining work and creating a complete baseline. Tailoring reviews can
reduce review resource cost for small and risk-accepting projects, with client and organizational negotiation and agreement.

F1
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F6

F5

F4

F3

F2

Finding area: Finding Text

#

E, E, E, E,
E, E, E

A, A, C, E,
C, E, E, C

B, B, C, E,
E

B, C, A, A,
C

C, E, C, C,
C

B, C, C, E,
C

Lit Assessment/ subfindings

Table 5.14: Findings with literature assessment of associated subfindings

Variation in resource cost of reviews: Resource costs for review and formality lower in subsystem
and peer reviews than mission-level reviews.
Review impact on decision gates and project progress: Assessments and concerns from reviews
are an input to decision gates, but not the sole consideration. Decision gates are typically ”hard
gates”: significant impact to not passing a review and several common outcomes, including postponing subsequent reviews, additional work, delta reviews, liens, and cancellation.
Review contribution to project control: Reviews act as a key project control measure by forcing
work and aligning development within the project schedule. Reviews allow control and insight between contractors, by providing communication and identifying process issues.
Review panel desired traits: Important to have review panel members with expertise on the
system-under-design and independence from design team. Careful selection of reviewers is a critical task for review organizers.
Information learned in reviews: Reviews let reviewers and participants learn about project errors
and issues, risks and risk management, design and process maturity, configuration management
and baselines, the design itself, project team competence, and project status.
Design team views on contribution of reviews at different levels: Design team members believe
subsystem reviews are better than mission-level reviews for getting directly useful actions, technically influencing the design, and integrating the design. RQ2: Design team members believe
mission-level reviews do not impact their technical understanding of the design.
Panel member views on interactions at reviews: Panel members see process of assigning and
modifying actions as a negotiation. Panel members see the interactions and discussions at the review valuable for learning about design rationale, and finding assumptions and overlooked design
issues.

F7
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F13

F12

F11

F10

F9

F8

Finding area: Finding Text

#

E, E, B, D

B, B, B, B

E, E, E, E,
C, E, C, D

E, D, E

C, E, E, B

E, B, D, D

B, D

Lit Assessment/ subfindings

Table 5.14: Findings with literature assessment of associated subfindings, continued

CHAPTER 6

INTERPRETATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS

This chapter first provides higher-order interpretations of research data against study
variables and summaries of theoretical gaps. Next, observations are made regarding trends
from data on research questions that were below the level of findings, and other ideas about
design reviews that were less directly linked to the study analysis.

6.1 Interpretations
This section gives interpretations—higher-level discussions on trends in variables and
gaps in theories compared to observed findings. It also discusses the criticisms of reviews in
the context of the other findings in the study. Finally, it relates the findings to the original
research questions.

6.1.1 Variation in findings against study variables
This subsection relates the findings to the study variables developed in case selection
and notes where additional variation was observed.
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6.1.1.1

Variation in findings against core study variables
Some of the findings in Chapter 5 describe how respondents see that reviews vary with

the three study variables level of review, phase of review, and participant role.
Level of review. The study variable level of review had a strong effect across cases and
participants. Findings F2, F3, and F4 describe (see Chapter 4) that respondents see missionlevel reviews and subsystem reviews as being fundamentally different in which needs they are
most effective at meeting.1
One variation with level of review is that subsystem reviews are better at examining
the design in technical detail, but mission-level reviews are broader in scope (Finding F2).
There appears to be an inherent trade-off in reviews of varying levels between technical detail and scope. Peer reviews have the greatest technical detail but only on a relatively limited
scope, while mission-level reviews can examine cross-subsystem interactions and external
actors and interfaces, but necessarily at a lower level of detail (Finding F3).
Stakeholder involvement also shifts with level of review. Mission-level reviews support
project-level needs such as examining the design effort (as opposed to the design artifact) and
meeting external stakeholder needs like supporting gate decisions by the client (Finding F4).
In contrast, subsystem reviews appear to primarily meet the needs of the design team and the
design organization, with limited external stakeholder involvement.
Resource costs of the review are also seen as shifting with level of review. Since subsystem reviews are largely internal to the design team and involve less preparation than mission1. See the terminology discussion in Section 1.3. This research examines spacecraft design projects, which term the highest-level reviews “mission-level reviews.” In other design
contexts such as DoD projects, organizations term these reviews “system-level reviews.”
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level reviews, they are seen as having lower resource demands on the project. This lower resource cost appears to be one reason why design team members prefer subsystem reviews.
These trends in the findings with the variable level of review show that—at odds with
assertions in standards like IEEE 15288.2 (2015)—the subsystem reviews and peer reviews are
significantly different than mission-level reviews in how they support design management.
This strong dependence on review behavior with level of review also points at a critical theory gap on this study variable. Very few sources discuss subsystem reviews and peer
reviews in fields other than software engineering, despite the arguments of several authors
(e.g., Chao 2005; Covington 2015) that subsystem reviews are critical to design quality. However, low-level software reviews such as code walkthroughs are very different from complex
subsystem reviews (e.g., spacecraft power subsystem reviews). Complex interactions with external actors, such as those discussed in Findings F2, F3, and F4, simply are not present in a
code review of a 500-line sub-function. Therefore, the research on low-level software reviews
cannot be applied wholesale to peer reviews and subsystem reviews in complex systems.
There is a gap in theory on the larger systems of reviews in design organizations. Missionlevel reviews are process checks and summative reviews on lower-level reviews. The various
levels of review feed data to other reviews and help coordination between key stakeholders—
design team, design organization, subcontractors, clients, and client organization—in ways
that are not well-studied but appear critical to design integration and project success. Effects from this study that vary with level of review include: external vs. internal; independent
vs. within-team; interim vs. summative; detailed vs. summarized; narrow vs. system-wide;
oversight vs. insight; formal vs. informal. Decades of practice have evolved review systems,
but there is a lack of theory on why and how review systems are effective.
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A related theoretical hypothesis, which can be examined in future work, is that overall review effectiveness for a project depends on a system of reviews. These larger systems of
reviews—hundreds of reviews in the observed spacecraft design projects—are seen as sufficiently necessary that they are worth spending significant resources on as “standard design
practice.” Reviews are an organizational structure that responds to a wide set of internal and
external stakeholder needs—as a system. A single review type should not be considered solely
in isolation since the findings show that a single review type (e.g., peer reviews) does not meet
all stakeholder needs.
To make a research finding, as Chao does, that “formal reviews . . . are less rigorous
technically,” “peer reviews . . . [must] identify design errors,” and that “peer reviews give the
most benefit while cost the least amount of time and effort” (Chao 2005, 53), has multiple
problems related to this hypothesis. First, Chao misses the point that higher-level reviews
check design issues that can’t be examined at a predecessor peer review (such as systemwide margins). Second, by making this assertion, Chao makes a seemingly unsupported value
judgment—that the needs met by peer reviews (e.g., finding detailed technical flaws in middesign of components) are more important than the needs met by summative subsystem reviews (e.g., ensuring the accomplishment of critical subsystem requirements) or missionlevel reviews (e.g., finding system-wide issues and gaining stakeholder concurrence). Finally,
Chao misses the point that mission-level reviews act as a check by the design organization
and client that subordinate reviews were done properly, a “meta-review” to ensure process
quality. If peer reviews are important, then checking that peer reviews are done well is very
important—and that check is largely performed at mission-level reviews.
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Under this hypothesis that the larger review system drives review performance (as opposed to one level of review), having “great” peer reviews and “poor” mission-level reviews
would result in worse project outcomes than having “good” reviews at both levels. Each type
of review needs to be considered in the larger system of reviews in design organizations, which
is an un-examined theoretical proposition on the study variable level of review.
Participant role. The study variable participant role had a strong effect on participant
views that was not predicted prior to this study and was not examined in prior related research
(e.g., Chao 2005).
Finding F12 documents how participant role interacts with the level of review study
variable: design team members prefer subsystem reviews for getting useful actions for their
work, influencing the design of other team members, and integrating subsystem work across
teams. Design team members generally do not see much technical value in the mission-level
reviews and say they do not learn much about the design at mission-level reviews.
Review panel members have a different view of mission-level reviews and find them
valuable. They feel that reviews help the design effort find overlooked design issues and see
the interactions and discussions as helpful for learning about the design. Panel members also
report a complex social negotiation on acceptance of actions between the largely independent
and external panel and the design team.
This variation in views between the design team and the review panel is important and
has not been previously reported. Prior work such as Chao (2005), which reports on reviews
based on interviews, may have unrepresentative findings by not controlling for which participant roles provided data. Few prior works have discussed the impact of participant role on
activities and views in design, and it appears to be a weak area of theory.
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Phase of review. The study variable phase of review was controlled in case selection
and recruitment. Finding F5 summarizes the impact of design phase on review behavior: participants reported that, for example, a review being a PDR or CDR influenced many things
including the ability for the team and actions to impact the design, the scope of decisions
supported, and the expectations for content, maturity, detail, and baselines. Some of this review variation with design phase is well-documented in the literature, particularly in process
standards.
In general, after CDR, the design team viewed the design as “closed,” and changes to
the design were only done as necessary. There appears to be an accepted process that is built
into the structure of design phases, involving the management of uncertainty, iterative design, and forcing of design decisions. The reviews act as fences or “gates,” which are critical to
defining this structure of design phases. Respondents appeared to accept this standard design
process as simply “how things are done” and seldom discussed it unless directly questioned.
Many respondents seemed surprisingly familiar with the design process and expectations at
specific reviews, referring unprompted to the organization’s process documents.
There is little literature on the theory of why reviews and design efforts vary with design
phase, and under what conditions this accepted structure of iteration, change management,
and design decisions is effective. The literature on the phase of review study variable describes
what design organizations do—but generally doesn’t discuss why those practices occur.
There were some minor interactions observed between the study variable phase of review and level of review. Specifically, in the accepted structure of reviews at ContractorA, the
only phases/types of required subsystem reviews are subsystem Requirements Review, subsystem PDR, and subsystem CDR (see Table 3.3). It is unclear from this study exactly why
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subsystem reviews are only conducted for these design phases. It may be that the needs met
by early conceptual reviews and later reviews such as integration reviews primarily involve
system-level issues, with subsystems examined in a less formal fashion, but further research
would be needed to probe this issue.

6.1.1.2

Observed additional study variables
Beyond the three study variables examined of level of review, participant role, and

phase of review, interview data and the literature suggest there are six other variables that affect design review behavior and design behavior in general.
Existing literature was examined in Section 3.2.3 on potential study variables to downselect to the two case variables (and one study variable that was related to the interview respondent). Additional evidence from interviews supported some study variables beyond the
three “core study variables” discussed above in Section 6.1.1.1. These variables are reported
in Table 6.1 to create a theoretical construct for future research: variables that likely impact
design in complex space and defense programs, which could be considered for either controlling or variation. Specific research studies may have a different emphasis on these variables—
or there could be additional variables for different study questions. However, the construct
generally appears useful for structuring the empirical study of systems engineering.
Few systems engineering works discuss theoretical case evaluation variables except for
two sources discussed in Section 3.2.3. Friedman and Sage (2004, 88–89) had “Concept Domain” (similar to Variable #2 [design phase]), and “Responsibility Domain” (similar to Variable #6 [designer role]). Szajnfarber (2011, 29) used “priority” (similar to Variable #4 [size
of design]), and “Level” (roughly Variable #2 [phase of design]) as well as additional factors
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9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

#

Candidate variable affecting design
behavior
Respondent role (Study Variable);
e.g., design team member, team
lead, review panel, review chair,
client
Phase of design (Study Variable);
e.g., early design phase, test and
delivery
Level of design (Study Variable);
e.g., mission / system-level, subsystem, sub-subsystem
Size / complexity / novelty of
work; e.g., large flagship (billiondollar), mid-size, small effort (under $100M)
Specific design organization;
e.g., ContractorA, ContractorH,
Raytheon, Intel
Designer role/ design relationship;
e.g., Prime, subcontractor, government developer
Specific acquirer; e.g., NASA, DoD
Office/service, prime contractor
(ContractorA, ContractorH)
Country/ region of development;
e.g., US, Europe, Japan
Industry or design domain; e.g.,
software, semiconductors
One respondent (1 of 21)

One respondent (1 of 21)

Few respondents (4 of 21)

Some respondents (5 of 21)

Some respondents (5 of 21)

Some respondents (8 of 21)

Most respondents (13 of 21)

Most respondents (15 of 21)

Observed support from respondents
All respondents (21 of 21), but less
often directly

No standards, very little literature

No standards, very little literature

No standards, very little literature

No standards, very little literature

No standards, very little literature

A few standards, very little literature

A few works of academic literature
(Chao 2005)

Many standards: (NASA 2017b;
IEEE 2015)

Almost no standards or literature

Other support

Table 6.1: Candidate variables affecting design behavior
in complex space and defense projects

related to that work’s research focus (time of development and nature of the innovation). Implicitly, any design project case is at some level of these nine variables. It would be useful
for meta-analysis in empirical systems engineering research if studies reported case data for
variables such as those in Table 6.1.
A tenth variable was examined, respondent experience level, but there were no clear
trends for respondent views as a function of experience level. Two participants noted that
their lower level of experience meant that they had less experience across a range of the study
variables phase of review and level of review. Some respondents offered that they had more
experience and had attended more reviews. However, the data were not sufficient to retain
experience level as a study variable or even a recommended variable for future study.
In some research, it may be necessary to separate the effects of parts of Variable #4—
size vs. complexity vs. novelty. Comments from respondents in this study generally did not differentiate between those variables when discussing review practice. Literature such as NASA
and DoD process documents largely differentiate projects by size (typically as total project
life-cycle cost) and by not complexity or novelty. NASA does have some process differences
for project “risk classification” (NASA 2014a). For this research, risk level was generally correlated with size and was not considered a useful separate variable.

6.1.2 Gaps in theory related to findings not involving case variables
There are theoretical gaps across the findings from the literature analysis in Section 5.5,
beyond the gaps related to study variables discussed above in Section 6.1.1.1.

229

6.1.2.1

Finding F1.1: Useful actions signify review success
Finding F1.1 on action items points out some complex issues. Engineers in the larger

design team and stakeholders such as the design organization view actions as a route to actively make the design better and to push for positive change—both for their area of interest
and for the entire project. The actions were seen as a critical and rare route for system-wide
or narrowly focused inputs into the design—planned, yet available to all. This was an uncommon way for relatively quick assessments, decisions, and actions, which several respondents
reported they were eager to take advantage of. Engineers in this research complained about
sitting in review meetings, but saw the actions as valuable to their work, as Huet’s dissertation (Huet 2006, 194) also found. This study provides direct empirical confirmation of Huet’s
finding that engineers only truly value the actions as an output of reviews.
Huet also connects action items to theories of sensemaking and knowledge transfer
(Huet 2006). However, actions are critical in other ways that bear further study and theory
development. They are complex socio-technical design artifacts in almost universal use, involving negotiation, management of change and uncertainty, and management of external
and internal stakeholders. In analyzing action items (see Section 4.2.1.3), they are relatively
accessible: crystallized design decisions in a formal organizational record. Actions and similar artifacts offer a window into design team behavior that needs further study.

6.1.2.2

F8.2: There is significant impact to projects when not passing a review
As discussed in Section 5.4.8.2, the literature does not discuss the negative impact of

not passing reviews. This is the downside of the role of reviews as “hard gates”: when the
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gates are not passed, there is a serious impact on the design team and project. From a project
team perspective, not passing a gate is an outcome to be avoided at nearly any cost—perhaps
leading to some of the “dog-and-pony show” criticism of over-preparation discussed later.
Although some laud the use of “gates with teeth” (Cooper 2009), the socio-technical
impact to design teams of failure or partial failure has not been examined in the research literature. Respondents in this research described negative aspects of project deferral at decision
gates: loss of momentum, reduced team morale, and added rework. Any of these issues can
lead to additional problems in projects that are already at-risk. If “hard gates” are standard
practice, then how to deal most effectively with the inevitable “not passing” projects should
be important to design organizations, but this aspect is little studied.

6.1.2.3

F9.4: Reviews allow control and insight between contractors, by identifying
process issues
Finding F9.4 points out that reviews are a critical project control link between contrac-

tors in the design. A few works observe some of this (O’Sullivan 2000; Huet 2006), but there is
a large gap in understanding how large complex enterprises with dozens of contractor firms
interact with each other effectively to produce an integrated design. Design reviews are one
method, but other methods are critical and observed in this research: contracts, integrated
master schedules, recurring engineering discussions, exchange of formal interface and design
documents, formal quality control visits and insight. There is a complex oversight/insight relationship between prime contractors and subcontractors and other partners, similar but different in key ways from the government acquirer/prime developer relationship. There is a large
gap in empirical data on the methods and pitfalls in managing such large multi-organizational
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design efforts, despite it being a common design organization issue. This research suggests
that reviews are part of industry standard inter-organizational control methods, but the literature and theory support are surprisingly sparse given its importance.

6.1.2.4

F13.3: Panel members see interactions and discussions at the review as valuable
for finding assumptions
Finding F13.3 describes a debate in software development literature on whether there

is a synergy in reviews, the “Fagan Phantom Inspector” effect (Fagan 1986, 747), which allows
review panels to find overlooked issues or more problems that a single reviewer would miss.
This issue appears to have little research outside of software development settings.
There is a lack of theory and evidence on how interactions and discussions between
panel members act to uncover assumptions and issues. Notably, there is ongoing research
on technologies for virtual design review (e.g., Daily et al. 2000; Brooks 1999)—which would
seem to hamper this panel interaction—but little research on potential downsides of reduced
interactions and discussions in virtual reviews per this finding.

6.1.3 Discussion of observed criticisms of reviews
Participants voiced several common criticisms, supported at a level similar to other research findings, as given earlier in Table 4.2. This section discusses these criticisms of reviews
in the context of this research’s observations, findings, and other literature. Some recommendations are provided for dealing with the underlying issues of the criticisms.
Some design team members criticized the amount of time spent on review preparation, seeing it as excessive and that project work was interrupted. However, Finding F6 found
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that the pre-review work had other benefits: forcing project work, team communications, reexamining work, and creating an integrated baseline. Since mission-level reviews are highstakes events involving project success or failure—an “all hands on deck” effort—the cases
observed did expend significant effort on the reviews. Whether the effort was worthwhile
is a value judgment that is difficult to make by an outside researcher. Clearly, some team
members dislike the interruption of work to focus on reviews. However, several respondents
pointed out the importance of having a successful review—that the stakes were high enough
that ensuring success (perhaps by over-preparing) was a common response. One recommendation is that projects balance review preparation with other tasks and make decisions on reviews understanding the project impact and communicate the need for focusing on reviews.
A second related criticism is that mission-level reviews can be dog-and-pony shows,
with insufficient detail. However, other findings related how subsystem reviews are inherently
best at finding details (Finding F2), and that mission-level reviews are good at getting external input and supporting client decisions. As discussed above, there is an inherent trade-off
between broader coverage (which is required to review the whole design) and greater detail.
Some respondents noted that they felt compelled to make the presentations and data as good
as possible, even at a high cost in preparation time, because they felt that the presentations
reflected on them and their team. Another respondent noted that teams like “to put their best
foot forward” at reviews because they know they are being judged by their clients. Similarly,
some respondents noted that reviews and the designs reflected on the design organization’s
reputation. One recommendation is that organizations monitor and balance the desire for
doing well at reviews and looking professional against the cost in work and maintain internal
communication to prevent over-preparation.
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A final criticism by design team members was that mission-level reviews don’t give them
meaningful action items, or actions are “work that they would have done anyway.” Some respondents did note that action items at ContractorA were actually not supposed to be routine
“work to be done,” and that was supposed to be part of the action item negotiations. Some
routine action items appear to have been accepted as no-impact concessions to the review
board. Another counterargument is that “low-action” mission-level reviews are an indicator
of a successful review. However, the role of reviews is to guard against relatively infrequent
but disastrous outcomes as a quality check, so finding many minor actions as part of this routine check is a necessary price for guarding against major problems. Ichida writes that design
reviews are “not for generating excellent ideas, but for making good ideas work . . . [like a game
of Go] avoiding bad moves without missing a lot of good ones in the process” (Ichida 1996b, 8).
Although engineers on individual projects may find a lack of meaningful reviews at missionlevel reviews annoying, it has an important “design audit” function (Sater-Black and Iversen
1994) for the parent design organization to prevent problems flowing into later phases when
they would be more difficult and expensive to fix.
A final criticism from some respondents was that the review package was often not reviewed by the panel prior to reviews, reducing effectiveness. Respondents were frustrated that,
after all of the work done to prepare the package (both at subsystem- and mission-level reviews), some panel members clearly hadn’t looked at the package. One panel member noted
that he, like many reviewers, simply didn’t have time to look at the read-ahead. Chao’s research similarly notes that experts are often very busy and in-demand, which was a problem
at JPL reviews (Chao et al. 2004, 6). One influential software text recommends canceling a
[lower-level] review if panels are unprepared (Freedman and Weinberg 1990, 106). Counter
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to this recommendation, one respondent panel member noted that rescheduling major reviews was not done casually, due to the logistical difficulty of assembling the external stakeholders and panel. Some respondents suggested improving panel member participation and
pre-work by the design firm resourcing a standing group of reviewers and having the panel
chair enforce preparation. Some respondents said they conducted extensive preparation and
were frustrated that their peers did not. One recommendation is cultural: design organizations make decisions about resources for reviews—to improve reviews, they must ask panel
members to spend more time on preparation. External review panel member preparation
likely cannot be influenced by the design organization. For better review programs, one software text (Wiegers 2002, 146–48) recommends: (1) training of reviewers, (2) documented processes, and (3) management commitment. Chao et al. make similar recommendations on
improving organizations’ review training and identifying a set of dedicated reviewers (Chao
2003, 27,46). However, this type of organizational or individual change is not a simple matter.

6.1.4 Relation of findings to research questions
This section relates the findings to the original study research questions.

6.1.4.1

Relation of findings to RQ1
Table 6.2 summarizes findings related to Research Question 1: How do technical reviews

impact subsequent project engineering and management activities?
There are several trends across the findings for RQ1. The work focus shifts significantly
between lower-level reviews and mission-level reviews. Findings F2 and F12 describe how
project work at subsystem and peer reviews focuses on technically detailed actions. These
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Table 6.2: Research Question 1 findings on technical reviews and project work
#
F1
(part)
F2
(part)
F3
(part)
F4

Finding (RQ1 part)
Useful action items signify review success. Action items are used to assess whether review criteria
are met, and action items identify critical issues.
Subsystem reviews better than mission-level reviews at technically detailed problem finding.

Mission-level reviews better than subsystem reviews at finding dependencies on external actors
and assessing the design effort.
Mission-level reviews support socio-technical needs that subsystem reviews don’t: forcing client
decisions, supporting client and design organization gate decisions, checking on project progress,
and checking if project is following institutional processes. Interactions with clients happen largely
at mission-level reviews.
F5
Earlier reviews allow team to influence design more, but design largely not open to change after
(part) CDR. Amount of review action items influencing the design decreases with design phase. Design
phase directly drives specific review content, criteria, and scope of gate decisions.
F6
Pre-review work has high resource cost due to preparing data and conducting dry runs. However,
pre-review work helps project as a forcing function for work and forcing team communications,
re-examining work and creating a complete baseline. Tailoring reviews can reduce review resource
cost for small and risk-accepting projects, with client and organizational negotiation and agreement.
F7
Resource costs for review and formality lower in subsystem and peer reviews than mission-level
reviews.
F8
Assessments and concerns from reviews are an input to decision gates, but not the sole consideration. Decision gates are typically “hard gates”: significant impact to not passing a review and several common outcomes, including postponing subsequent reviews, additional work, delta reviews,
liens, and cancellation.
F9
Reviews act as a key project control measure by forcing work and aligning development within the
project schedule. Reviews allow control and insight between contractors, by providing communication and identifying process issues.
F12
Design team members believe subsystem reviews are better than mission-level reviews for getting
(part) directly useful actions, technically influencing the design, and integrating the design.
F13
Panel members see process of assigning and modifying actions as a negotiation.
(part)

lower-level reviews are seen as better for the design team to influence and improve other parts
of the design. The work conducted at the lower-level reviews is primarily focused on the design
artifact. Findings F3 and F4 show that the focus of work shifts at the mission-level reviews to
examining external dependencies, the design of the system as a whole, and supporting nontechnical needs such as client and design organization decision-making. Finding F7 describes
how the work at lower-level reviews is seen as lower-formality and at a lower cost in project
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resources than mission-level review work, which also helps explain why many design team
members prefer lower-level reviews. This shift in emphasis as a function of review level is a
literature gap (see Section 6.1.1.1).
Pre-review work is significant to the work of the project in several ways. Finding F6
describes how the main resource cost of reviews is seen as pre-review work. However, this
work has benefits, including forcing communications within the team, forcing a reconsideration of the design by the team, forcing the team to complete work, and creating an end-to-end
consistent design baseline. These benefits are seen as significant, although indirect.
Findings F1, F12, and F13 show how action items are seen as critical to the workflow
from reviews into the project. Actions drive many things, including whether projects continue to the next phase, helping identify critical issues, and influencing designs. Actions at
lower-level reviews are seen as more immediately useful and technically influential by team
members. Panel members see their development of action items as a negotiation with the design project, to balance views of overlooked work by the independent panel against resource
priorities of the project leadership. There has been little research on the way actions impact
the work of the project, beyond noting that they are seen as critical in recording decisions for
project action (Huet 2006).
Finally, reviews are crucial to management and control of the greater work of the design project. Finding F8 describes how reviews drive gate decisions and whether the entire
project proceeds. Finding F9 describes how reviews act in larger work coordination between
contractors and between design teams within the larger project, similar to some observations
by O’Sullivan (2000).
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6.1.4.2

Relation of findings to RQ2

Table 6.3: Research Question 2 findings on technical reviews and participant views and
knowledge
#
F1
(part)
F2
(part)
F3
(part)
F5
(part)

Finding (RQ2 part)
Review minutes act as a formal organizational record and overall assessment.

Subsystem reviews better for learning about design details, but mission-level reviews broader in
scope. Peer reviews have highest level of technical detail, but are relatively narrow in scope.
Mission-level reviews better than subsystem reviews at finding overlooked design issues, assumptions, and broader-scope issues across the system.
Level of detail and expected design and process maturity increase with design phase. Openness
to changes in design decreases with design phase. Design phase directly drives expected baseline
content.
F10
Important to have review panel members with expertise on the system-under-design and independence from design team. Careful selection of reviewers is a critical task for review organizers.
F11
Reviews let reviewers and participants learn about project errors and issues, risks and risk management, design and process maturity, configuration management and baselines, the design itself,
project team competence, and project status.
F12
Design team members believe mission-level reviews do not impact their technical understanding
(part) of the design.
F13
Panel members see the interactions and discussions at the review valuable for learning about de(part) sign rationale, and finding assumptions and overlooked design issues.

Table 6.3 summarizes findings related to Research Question 2: How do technical reviews
affect participant views and self-reported knowledge of the project?
Across the findings for RQ2, reviews contribute in varying ways to participant views
and knowledge. There is a shift in learning similar to the shift in work observed, between
mission-level reviews and subsystem reviews. Findings F2 and F3 describe how lower-level
reviews are narrower in scope, so team members can learn about technical details. Missionlevel reviews, in contrast, allow examining assumptions, learning about broader-scope issues and interactions, and forming overall assessments of the design and the design team—
learning that can’t happen at subsystem reviews.
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Finding F11 describes major classes of information that participants say they learned
about, including project errors and issues, risks in the design and design effort, maturity of
the design, the overall project baseline and design itself, project status, and the competence
of the design team.
There is variation in learning about these areas of information (Findings F12 and F13)
between internal and external participants. External panel members find the reviews valuable
for learning and assessing the design and finding overlooked issues. Internal team members
report that they learn less about their own system and work but do value learning about other
subsystems and system-level issues.
Finding F10 reports that the learning and quality of assessment by the design panel is
seen as critically affected by panel expertise and independence, which mirrors some research
and recommendations.
Finding F5 describes the variation with design phase on what learning and assessment
can be done. Design phase influences expectations for maturity level and detail, which have
an impact on the assessments and views of the project and work done by the panel.
Finally, Finding F1 reports how the minutes are seen as the formal record of overall
system assessment (as well as the record of final agreed-to actions). Team members value
the action items more, but the literature suggests that minutes are valued by management for
recording key assessments and acting as a formal record, which Huet and others (Huet 2006;
Huet, Culley, McMahon, and Fortin 2007) suggest supports organizational decision-making
and organizational knowledge practices (Weick 1995).
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6.2 Observations
This section sketches additional issues from the research, beyond the more strongly
supported findings. These topics are candidate issues for follow-on study.

6.2.1 Other trends from participant data
This section summarizes some trends from the analysis of participant data that are not
directly related to the research questions. Representative quotes are given in Section G.1.

6.2.1.1

Acquirer and contractor interactions at reviews
One major class of review participant role that is identified in Table 3.5 but not exam-

ined in this research is external stakeholder representatives, such as client, interfacing design
contractor, or subcontractor. These stakeholders have differing interests in reviews, and there
is some limited literature on stakeholders in reviews (see Section 5.4.3). Interactions with
stakeholders from the acquirer/client organization, other parts of those organizations, interfacing contractors, and subcontractors were observed in the design reviews, documented in
action items, and discussed in interviews.
Acquirer organization needs from the review are similar but not the same as the needs
of the design organization. They seek to understand the design, risks, level of maturity, and
other issues to support phase-gate decisions. Other parts of the design firm also represent
their organizational interests at reviews, such as quality, launch services, and science and
technology development. One observed technical review had an entire morning of background briefings on the project for stakeholders.
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Subcontractors have many interests, similar to internal design teams but with important differences. Subsystem reviews between ContractorA and subcontractors acted as a control function, as well as for technical coordination, insight, and inter-organizational agreement. External but interfacing contractors (such as launch vehicles, control software, and network hardware) are often present at mission-level reviews to learn about the system but also
to “answer for” issues with their design plans to the government representatives. These act as
informal system-of-systems review discussions—but the lack of a formal system-of-systems
review between multiple interacting programs was noted by participants in one case as an
issue that created problems on system deployment.
Most interview respondents (16 of 21) discussed interactions with clients and other
contractors at design reviews, including how the reviews affected work by clients and other
contractors (see sample quote in Section G.1.1). Issues included acceptance of the design,
understanding of the design, flowing information to other parts of the client design organization, forcing action within the larger acquiring organization, seeking alignment of work, processes, and schedules with other interfacing contractors, and managing technical disagreements with interfacing contractors.

6.2.1.2

Confidence in the project
A major topic was that of stakeholders gaining confidence in the project from the things

they learned and saw at the technical review. Some interview respondents (7 of 21) discussed
confidence as something critical for the acquiring organization and the design organization
to gain at the reviews (see sample quote in Section G.1.2).
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“Confidence” is a rarely mentioned and loosely defined term in the literature on reviews. It appears to involve understanding the overall risks, understanding the overall design
and work-to-be-done, as well as having a feel for the capability of the design team—and therefore having a better insight into the project’s likelihood of success. The formal success criteria in the review minutes—ostensibly the overall assessment of the project—were mentioned
roughly as often as the less well-defined “confidence” in the project.
Respondents felt confidence was important. A few team members discussed how they
felt about the project and their confidence in finishing the design. However, most respondent
discussions on confidence were about giving the acquirer representatives more confidence
in the project so that they would advocate for the project in decision boards and within the
acquiring organization.

6.2.1.3

Honesty, trust, and openness in technical reviews
A key issue from interviews, related to confidence, was the role of honesty, trust, and

openness in reviews.
Some interview respondents (10 of 21) discussed the importance of giving the impression of honesty and openness, and how honesty could result in trust by stakeholders (see sample quote in Section G.1.3).
This issue is little discussed in the literature, but respondents indicated that ContractorA, unlike some other organizations, had an organizational culture and conducted reviews
that encouraged honesty and openness about issues in the project, sometimes to a fault. They
saw this as being a strength of their design organization, which allowed the client to trust ContractorA and the design team because they were divulging the real issues with projects.
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An explanation related to this work’s findings may be that because the mission-level reviews can only cover shallow levels of detail (but broadly across the system), almost as a review
of reviews, the panel and client must trust that the team is self-reporting critical issues rather
than covering up problems. If there is a perception of a lack of honesty or openness—then
the entire review is suspect, because it is practically infeasible for panel members to check on
every assertion by the design team. However, the role of trust (and when it is violated, or how
it is built), especially between organizations, is a socio-technical issue that is understudied
given its reported importance.

6.2.1.4

Criticism avoidance
A topic related to honesty, trust, and openness is criticism avoidance, which was dis-

cussed by most respondents (12 of 21) (see sample quote in Section G.1.4). This appears to act
on several levels. The first, and most simple, is that individual engineers and the project have
a desire to avoid criticism of their work. They know they are evaluated, and they report a fundamental desire to “put your best foot forward.” The engineers work to have strong briefings
and give a positive impression of the team. If emphasized too much, this criticism avoidance
behavior may conflict with the need to be open and honest with the client.
A second topic related to criticism avoidance is the organizational benefit of honesty.
Some respondents noted that, by being open and honest and holding reviews, the design firm
avoids later criticism by being able to say that they have open processes and divulge all known
problems with the design effort. If the design firm didn’t hold good reviews or wasn’t honest, it
would be vulnerable to later criticism that it was not meeting the expectations of the acquiring
organization.
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A third topic related to criticism avoidance is the desire for ContractorA to avoid blame
for poor decisions or design by other organizations, such as interfacing contractors that were
not under ContractorA’s contractual control. The responses indicated that, by clearly stating
what work ContractorA was doing and pointing out potential issues with interfacing contractors to the client, ContractorA trying to elevate larger problems. If issues arose between design
contractors, at least ContractorA had clearly stated what they were doing and had given the
client the chance to address issues. This falls in the under-studied topic of “enterprise systems engineering” (Rebovich 2005) or “collaborative systems-of-systems” (Maier 1998, 276–
78). Often there are emergent properties and dependencies in the design of complex systems,
which are not controlled by a single design firm or government office.

6.2.1.5

Role of design culture in technical reviews
Design culture, or the organizational culture of the design organization and various

sub-organizations and teams, was brought up as an issue for reviews by most respondents (15
of 21) (see sample quote in Section G.1.5).
Design culture was seen as having an impact on internal expectations of behavior at
reviews. Design culture also affected how the work was done, how external stakeholders were
treated, and how reviews were conducted. Some key aspects of design culture were seen as
within the control of the leadership of the design organization (e.g., the Chief Engineer) and
where they placed emphasis, attention, and resources. The panel chair was also seen as a
strong influence on the interactions in the review. There were common proud remarks that
ContractorA had a strong design culture, in having internal norms and procedures that were
not reliant on client input, and practices were seen as better than competing organizations.
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There were multiple references to how other design organizations conducted reviews, as well
as variations within ContractorA (subcultures and teams). However, the role of design culture
in engineering appears lightly studied, given its apparent importance.

6.2.1.6

Role of independent assessment in technical reviews
The need for independent assessment in reviews was discussed by most interview re-

spondents (15 of 21) (see sample quote in Section G.1.6). There was a general agreement that
there was value in having reviewers from outside the design team. However, some noted (as
discussed earlier) that reviewers outside the design team would necessarily have less knowledge of the design than reviewers inside the design team.
Note that independence was often seen as similar but not identical to being external
to the design team. Further, the reviews themselves were sometimes seen as being “internal”
or “external.” Subsystem reviews tended to be internal to the design team. However, some
mission-level reviews were external to the design team (but internal to the design organization), and some mission-level reviews were managed external to the design organization.
The literature on external versus internal reviews is summarized in Section 5.4.7, and
literature on independence in Section 5.4.10. There is a fair amount of literature on these
issues, but the sources lack empirical data.
Generally, respondents accepted the need for independence—but were less tolerant
of reviewers from outside the design firm at lower-level reviews. Per Finding F10, respondents saw having independent reviewers as having value. However, only a few respondents
discussed the trade-off between independence and knowledge level. Similarly, respondents
discussed trying to get panel members who had knowledge but were not in the design team.
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The decisions on panel selection were informal at the subsystem level and left to design teams.
There appears to be a cultural acceptance and delegation of “what is independent enough” at
lower levels of boards. However, at higher-level reviews with an SRB, panel selection becomes
highly formal, and independence is mandatory. Participants felt that having independent reviewers helped in finding overlooked issues, as well as avoiding bias.

6.2.1.7

Role of formality in reviews
Most respondents (11 of 21) discussed formality of reviews, and there were varying

views on formalism (see sample quote in Section G.1.7). Some saw it as “having pretty slides
and fully documenting every decision.” Formality was seen as varying between design organizations and cultures, and that different clients mandated varying levels of formality. Some
saw the higher formality of larger projects as a necessary response to complexity and cost.
Respondents saw the variation in formality noted in Finding F7, that mission-level reviews were more formal than subsystem reviews, with tabletop and peer reviews being the
least formal. Some saw formality as being less risk-tolerant and wanting more oversight. Some
saw formality as simply documenting issues and having documented agreements and deliverables and completion of work with clients, and therefore associated the need for formality
with documentation and client presence. A few mentioned the role of formal minutes and
formal record keeping (per Finding F1), but formality in design documentation was not mentioned often.
This research suggests some causes of formality. One role of formality appears to be
organizational. Summative reviews need formality because they are the assessment (for the
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design organization or client) of a baseline. In contrast, interim reviews such as peer reviews
“don’t count”—they can be informal because they aren’t checking the completion of work.
Some respondents disliked the formality and “bookkeeping minutiae” and “chartsmanship” of higher-level reviews with external stakeholders, but a smaller number saw a necessary role for it. The role of formality, both in inter-organizational dynamics and in documentation and decision/knowledge processes, is under-studied. There appears to be a common
casual criticism that formality is bad. There is a lack of understanding of the reasons for formality in design, when it is needed, and when it should be avoided.

6.2.2 Other ideas on reviews
This section presents other thoughts on technical reviews by the researcher from literature, observation, or interviews that may be useful to researchers or practitioners.

6.2.2.1

Risk management in technical reviews
Finding F11 discussed that reviews let participants learn about risks. However, there

is a contrast between some references on risks in reviews (see Section 5.4.11), which focus on
purely technological risks, and the observed practices and comments about reviews.
The action item analysis reported in Section 4.2.1.3 described how there was relatively
more emphasis in action items on the artifact under design at subsystem reviews, and there
was increasing emphasis on the design effort at mission-level reviews.
Some respondents said that they were not supposed to focus on non-technical risks—
but there still were “non-technical risk” actions at subsystem reviews, such as examining the
staffing levels or the schedule for developing products.
247

It appears that there is a shift in emphasis from near-purely technical risks at the subsystem/ peer reviews to an implicit acceptance and wanting to understand “all risks” at the
mission-level reviews. There is evidence from documents and observations of a dividing line,
though, where actions or discussions were deemed “too programmatic” and action items were
rejected or discussions curtailed—often on issues related to schedule, cost, and resources.
This dividing line was not absolute; there were accepted discussions and actions on schedule
and resource dependencies when they were thought to affect the development effort.
Clearly, risk management was a major role of reviews: participants debated individual risk assessments and plans, examined overall risk processes, and sought to identify overlooked or under-resourced risks.

6.2.2.2

Technology development and technical reviews
Some interview respondents (9 of 21) discussed specific technologies in development

and how they were affecting their project. Reviews appear to function as a critical reporting,
assessment, screening, and decision point in new technology for the development. However,
the role of reviews in technology development is not well studied in the academic literature,
other than the prosaic assertion that projects should “achieve TRL 6 at PDR.” Respondents
appeared comfortable in using TRLs as a high-level surrogate for design maturity. During
reviews, participants commonly discussed how well key technologies were maturing.
Reviews appear to be a touch point for technology development and assessment in the
design organization. Reviews forced decisions on the maturation of technology and whether
it would be ready by key dates in the development, such as the ordering of components and
the delivery of parts by teams and subcontractors. Alternate plans were presented for at-risk
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or high-risk technology components. Many review discussions focused on newer or riskier
technologies, which were seen as threatening to the project overall.

6.2.2.3

Design interactions at technical reviews
From observations and interviews, reviews were a site for design negotiation and de-

sign interactions. At subsystem reviews, a commonly-debated issue was interactions between
the subsystem under review and other subsystems, as well as how the subsystem was meeting overall system needs or requirements. Many action items at subsystem reviews involved
other subsystems, and key leaders from other design teams attended subsystem reviews to
learn about that subsystem, describe their work, and influence the design of other subsystems. Subsystem reviews were an important forum for internal design development by various sub-teams in the design.
Technical reviews also appeared to help structure the design work as a whole: the implicit iteration of design during design phases and the partitioning structure of the design
and its interfaces. Both design decisions and negotiation were observed at reviews, as well
as cross-team and cross-subsystem negotiations and cueing up of future work. The discussions and design focus at mission-level reviews shift to the system as a whole and interactions
with external systems.

6.2.2.4

Social and team interactions at technical reviews
Design reviews were observed to have many social interactions. Technical reviews

were often the only time in a large design project at ContractorA where a large proportion
of the technical team (or at least their leaders) meet key stakeholders in a project.
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Some respondents (9 of 21) commented on how reviews affected the teamwork within
the design project or influenced their morale and feelings about the project. Respondents
often offered their impressions from their experiences at the review on the likely success of
the project or the effectiveness of the design team.
All observed reviews at the mission level, as well as most reviews at the subsystem level,
ended with comments by project leaders and the panel on the amount of work done and positive statements about the design team. The reviews are also forums for informal discussions
outside of the briefings—discussions between key stakeholders who seldom had a chance to
interact informally and in-person. The social role of technical reviews is largely unexamined
in the literature, but social interactions such as negotiations do have an impact on reviews.

6.2.2.5

Role of systems engineers in technical reviews
Systems engineers had varying roles in the observed reviews in the cases under study.

They played a key role in structuring and making decisions on review plans and interacting
with the clients on making decisions on agendas and the scope of mission-level reviews.
Systems engineers acted as “linking pins” (Likert 1961, 1967). One or two key systems
engineers attended all subsystem reviews in the observed projects. The systems engineers’
roles appeared to be getting insight, negotiating action items to make the subsystems work
better together, and confirming that subsystems met system needs and were ready for higherlevel reviews. At ContractorA, the project/program managers were invited and sometimes
attended subsystem reviews, but the systems engineers acted as technical integration experts
and interfaces with the technical design team. Systems engineers played a coordinating role
between the overall project management and aligning internal technical efforts.
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Systems engineers also played the primary role in running mission-level reviews. Many
of the external stakeholder representatives from clients, the design organization, and other
interfacing contractors were systems engineers or represented subdisciplines of systems engineering, such as quality management.
Systems engineers on the project also had key technical management roles that were
reported at design reviews and thus were typically the “lead-off briefer” at mission-level reviews: overall conceptual design and balancing, and interaction with external systems and
stakeholders, risk management, baseline management, allocation of mission-level requirements, monitoring of technical margins and allocations to subsystems.
Systems engineers were less involved with lower-level reviews than mission-level reviews. One respondent lead systems engineer reported that he let the subsystem leads decide
how to conduct their subsystem reviews. The subsystem leads were both managers and expert engineers in their specialty areas, such as mechanical design. Some systems engineer
respondents reported that they didn’t get value in or attend lower-level tabletop reviews or
component-level reviews, such as reviews of circuit cards or subassemblies. The participation in those lower-level reviews was dominated by specialty engineers such as software engineers or mechanical designers with less integrative roles. This appears to be caused by a
division of roles of the reviews. The integration between the subassembly and the rest of the
spacecraft (which is a central concern of systems engineers) had already been discussed and
agreed to in other meetings and reviews, leaving the lower-level reviews to focus on “perfective” issues—how to make a specific component best meet specific requirements—and technical error identification.
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6.2.2.6

Role of technical reviews in structuring the design effort
Reviews structure the common language and processes of the design firm. They create

a common point of reference that is “efficient” because every team at ContractorA is not inventing a new process. Reviews also act as boundary objects for a planned iteration in design
and a gradual “necking down” of design risk to more reliably succeed.
Similarly, reviews provide a common process for clients and other interfacing contractors. For example, there is an industry-wide understanding of what content is expected in
each review, formalized in standards and process documents. That expectation of review content and design maturity is built into other project control and contractual structures.
Technical reviews act as a common project-structuring paradigm that allows the management of complex projects involving dozens of contractors. This “common language, structure, and project control” aspect of reviews is largely not discussed in the research literature.
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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This chapter presents a summary of the research, discusses contributions of the study,
and suggests areas for further research.

7.1 Research overview
Technical reviews are a critical industry-wide practice that play a crucial role in complex systems development. The purpose of this study is to explore the practice of reviews in
major space and defense development projects.
The empirical basis for this work is a multi-case qualitative study of technical review
participants, who were interviewed to explore their perspectives on design reviews. Case
studies were selected to span two expected theoretical variables, phase of review and level
of review. Interview participants were sought to span another expected theoretical variable,
participant role. Interview data were analyzed using standard qualitative methods to examine
major trends and develop findings. Interview data were reinforced with project data and technical review data where appropriate. The resultant findings were analyzed using a systematic
literature review to assess the level of support of the findings in current academic literature.
The findings were examined for variation and trends across the research variables.
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7.2 Summary of contributions
This section summarizes the major and minor contributions from the research.

7.2.1 Contribution 1: Providing a complete set of specific findings on what participants
say they get from reviews that impacts their work (RQ1) and what they learn (RQ2)
This study gives a complete set of data-supported ways that reviews help stakeholders.
Prior academic works on reviews generally each focus on one way that reviews help stakeholders, e.g., project risk identification (Orlowski 2017). This set of 13 findings is developed in
Chapter 4 from interview data and project documents. Table 7.1 lists the 13 findings.
Having a complete set of key needs met from reviews is important because it supports
follow-on theory work on reviews and helps in giving practical recommendations for reviews.
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Table 7.1: Summarized findings, restated
#
F1

F2

F3

F4

F5

F6

F7
F8

F9

F10

F11

F12

F13

Finding
Role of action items and minutes in reviews: Useful action items signify review success. Action
items are used to assess whether review criteria are met, and action items identify critical issues.
Review minutes act as a formal organizational record and overall assessment.
Contribution of subsystem reviews: Subsystem reviews better than mission-level reviews at technically detailed problem finding. Subsystem reviews better for learning about design details, but
mission-level reviews broader in scope. Peer reviews have highest level of technical detail, but are
relatively narrow in scope.
Contribution of mission-level reviews: Mission-level reviews better than subsystem reviews at finding dependencies on external actors and assessing the design effort. Mission-level reviews better
than subsystem reviews at finding overlooked design issues, assumptions, and broader-scope issues
across the system.
Socio-technical role of mission-level reviews: Mission-level reviews support socio-technical needs
that subsystem reviews don’t: forcing client decisions, supporting client and design organization gate
decisions, checking on project progress, and checking if project is following institutional processes.
Interactions with clients happened largely at mission-level reviews.
Variation of reviews with design phase: Earlier reviews allow team to influence design more, but design largely not open to change after CDR. Amount of review action items influencing the design decreases with design phase. Design phase directly drives specific review content, criteria, and scope of
gate decisions. Level of detail and expected design and process maturity increase with design phase.
Openness to changes in design decreases with design phase. Design phase directly drives and expected baseline content.
Resource cost of reviews: Pre-review work has high resource cost due to preparing data and conducting dry runs. However, pre-review work helps project as a forcing function for work and forcing
team communications, re-examining work, and creating a complete baseline. Tailoring reviews can
reduce review resource cost for small and risk-accepting projects, with client and organizational negotiation and agreement.
Variation in resource cost of reviews: Resource costs for review and formality lower in subsystem
and peer reviews than mission-level reviews.
Review impact on decision gates and project progress: Assessments and concerns from reviews are
an input to decision gates, but not the sole consideration. Decision gates are typically “hard gates”:
significant impact to not passing a review and several common outcomes, including postponing
reviews, additional work, delta reviews, liens, and cancellation.
Review contribution to project control: Reviews act as a key project control measure by forcing work
and aligning development within the project schedule. Reviews allow control and insight between
contractors, by providing communication and identifying process issues.
Review panel desired traits: Important to have review panel members with expertise on the systemunder-design and independence from design team. Careful selection of reviewers is a critical task for
review organizers.
Information learned in reviews: Reviews let reviewers and participants learn about project errors
and issues, risks and risk management, design and process maturity, configuration management and
baselines, the design itself, project team competence, and project status.
Design team views on contribution of reviews at different levels: Design team members believe
subsystem reviews are better than mission-level reviews for getting directly useful actions, technically influencing the design, and integrating the design. Design team members believe mission-level
reviews do not impact their technical understanding of the design.
Panel member views on interactions at reviews: Panel members see process of assigning and modifying actions as a negotiation. Panel members see the interactions and discussions at the review
valuable for learning about design rationale, and finding assumptions and overlooked design issues.
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7.2.2 Contribution 2: Identifying novel research-based findings on the effect of reviews
on project work and participant learning
Some items within the “complete set” are novel, or that particular item is asserted in
the literature without empirical data. Table 7.2 summarizes the parts of findings that (A) are
not found in current literature. Table 7.3 summarizes the parts of findings that (B) are a new
extension of a finding stated in a source. These parts of findings are data-based descriptions
of what reviews do that are not fully reported on or examined in the literature.

Table 7.2: Parts of findings that (A) are not found in current literature
#
F3
(part)
F5
(part)

Finding (part that is not found in current literature)
Contribution of mission-level reviews. Mission-level reviews are better than subsystem reviews at
finding overlooked design issues and finding assumptions of the design.
Variation of reviews with design phase. Earlier reviews allow the team to influence the design
more, but the design is largely not open to change after CDR. The amount of review action items
influencing the design decreases with design phase.

Table 7.3: Parts of findings that (B) are a new extension of a finding stated in a source
#
F1
(part)
F3
(part)

Finding (part that is an extension of finding in source)
Role of action items in reviews. Useful action items signify review success.

Contribution of mission-level reviews. Mission-level reviews are better than subsystem reviews at
finding dependencies of the design and project on external actors. Mission level reviews support
design programs by forcing needed decisions by clients and supporting client and design organization gate decisions, and subsystem reviews don’t.
F6
Resource costs of reviews. The resource costs for reviews are lower in subsystem reviews and peer
(part) reviews than in mission-level reviews.
F8
Review impact on decision gates. There is significant impact to projects when not passing a review.
(part)
F9
Review contribution to project control. Reviews allow control and insight between contractors, by
(part) identifying process issues.
F12
Design team views on contribution of reviews at different levels. Design team members see sub(part) system reviews as better than mission-level reviews for getting directly useful actions, technically
influencing the design, and integrating the design. Design team members see mission-level reviews
as not impacting their technical understanding of the design.
F13
Panel member views on interactions at reviews. Review panel members see the interactions and
(part) discussions at the review as valuable for finding assumptions in the design.
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Table 7.4 summarizes the parts of findings that (C) give supporting data to an assertion from a source lacking empirical data. The novel subfindings are important because they
support assertions in sources on what reviews do—which previously had no supporting empirical data.

Table 7.4: Parts of findings that (C) give supporting data to an assertion from a source lacking
empirical data
#
F1
(part)
F2
(part)
F3
(part)

F5
(part)
F9
(part)
F11
(part)

Finding (part that matches a source assertion but lacks supporting data)
Role of action items and minutes in reviews. Action items are used to assess if review criteria were
met, and to identify critical issues. Review minutes act as an overall assessment.
Contribution of subsystem reviews. Subsystem reviews are better than mission-level reviews at
technically detailed problem solving. Peer reviews have the highest level of technical detail and are
narrowest in scope, compared to mission-level and subsystem reviews.
Contribution of mission-level reviews. Mission level reviews are better than subsystem reviews at
assessing the design effort and checking on project progress. Mission-level reviews are broader in
scope than subsystem reviews, and better than subsystem reviews at finding broader-scope issues
across the system.
Variation of reviews with design phase. Design phase directly drives specific review criteria. The
level of detail increases with design phase. The design phase directly drives the expected baseline
content.
Review contribution to project control. Reviews act as a key project control measure, by forcing
work.
Information learned in reviews. Reviews let reviewers and participants learn about configuration
management and baselines, and the competence of the project team.

7.2.3 Contribution 3: Showing an initial theoretical dependence between views on the
value of review activities on respondent role
Analysis of the findings shows a strong dependence between “who you are and what
you do” and “what you think you get out of reviews”—a strong role dependence. For example, panel members value gaining insight on design assumptions at mission-level reviews,
but design team members do not value this aspect of reviews. This role dependence and the
supporting data are described in Section 6.1.1.1.
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The dependence of needs met by reviews on participant role is significant because it
helps explain observed design behavior. It also raises validity questions for major conclusions
of prior research (e.g., Chao 2005) that collected data from respondents with a limited set of
roles, thus creating a bias in results due to not-fully-representative participant values.

7.2.4 Contribution 4: Showing a difference in needs met by subsystem and mission-level
reviews (variation in variable level of review): they meet fundamentally different
sets of needs for stakeholders
Analysis of the findings shows a strong difference in which stakeholder needs are met
by the two levels of reviews. Subsystem reviews are largely focused on the design team needs
and improvement of the detailed artifact design. System reviews are focused on integrative
issues and external stakeholder needs. This variation of needs met with level of review is discussed in Section 6.1.1.1.
The review level dependence of needs met by reviews is significant because many industry standard process documents (e.g., IEEE 2015) incorrectly treat the two sets of reviews
as identical. It is also significant because it identifies an issue with prior literature (e.g., Covington 2015; Chao 2005) that ignores the needs met by mission-level reviews and focuses on
needs supported by subsystem reviews. These works come to the logically circular conclusion
that subsystem reviews are more effective than mission-level reviews—while not considering
the needs that mission-level reviews meet well.
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7.2.5 Contribution 5: Creating a new two-step systematic review methodology for
focused research on multiple subtopics within a common topic area
This research creates a modified approach to systematic review of literature, involving
two sequential process steps rather than two looped process steps. The two-step method is
described in Section 3.5.1. This method dramatically speeds up literature review and yields
an intermediate database that is more useful to other researchers when there are many subsearches done on a common topic (e.g., the subtopic of “risk identification” within the common topic of “technical reviews”).
This methodology of two-step systematic literature review is important because it results in searches which take less work and yield a more generally useful output database in
some research settings.

7.2.6 Additional contributions: Systematic review literature database and list of key
design review variables
There are two additional contributions of the research. This research developed a list of
nine key design review variables that affect design behavior, based on interview data and literature (Section 6.1.1.2). This provides an initial set of variables to examine for theory-building,
or to consider when extending this research to other settings. The three variables shown to
be most dominant—level of review, participant role, and phase of review—were explicitly examined in this research. Follow-on work could examine the effects of the other six variables,
such as size, complexity, and novelty of design.
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Another contribution of this research is the systematic review literature database of
322 sources on technical reviews, reported in Appendix F. This database supports follow-on
research on technical reviews and design organizational behavior.

7.3 Recommendations for future research
While conducting research and analysis, this study identified several follow-on research
possibilities.

7.3.1 Follow-on research: Data acquisition and theory development for a role-based
theory of reviews
As discussed in Section 7.2, one of the major contributions of the research is establishing initial theory on the relationship between stakeholder role and what function reviews are
seen as performing. This initial theory is described in more detail in Section 6.1.1.1.
Due to IRB restrictions, this research focused on stakeholders from (a) the design team
and (b) the design organization. There are two other major sets of stakeholders outside the
design firm: (c) representatives of the client/acquiring organization, and (d) representatives
of interfacing and subcontracted design firms. There was some preliminary respondent information on the needs and views of these individuals, but it was second-hand and requires
direct research.
To develop a role-based theory of review stakeholder needs, at least two focused research campaigns are recommended to interview (c) representatives of client/acquiring organizations and (d) representatives of other interfacing/subcontracted design firms.

260

Literature suggests (Chao 2003, 35) that the client primarily seeks insight and some
control over the design firm, through mission-level reviews (and may also gain insight from
optional attendance at subsystem reviews). From literature (e.g., NASA 2016), observations,
and some interview discussions, the government client also needs key technical questions
answered to support milestone gate decisions, as well as buy-in from extended client organization stakeholders. Some decisions were noted as difficult for the client to make, and
there is client decision-making being triggered or forced by the design organization in reviews. There were complex interactions observed in this research that require focused study,
perhaps in one or two cases where the researcher can interview government or contractor
acquirer/clients about what they get out of reviews along the lines of this research.
Subcontractors often have an acquirer-developer relationship with the prime design
firm that is analogous but not identical to the government-prime developer relationship. Interview data from this research indicates that technical reviews of subcontractor deliverables
act somewhat like mission-level reviews as a designer/acquirer interface, despite being at a
lower level of design (subsystem or lower component). Case C of this research (NASASpaceProgram5 sPDR) was one instance where ContractorA was designing a major subsystem for a
system that had ContractorH as the prime developer (with NASA funding). Similarly, one subsystem review in Case E (NASASpaceProgram4 sPDR) was a second case where ContractorA
was integrating a subsystem design into its overall system design—but the only contractual relationship was between the other contractor and NASA. There are complex contractual, managerial, technical, and organizational interactions already apparent from interview responses
in these two cases, requiring focused study with separate accesses and case selection.
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A stakeholder analysis should be conducted on technical reviews. Some sources (e.g.,
Chao 2003, 52–53; Craig 2010, 77380R-4–5; Oakes 2012, 30–31) report a stakeholder structure,
but the stakeholder structure behind reviews should be re-examined with more explicit data
and sources. In addition, these works on review stakeholders do not consider subcontractor
reviews or how formal (mission-level) reviews interface with client gate milestone decision
meetings, and thus are missing some key stakeholder needs of reviews.
Finally, given research data from the additional stakeholder cases, the initial insight of
this research—that stakeholders gain different values from different types of reviews—can be
extended to the new stakeholders and the reviews where they interact with the prime design
firm that was the focus of this research. The theory can be thus extended to the full main set
of stakeholders identified to make a true “research-based complete set” of stakeholder needs
met by reviews. This would be crucial to confirming the role of reviews in design and how it
supports other management and technical interactions.

7.3.2 Follow-on research: Examine identified conflicts in literature
The systematic review literature analysis (Chapter 5) identified multiple areas where
current literature on reviews conflict with each other. Although this research has data and a
position on each of these conflicts, it would take focused research to probe each conflict in
the literature and make an evidence-based explanation and develop a convincing resolution
to the conflict. However, this would be a valuable contribution, because these conflicts relate
to fundamental aspects of design behavior in complex projects.
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Table 7.5 summarizes the conflicts in literature related to findings (category D). Focused research is necessary to provide a robust research-based resolution to these conflicts,
beyond the observations in this research.

Table 7.5: Parts of findings that (D) establish a data-supported position in an area where
sources conflict
#
F7.2
(part)
F8.3

Finding (part matching source assertion that lacks data)
Variation in resource cost of reviews. The level of formality is lower in subsystem and peer reviews
than mission-level reviews.
Review impact on decision gates and project progress. Decision gates associated with reviews are
typically “hard” gates: project work is not allowed to proceed unless gate criteria are met. There are
several common outcomes to reviews, including postponing subsequent reviews, additional work,
delta reviews, liens, and cancellation.
F10.2 Review panel desired traits. It is important to have review panel members with independence
from the design team.
F11.8 Information learned in reviews. Reviews let reviewers and participants learn about project status.
F13
Panel member views on interactions at reviews. Review panel members see the interactions and
(part) discussions at the review as valuable for finding overlooked design issues.

As described in Section 5.4.7.2 on Finding F7.2, there is conflict in the literature whether
subsystem reviews are described as relatively informal or formal. A research campaign at one
design firm could examine reasons for formality in design and technical reviews and compare the formality level and seek data on technical reviews at in multiple cases: mission-level
reviews, subsystem reviews, peer reviews, and component-level reviews, as well as subsystem reviews where there is a contractor-subcontractor relationship. Comments on review
formality were common in interviews: respondent engineers generally disliked formality and
claimed formality increased the resource cost of reviews. See also the observations in Section 6.2.1.7 on the role of formality in the studied cases and interviews. Understanding formality in reviews could give insight into the organizational and social forces as well as the role
of formality in reviews and development in general.
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Section 5.4.8.3 describes the literature conflict related to Finding F8.3—whether decision gates in development are “hard” or “soft”. Data from this research suggests that the design
setting matters strongly: which organization is making the gate decision and whether it is an
internal or multi-organization development. In order to contrast multiple design settings, it
may be most effective to use a survey research design with open-ended questions and followup interviews. One possible explanation of the differences in decision structures is that “internal” and “teaming” developments allow the “soft” decisions described by some literature
(e.g., Johansson et al. 2009; Cooper 2008), while “hard” gate decision outcomes are associated with design settings with a strong acquirer/developer contractual relationship such as
that described by this dissertation and Chao’s dissertation (Chao 2005). The types of decisions likely also link into organizational forces and methods that support decision and management structures of the acquirer and developer. However, there appears to be relatively
little research on the decision outcomes of gate decisions and why they differ.
The conflict in literature related to Finding F10.2 is described in Section 5.4.10.2. The
role of independence in design reviews is debated in several sources, as well as whether it is
necessary to be “fully independent” and whether subsystem and lower reviews require independence. Independence from the design team is also asserted to be associated with higher
costs and with reduced access to internal experts. This research found that there are organizational norms on independence that vary between design firms, so cases of several firms could
be examined, likely with semi-structured interviews, to probe the reasons, costs, and benefits of independent panel members in settings with different organizational norms of review
independence.
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Finding F11.8 on learning about project status in reviews had conflicts in the literature
discussed in Section 5.4.11.8. Some sources assert that reviews should only focus on technological issues, while other sources see a valid role for programmatic issues such as project
status, particularly when project plans have issues impacting technical development. These
conflicts in the literature highlight a debate on the role and scope of reviews. Respondents in
this research had conflicting views. Some respondents asserted that “we aren’t supposed to
discuss management issues.” Other observed review participants accepted some action items
on project planning, but rejected other action items as too managerial. It would require separate research to probe opinions on whether management issues are acceptable for review
discussions. There may be organizational variation in views on the line between technical
reviews and management reviews, requiring data from several design firms.
Finally, for Finding 13.3, Section 5.4.13.4 describes the ongoing debate in software development literature on whether there is a synergy in reviews, the “Phantom Inspector” effect
(Fagan 1986, 747), which allows review panels to find overlooked issues or more problems that
a single reviewer would miss. This issue does not appear to have been investigated outside
of software development settings. Panel members in this research stated they could identify
overlooked issues better because of the discussions among panel members. A research campaign could survey or interview panel members from review panels at various levels to understand how well panels identify overlooked issues in reviews and how and whether panel interactions help in issue identification. Purely technological software code error identification
involves different socio-technical processes than finding emergent cross-functional issues in
complex systems such as spacecraft. This suggests that findings from empirical software research may not extend to complex systems engineering settings.
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7.3.3 Follow-on research: Other related research on technical reviews
This research study was constructed as an empirical analysis of engineering sociotechnical behavior. There are several major areas of suggested follow-on empirical research
and theoretical work. These include:
• Design reviews and design meetings and team interactions in general are an accessible
source of information on design behavior. Multiple qualitative research approaches were
considered but not used due to access or other issues. These approaches could add value—
discourse analysis of meetings, ethnography, analysis and coding of design artifacts such
as actions and other design artifacts [although some analysis review actions was done as
reported in Section 4.2.1.3]. The entire empirical field of “studying engineers as they work
on real projects” is significantly under-studied, likely because of access issues (Valerdi and
Davidz 2009). Triangulation with other sociological methods would strengthen the understanding of organizations and individuals doing design work.
• The three study variables studied (phase of review, level of review, and participant role)
could each be studied in cases covering other sets of the other study variables (i.e., a different industry, a different level of complexity, and a different client organization). There are
very few comparative studies of empirical data in systems engineering, conducted where
cases are carefully chosen against theoretical variables, rather than essentially using convenience sampling.
• The three study variables studied (phase of review, level of review, and participant role)
could be studied individually in a single case study to go into more depth on each variable.

266

1. An example for level of review could be studying a single design project and examining a large set of reviews, spanning many levels of review in that project—tabletop
or component-level reviews, subcontractor reviews, internal peer reviews, subsystem
reviews, mission-level reviews, and client/developer phase gate reviews. This would
provide additional understanding of the inter-relationships between reviews.
2. A second example of an in-depth study is examining a single value of all the study variables, in an effort to understand the inter-relation of design interactions and reviews
at a single project in a relatively short time frame (perhaps one phase of development).
3. A third recommended study is to examine peer reviews and subsystem reviews in a
single project. Multiple sources argue that these lower-level reviews are critical to design success, yet there are very few empirical studies on them outside of software engineering. How are these reviews important, and how can they best support the needs
of projects and stakeholders?
• The three study variables studied (phase of review, level of review, and participant role)
could be studied in a single case study to examine points that were not covered by cases
in this study.
1. One suggested point to study within these study variables is that of system-of-systemslevel reviews. System-of-systems reviews are reported to be a key element of very large
and complex projects (Dahmann et al. 2010, 15). However, the practice of system-ofsystems reviews has very little research based on actual design projects.
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2. A second suggested study is of review types which were observed to be important in
other research: lower-level reviews such as component-level and tabletop-level reviews (Covington 2015) or contractor/subcontractor reviews (Chao 2003).
• Six other study variables were identified in respondent interviews and the literature as significant: size/complexity/novelty, specific design organization, designer role, specific acquirer,
country of development, and industry. These are promising avenues of investigation into
the socio-technical behavior of design organizations. They could be studied to extend the
analysis of this research and to develop theory to better understand what makes design organizations work well.
• A study could test the theoretical hypothesis (Section 6.1.1.1) that overall review effectiveness for a project depends on a system of reviews. Suggested approaches include:
1. Examine one case study project in-depth to understand the data flows and dependencies in a design firm of this system of reviews and develop metrics for effectiveness of
the review system for the design firm.
2. Conduct a cross-case analysis to empirically support the relative impact of a better
system of reviews on project success. This may require a cross-design-firm analysis,
since the review structure and effectiveness may be peculiar to individual design firms
(for example, there was evidence that review practices are different at ContractorH
compared to ContractorA). The study should examine multiple projects at each firm,
because the hypothesis has a reliability aspect—the effectiveness of a system of reviews lies in making projects more reliably good, which mandates assessing multiple
projects.
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7.3.4 Follow-on research: Study of gate reviews
Moving further afield from technical reviews, a related but challenging research need
is the study of major gate or milestone reviews.
Although they are difficult to access, studying actual decision processes at major gate
decision meetings or even internal developer-level gate decisions would be invaluable. Gate
decision meetings directly touch major project decisions and critical failures of projects, and
expose major developer challenges and acquirer needs. The decision-theoretical aspects of
gate decisions and technical reviews is a key area that was not deeply probed in this research.
In the literature, major gate review meetings are largely “black boxes”: acknowledged
as important but lacking in direct research data on internal processes. How are decisions
made on major programs at gate decision meetings? What supports these decisions? How
“good” are these decisions? How were the decisions viewed in retrospect? Are the decisions
made by a single decision-maker at the gate decision meeting—or in prior pre-meeting activities, or by multiple decision-makers? How influential are the various inputs to the decision?
How do decisions connect to organizational work? What are the effects of the other identified organizational setting variables (client, project size, etc.) on decisions? Probing these key
questions about gate decision meetings would be an important contribution to understanding design and development processes.
Qualitative research on real-world design projects is a promising way to examine these
difficult questions and can lead to the development of theory on the systems engineering of
complex systems.
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APPENDIX A

HUMAN SUBJECT RESEARCH APPROVALS

This appendix reports the approval by the University of Alabama for this human subject
research, as required by relevant policy and law.

A.1

UAH IRB research protocol approval
In accordance with UAH guidance and other applicable regulations, the protocol de-

scribing the conduct and protection of Human Subject Research issues for this research was
reviewed and approved by the UAH IRB as stated in their letter of approval in Figure A.1.
This research was approved by the UAH IRB as “expedited review category human subject research,” since it was “research on individual or group characteristics or behavior . . . or
research employing survey, interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation, human
factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies.”

A.2

UAH IRB research proposal and protocol
The IRB research proposal and protocol shown in Figure A.2 describes the assessed

potential risks to the research subjects and the measures taken to reduce the risks.
The process used to develop the research plan is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
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Expedited (see pg 2)

December 13th 2017

Exempted (see pg 3)

Robert Braunger
College of Engineering
University of Alabama in Huntsville

Full Review
Extension of Approval

Dear Mr. Braunger,
The UAH Institutional Review Board of Human Subjects Committee has reviewed your
proposal, Technical Reviews in Complex Development Programs, and found it meets the
necessary criteria for approval. Your proposal seems to be in compliance with this institutions
Federal Wide Assurance (FWA) 00019998 and the DHHS Regulations for the Protection of
Human Subjects (45 CFR 46).
Please note that this approval is good for one year from the date on this letter. If data
collection continues past this period, you are responsible for processing a renewal application a
minimum of 60 days prior to the expiration date.
No changes are to be made to the approved protocol without prior review and approval
from the UAH IRB. All changes (e.g. a change in procedure, number of subjects, personnel,
study locations, new recruitment materials, study instruments, etc) must be prospectively
reviewed and approved by the IRB before they are implemented. You should report any
unanticipated problems involving risks to the participants or others to the IRB Chair.
If you have any questions regarding the IRB’s decision, please contact me.

Sincerely,

Bruce Stallsmith
IRB Chair
Professor, Biological Sciences

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR RESEARCH
Von Braun Research Hall M-17
Huntsville, AL 35899

T

Figure A.1: UAH IRB approval letter
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Expedited:
Clinical studies of drugs and medical devices only when condition (a) or (b) is met. (a) Research on drugs for which an
investigational new drug application (21 CFR Part 312) is not required. (Note: Research on marketed drugs that significantly
increases the risks or decreases the acceptability of the risks associated with the use of the product is not eligible for expedited
review. (b) Research on medical devices for which (i) an investigational device exemption application (21 CFR Part 812) is not
required; or (ii) the medical device is cleared/approved for marketing and the medical device is being used in accordance with its
cleared/approved labeling.
Collection of blood samples by finger stick, heel stick, ear stick, or venipuncture as follows: (a) from healthy, nonpregnant
adults who weigh at least 110 pounds. For these subjects, the amounts drawn may not exceed 550 ml in an 8 week period and
collection may not occur more frequently than 2 times per week; or (b) from other adults and children, considering the age,
weight, and health of the subjects, the collection procedure, the amount of blood to be collected, and the frequency with which it
will be collected. For these subjects, the amount drawn may not exceed the lesser of 50 ml or 3 ml per kg in an 8 week period and
collection may not occur more frequently than 2 times per week.
Prospective collection of biological specimens for research purposes by noninvasive means. Examples: (a) hair and nail
clippings in a nondisfiguring manner; (b) deciduous teeth at time of exfoliation or if routine patient care indicates a need for
extraction; (c) permanent teeth if routine patient care indicates a need for extraction; (d) excreta and external secretions
(including sweat); (e) uncannulated saliva collected either in an unstimulated fashion or stimulated by chewing gumbase or wax
or by applying a dilute citric solution to the tongue; (f) placenta removed at delivery; (g) amniotic fluid obtained at the time of
rupture of the membrane prior to or during labor; (h) supra- and subgingival dental plaque and calculus, provided the collection
procedure is not more invasive than routine prophylactic scaling of the teeth and the process is accomplished in accordance with
accepted prophylactic techniques; (i) mucosal and skin cells collected by buccal scraping or swab, skin swab, or mouth washings;
(j) sputum collected after saline mist nebulization.
Collection of data through noninvasive procedures (not involving general anesthesia or sedation) routinely employed in
clinical practice, excluding procedures involving x-rays or microwaves. Where medical devices are employed, they must be
cleared/approved for marketing. (Studies intended to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of the medical device are not generally
eligible for expedited review, including studies of cleared medical devices for new indications).
Research involving materials (data, documents, records, or specimens) that have been collected, or will be collected
solely for nonresearch purposes (such as medical treatment or diagnosis).
Collection of data from voice, video, digital, or image recordings made for research purposes.
Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not limited to, research on perception, cognition,
motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural beliefs or practices, and social behavior) or research employing survey,
interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation, human factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies.

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR RESEARCH
Von Braun Research Hall M-17
Huntsville, AL 35899
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Figure A.1: UAH IRB approval letter, continued
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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA IN HUNTSVILLE

FORM 1: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPLICATION
[Application# E2017105]
Is this application to extend IRB approval of a previously reviewed and accepted protocol?
Yes

No

If yes, what is the Previous IRB Application Number: N/A
Principal Investigator/Study Director Name: Robert M. Braunger
Status: Faculty

Staff

Student

Department: Industrial & Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
College/Research Center: UAH College of Engineering
Telephone:

Email:

Supervising Faculty Information (if student)
Name: Paul D. Collopy
Campus Address: Olin B King Technology Hall, Room N136, 301 Sparkman Dr,
Huntsville, AL 35899.
Telephone:

Email :

Funding: External

Internal

Unfunded

Funding source (if applicable): N/A
Title of Study: Technical Reviews in Complex Development Programs (Doctoral dissertation
research)
Purpose of Study: The study examines the role of engineering technical reviews in design
projects.
State the Hypotheses, Research Question, or Practice Question:
Research Question 1: How do technical reviews impact subsequent project engineering and
management activities?
Research Question 2: How do technical reviews affect participant views and self-reported
knowledge of the project?
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Figure A.2: UAH IRB research protocol
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Description of Subjects: The research participants are drawn from the population of engineers
and managers who attend large technical design review meetings (30-100 people are typical
for these meetings) of a few selected large engineering projects (e.g., design team for a
spacecraft). The individuals are all adults of varying ages (23-70), genders, ethnic
backgrounds. No “special populations” will be allowed (children, minors, or prisoners). The
desired sample size is 5-10 interviewees, sampled from 3-8 design reviews (approx. 15-80
interviewees in all).

How Subjects Will Be Selected and Recruited: Interviewees will be requested as volunteers
from existing collected lists of meeting attendees. Meeting attendee lists will be requested
from the program managers / lead engineers who conducted the design reviews, typically
from electronic invitations to the meetings, sign-in lists, or meeting minutes. If actual
attendee lists are not available, the researchers will seek a list of project personnel and
likely attendees from the program managers / lead engineers.
Potential Interviewees are generally professionals from contractor/defense industry companies
participating in the design project. Interviewees are from one lead design company/
(see Form 1/Enclosure 4 for letter of support from the company and company
information). Interview volunteer invitations will be forwarded via email from that
company’s central contact.
The draft volunteer solicitation email is at Form 1/Enclosure 5.

Background and qualifications of the principal investigator and additional personnel directly
involved in the research: The principal investigator is the main data acquirer and research
designer, and has experience in design reviews. The principal investigator has taken the
required CITI human subject research training for UAH:
1. Conflicts of Interest (17 Oct 2017)
2. Export Compliance (17 Oct 2017)
3. Human Subject Researchers (17 Oct 2017)
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4. Responsible Conduct of Research for All Researchers (17 Oct 2017)

Description of Procedure: The researcher will have a one-on-one interview with a volunteer
interviewee at the company workplace, a neutral and private area (such as the interviewee
office or other private area), or by a telephone call. Interviews will not be conducted in public
spaces where third parties can overhear the interview. Consent forms will be signed prior to
interview (see section on Procedures for attaining Informed Consent or Assent).
The interview will be recorded using a digital recorder. Interview questions will come from a
standard interview list, with potential follow-up questions based on interview responses.
Interview questions may also come from observations from the particular review meeting. The
interview is intended to run approximately 30 minutes but may run short or long depending on
responses.
Subsequent to the interview, the initial digital recording will be transcribed and then anonymized
with coding of individual names, companies, and other identifying terms. The coded interview
transcripts will be the main data used in subsequent analysis (see section on “How You Will
Ensure Confidentiality/Anonymity”).
Participants will be informed of any specific quotes from their coded transcripts planned for
research reporting and allowed to comment or request removal of their quote.
Participating organizations (i.e. the companies at which the participants work) will be offered the
resultant (coded) research reporting for review as part of standard publication review processes
within those organizations.

Instrumentation (if applicable): Instrument of study is interview questions. See attached
standard list of questions.

Duration of Study
a. Total amount of time with each subject: approx. 30 minutes
b. Time to complete study: 1 year
Benefit(s) of the Study: This research is intended to understand the design process and general
engineering practices. The results of the descriptive study is a better understanding of design
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practice. Study findings are of benefit to the general systems engineering field, and have no
direct individual benefit.

Incentives and compensation: Research participants may be compensated for the work time
taken to conduct the interview, depending on company policy (see Enclosure 4 for specific
procedures for each company). Any compensation for interview time will be based on
participants’ current wage rate for the time of the interview, and will be conducted through
company human resources to properly account for taxes and other required reporting. If
employing company policy does not allow for reimbursement for interview time, then no
compensation will be offered (will vary with company, as stated in Enclosure 4).

Possible Risks to Subject(s) and Precautions Taken to Avoid Risks: There does not appear to be
physical, psychological, or legal risk to interviewees. The main risk to interviewees is a
relatively rare but typical social/economic “worker risk”. Per the CITI IRB training
(“Vulnerable Subjects - Research Involving Workers/Employees” (2017), a potential risk is
the research leads interviewee workers to be seen by their employer as “not performing job
duties as expected. This could adversely affect the worker's job and could result in job
restriction or loss.” A related risk is “reputational risk”, when the interviewee’s work
product is seen as not having been done well. Both risks are within the human subject
category “Breach of Confidentiality risks” (ref: 2017 CITI IRB training, “Assessing Risk- SBE”,
and OHRP Expedited Review Categories (1998)). These risks to employability or reputation
are relatively unlikely and of relatively low consequence in the opinion of the PI and faculty
advisor. These risks are protected against by anonymizing/coding the interview data and
avoiding the association of interview statements with identifiable interviewees and their
employer (see below). The principal investigator and faculty advisor feel that these
confidentiality protections are reasonable and appropriate and cause the risks related to
breach of confidentiality to be no more than minimal risk.
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How You Will Ensure Confidentiality/Anonymity: No names of interviewees or identifiers are
used in general research analysis and reporting (coding of data). Data with interviewee
names or identifying characteristics such as company name (raw recordings, coding list of
names and identifiers, and consent forms) are stored and safeguarded (encrypted and
password protected on USB drives). The coding list is used to inform participants if using a
quote from them in research reporting (consent form item).
The only individuals having access to un-coded audio recordings are the Principal
Investigator and the Faculty Dissertation Committee (by exception). The only individuals
having access to coded audio recording transcripts (pre-publishing/ analysis phase) are the
Principal Investigator and Faculty Dissertation Committee. Analysis and reporting will be
conducted on coded transcript data. Research verification/other use of un-coded data
associated with participant names will only done if necessary and by the Supervising Faculty
Member.
Consent forms and un-coded interview data will be destroyed one year after completing the
research (publishing of dissertation report and associated journal article) to allow for
external verification/validation requests. Coded interview data will be destroyed five years
after completing the research.
Procedures for attaining Informed Consent or Assent: Interviewees are volunteers,
responding to solicitation email (and are emailed with summary of research and consent
form). Interviewees are explained consent form prior to participation. A solicitation email
is sent and interviewees are informed of voluntary nature of interviews.
In the case of an in-person interview, the consent form will be discussed and signed by
interviewee before proceeding with the main interview.
In the case of a telephone interview, consent will be obtained prior to the main interview.
Consent forms will be emailed to telephone interviewees. The initial part of the telephone
call will consist of discussing the consent form and emailing back consent form with
interviewee digital signature prior to the main interview. If interviewee needs time to
consider or does not have ability to email back consent form, then the main interview will
not be conducted until the signed consent form is obtained by the interviewer.
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The protection protocol follows the proposal process of the UAH and University of Alabama IRB and general practices and interpretations of Human Subject Research law and requirements.
Some of the protocol is redacted in order to meet obligations for confidentiality. Examples include company-specific recruitment processes and any terms which would identify
companies. The full IRB protocol may be requested from the Research Committee or UAH
IRB.
Confidentiality protections for research volunteer subjects and their organizations are
described in the Research Proposal and Protocol. As discussed in the protocol’s confidentiality protection plan, all published material such as this dissertation uses pseudonyms to give
confidentiality to individuals and organizations. The protection plan also restricts the access
and storage of material which can identify individuals. Access to “raw” research source material with un-coded respondent and company identifiers such as recordings and initial transcripts is restricted to the research committee.
According to UAH policy, the author/Principal Investigator and Advisor state that they
have no conflicts of interest affecting subject welfare which are related to the research projects.
In addition, the Principal Investigator has taken all human subject research training required
by regulations and policy.
Individual consent form samples and handling of documentation and research materials are included in the protocol. A sample consent form is shown in Figure A.3.
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Enclosure 3 (Consent Form) to Form 1
Consent Form: Technical Reviews in Complex Development Programs
You are invited to participate in a research study about technical design reviews. This study is designed
to help us to better understand the role of technical design reviews in engineering projects.
The primary investigator is Robert Braunger, from the University of Alabama in Huntsville
(
).
PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED IN THE STUDY: Participation in this study is completely
voluntary. Once written consent is given; you will be asked to have a one-on-one interview and asked
questions about the design review which you attended. Questions focus on work triggered by the review
and what you learned from the review. This session will take approximately 30 minutes.
DISCOMFORTS AND RISKS FROM PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY: The interview will be
digitally recorded to help analysis. The recordings are safeguarded and your name is removed from
written transcripts made from the recording.
The most likely risk from this study would be if you said negative things about your work which make
your employer unhappy with you. The researchers consider this risk possible but not likely. We protect
you by keeping your name and employer separated from what you say in research analysis and reporting
(see CONFIDENTIALITY below). Your name will not be in any research reports. We also will show
you any of your quotes used in research reporting so you can potentially ask that it be removed.
EXPECTED BENEFITS: Results from his study can benefit society by improving our understanding of
how engineers conduct design reviews.
INCENTIVES AND COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPATION:
<if interviewee company policy allows it: You will be given a charge account to compensate for time
spent on this interview>
<if interviewee company policy does not allow it: There are no incentives for this study>
CONFIDENTIALITY OF RESULTS: Participant codes instead of names and employers will be used to
record your data, and these codes will be made available only to those researchers directly involved with
this study, thereby ensuring strict confidentiality. This consent form and un-coded interview data will be
destroyed one year after completing the research. The data from your interview will only be released to
individuals who are directly involved in the research and only using your participant code. Any terms that
we feel could help identify you (such as project names) are also protected with coded identifiers. Consent
forms, interview recordings, and un-coded data associated with you will be protected by only being stored
on password-protected encrypted USB drives.
FREEDOM TO WITHDRAW: You are free to withdraw from the interview at any time. You will not be
penalized because of withdrawal in any form. Investigators reserve the right to remove any participant

Figure A.3: Sample consent form
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from the session without regard to the participant’s consent. You may stop the interview at any time, and
may ask to have your data removed or simply stop the interview.
CONTACT INFORMATION: If you have any questions, please ask them now. If you have questions
later on, you may contact the Principal Investigator Robert Braunger, at
or at
. You may also contact the faculty research supervisor Dr. Paul Collopy, at
or at
. If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or
concerns or complaints about the research, you may contact the UAH IRB Office at
or
email the IRB chair Dr. Bruce Stallsmith at
.
If you agree to participate in our research please sign and date below. If you are under the age of 18, we
will not be able to conduct this study, so please inform me.
This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at UAH under Application #E2017105 and
will expire in one year from December 13, 2018.
________________________________
Name (Please Print)

______________________________
Signature
Date

Figure A.3: Sample consent form, continued
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APPENDIX B

GENERAL INTERVIEW QUESTION GUIDE

As discussed in Chapter 3, this research used semi-structured interviews. A general
interview guide was developed prior to the set of interviews, shown in Figure B.1.
This general interview guide was approved by the IRB, as described in Section A.2.
Note that additional specific questions for a given interview subject were developed
before each interview based on examining the documents and field notes from that specific
review. Specific questions were also developed to probe issues related to key ideas and emergent theory. The interview method was semi-structured, so follow-up questions were also
asked during the interview, in response to statements by the respondent. Questions asked for
each specific interview were recorded and archived in transcripts.
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Research interview questions / Interview Guide / Robert Braunger Oct 2017
Topic: items I ask design review participants
Target: 30 minute interview, recorded (on the order of 10 questions, divided between 2 research Q’s)
Main questions:
The purpose of this research is to learn about the role of design reviews in systems engineering and management of
complex systems, from actual projects like yours, so we greatly value your thoughts.
I’m a doctoral student in systems engineering, and have been given permission to ask for interviews, attended the
[name of review], and have looked at slides and minutes and some other project material so we can have a more
productive interview.
Q’s about interviewee role & experience
First, to put your experiences in perspective, I wanted to get brief info on your background.
a. What was your role in the recent review (engineering lead, manager, engineer)?
b. How many reviews like this have you been involved in?
A. Research Q1/Review Outcomes
1. Did you assign or work on any actions from the review?
2. What other products or results from the review triggered or influenced your follow-on work?
3. Before the review- how did the review or preparation for it affect work or products of the project?

C. Research Q2/Participant views and self-reported knowledge of program/design
4. Next I’d like to ask some questions about what you learned as a result of the review. What did you learn about the
technical design as a result of the review?
5. What did you learn about the project- the management, the status and plans, etc.?
Closing/General
6. Are there additional thoughts you’d like to share about technical reviews in your project or organization?

Figure B.1: General interview questions
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1

APPENDIX C

PILOT STUDY DESCRIPTION

As discussed in Chapter 3, a pilot study was conducted on a single technical review case
(Pre-Ship Review of a DoD Space Program from ContractorA) in order to develop the research
methodology, survey relevant literature related to the topic, and develop assessment factors
to select research cases for the main study.
The pilot study description given in Figure C.1 relates the methodology, literature, data,
and initial conclusions of the pilot study. Parts of the pilot study report have been redacted
due to IRB confidentiality requirements or omitted in the interest of brevity.
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1. Introduction
Design reviews in major complex defense and space acquisition programs are
high stakes events- considered “critical milestones” in design efforts, and can feed
into major decisions involving scope and success or failure for programs involving
millions or billions of dollars. Design reviews are major technical meetings
reviewing technical outputs of a design phase, often involving dozens or hundreds of
engineers and engineering managers for complex systems, and are used as critical
events separating major phases of design of complex systems. The processes for
design reviews evolved over the last 50 years in NASA and the DoD, with the primary
stated intent being to support major development decisions with technical insight.
However— systems engineering and acquisition in government large
government programs has had un-even success and theories of systems engineering
have little understanding of why success has been un-even. There has been a
recurring series of criticisms by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) and
other studies of the US government acquisition systems and design reviews (GAO,
2015a; 2002; 2016; 1996) stating that neither are meeting critical needs for a massive
enterprise: a portfolio of $54 billion for NASA’s 18 major programs and over $1.4
trillion for DoD’s 80 major programs (GAO, 2015b). GAO has argued that
insufficient technical reviews and poor decisions based on insufficient reviews are a
major contributor to ongoing failures of the government acquisition systems (GAO,
2007). For example, about half of the programs in the DoD portfolio have had major
cost growth since 2004—of over $230 billion dollars; worse- there is a bow-wave of
programs pushed into the future because of increased cost and schedule slips,
meaning that the DoD will get less total capability and get it later (GAO, 2015a). This
is the primary practical gap behind this research campaign—design reviews are not
consistently supporting critical decisions to enhance the likelihood of project
success for many multi-billion dollar government projects, so study of design
reviews is practically needed.
There is also a second related theoretical gap: the theory base behind design
reviews is fragmented and does not seem consistent with real-world practice in
design reviews. The existing technical rationales and structures for design reviews,
as written up in normative documents like industry standards (IEEE 15288.2; IEEE,
2015) and government process documents (e.g., Defense Acquisition Guidebook;
DoD, 2013) don’t explain what design reviews currently do, let alone what they
should do to improve systems engineering. Such normative guidance focuses more
on method than rationales. What little rationale is presented in these documents is
almost purely technological and managerial and is silent on other socio-technical
issues found in reviews. Few of the sociological issues which have been key failure
points in our multi-billion dollar procurements – such as lack of external
independent review or complex management structures -- are discussed in design
review and decision guidance—despite their criticality.
Building an understanding of the underlying rationales of evolved engineering
practices motivates my research question: why do participant engineers in design

Figure C.1: Pilot study description
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reviews think they do design reviews—what good do participants believe design
reviews do for their project? Note that we are interested in higher-levels-ofabstraction and general rationales such as risk identification and technological
design decisions—not immediate lower-level rationales for a specific review, such as
System Requirements Reviews baselining and approving design-to requirements.
A final aspect of this line of research is the rarity of empirical evidence on
detailed practice in complex design efforts, particularly in the space and defense
industries. The author has obtained access to design review practice, and the
resultant dataset is relatively unique- interviews and meeting artifacts from a critical
decision meeting for a complex multi-million dollar spacecraft design effort.
2. Literature
a. Brief summary of DoD review practice
Figure 1 shows the notional sequencing of common Department of Defense
design reviews in the DoD normative process guidance. Examples of key design
reviews which feed into major program decisions are System Requirements Reviewprimarily stated as a review to checks to see if the system requirements are mature
enough to proceed into design, and the Critical Design Review, which is a review at
the end of the detailed design phase before moving into product production (for
hardware) or final coding integration (for software-intensive systems).

Fig. 1. Technical Reviews in DoD acquisition lifecycle, from Defense Acquisition Guidebook
(Department of Defense, Defense Acquisition University, 2013)

The role of design reviews has evolved over the last 50 years. Prior work by
Braunger and Collopy (Braunger & Collopy, 2016) presented some of the key
technical normative rationales for design reviews and cited industry standards such

Figure C.1: Pilot study description, continued
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as the new IEEE 15288.2-2014 industry standard on defense design reviews (IEEE
Computer Society, 2015). Normative process documents largely focus on
technological rather than social interactions such as communication and
sensemaking which some authors have noted as critical in the practice of
engineering (Bucciarelli, 1994;,O’Sullivan, 2000;,Eriksson, 2009). However, process
documents such as IEEE 15288.2 or internal program guidance have set terms,
timing, and content of reviews, and have made reviews major contractual
deliverables standard across industry and government.
b. Theoretical / academic research-based factors relating to design reviews
Planned Flow of study conceptual development from Inductive to Deductive

Inductive- from
specific observations
to general principles

Deductive- From
theory and general
principles to specific
expectations

Initial Case

Next / Planned Cases
5. Revisit literature and theory. Modified new
set of factors with expected behavior/
comments that may be observed, for next case
study situation (taking into account expected
variation with the new case circumstance)

2. Grouping and down-selecting
factors into 21 initial theorybased categories, with related
expected behaviors in reviews

1. Initial development of
~55 rationales/factors from
researcher empirical past
experience (R. Braunger &
P. Collopy) and prior
reviews attended

3. Analysis of empirical review
participant interview transcripts, and
initial coding of interview responses
vs. initial theory-based categories.
Also participant and researcher
comments on case context factors
which will create variability

4. Code analysis and revisionidentification of gaps, underrepresented factors, new factors
-> new candidate code set. Also
emerging opinion on variation in
factors with case contextual
factors (e.g. design phase, scale)

Planned redo of steps 35 for next
cases / later
research

Fig. 2. Planned flow of study conceptual development

As shown above in Figure 2, a key initial part of this study has been development
of theoretical factors expected to be observed in reviews or brought up in interviews
in the scope of this research. First, an initial set of likely rationales/factors were
brain-stormed by the two main researchers (R. Braunger and P. Collopy), based on
their prior experiences as engineer-participants in collectively over 30 years and
attendance at dozens of review. The initial set of over 55 factors was then analyzed,
grouped, and researched against the extant literature in design reviews, systems
engineering and management, and decision theory (see Braunger and Collopy,
2016), and a second smaller set of 21 initial theory-based factors, with associated
literature. These were major behaviors and rationales for reviews that were expected
to be observed. This initial theory-based set of factors is summarized in Table 1
(next page), tagged as being in one of three focus areas (technical, programmatic, or
socio-technical), and roughly described as how each would be expected to surface in
interviews, artifacts, or review meeting transcripts.
The below is a brief summary of major theoretical works and how are expected to
manifest; a longer theoretical discussion of each factor will be reserved to a separate
major paper, except where the factor ends up being critical to observations of this
research.
Table 1 shows theoretical strands supporting multiple factors / reasons for
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reviews and design practice. An obvious note on the assessed theoretical
background from reviews is that the theoretical base is not only fragmented, but
such a wider presentation of the many major rationales for design reviews has not
been presented in the literature—as discussed earlier, normative standards
documents primarily only focus on the technological and some managerial aspects
and neglect socio-technical factors. Such a fragmented theoretical landscape and
complex organizational process phenomena is what Langley argued is often best for
strategies of sensemaking from deeper case study observations (Langley, 1999). It is
the intent of this research to determine if some of the identified 21 major factors
from theory / academic writing are evident in empirical observations of design
reviews and interviews with review participants. Further, we would like to see if
some factors are more dominant in some settings or in the opinions of some subsets
of engineers, and potentially narrow or combine factors based on feedback and
analysis of the reviews. Some of these factors may be more relevant or more present
in some reviews (e.g., stakeholder agreement may be more important at
SRR/program start, and trade study / technical decisions may be more present at
PDRs/design beginning), and in some organizational settings (e.g., contractor
reviews may focus on technical issues, government / PEO/System-of-systems
reviews may focus on larger stakeholder issues than detailed technical issues).
This was an initial rough theoretical framework of issues expected in reviews
from literature review and the experience of the research team. . It is not suggested
that these are the only factors, that they are sufficient, completely separate, or that
they form a theory with factors—this represents a starting set of theoretical issues
that intended to be investigated through interview questioning to check empirical
presence and role in the initial case study empirical observations / interviews.

Figure C.1: Pilot study description, continued
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Larger programmatic decisions
supported by that review
(Programmatic)

2

Forum for resource decisions
and prioritization. Critical
issue identification and
elevation to acquirer or outside
program (Programmatic,
technical)
Creation of common language
and ruleset; standardized
process (Socio-technical)

4

5

Technical risk management,
maturity assessment
(Technical)

3

1

Theoretical Factor
(Focus area: Technical,
Programmatic, Socio-technical)
Timing of review / scope of
review (Technical,
Programmatic)

Factor
#
Normative references like IEEE 15288.2 (IEEE
Computer Society, 2015) or PEO-level guidance
(e.g., (U.S. Air Force Space and Missile Center,
2009).
DoDI 5000.02 guidance on decision structure (U.S.
Department of Defense, Undersecretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2015);
PEO guidance (e.g., USAF SMC, 2009), defense
decision architecture described in NRC (2009).
Commercial stage gates and go/kill development
decision points- (Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1995)
Ichida(1996)- on risk identification; Cooper (2001)
on partitioning cost/info gathering. Normative
processes like TRLs in DoD Acquisition Guide
(2013) and IEEE 15288.2 (2015) reporting of risks.
Review as a reliability improvement and risk
reduction technical method (Kitagawa, 1985)
Academic discussion of risk reduction at resource
cost in Ahmadi & Wang (1999).
Oakes (2012) on resource decisions, prioritization,
de-scoping, problem identification, feedback of
decisions to higher levels in organization.
Wheelwright and Clark (1992a; 1992b) on
resource/prioritization in portfolio management
and program decisions
Christiansen and Varnes (2009) on structured rules
in design.
Chao (2005) on process standardization through
rules.

Theoretical/academic factor references

Citation of common norms in review
(process documents); use of standard
referent process terms (e.g., TRLs)

Real-time decision-making and
prioritization in meeting; referral to higher
boards or outside decisions (in actions)

TRL reporting, risk identification, risk
discussions.

Supported decisions, stakeholders.
Reference to supported decisions and life
cycle of development

Exit/entry criteria, scope, expectations,
sequencing, contractual deliverables

How factor is expected to manifest in review
meeting, artifacts, or participant interviews

Table 1 - List of factors and supporting literature, for design reviews
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Setting and acceptance of
design constraints as design
progresses; design validation.
(Technical)
Internal education,
organizational learning,
communication, and
sensemaking-like common
shaping of concepts/vision
(Socio-technical)
Shaping engineering team /
organization (Socio-technical)
Focusing effort of organization
on artifacts under review.
(Socio-technical)
Organizing internal
subordinate design processes.
(Technical)

8

12

11

10

9

Stakeholder need alignment
(Socio-technical)

Theoretical Factor
(Focus area: Technical,
Programmatic, Socio-technical)
Error identification

7

6

Factor
#

Internal communication as part of reviews in Huet
(2006) and Huet et al. (2007); Organizational
sensemaking and shaping of meaning in
Weick(1995; 2001)
Shimodiara (in Ichida, 1996) that design review
trains designers.
Creation of the design team as focus of engineering
leadership in Bucciarelli (1994)
Choo (1996) on structuring and directing attention
of organization to increase support decisions and
knowledge building
Mintzberg (1979) on creating process points for
groups to work towards, as well as forcing internal
organizational processes,
Chao et al. (2004) - bulk of technical value of
formal design reviews is preparing for them.

Boehm and Ross (1989) - strategic involvement of
stakeholders and matching development with win
conditions of stakeholders
Berztiss (2002)- reviews validate work products of
development as part of knowledge engineering

Parnas and Weiss (1985) and Chao et al. (2001) reviews as primary error management tool in
development
Sauer et al. (2000) and Ichida (1996) on use of
group expertise to find flaws in reviews.

Theoretical/academic factor references

Discussion of prior work and set of review
artifacts; sequencing of prior peer reviews
and overall project schedule.
Reports of prior peer reviews and lead-up
work; statements on prior work being the
critical work.

Slides and discussion which educates
clients/sponsors/internal team on design
concept.
General comments to design team (as
opposed to stakeholders) related to design
concepts
Statements in review addressed to “team”-

Presentation of data and artifacts and
“scrub/review” of data/artifacts by review
panel. Questioning of technical sufficiency /
assumptions by panel. Questioning by other
specialized knowledge/subject matter
experts outside and within team.
Discussion of higher-order stakeholder
needs, adjustment of development to meet
them in review
Requesting stakeholder acceptance and
baselining or input / validation of artifacts.

How factor is expected to manifest in review
meeting, artifacts, or participant interviews

Table 1 - List of factors and supporting literature, for design reviews
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Program control- parent /
funding office insight into
developer progress; developer
feedback to funding office
(Programmatic)
Program control- parent /
funding office acquiring
confidence that design will
“work” (socio-technical)
Management of stakeholders by
developers; stakeholder
influence on program (Sociotechnical)

15

17

16

Configuration management of
program and control of design
baselines (Technical)

Theoretical Factor
(Focus area: Technical,
Programmatic, Socio-technical)
Acting as quality control gate
and improving quality (quality
management) (Technical)

14

13

Factor
#

March (1991); Pffeffer (1981) on power/resource
relationships in organizations and exerting power
on decision-making.
O’Sullivan (2000) on direct contractual control and
leverage

O’Sullivan (2000)- acquirer/integrator needing
confidence that developer can make something
that will work as intended.

Wesner et al. (1995) on design review is the
fundamental process used to review the design,
identify improvements, and ensure the design is
meeting the customer needs by the designer—a
critical quality gate so design can continue.
Chao (2005) on creating standardized processes so
sub-contractors reduce variation among business.
Clausing (1994): design reviews and phase-gate
reviews as progress checks and checks on quality
as part of total quality management: checking
design against key criteria and freezing decisions to
allow getting to market quickly
Reviews ensure design compatibility with the
project baseline (both technically and resource‐
wise) and alignment with external and in‐house
design and technical standards- Shimodaira (in
Ichida, 1996).
Design reviews support the detailed audits that
allow for checking and baselining major
configurations; avoidance of rework /improvement
saves resources (Przemieniecki, 1993).
Freedman and Weinberg (1990)- technical reviews
put technical reporting to acquirer in context.

Theoretical/academic factor references

Argument and dominance/resource debates
in review; discussion that contracts / formal
needs not met.

Statements of acceptance (or concern) by
acquiring office representative.

Questions by program office/acquiring
office; information presented intended to
inform/educate acquirers.

Discussions of baselines, approval of
baselines, or configuration management of
design

Discussions of quality review processes;

How factor is expected to manifest in review
meeting, artifacts, or participant interviews

Table 1 - List of factors and supporting literature, for design reviews
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Normative decision supportpresenting and getting
agreement on formal design
trades and critical design
decisions. (Technical)
Behavioral decision supportsatisficing, rule-following,
independent input- to deal with
limited information/ behavioral
decision making (Sociotechnical)

Management of
government/contractor
(supplier / acquirer) –
partitioning design and dealing
with complexity, aligning
contract deliverables
(Programmatic)

19

21

20

18

Theoretical Factor
(Focus area: Technical,
Programmatic, Socio-technical)
Avoidance of criticism / fear of
outside punishment

Factor
#

March ( 1994)and Hammond, Keeney, and Raiffa
(1999) on satisficing and use of independent input
to avoid bias in organizational decisions.
Esser (1998)on groupthink in organizations and
associated behavior- collective avoidance and
collective optimism.
Salancik and Brindle (in Shapira,2002) on rules
and regulations as institutional / administrative
form of power and resource negotiation
Junker (2007) on red-teaming and hostile reviews
Holmgren, in Przemieniecki (1993) on contractual
relationships.
Clark & Wheelwright (1993)- decision reviews
necessary to manage large and complex projects,
due to needing to manage the complexity alone.
Hammond, Keeney and Raiffa (2001) on splitting
of decisions and partitioning effort in design, to
manage large teams of engineers which are often
dispersed.

Kohlberg & Hersh, (1977) - doing action (review)
due to authority setting a rule, as opposed to the
inherent rightness of the action.
Kitagawa (1985) on reviews and critical studies to
resolve design problems.

Theoretical/academic factor references

Discussion of alignment and deliveries /
integration with subsystems and integrated
schedules; discussion of contracts and
deliverables

Negotiation, acceptance of limited trades,
inputs by independent “expert” panel;
references to standard rules as justification.
Questioning (de novo) of decisions and
design accepted within design team. Use of
red-teams, negative comments, skepticism
in panel / reviewers.

Discussion of rules and external
consequence (criticism by parent office,
Congress, etc.).
Presentation of critical trades and
information; taking of actions on follow-on
trades and studies.

How factor is expected to manifest in review
meeting, artifacts, or participant interviews

Table 1 - List of factors and supporting literature, for design reviews

3. Methods
The research intent for this initial study is to exercise the conceptual
development (iteration from empirical past experience to theory to empirical
observations to updated theory) as sketched before in Figure 2. To conduct and
ground the theory development, the study focuses on a single “exploratory case
study” design following Yin’s (Yin, 2009; 2002) approach. To help answer the
research question of why participants in the review think they do design reviews and
what good the design reviews do for their project, the data acquisition from each
case will consist of artifacts (design review slides, minutes and actions) and
interviews with a number (3-6) of design review participants from that case study
review. The intent is to use the single case study as an initial deep dive to examine
the initial set of theoretical rationale factors for validity in this case study, and also
explore potential case-specific contextual factors which could influence the factors
to shape future empirical case selection and theory building.
Case study selection criteria were primarily motivated by two issues: (1) selecting
a design review/ project which either happened recently enough that retrospective
recall by interviewees would be reasonably accurate (within a year), or a review that
is planned to occur during the period of the study, (2) selecting a review and case
that allows access to design review participants for interviews, as well as access to
design review artifacts (minutes, slides, etc.) to allow for efficient and in-depth
questions. Since a single case was chosen, it was desired to have a representative
real design activity, and to note for future analysis any mention of case-related
variability (design review stage, design project complexity, design organization
culture, etc.).
Practically, as has been described for qualitative corporate governance and
board meeting research (Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007), gaining access to design review
meetings and participants at sufficient detail for qualitative research can be
“extremely difficult” and requires “utilization of several non-traditional routes”.
Specifically—case study selection and access has to generally be done via “informal
access to a gate-keeper” and “leveraging prior access” methods (Leblanc and
Schwartz, 2007). This research design for access to design review meetings
experienced the same barriers described for corporate board meetings- it is difficult
to access the exact cases that case study design process theory (Yin, 2002) would
suggest accessing driven purely by needing to confirm and explore the developing
theory. Further, as is common in such industrial / government research, the names
of the particular companies, government offices, and individuals had to be
“anonymized” and replaced with generic identifiers, due to the Institutional Review
Board protection processes developed for this study. The original data from the
research (raw recording data files and raw/un-anonymized transcripts) were
encrypted and separately stored for academic archiving issues.
In this exploratory study—one case study (DoD Space Program 1 Program
System Reviews) was accessible which explored some but not all of the case study
selection criteria listed above. The case is summarized below.
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Descriptive Factors of Cases
System Sector
Type of Designed System
Artifact and technology
Artifact maturity
Scale of program
Type of review/ program status
Time of review
Organizational Complexity of
development
Technological Complexity of
development
Main briefers at review
Target stakeholders at review
Number of participants in
review
Location of review
Length of review

Case 1: DoD Space System Pre Ship Review
Defense (DoD)
Single space program- sensor
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
Critical Design Review (for spacecraft equipment/ near end
of spacecraft hardware development)
Fall, 2015 thru Spring 2016 (past and ongoing: 4 of ~8 reviews
completed)
Medium (single program)
Medium-High (new development/prototype; new
technologies).
Prime Contractor (ContractorA)
[redacted]
[redacted]

Contractor site
One day / 2-6 hours (varied, first one longer and later ones
shorter)
Table 3: Case study comparison and features relevant to review (technological and sociological
factors)

This case (“DoD Space Program Pre-Ship Reviews”) consists of a set of four PreShip Reviews conducted in [redacted], of a DoD space program. ContractorA was
the prime developer of the spacecraft equipment. The CDR was held at ContractorA
site with briefings and technical content delivered from individual ContractorA lead
engineers and program managers to DoD representatives.
The chosen case does cover several of the selection criteria of interest, in that it
was recent, and data was accessible. Within the single case study of the targeted set
of four associated design reviews (Pre-Ship Reviews, each held before release
[redacted]. The unit of analysis was a single engineer-participant who was
interviewed.
The interviewee target population set, in order to understand design review
reasons and issues that came up in that specific design review, was analyzed as
having a set of five target levels, which ideally this study or later studies would
sample more fully to show variation in viewpoint: (1) presenting lead engineers at
the review, (2) stakeholder representatives at the review, (3) other program
manager/engineering leads with insight into the program, (4) working level
engineers involved with the project who attended, and (5) engineering leadership
who attended the review (such as engineering QA and department heads). Not all of
these levels of participant individuals may volunteer to be interviewed or be
accessible for a given case, but the above set of five are desiderata for interviewees
which will be approached per IRB and corporate/government rules for interviewing.
It was desired that at least 3-5 and interviewees respond for each case study,
covering as many of the above interviewee classes as possible. In this initial study,
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three individuals were interviewed, with characteristics described below in Table 4.
Most relevant is that—all participants are relatively experienced engineers and have
experience on multiple programs and design review efforts.
Data Aspect of
interviewee
Review
Participant
Level
Specific Role
in Review
Experience at
ContractorA
Total
professional
experience
Educational
Level
Design Review
Experience
Length of
interview

Participant#1
“Ctr_MSE1”
(1) Presenting
Lead Engineer

Participant#2
“Ctr_MSE2”
(1) Presenting
Lead Engineer

Participant#3
“CtrA_SrEngLdr”
(5) Engineering
Leadership at review

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

45 minutes

48 minutes

37 min (plus a 90
min discussion)

Table 4: Description of interviewees

Data were collected following qualitative research practice, prototyped from
similar major ethnographic studies of design practice which involved interviews and
artifacts to develop theory (Eriksson, 2009); (Chao, 2005); (Gregory Huet, 2006).
Over two hours of informal interviews were conducted with two leaders in the target
design organization (without transcripts/notes/encoding) to understand context of
the project, design practice, and to gain and negotiate access to data and
interviewees per corporate / government rules and practice. Artifacts from the case
study design review (slides, minutes, action items, and attendee lists) were retrieved
and examined to frame the initial main questions.
Ideally- it would be desired to attend the review itself to note key interactions for
follow-up questions, but this was not possible in this initial study due to the fact that
the four PSR reviews were in the past; follow-up study may include attending a PSR
later in the series and asking follow-up questions. Interview targets were selected
and interviews requested and coordinated. Following the interview process
recommendations of (Rubin & Rubin, 2004), the qualitative interview followed a
responsive interviewing model, with initial questions developed prior to each
interview based on the artifacts and prior interviews and interviewer knowledge of
the design case study, and follow-up questions sought and explored during the
interview. Interview questions were intentionally not framed in the initial
theoretical factors but rather focused on the general area of the primary research
question: reasons for the review, key interactions in the review, and payoff for the
review, and opinions on value. Appendix A includes a sample list of initial
questions. Follow-up questions and probe questions were asked per responsive
interviewing methods (Rubin & Rubin, 2004) to seek further detail. Snowball
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interview contacts who were knowledgeable on reviews were sought out for followon research. Also, questions were asked on perceptions of variation in how review
contextual factors could change the review rationales and conduct—to enable model
building for research on future cases of reviews. The interview questions were
adjusted and self-reflection on each interview after it is conducted; there was no
intent to have same questions for all participants, per responsive interviewing
methodology (Rubin & Rubin, 2004).
Data collection from the interviews consisted of raw data recordings of the
interviews. The recordings were transcribed into written transcripts by the
researcher. Per draft IRB protection plan and agreements with the target
organization leadership, the transcripts were “anonymized”, cleansed of personal
and organizational identifiers as well as protected information (“For Official Use”,
ITAR, and other potential non-releasable data). Raw/un-anonymized transcripts
and recordings were archived in an appropriate safeguarded repository and the
main analysis conducted on cleanses/substituted data. Transcription and coding
was done relatively quickly (within days) after the interview and before transcription
of another interview, to enhance researcher recall of context.
The analysis approach followed qualitative research methods (Miles &
Huberman, 1994) to code the artifacts and interviews according to categories
developed during the analysis. As discussed earlier, an initial prior-experiencebased framework of engineering “design review rationales and forces” let to a set of
over 50 initial likely design review rationales/forces. Then the set of initial rationales
were pruned, combined, and developed based on academic theories, to develop the
initial factor list, which corresponds to a “provisional start list of codes prior to
fieldwork” (Miles and Huberman, p. 58).
As the interviews and artifact reviews progressed, the coded responses and data
were examined against this initial list and categories. A list of proposed code
modifications was developed, but time did not permit the “code revision” phase
(Miles and Huberman, p. 61). Initial results and sample quotes are presented later.
Future work includes completing within-case analysis and comparison, to examine
variation of responses among interviewees and potential sources, as well as
examining the candidate follow-on questions which were developed for follow-up
interviews. Additional time would be taking for coding checks by another member
of the research team and peer-review and discussion of coding as well as discussion
of memos taken on observations during coding for possible theory modification and
follow-on questions.
One result of this pilot study was to develop the data acquisition and analysis
software and initial coding methods for follow-on study. The initial theories and
forces/reasons found in this pilot study will be used to support case study selection
and examination for the planned follow-on study, which is the main purpose of
exploratory case study research (Yin, 2002).
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4. Results
The initial results of coding analysis is presented in Table 5 as a summary table of
each initial rationale factor sorted in order of its relative occurrence in order of
words in transcripts across all interviews. Word occurrence was used in this table
instead of number of quotes, because a longer discussion likely implies more weight
to the speaker (a good example is some of the longer anecdote/stories of
Interview#3—he clearly intended to tell a story to make a point, rather than
responding to questioning). Note that some discussions had multiple
codes/rationales.
FACTR
#
FACTOR_TEXT_CODE
P1
P2
P 3:
TOT
15
PROGRAM_INSIGHT
1267
2015
295
3577
6
ERROR_IDENTIFICATION
475
1363
1725
3563
21
COMPLEXITY_MANAGEMENT
566
698
1084
2348
16
PROGRAM_CONFIDENCE
363
850
838
2051
13
QUALITY_GATE
808
515
585
1908
17
STAKEHOLDER_MANAGEMENT
181
1545
0
1726
9
INTERNAL_COMMUNICATION
0
673
341
1014
4
RESOURCE_DECISIONS_ISSUEID
0
594
402
996
10
SHAPE_TEAM
0
0
934
934
14
CONFIG_MANAGEMENT
291
229
388
908
11
ORGANIZATIONAL_ATTENTION
30
706
22
758
7
STAKEHOLDER_NEED
48
680
0
728
3
TECH_RISK
0
260
378
638
12
ORGANIZING_DESIGN
120
82
341
543
20
DECISION_BEHAVIORAL
326
121
37
484
5
COMMON_LANGUAGE PROCESSES
0
161
304
465
19
DECISION_NORMATIVE
58
348
0
406
8
DESIGN_BASELINE
118
229
0
347
2
SUPPORT_PROG_DECISIONS
122
207
0
329
1
REVIEW_SCOPE
100
0
0
100
18
RULE_FOLLOWING
79
0
0
79
Table 5: Initial results of interview coding analysis- word frequency of factors by interviewee

Even from this small initial study, the amount of discussion supports that the 21
initial factors were generally present, with two noticeably under-represented areas
(#1 REVIEW_SCOPE and #2 AVOID_CRITICISM—which I re-coded as #2
RuleFollowing, but still was minimally present). Some dominant factors which were
strongly represented in the interview responses include the top six factors:
PROGRAM_INSIGHT, ERROR_IDENTIFICATION, COMPLEXITY_MANAGEMENT,
PROGRAM_CONFIDENCE, QUALITY_GATE, and STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT.
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There was also variation among the interests of the participants. Although all three
participants talked about the five most common factors, SrEngLdr was the only one
to discuss SHAPE_TEAM- and he discussed team shaping and team building at
length.
Below in Table 6 are some short sample responses from the most common six
factors, to show the richness of the responses and that they did match the concept:
Factor#
(RelRank)
15 (#1)
6 (#2)

Theoretical Factor
(Focus area: Technical, Programmatic, Socio-technical)
PROGRAM_INSIGHT: Program control- parent / funding
office insight into developer progress; developer feedback to
funding office (Programmatic)
ERROR_ID: Error identification

Sample quote
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

21 (#3)

COMPLEXITY_MANAGEMENT: Management of
[Redacted]
government/ contractor (supplier / acquirer) – partitioning
design and dealing with complexity, aligning contract
deliverables (Programmatic)
16 (#4)
PROGRAM_CONFIDENCE: Program control- parent /
[Redacted]
funding office acquiring confidence that design will “work”
(socio-technical)
13 (#5)
QUALITY_GATE: Acting as quality control gate and
[Redacted]
improving quality (quality management) (Technical)
17 (#6)
STAKEHOLDER_MANAGEMENT: Management of
[Redacted]
stakeholders by developers; stakeholder influence on
program (Socio-technical)
Table 6: Sample Exemplar quotes from interviews, for six factors at highest frequency (by words)

However- there were 20 quotes which appeared to not exactly line up with the 21
factors, or which argued for some of the 21 initial factors to be re-worded or split up.
Examples include: (1) splitting up customer confidence factor into internal (design
leadership) and external (client) confidence, and (2) splitting up the “complexity
management” factor into managerial complexity and technical complexity issues.
I did decide to modify “avoiding criticism” as a factor—there were no quotes
supporting this factor in the interview. However, I replaced it with a new “rule
following” factor—having a review simply for the reason that it is the process/rule
(as opposed to technical / other reasons). Two rationale areas found that are being
considered for a new factor/ rationale include (1) adding the rationale factor to
communicate to client that we are honest and trustworthy (several quotes from
EngSrLdr), and (2) adding a “self-interest/program protection” rationale, which was
supported by a long, if cynical, quote from EngMSE2. However, these approximately
20 quotes and roughly a dozen modifications to the factor list are under
consideration and will require analysis, and discussion with the larger research team
before adding as a major factor.
One other area being considered for addition is coding for counter-examples.
There are a few cases where an interviewee implies that they have no value or see
negative value—for example, when EngMSE2 implies that he sees no value in having
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a large team in the room (and thus— no value in internal communication/training
in the review):
[redacted quote]
However—despite seeing little value to having extra people in the review and
their communication in the review itself, the respondent saw that communication in
the team was inherently limited and reviews can sometimes solve problems coming
from mis-communication:
[redacted quote]
As a result, CTR_MSE discusses internal communication as an issue in design
reviews: he sees a role in the reviews in catching errors (“error identification”) from
problems in internal communication in the design team, but he doesn’t think that
internal communication and having the team communicate and learn at the reviews
is a valuable role of the reviews. Future analysis will work to split out arguments
against factors as well as arguments supporting factors.
In summary, the interviews generally supported most of the 21 initial theoretical
factors (with one factor re-designated from “Avoidance of Criticism” to “Rule
Following”, and two factors having relatively low representation). The respondents,
largely un-prompted directly, stated in their own words or gave an anecdote which
was evaluated to be within the pre-made definition and meaning of that factor. The
factors will be refined in a future effort from the output of the study.
The primary limitations in this study are related to the chosen method of it being a
single exploratory case study. It therefore represents a single point in a larger design
effort (PSR as opposed to SRR / CDR earlier in design)—and some factors may be
more important earlier in design (such as achieving stakeholder need agreement at
SRR). Similarly, having one case means that we are looking at one organizational
setting- a fairly simple structure with one main contractor and a second integrating
spacecraft contractor with one government office, and thus effects with higher levels
of organizational complexity are not examined. Similarly there is one set of
engineering culture being examined.
A second issue is the limited set of interviews (three) and limited levels within the
organization (the review chair and two presenters/engineering leaders). A more full
study would examine sources of variation across position and role of interviewees,
and get more depth and confidence in observed factors with a larger set of
participants. Having multiple interviewees would also allow improved validity
because it would allow estimating when finding new effects has “converged” and
there appear to be fewer new insights/observations.
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Finally, the analysis was not completed, which would involve validity checking by a
second researcher of the coding, and decisions on coding modification (adding,
splitting, etc.)—there is a set of proposed coding modifications, but time did not
allow completion.
5. Conclusion
This initial study produced several contributions. First, an initial “theory-based
set of rationale factors” for why design reviews are conducted and what value they
have were developed, reduced from an initial set of over 55 based on prior
professional experience of the researchers. Second, this initial set of factors was
checked against empirical qualitative interviews of three interviewees in a sample
design case—a DoD development of space vehicles and a set of associated Pre-Ship
Reviews. Quoted responses from the interviewees, when coded, appear to support
most of the initial 21 factors, with 2 of the factors being relatively weak and at least
two new factors being considered for addition and two factors for splitting.
This constitutes at least an initial confirmation of the initial theoretical coding
set, although further validation and analysis is required.
In addition, this initial study acted as a pilot study to develop data acquisition
and coding techniques as well as sample interview questions, draft IRB protocols,
and other required methodological support for follow-on studies. The respondent
interview quotes also provided some information on likely variation of other cases—
which will support follow-on case analysis by allowing prediction of some major
factors that will cause data to vary.
References [omitted]
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Appendix I:
Sample research interview questions
Topic: items I ask design review participants
Target: 30-minute interview, recorded
Preparation (beyond this)- look at minutes, slides, to tune basic questions.
(see also Rubin & Rubin on interview questions).
Main questions:
This is just a short interview, which I’d like to record so that I don’t have to take notes. Right
now, what I learn is being used in early research development for my dissertation proposal
[redacted]. But—at any time, if you don’t want to answer something or want to stop—just
let me know. [Also discuss protection methods, give draft IRB handout]
Q’s about interviewee/ experience level
Just to get an idea of your relative experience level for the study—you’ve been at
{ContractorA} for how long?
And other than {ContractorA} —how many years and companies have you been at? (just
rough) [
And—what is your education background—major degrees?
Roughly how many major design projects and design reviews have you been in? 5? 10?
Dozens?--(Intro): I didn’t go to the PSR reviews, but [redacted] have looked at slides and minutes. At
the PSR for {DoDSpaceProgram1}, you were/are (role), and your role in the review was
(job)—(and you attended PSR1 & 2, presented at PDR), right? I have the agenda, slides, and
minutes here, if you want to look, since it has been a while.
General/Tour questions
1. How did you think the PSR went, in general (tour question)?
2. How did this review compare to other reviews you’ve been at?
3. Did you think this PSR was a good review?
4. Did the review go as you expected?
General/on their brief
5. How much prep did you have to do for the PSR?
6. Were there prior practices / reviews / split-up of the review itself or the prep (prereviews)?
How have PSRs worked/changed—between PSR 1, 2,3 4.
7. [How did your presentation go?] Did it [the PSR] do what you wanted?
a. Follow-up: were there questions/issues raised during your brief
b. (I saw XYZ actions from minutes—how did those come up?)
8. Was there anything contentious while you briefed / in the review / that you got stuck on
or were a major issue?
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Q’s on Stakeholders
9. Who were the stakeholders who interacted in the review (in your brief/in the PSR)—The
{ContractorA} design team and program office?
10. Were the stakeholders concerned about many things at the PSR?
11. What was your impression of how the stakeholders/ program office / sub-contractors
thought of the review or program, at the review?
12. Do you recall anything specific that the stakeholder/Program office said or did in the
PSR?
- What do you think stakeholder/Program office got out of the PSR/review?
13. How about the stakeholder/sub-contractor- do you recall anything they said or did at the
PSR?
- what do you think the sub-contractor got out of the PSR/review?
Q’s on impact to program
14. For you in the design effort- what was the benefit of this review/PSR?
15. Imagine if you hadn’t had this review/PSR—say if the program manager cancelled or
skipped it—what would have been the impact, do you think?
16. How did this PSR impact the near-term work of the program? Did it just affirm things?
17. How was this review different from the other {DoDSpaceProgram1} reviews (like CDR)?
[potentially go to more detailed questions in later section]
Q’s on general practices at this place
18. How well do you think {ContractorA} does at running reviews in general, compared to
other contractors or offices/reviews you’ve seen?
19. What do you think about the guidance/planning process at {ContractorA} on doing
reviews? Is it too specific, too vague?
20. Are there things about reviews that you really don’t like? What?
21. Are there things about reviews that you’ve found useful or you like?
22. Are there things that {ContractorA} or the program does really well in reviews?
Snowball/follow-on
23. Who else should I talk to about this review ({DoD SpaceProgram1} PSR)- that really knew
what was going on or was important to the review?
24. Who do you think is an expert at {ContractorA} on reviews, that I should talk to, or that
you’d consult when doing a review?
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APPENDIX D

DATA INVENTORY

As discussed in Chapter 3, data was collected on the six research cases for multiple
data types. Summary statistics of the data are given in Table 3.4.
This appendix gives an inventory of the collected data artifacts. This inventory has been
anonymized and coded due to IRB confidentiality requirements.
Data artifacts (interviews and documents) were archived after analysis per the IRB protocol to protect the privacy of the participant organization and respondents.
The data inventory reporting format is modified from Szajnfarber (2011, 171–178).

D.1 Inventory of interviews
Table D.1 gives an inventory of interviews acquired. The inventory has been anonymized per the IRB privacy protection plan (see Appendix A). Codes for standard respondent
roles are described in Table 3.5. Codes for case study project names are described in Table 3.2.
Interviews are available for validation at varying levels of anonymization. Raw recordings and raw transcripts have restricted access, per the IRB protocol. Anonymized transcripts
may be requested through the research committee.
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A.NASASpaceProgram2 PER

308

4

D. DoDSpaceProgram1 ORR

7

1

1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
7

1

1

1

E. NASASpaceProgram4 sPDR

6

1
1

1
4

1

1

1

F. NASASpaceProgram4 PDR

1

1
1

6

1

1
1

1
1
1
1
10

1

1

1
1

1

11

1

1

1
1
1
1
1

1

1
19

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1

1
1
1
1
8

1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1 1
11 11

1

1

1

1
1
1

1
1

5

1
1

1

1

1

Working Eng

4

1

B.NASASpaceProgram4 SRR/ MDR
1

1

Subsystem

1

Prelim/Final Design
1

1
1

Presenter/lead

1

C. NASASpaceProgram5 sPDR

1

Concept
1
1

Assembly/Int/Test/Flight
1
1
1
1
1

System

1
1
1

Board member

1
1

Design Phase Lvl of Review Participant Role AnonName

Ctr_MSE3
ContractorA_SrEngLdr1
ContractorA_EngLdr22
ContractorA_EngLdr24
ContractorA_EngLdr5
ContractorA_SrEngLdr1
ContractorA_SrEngLdr1
ContractorA_Eng4
ContractorA_Eng8
ContractorA_EngLdr34
ContractorA_EngLdr35
ContractorA_EngLdr33
ContractorA_Eng9
ContractorA_EngLdr3
ContractorA_Eng13
ContractorA_EngLdr37
1 ContractorA_EngLdr16
Ctr_MSE2
ContractorA_EngLdr36
Ctr_MSE2
ContractorA_Eng10
ContractorA_Eng22
1 ContractorA_Eng24
ContractorA_EngLdr45
ContractorA_EngLdr34
2

Other

1
1
1

Reviews

Review Panel Member (Sys Eng)
Review Panel Chair/Chief Engineer
Flight Software Lead
Mission Design Lead
Board Panel Member (Proj Mgmt)
Review Panel Chair/Chief Engineer
Review Panel Chair/Chief Engineer
Mech Design Engineer
Launch Services Lead
Mission Systems Software Engineer
Integration and Test Lead
Board Panel Member (Mech Design)
Test Engineer
Review Panel Member (GNC)
Test Engineer
Ground System SW Lead
Review Panel Member (Quality)
Mission Systems Engineer
Integration and Test Lead
Mission Systems Engineer
Test and Integration Engineer
Electrical Engineer (Instrument)
Electrical Engineer (Avionics)
Software Engineer/review panel chair
Mission Systems Software Engineer

Respondent Title

Len

23
63
40
48
66
27
29
57
44
32
35
33
29
32
29
42
38
55
27
35
20
51
53
68
60

Mins

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
TOT

Int#

Table D.1: Inventory table of acquired interviews

D.2 Inventory of documents
Table D.2 gives an inventory of relevant acquired documents. This inventory is anonymized per the IRB privacy protection plan (see Appendix A). Codes for case study project
names are described in Table 3.2.
Documents were not anonymized and have access restrictions due to IRB procedures
as well as design organization access restrictions. Access to documents must be coordinated
through the research committee as well the company which provided the document.
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Table D.2: Inventory table of documents
# Artifacts

Internal Process Standard, CtrA Technical
Reviews, 36 pages

Process
document
Process
Internal article; CtrA Technical Reviews, 15 pages
document
Internal Process Standard, CtrA Production
Process
processes, 36 pages
document

CtrA.4

CtrA Technical Review
process checklists

Internal Process guidance: checklists for technical
reviews; 7 review types; typically 1-2 pages ea. 7
docs include: Fabrication Feasibility Review (FFR)
Checklist; Engineering Design Review (EDR)
Checklist; Integration Readiness Review (IRR)
Process
Checklist; Preliminary & Critical Design Review
document
(PDR & CDR) Checklist; Test Readiness Review
(TRR) Checklist; Fabrication
Feasibility/Readiness Review Harness Checklist;
Fabrication Readiness Review (FRR) Checklist

CtrA.4

CtrA systems engineering
process doc

Internal Process Standard, CtrA systems
engineering processes, 13 pages (refers to other
docs)

Process
document

NASASpaceProgram5 (ContractorH) SEMP, 42
pages
Internal Process Standard, CtrH Systems
Engineering, 88 pages
Internal Process Standard, CtrH Technical
Reviews, 89 pages

Formal
document
Process
document
Process
document

CtrH planning documentproducts for each review

Internal / informal spreadsheet, analysis of CtrH
deliverable products for each review

Internal
document

A.1

PER Slide Set

Slide set from PER; 39 presentations

A.2

PER invite emails

A.3

PER Minutes

Formal Minutes memo from PER; with review
Memo
board list, list of attendees, action items; 24 pages

A.4

PER Agenda

Proposed/in-work agenda for PER

Systems Engineering
Management Plan
CtrH Systems Engineering
CtrH.2
process doc
CtrH Technical Review
CtrH.3
process doc

CtrH.1

CtrH.4

A.5
A.6

NASASpaceProgram2
personnel list
NASASpaceProgram2
Schedule

A.7

PER pre-brief slide sets

B.1

SRR/MDR Slide Set

Presentations
Internal
Outlook emails; invitations to attendees; 3 emails
document

Staffing list, NASASpaceProgram2 project
NASASpaceProgram2 Integrated Master
Schedule
Slide sets, technical pre-briefs prior to PER; 3
presentations
Slide set from SRR/MDR; 33 presentations

310

Internal
document
Internal
document
Internal
document

Case

Formal Doc/Memo

CtrA Technical Review
process doc
CtrA internal tech paper on
CtrA.2
tech reviews
CtrA Production process
CtrA.3
doc

CtrA.1

Document
Type

Presentation

Anonymized Document Description

InternalDoc

Doc# Anonymized Identifier

All

1

All

1

All

1

All

9

All

1

C

1

C

1

C

1

C

1

A
A

43
3

A

1

A

1

A

1

A

1

Presentations

A

3

Presentations

B

33

Table D.2: Inventory table of documents, continued
# Artifacts

Case

B.2

SRR/MDR Minutes

B.3

SRR/MDR Board
evaluations

Formal Minutes memo from SRR/MDR; with
action items, recommendations, RFAs,
attendance list; 77 pages
Detailed comments from SRR/MDR individual
board members; 7 pages

B.4

SRR/MDR email

internal email to SRR/MDR attendees

B.5

SRR/MDR RFA Tracking
spreadsheet

Internal tracking spreadsheet, SRR/MDR action
items responses

B.6

KDP-B brief from
Summary brief to KDP-B panel, on SRR/MDR.
SRR/MDR chair and project From chair and project manager

Presentations

B

1

B.7

Project brief to KDP-B

Presentations

B

1

B.8

SRB Update Slide Set

Presentations

B

12

B.9

SRB KDP-B memo
SRB RFA Tracking
spreadsheet

Briefing from project to KDP-B panel
Briefing to SRB / update on SRR/MDR; 12
presentations
Memo to KDP-B/NASA from CtrA
Internal tracking spreadsheet, SRB Update RFAs
and responses

B

B.11

SRB invite email

internal email to SRB Update attendees

Memo
Internal
document
Internal
document

B.12

SRB presentation to KDP-B Summary brief to KDP-B panel, from SRB chair.

B.10

B.13
B.14

NASA Program office
presentation to KDP-B
SRR chair presentation to
KDP-B

B

1

B

1

B

1

1

B

1

B

1
1

Summary brief to KDP-B panel, from program
office.

Presentations

B

1

Summary brief to KDP-B panel, from SRR chair.

Presentations

B

1

Presentations

C

17

C.2

sPDR sign-in list

C.3

sPDR agenda

C.4

sPDR Convening Memo

C.5

sPDR planning document

C.6

sPDR board results memo

C.8

1

B

Subsystem/module
Preliminary Design Review Slide set from sPDR; 17 presentations
(sPDR) Slide Set

sPDR early planning
document
NASASpaceProgram5
Technical Review process
doc

Formal
document
Internal
document
Internal
document

B

Presentations

C.1

C.7

Memo

Internal
document
Agenda for sPDR. Includes presenter names and Internal
times.
document
Review board formal convening memo. Includes
Memo
board members and intended scope.
Document sketching intent and scope of each
Internal
brief prior to developing them
document
Attendance list to sPDR.

C

1

C

1

C
C

Memo (draft) from review board, stating
Memo
strengths, weaknesses, major actions from review

C

Document sketching deliverables, attendees,
dates, alignment with guidance for sPDR

Internal
document

C

Formal internal project document; stating review Formal
plan for entire project
document

C
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Formal Doc/Memo

Document
Type

Presentation

Anonymized Document Description

InternalDoc

Doc# Anonymized Identifier

1
1
1
1
1

Table D.2: Inventory table of documents, continued
# Artifacts

C.10

sPDR goals

C.11

sPDR success criteria and
objectives

C.12

Parent sPDR board memo
(after this sPDR)

C.13

Planning Document sketching overall goals for
sPDR
Planning Document sketching objective of sPDR
and deriving success criteria
Formal memo from review board of the parent
subsystem (FS PDR) over the sPDR. States
findings, ratings against criteria

Case

Formal
document

C

Internal
document
Internal
document

Formal Doc/Memo

C.9

NASASpaceProgram5
Systems Engineering
Formal internal project document; stating
Management Plan (SEMP) systems engineering plan for entire project
process doc

Document
Type

Presentation

Anonymized Document Description

InternalDoc

Doc# Anonymized Identifier

1

C

1

C

1

Memo

C

1

Subordinate review list
underneath sPDR

Formal memo, from subsystem project, of
subordinate reviews planned to be held across
Memo
lifetime, at lower level, for the subsystem/module

C

1

C.14

Subordinate peer review
slides

Slide set, prior peer review of a subsystem within
the subsystem/module. Includes peer review
schedule, project guidance on peer reviews

Presentations

C

C.15

PM email post-review

Internal
document

C

C.16

sPDR pre-brief on
deliverables

Email from assistant PM of project, to project
team, on success of sPDR
Presentation from ContractorA to ContractorH
leadership on project, on planned PDR/CDR
deliverables and analyses

Internal
document

C

1

D.1

Operational Readiness
Review (ORR) Slide Set

Slide set from ORR; 9 presentations

Presentations

D

8

D.2

ORR invitation memo

Formal client memo, inviting stakeholders to ORR Memo

D

D.3

Internal email,
(DoDSpaceProgram1
ContractorA)

Internal process email to CtrA
DoDSpaceProgram1 workers.

Internal
document

D

1

D.4

External attendee list, ORR

1

ORR RFA Tracking
spreadsheet

D

1

D.6

ORR Documentation list

D

1

D.7

ORR Plans and scope

D

2

D.8

ORR Entrance and Exit
Criteria

Internal
document
Internal
document
Internal
document
Internal
document
Internal
document

D

D.5

Internal planning document, Planned list of
external/stakeholder attendees.
Internal tracking spreadsheet, ORR action items /
Requests for Action and responses
Internal planning document, list of planned
artifacts (ORR documents) prior to review
Internal planning document, scope and intent of
briefs in ORR prior to preparation
Internal planning brief, development of entrance
and exit criteria for ORR by client

D

1

E.0.1

Status tracking document,
subsystem reviews

Internal document tracking subsystem PDRs and Internal
dates
document

E

1

E.0.2

Sample outline, subsystem Internal sample brief, typical subsystem sPDR
sPDRs
outline

E

1
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Presentations

1

1

1

Table D.2: Inventory table of documents, continued
# Artifacts

Case

Formal Doc/Memo

Slides for Avionics subsystem PDR, 8
presentations
Minutes for Avionics subsystem PDR, including
action items, attendees, board member list, and
presenter list
Slides for Fault Management subsystem PDR, 19
presentations
Memo from review chair, reporting conduct of
sPDR

Document
Type

Presentation

E.1.1 Avionics sPDR slides

Anonymized Document Description

InternalDoc

Doc# Anonymized Identifier

Presentations

E

Memo

E

Presentations

E

Memo

E

internal email, invitation to Fault Mgmt sPDR

Internal
document

E

E.3.1 Flight Software sPDR Slides

Slides for Flight Software subsystem PDR, 12
presentations

Presentations

E

E.3.2 Flight SW sPDR minutes

Minutes for Flight SW subsystem PDR, including
action items/recommendations, attendees, board Memo
member list, and presenter list

E

1

E.3.3 Flight SW sRR minutes

Minutes for Flight SW subsystem Requirements
Peer Review, including action
items/recommendations, attendees, board
member list

Memo

E

1

Minutes for Flight SW subsystem Requirements
Flight SW sRR delta review Delta Review, including action
E.3.4
minutes
items/recommendations, attendees, board
member list

Memo

E

1

E.1.2 Avionics sPDR minutes
Fault Management sPDR
slides
Fault Management sPDR
E.2.2
memo
Fault Management sPDR
E.2.3
invitation

E.2.1

E.3.5 Flight SW sPDR invitation
E.3.6

Flight SW sPDR attendee
list

internal email, invitation to Flight Software sPDR
internal dialin log capture, attendees of Flight
Software sPDR
Slides for Guidance, Navigation, and Control
subsystem PDR, 18 presentations

Internal
document
Internal
document

Memo

E

E.4.3 GNC sPDR invitation

internal email, invitation to GNC sPDR

Internal
document

E
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1
12

1

E.4.2 GNC sPDR minutes

Slides for Ground Hardware peer PDR, 1
Presentations
presentation
Minutes for Ground HW PDR, including action
E.5.2 Ground HW sPDR minutes items/recommendations, attendees, review panel Memo
member list
Internal
Ground HW sPDR
E.5.3
internal email, invitation to Ground HW sPDR
invitation
document

1

E

Minutes for Guidance, Navigation, and Control
subsystem PDR, including action
items/recommendations, attendees, board
member list

Ground Hardware sPDR
slides

19

1

E

E.5.1

1

E

Presentations

E.4.1 GNC sPDR slides

9

18

1

1

E

2

E
E

1
1

Table D.2: Inventory table of documents, continued
# Artifacts

E.6.3
E.7.1
E.7.2

Ground Software sPDR
slides

Slides for Ground Software heritage and PDR, 1
Presentations
presentation
Minutes for Ground SW PDR, including action
Ground SW sPDR minutes items/recommendations, attendees, review panel Memo
member list
Internal
Ground SW sPDR invitation internal email, invitation to Ground SW sPDR
document
Slides for Harness Subsystem Peer Review / PDR,
Harness sPDR
Presentations
1 presentation
Minutes for Harness sPDR, including action
Harness sPDR minutes
items/recommendations, attendees, review panel Memo
member list

E.8.1 Instrument sPDR slides

Slides for Instrument PDR, 24 presentations

Presentations

Minutes for Instrument sPDR, including action
items/recommendations, attendees, review panel Memo
member list
Internal
E.8.3 Instrument sPDR invitation internal email, invitation to Instrument sPDR
document
Slides for Structure PDR Peer Review, 24
E.9.1 Mechanical sPDR slides
Presentations
presentations
Minutes for Structure PDR, including action
E.9.2 Mechanical sPDR minutes items/recommendations, attendees, review panel Memo
member list
Slides for Mission Design/ Navigation PDR, 1
E.10.1 Mission Design sPDR
Presentations
presentation
Mission Design sPDR
Minutes for Mission Design/Nav sPDR, including
E.10.2
Memo
minutes
review panel member list
E.8.2 Instrument sPDR minutes

E.11.1 Power sPDR slides
E.11.2 Power sPDR minutes

E.12.1 Propulsion sPDR minutes

Slides for Electrical Power sPDR, 24 presentations Presentations
Minutes for Electrical Power System PDR,
including action items/comments/concerns,
attendees, review panel member list
Minutes for Propulsion PDR, including action
items/comments/concerns, review panel
member list

E.13.1 RF sPDR slides

Slides for RF subsystem PDR, 2 presentations

E.13.2 RF sPDR Invitation

internal email, invitation to RF sPDR

Testbed Software sPDR
Slides for Testbed Software subsystem PDR, 1
slides
presentation
Testbed SW sPDR attendee
Document, attendees of Testbed Software sPDR
E.14.2
list
E.14.1
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Case

E

1

E
E

1
1

E

1

E

1

E

23

E
E

Formal Doc/Memo

E.6.2

Document
Type

Presentation

E.6.1

Anonymized Document Description

InternalDoc

Doc# Anonymized Identifier

1
2

E

24

E

1

E

1

E

1

E

24

Memo

E

1

Memo

E

1

Presentations

E

Internal
document
Internal
document
Internal
document

E

2
1

E
E

1
1

Table D.2: Inventory table of documents, continued
# Artifacts

E.15.1 Thermal sPDR slides
E.15.2 Thermal sPDR minutes
E.15.3 Thermal sPDR Invitation

Tracking Document, assigned actions and
Internal
recommendations and status, from Testbed SW
document
sPDR
Slides for Thermal subsystem PDR Peer Review, 1
Presentations
presentation
Minutes for Thermal peer review, including action
items/suggestions, attendees, review panel
Memo
member list
Internal
internal email, invitation to Thermal sPDR
document

Preliminary Design Review
Slide set from PDR; 31 presentations
(PDR) Slide Set
SRB PDR RFA Tracking
Tracking Document, assigned SRB actions and
spreadsheet
recommendations and status, from PDR
Document tracking process guidance against PDR
PDR planning document
briefs, and status of deliverables
Project Terms of Reference Formal project document stating scope for
document
reviews by SRB for this project

Internal
document
Internal
document

F.5

NASASpaceProgram4
Systems Engineering
Formal internal project document; stating
Management Plan (SEMP) systems engineering plan for entire project
process doc

F.6

NASASpaceProgram4
Schedule

F.7

F.1
F.2
F.3
F.4

Presentations

E

1

E

1

E
E

1
2

F

32

F

1

F

1

F

1

Formal
document

B,E,F

1

NASASpaceProgram4 Integrated Master
Schedule, for Phase C

Formal
document

F

1

Findings, PDR panel

Draft briefing stating findings of PDR SRB. Input
briefing to KDP-C decision. Includes ratings
against success criteria, summary, draft actions
and recommendations.

Presentations

F

2

F.8

Project response to PDR
SRB findings

Draft briefing stating project response to findings
Presentations
of PDR SRB. Input briefing to KDP-C decision.

F

2

F.9

PDR Invitation

internal email, invitation to PDR

F.10

PDR attendee list

F.11

PDR email

internal dialin log capture, attendees of Flight
Software sPDR
internal email to project members and PDR
attendees
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Memo

Case

Formal Doc/Memo

Testbed SW sPDR actions
and recommendations

Document
Type

Presentation

E.14.3

Anonymized Document Description

InternalDoc

Doc# Anonymized Identifier

Internal
document
Internal
document
Internal
document

F

1

F

5

F

1

APPENDIX E

DETAILED FINDINGS LISTING

This appendix lists in Table E.1 all detailed findings from interviews and documents in
Chapter 4. The table shows the linkage from the detailed findings to the summarized findings
in Table 4.2 and common criticisms in Table 4.3.
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C2

F3

F3

F13

4.2.1.2:6

4.2.1.3:1

4.2.1.3:2

4.2.1.4:1

F5

4.2.1.2:4

F12

F12

4.2.1.2:3

4.2.1.2:5

F12

4.2.1.2:2

F5

F2

4.2.1.2:1

4.2.1.2:4.2

F1

4.2.1.1:3

F5

F1

4.2.1.1:2

4.2.1.2:4.1

F1
Most respondents w role of review
board member (7 of 8)
Some respondents with the role of
review board member (3 of 8)
Most respondents (12 of 21)

Some respondents (10 of 21)

Level of support

Variation of action impact to design with phase 1: Design team preferred
earlier reviews in design phase, because they could influence the design
more and there was less resistance to changes.
Variation of action impact to design with phase 2: Design team received
most actions impacting design at subsystem PDR, with less designimpacting actions at sub-system CDR.
Design team felt they could influence the design with internal action items
more at the subsystem-level reviews than at the mission-level reviews.
Design team felt that mission-level reviews didn't give them meaningful
action items, or that the action items were ``work that they would have done
anyway''.
More action items focused on ``the design effort'' (as opposed to the artifact
under design) at mission-level reviews compared to subsystem-level
reviews.
More action items with external actors (vs. internal actors) at mission-level
reviews compared to subsystem-level reviews.
Review panel saw negotiation and modification of action items as part of
action item process.
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Analysis of documents: action item
statistics (above 95% confidence)
Some panel member respondents (3
of 8). Action item project documents.
One counter-opinion.

Analysis of documents: action item
statistics (above 95% confidence)

Some respondents on the design
team (4 of 14)
Some (7 of 14) respondents on the
design team. One counter-opinion.

A few other respondents on the
design team (2 of 14)

Some respondents in the design
team (4 of 14)

Most respondents with the role of
"design team member" in reviews
held during phases with subsystem
reviews (4 of 7)
The design team saw Action items at subsystem reviews as a way to
Some respondents within the design
technically influence other parts of the design and make it better-integrated. team (5 of 14)
The design team saw design-impacting action items as varying with the case Some respondents on the design
variable "phase of review".
team (6 of 14)

Useful action items seen as a surrogate for how successful they thought the
review was for the project.
Review board members saw action items as a record of critical issues they
found within their area of expertise during the review.
Review board members saw overall review board success as passing higher
level review criteria. Criteria were themselves based on the action items.
Significant value seen in the technically detailed problem-finding in
subsystem reviews.
More directly useful action items received from subsystem-level reviews
compared to mission-level reviews.

Sum Detailed Finding Text
Finding

4.2.1.1:1

Detailed
Finding #

Table E.1: Listing of detailed findings
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4.2.3.1:2

4.2.3.1:1

4.2.2.2:1.4

4.2.2.2:1.3

4.2.2.2:1.2

4.2.2.2:1.1

4.2.2.2:1

4.2.2.1:6

4.2.2.1:5

4.2.2.1:4

4.2.2.1:3

4.2.2.1:2

4.2.2.1:1

Detailed
Finding #

Preparing for review was seen has having a high resource cost in project
time and attention.
F6 A major type of pre-review work was seen as preparing data for the review,
because it wasn't documented or worked that way in the project or because
it took time to communicate it well.
F6 A major type of pre-review work was seen as conducting dry runs and
preparations.
C1 Team members who were not on any boards felt negatively or criticized the
amount of work spent on dry runs.
F6 Tailoring reviews for projects seen as allowed for projects which were
smaller or accepted risk and had client and design organization agreement,
to reduce resource cost.
F7 Resource cost of review preparation seen as lowest at internal ``peer
reviews'', ``board reviews'', or ``table-top reviews'', the least formal type of
review.
F6 Significant technical value seen in the work done to prepare for reviews.
(Tech benefits split out below into 3 parts)
F6,F9 TechBenefit 1: Technical benefit seen in pre-review work: forced internal
communication during dry runs.
F6 TechBenefit 2: Technical benefit seen in pre-review work: forcing "the whole
design" to be created in the first place, in review preparation.
F6 How design baselining/TechBenefit2 varies: Processes for internal design
baselining observed for subsystem-level reviews compared to mission-level
reviews. Mission level: internal interactions happened during dry runs.
Subsystem level: discussions happened during review itself.
F6 Tech Benefit 3: Technical benefit seen in pre-review work: individual
designers were forced to examine and question their own work in
preparation for facing external review of their design.
F5 Content of reviews and scope of gate decisions at a particular review seen as
driven by "design phase".
F4 Role of reviews seen to vary for client-mandated compared to internal
reviews done by the design organization. There is a complex hierarchical
structure of reviews to support decisions by the three organizations (design
organization, client organization, design team), from mission-level reviews
to subsystem-level reviews.

F6

Sum Detailed Finding Text
Finding

Some respondents (5 of 21). Process
doc support.

Some respondents (8 of 21).

A few (4 of 21) respondents

A few respondents (4 of 21)

Some respondents (6 of 21)

Some respondents (5 of 21)

Some respondents who were not on
any review boards (4 of 12)
A few respondents (4 of 21) and
documents. Counter-opinion by 2
respondents.
Some respondents who attended
subsystem reviews (4 of 16). Project
documents.
Most respondents (11 of 21)

Some respondents (8 of 21)

Some respondents (6 of 21)

Most respondents (12 of 21)

Level of support

Table E.1: Listing of detailed findings, continued
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F8

F8

F9

F9

F4

4.2.3.2:5.5

4.2.4.1:1

4.2.4.1:2

4.2.4.2:1

F8

4.2.3.2:5.1

4.2.3.2:5.4

F5

4.2.3.2:4

F8

F8

4.2.3.2:3

4.2.3.2:5.3

F8
F8

4.2.3.2:1
4.2.3.2:2

F8

F8

4.2.3.1:4

4.2.3.2:5.2

F8

Not passing a review was seen as rare, but that it happened.
Decision gates seen as generally ``hard gates'' and that work could not
proceed without approval.
At the review board and team leadership level, the review criteria seen as an
accepted metric for whether the project passed the review. Working-level
engineers did not discuss review criteria.
Review criteria items varied directly with phase of review (specific review
like SRR, PDR, etc.)
Non-success Outcome 1: The most common ``non-success'' outcome seen
as postponing the review or having an ``extended phase'' if the project
thought it couldn't meet the review criteria before the review.
Non-success Outcome 2: Reviews which were assessed poorly seen as
commonly receiving many actions which took a long time to recover from.
Non-success Outcome 3: Delta reviews seen as way to recover from poor
review, more commonly at sub-system level than at mission-level.
Non-success Outcome 4: Having liens, or continuing work into the next
phase despite not passing a review criterion, was seen as rare outcome and
by-exception.
Non-success Outcome 5: Outright failure at the review followed by
cancellation or reassigning work was seen as most rare outcome of failed
reviews.
Design reviews seen as a forcing function on work within design phases,
helping focus effort by groups within the design team.
Technical reviews help manage the partitioned design by acting as mileposts
aligning subsystem and component technical development within the
overall project schedule.
Reviews, particularly at mission-level, seen as important for the larger
design organization: checking on the progress and quality of the project and
ensuring institutional processes were followed.

Relation between technical reviews and major NASA milestone gate
decisions seen by project leaders as: For NASA(client) decision gates, the
technical review results were reported, but were not the sole consideration.
The issue of how to tailor the processes for a small project and negotiating
what the client and design organization wanted was seen as important

Sum Detailed Finding Text
Finding

4.2.3.1:3

Detailed
Finding #

Some respondents from the design
teams (4 of 14)
Evidence from documents: schedules
and action items, Some respondents
(8 of 21)
Some respondents (6 of 21)

A few respondents (3 of 21)

Some respondents (5 of 21), process
documents
A few respondents (4 of 21), process
documents

A few respondents (2 of 21)

Some respondents (5 of 21)

Process documents

Some respondents on boards and
design team management (5 of 14)

Some respondents in leadership
roles (3 of 15) as well as case
documents
Most respondents who attended
reviews for specific project/set of 3
cases (B,E,F) (8 of 10).
Some respondents (6 of 21)
Some respondents (5 of 21)

Level of support

Table E.1: Listing of detailed findings, continued
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F1

F1

F1

4.3.1.1:2

4.3.1.2:1

4.3.1.2:2.1

F9
F9

4.2.4.4:1
4.2.4.4:1.1

F8

F4

4.2.4.3:3

4.3.1.1:1

F4

4.2.4.3:3

F9

F4

4.2.4.3:2

4.2.4.4:1.2

F4

Most respondents attending Case E
mission-level reviews (5 of 8)

Most respondents (12 of 21)
Most respondents attending project
reviews in Case C (4 of 6)

From analysis of attendee lists in
review minutes. Counter opinions by
a few respondents (4 of 21).
Some respondents who attended
mission-level reviews (5 of 15)

Some respondents (9 of 21)

Most respondents (12 of 21)

Level of support

Some respondents who attended
mission-level reviews (3 of 8) and
project KDP documents
Minutes were used as formal documentation (organizational record) of the Most minutes (9 of 14) marked for
review. First, minutes documents were purposefully distributed and stored. specific distribution. Most CtrA
Second, minutes were stored on project repositories.
reviews (14 of 15) had minutes on
their project depository. Process
document support.
NASA SRBs had the most formal reporting processes, with reports and
Process documents, Case documents
formal post-review briefs. Contractor required minutes or reports for
``formal'' reviews.
Minutes had standard data elements. 1: action items, post-negotiation.
Process documents, All case
documents (minutes) (15 of 15
reviews)

Reviews seen as allowing insight and control between contractors.
(In specific case C) Prime contractor seen as having strongly participated in
subcontractor's reviews, and to have required subcontractor to follow the
prime's design processes.
(In specific case E) reviews seen as highlighting communication and
process issues between contractors, such as how to conduct reviews and
priorities of work.
Assessments and ``areas of concern'' seen as the primary outputs of reviews
briefed to the major NASA milestone (KDP) decision board.

An important role of reviews seen as identifying issues which needed client
decisions and to force necessary client or external stakeholder action. This
was not brought up by respondents who only attended subsystem reviews.

Major role of design reviews seen as giving necessary insight to the client
organization into the project, so the client agrees with and supports the
project.
Being open and honest with the client or review board was seen as
important in order to increase their trust and confidence in the project.
Interactions with client representatives happened largely at the missionlevel reviews, rather than at subsystem-level reviews.

Sum Detailed Finding Text
Finding

4.2.4.3:1

Detailed
Finding #

Table E.1: Listing of detailed findings, continued

F1

F1

F1

F1

F1

F10

F10

F10

C4

C4

C4

4.3.1.2:2.3

4.3.1.2:2.4

4.3.1.2:2.5

4.3.1.2:2.6

4.3.2.1:1

4.3.2.1:2

4.3.2.1:3

4.3.2.2:1

4.3.2.2:2

4.3.2.2:3

Level of support

Process documents, Most Case
documents (minutes) (12 of 15
reviews)
Minutes had standard data elements. 2a: Mission-level reviews had more
Process documents, Most Case
formal assessments than subsystem reviews.
documents (minutes) (3 of 4 missionlevel reviews)
Minutes had standard data elements. 2b: Subcontractor/subsystem review Case documents (minutes) (1 of 1
was formal assessment similar to mission-level review.
subcontractor review)
Minutes had standard data elements. 3: Information on panel members and All Case documents (minutes) (15 of
attendees.
15)
Minutes had standard data elements. 4: review agenda.
Most Case documents (minutes) (9 of
15)
Careful selection of reviewers was seen as a critical task of the chair or
ContractorA process documents,
design organization.
some respondents (7 of 21)
Panel's existing expertise on systems similar to those designed seen as a key Most respondents (11 of 21)
component of views and knowledge of the panel.
Having reviewers who were independent on panel seen as valuable
Some respondents (7 of 21), process
(independent defined as not being on design team).
documents
Read-ahead packages are mandated, but seen as not always used by
Some respondents (7 of 21), process
reviewers before the review.
documents
Lack of panel examining the pre-review package review was seen as
Of the 7 noting lack of use of minutes
common issue. Opinions varied on impact: Opinion1: Lack of pre-review
pre-review: 3 of 7 saw it as problem. 3
seen as problem reducing effectiveness of review. Opinion2: Amount to
of 7 said not enough time due to
review and detail result in not enough time. Opinion3: Seen as easier to
scope/detail. 1 preferred to go to dry
attend dry runs than review package. Opinion4: Seen as not necessary to do runs. 1 said not necessary due to
pre-review due to prior knowledge.
prior knowledge.
Technical review package seen as sometimes used for learning or
Some respondents (6 of 21). Of those
communication after the design review. Includes using it for: people outside 6: 3 used for learn/pre-work, 2 used
the design team to learn or reuse work, for their own later work or later
for own or project work, 1 used in
project use, in training new engineers, and technical coordination with
training new engineers,1 used w
external contractors
outside contractors. 1 counteropinion that they were not detailed
enough to be useful.

Minutes had standard data elements. 2: final overall assessment of design.

Sum Detailed Finding Text
Finding

4.3.1.2:2.2

Detailed
Finding #

Table E.1: Listing of detailed findings, continued
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F3

F11
F11

F11

F11

4.3.3.1:3.3

4.3.3.2:1
4.3.3.2:2

4.3.3.2:3

4.3.3.2:4

F13

4.3.3.1:2

F13

F11

4.3.3.1:1

4.3.3.1:3.1

F13

4.3.2.3:3

F3

F13

4.3.2.3:2

4.3.3.1:3

F13

Level of support

Most respondents who were panel
members on the case projects or
prior projects (8 of 10). Of those 8, 5
saw questions as critical; 3 would ask
about items beyond slides.
At subsystem or peer-level reviews, panel members saw verbal interactions Some respondents who were panel
as mostly a detailed walk-through and questioning of every item in the
members at subsystem or peer-level
design.
reviews (3 of 6)
It was seen as valuable that project members heard in reviews from
Some respondents (6 of 21)
stakeholders who they didn't normally interact with, such as clients or users.
Reviews seen as identifying errors and issues, many of which became action Most respondents (13 of 21)
items.
Various sub-types of issues included: errors, issues, concerns, and open
Process documents, minutes
issues, each with varying usage.
Mission-level reviews seen as able to find issues where the design team
Some respondents who attended
``missed things'' or had internal assumptions that may not be true.
mission-level reviews (5 of 15)
Of the 5 who saw mission reviews
More review panel members felt that mission-level reviews could find
find missed things / assumptions,
missing issues or assumptions in the design, compared to design team
most (4 of 5) were on review panels; 1
members.
was on the design team. Counteropinion by some on design team (3 of
14).
Finding ``overlooked design issues'' was seen as a role at subsystem reviews Some respondents who attended
but less important compared to mission-level reviews.
subsystem reviews (3 of 14)
Risk identification was stated as a central role of reviews.
Process documents
Reviews seen as forum for examining specific design risks and whether they Some respondents (6 of 21)
were properly managed, by being in the risk database or having design
margin.
Review seen as way to check whether the risk management of the project
Some respondents (8 of 21)
was effective.
Design team leaders saw as important for design project to get from reviews All three respondents who worked as
an as-complete-as-possible view of the risks to the project.
Mission Systems Engineers

Panel members saw discussions at the review itself as valuable for learning.
Various aspects seen as valuable: (1) questions from panel, which turned
into actions, (2) Asking about things beyond the slides such as design
rationale or missing items.

Sum Detailed Finding Text
Finding

4.3.2.3:1

Detailed
Finding #

Table E.1: Listing of detailed findings, continued
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4.3.3.5:5

4.3.3.5:4

4.3.3.5:3

4.3.3.5:2

4.3.3.5:1

4.3.3.4:3

4.3.3.4:2

4.3.3.4:1

4.3.3.3:3

Risks were common issues brought up in review action items. Risk-related
actions were most commonly either (1) requests for risk analysis, (2)
creation of a new formal project risk, or (3) modification of an existing
project risk.
The importance placed on maturity assessment in reviews varies between
contractors and clients.

F11,F5 A role of review was seen as assessing the level of maturity of the design or
processes against the maturity considered appropriate for that review's
phase.
F11 Technology Readiness Level used as a surrogate for maturity of specific
technologies at mission-level review time. TRL terms used as accepted
definitions
F11 Reviews seen as involving a check on of documentation and configuration
management of the design baseline at the time of review.
F11 The rationale for reviewing the document baseline and specific focus items
seen to change with phase of design.
F5 The expected baseline and specific contents for each design phase, as listed
out in review process document, seen as accepted and well-known.
F11 Participants who didn’t present at the review felt they learned a lot about the
design from reviews and related activities.
F12 Design team members who presented at the review felt mission-level
reviews did not significantly impact their technical understanding of the
design. Mission-level reviews were not relevant to them or covered issues
they already mostly knew.
F2,F3 Review level seen to impact what participants could learn: subsystem-level
reviews had more details and mission-level reviews were less detailed but
broader in scope.
F2 Mission-level reviews seen as less effective for learning about details and
identifying technical problems compared to subsystem-level reviews,
because of time available and having external participants.
F2 Peer reviews, also known as tabletop reviews (internal reviews below
subsystem review), were noted as having the highest level of technical detail
(compared to mission-level and subsystem-level reviews) but cover a
relatively limited scope.

F11

4.3.3.3:1

4.3.3.3:2

F11

Sum Detailed Finding Text
Finding

4.3.3.2:5

Detailed
Finding #

Most respondents who attended both
subsystem and mission reviews (6 of
7)
Some respondents (8 of 21). Counteropinion by a few (3 of 21).

Some respondents (9 of 21)

Some respondents (9 of 21), process
document
Some respondents who attended but
did not present (7 of 14)
Most respondents who presented at
the review (5 of 7)

Some respondents (8 of 21)

A few respondents attending missionlevel reviews (3 of 16). ContractorH
process doc.
Most respondents (11 of 21)

Analysis of process docs (CtrA vs
CtrH vs. NASA). Analysis of case
documents
Some respondents (7 of 21)

Analysis of review action items : 140
references to ``risk'' in 508 action
items.

Level of support
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F11

F11

F11

4.3.3.6:2

4.3.3.6:3

F5

4.3.3.5:7

4.3.3.6:1

C3

Mission-level reviews criticized as "dog-and-pony shows'": unable to
conduct true technical critique. This was caused by either wanting to avoid
argument or due to lack of time.
Detail level seen to vary with phase. In general, CDR was seen as having the
highest detail level on the chosen design, and was an explanation of the
chosen design and testing results. PDR had a lower level of detail, but was
more open to design inputs. Pre-PDR reviews had high level design and
lower detail. Reviews after CDR were seen has having the design largely not
open to change.
Design reviews seen as forum for review participants to learn about project
status and readiness.
Participants held personal opinions from the review about the status and
readiness of a specific project to go into the next phase, as opposed to the
group assessment against criteria.
Review seen as a way to communicate the competence of the design team.
Participants held opinions from the review whether the team under review
as competent.

Sum Detailed Finding Text
Finding

4.3.3.5:6

Detailed
Finding #

Most respondents (11 of 21)

Some respondents (7 of 21)

Most respondents (12 of 21)

Some respondents (5 of 21), process
documents

Some respondents who attended
mission-level reviews (4 of 15)

Level of support

Table E.1: Listing of detailed findings, continued

APPENDIX F

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW LITERATURE LIST

This appendix reports the listing of “major” literature on technical reviews, as retrieved
in a systematic review using the procedures and search terms described in Section 3.5.
References in this list have at least one page discussing technical reviews. These references were also the focus of the analysis reported in Chapter 5. Summary statistics of the
references in this literature list and their types are reported in Table 3.9.
Literature in this systematic review database is reported for follow-on research. The
reference format is per Chicago Manual of Style, 16th ed., but with a framed box to differentiate
the systematic review literature list from the dissertation bibliography.
The literature search effective date is 19 May 2019. Note that some research indicates
a typical publication lag between “initial publishing of pre-print online” to “final print publication, assignment of volume and issue number, and inclusion of metadata in literature databases” of over four to nine months, depending on the specific publication route (Tort et
al. 2012, 2). This suggests that this literature list has better coverage of literature initially published before September 2018, with decreasing coverage between September 2018 and January 2019, and limited coverage after January 2019.
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APPENDIX G

ADDITIONAL DATA AND ANALYSIS

For the sake of brevity, some reference data are given in this appendix rather than interspersed in the main body text. A separate historical discussion of the early history of technical
reviews is also given in this appendix.

G.1 Additional interview quotes
This section gives additional interview quotes supporting observations.

G.1.1

EngLdr5, Interview #5
Sample quote supporting Section 6.2.1.1 observation that respondents discussed in-

teractions with clients and other contractors at design reviews:
Int: When you showed that slide—
EngLdr5: Yes.
Int: —who-ever was in the room from the client organization . . . do you think you communicated that to them?
EngLdr5: Yes.
Int: So, you’re trying to give them insight into the design choices—
EngLdr5: Insight, and to inoculate against . . . argument. And antibodies.
Int: So, they understand and they—
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EngLdr5: Because I could always go back and say, “This is what I told you. You’re—”
Int: So, you’re trying to convince them, or you’re also protecting yourself against future . . .
EngLdr5: I’m try . . . right. I’m trying to give them a context on how we’re going to have an
argument. I want the arguments on my terms. I want the arguments in my context [taps
table].
Int: So, you’re framing the decision.
EngLdr5: Correct. . . .
Int: . . . So, it worked to the extent you needed it to. You framed enough of the discussion with
the client organization that they accepted—
EngLdr5: And, again, it wasn’t—it wasn’t me. It was—the team gave data and information
so that we could give the story to our champion, to make sure they were successful, and
had a solid story in their organization. And above. (EngLdr5, Interview #5)

G.1.2

SrEngLdr1, Interview #2
Sample quote supporting Section 6.2.1.2 observation that respondents discussed con-

fidence as something critical for the acquiring organization and the design organization to
gain at the review:
SrEngLdr1: They’re [ContractorH review participants] there for two reasons. One is to be able
to see first-hand what the discussions are, the depth of the discussions, what the technical
issues were. It’s an opportunity for them to get insight into what’s going on at that stage
of the project. They also—
Int: Sorry . . . why do they need insight? Are they giving advice to the program office?
SrEngLdr1: Their role—there will be subsequent reviews to PER, that are SRB reviews. And so,
having a history of the issues and seeing things for themselves gives them more appreciation for what the issues are. And whether or not the review was thorough is part of
it. It builds confidence; it gives them insight into the issues down-stream, so when they
do . . . I guess the SRB-chaired review is Operations Readiness Review, ORR. So, there
was actually this gap between SIR, System Integration Review, which is an SRB review,
and then Operations Readiness Review. So, in between there, we have these project-led
or institutional-led reviews, which are PER and then Pre-Ship [Review]. And, this gives
them an opportunity to just keep up to speed with all the details and the issues which
are going on with the project [in between SRB reviews]. At the same time, they also bring
their own expertise to the review process, so they add value in the fact that they are invited to participate fully and ask questions and—
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Int: So, they might also be on the SRB for the institutional-level . . . or the mission-level reviews
like the ORR, these people.
SrEngLdr1: Oh, yes, absolutely, they will be. So again, they are there for the purposes of getting insight into the project and they are also contributors at that point of the project.
(SrEngLdr1, Interview #2)

G.1.3 EngLdr16, Interview #17
Sample quote supporting Section 6.2.1.3 observation that respondents discussed the
importance of giving the impression of honesty and openness, and how it could result in trust
by stakeholders:
EngLdr16: And you know, it makes me proud to be here, but I think {ContractorA} is extremely
honest in the technical reviews. We disclose the challenges, we disclose the failures, people admit their mistakes, so there’s very little sugar coating that I see, during these reviews. Which, again, I find to be very refreshing, so I find them to be—
Int: Because some other places aren’t quite as frank? [laughing]
EngLdr16: Correct. Yeah. Some other places either have been—you know, earlier in my career,
or been sent to do reviews—you had to ask twenty questions to fish out the answer. And,
here, we seem to present the true status with an exceptional degree of honesty, and the
facts are what the facts are. And we’ve also had reviews where—they weren’t successful,
and we had to do them again. Because we didn’t meet the criteria. So, they’re not a
“pass,” you know—
Int: Right.
EngLdr16: They’re actually an activity that requires preparation and commitment to get through.
I find them to be very effective. (EngLdr16, Interview #17)

G.1.4

EngLdr22, Interview #3
Sample quote supporting Section 6.2.1.4 observation that respondents discussed crit-

icism avoidance at reviews:
EngLdr22: If I saw something on a ground software slide, that I thought was wrong, I would not
stand up in the middle of the review and start asking questions of the ground software
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lead. I might go talk to him later. But there’s no way I would change the dynamic of that
review, in front of all these NASA people. And make my ground software people—
Int: —and start poking at your own design—
EngLdr22: Yeah, I’m not doing that to somebody. And so, I think that you lose a little of that,
because you don’t want your fellow employees to look bad in front of NASA, so you don’t
ask those questions. I think it’s just—
Int: So, would they ask those things at the subsystem review?
EngLdr22: Yeah. Yeah, ask them at the subsystem review, or when we’re having a walk-thru
[prior to the review], is definitely a different dynamic than when you actually do the
presentation. I think—we have a smaller subset, so we have just the team, and the team
asks us real questions at that point, about what your system’s doing. But when you have
everybody there—you’re not going to—
Int: They’re not going to ask questions within the team [at the external review]: “why did you
do that?”
EngLdr22: Yeah, I think that would be—yeah. [laughs] I don’t know. I wouldn’t think it would
be appreciated. (EngLdr22, Interview #3)

G.1.5 EngLdr3, Interview #14
Sample quote supporting Section 6.2.1.5 observation that respondents brought up design culture, or the organizational culture of the design organization and various teams and
sub-organizations, as an issue for reviews:
EngLdr3: Over the course of my career, I’ve had exposure—besides the {DoDAgency2}, I’ve
had exposure to of course, {DoDAgency3}, and NASA, even {OtherGovernmentAgency3}.
And there’s certainly a thread of similarity through all of it. But I think the bigger differences are just the among, as I said earlier—who’s the particular contractor, the sponsor,
and the people involved [taps table].
Int: And so, if you went to a series of {DoDAgency1SystemB}, with that one program office, with
that one design group, if you went to a {DoDAgency1SystemBProject1} vs. a {DoDAgency1SystemBProject2} [review], there’s probably a commonality—
EngLdr3: Yeah, right. . . .
Int: But if you move over and go to, like a {DoDAgency2SystemA} design review—
EngLdr3: Yeah, I wouldn’t say it’s totally different. There’s a thread—I mean, they’re all kind of
following the same rules, but there’s always a different flavor because of the culture that’s
involved. . . . I thought {DoDAgency2SystemA} was actually from a system engineering
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perspective, that was probably—If I had to rate the quality of system engineering, among
all of the different programs I’ve been exposed to over the years, I’d say probably {DoDAgency2SystemA} was the best, clearly the best.
Int: Well, and a very successful program.
EngLdr3: Yeah.
Int: They were the best, because of their level of detail, or just they were very thorough, or . . . ?
EngLdr3: I’d say they were . . . they did think about the system. You know they really did. And it
was thorough, too. You know, when you look at the, just {MilitaryTechnology}. I mean,
the degree to which they really dug into the math [laughs] and what you really need to
do to get a very high confidence. [taps table] I mean, they did it, over a period of years,
but it was also very well connected. It was divided into three basic parts, there was the
{MilitaryTechnology}, basically, and then there was the {MilitaryTechnology}, and then
the {MilitaryTechnology}. So, you had a {MilitaryOfficer} in charge of each, but they had
a {MilitaryOfficer} Forum . . . I can’t remember what they called them back then, but they
had this board of {MilitaryOfficers}, would meet on a very regular basis. I think it was
weekly. And then they’d go through all the issues, and the concerns about the program,
and particularly the interconnections, and work it out. And so, they’d work together,
clearly. (EngLdr3, Interview #14)

G.1.6 EngLdr45, Interview #24
Sample longer quote supporting Section 6.2.1.6 observation that respondents discussed
the need for independent assessment in reviews:
Int: Do you consider this, like the flight software PDR, requirements review, did you consider
that a peer review? Or was that more of a subsystem review? Or how do you guys—the
terms sometimes vary—
EngLdr45: I think, it’s maybe a soft definition. I think that was a peer review. And certainly,
it was among the team. Their team. I’m not a member of the {NASASpaceProgram4}
team.
Int: Right.
EngLdr45: But that’s a level of independence that, you know, the culture brings in. You want
to have a peer review. With their peers. You’ll have a certain amount of independence.
Part of our institution, being brought in, that have understanding of that type of subject.
So, say, if this was a C&DH system, which is what this was, a Command and Data Handling system, it’ll be among their peers and the developers. And their leads. And, then,
someone like myself, coming from out . . . who’s a subject matter expert in that area. But,
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not on that project. And then, at the same time, during these reviews, if you look carefully
at the attendees, you will see other folks coming in from, say, {NASA Office1}.
Int: Right, or other projects like {NASASpaceProgram2} you had {EngLdr22} . . .
EngLdr45: Yes, yes.
Int: And, now, the independent people, what did you see your role—I guess people do different
things. So, the people who are inside the team, I would think they know the software
in more detail, but you as an independent person, what did you see your role as, in the
review?
EngLdr45: Well, I think that the key thing is that, they don’t develop myopic vision. And they
get so focused in their work that they don’t consider alternative solutions, or “gotchas” or
problems that they may not foresee. So, by having that independence, it’s a fresh thought.
So, folks who are not in on a day-to-day basis, who don’t develop that myopic vision, and
say, “OK, well, they may not be considering a larger problem.” And that helps. You don’t
have the . . . [sighs] It’s important to have, when you do pick an independent person, that
it’s someone who has, maybe done it before, who’s well-experienced in it. But isn’t close
on that project, so they do understand the domain quite well.
Int: Hm.
EngLdr45: So, there is some thought that actually goes in, certainly in these reviews, because
I know that they put thought into it, and it’s like, “Oh, who are the right people, and
who are . . . ,” and get in there. And of course, [taps table] then there’s the challenge of
availability of those folks. (EngLdr45, Interview #24)

G.1.7

Eng8, Interview #9
Sample quote supporting Section 6.2.1.7 observation that respondents discussed for-

mality of reviews, and had varying views on formalism:
Eng8: That’s one of the other challenges, too, to getting things from these reviews, is making sure
they understand their data products. The right information is going back and forth to
the right people to work them. The right stuff at the right times, so when you stand up in
this review, “Yeah, yeah, we’ve got our coupled loads. Our structure design is done. We’re
ready to go.” You know. And trying to convince them that going through these processes
at a certain pace, at the right set of constraints applied. Reviews, and carefulness of the
data that goes out, and everything. [taps table] Until they hit a landmine, as far as they’re
concerned, the road looked pretty good to them, you know? [laughs] And, so, you’re
trying to convince them, that there’s—
Int: So, you actually prefer a little bit of the formalism and management that’s in reviews?
Because some engineers hate it. Think it’s a waste of time.
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Eng8: No, I think it’s very good. No, I think it’s—yeah, I actually have no problems putting
things down on paper. You know? I mean, a lot of engineers hate it. And I keep telling
them, [taps table] time and time again—that’s your key to success. That you’ve put it on
paper.
I mean, when I’m working as a system engineer now. I took over this thing, for this job
that came in. And some other guys had been working it for five months. And I sat down,
[taps table] I said, “OK, what about this mechanism. Have we looked at it?”
“Yeah, yeah, that won’t fit.”
“OK, well, what about this approach, have we . . . ?”
“Yeah, we’ve already looked at that.”
And after a couple of those kinds of answers, I’m like, “OK, well, let’s see it.”
“What do you mean?”
“Let’s see it. You wrote it down, right? He looked at what the mass was [taps table], or
what the velocity was, or what you traded, the conditions of the trade, and he arrived
this conclusion, because . . . ?”
“Oh, we don’t have time to document stuff.”
“Oh, okay. Well, guess what. We’re starting from ground zero.” [laughs].
And for two of those things, we ended up going with a completely different design. Because when we looked at it, and wrote it down, here’s the criteria for success. And gee,
this one met 8 of 10 and that one met 14 of 10. I’m taking the 14’er!
Int: Right, but until you wrote it down, it wasn’t evident.
Eng8: It wasn’t evident! No. And I mean, I’m not a stickler who says, “I expect a finely-worded,
edited document that’s perfect in every form.” No. You can use PowerPoint. Just tell
me what your assumptions are, what you traded, what your decision process was and
the results and why you arrived at the results. And sometimes the results are, “It was
inconclusive so we picked A versus B because we didn’t have time.” That’s OK! [laughs]
Int: As long as you just say it, and you’re aware of it, I guess.
Eng8: Yeah. I can come back two years from now, and someone can say, “Have you looked at
that?” And I can [makes flipping paper gesture] “There it is. Yes, we did. And this is what
we arrived at.”
So, I, actually, am quite the opposite. I am all for writing things down. [laughs] Be careful
on the rules you apply on how rigorous it’s gotta be. (Eng8, Interview #9)
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G.2 Historical development of technical review concept
This section gives a longer discussion on the historical development of technical reviews, to supplement Section 2.2.
The practice of technical reviews developed alongside the practice of systems engineering and acquisition in the 1950s and 1960s. The historical development of technical reviews as key points between phases of design work can be traced through changes in systems
engineering standards and texts. This discussion focuses on aircraft and missile / spacecraft
development because of their influence on the practice of technical reviews.
In the US before World War II, there was little integrated engineering of systems and
limited technical review of contractor-developed aircraft, like other technical systems acquired
by the government at the time (Putnam 1972, 2–3; Gorn 1989, xv–xvi; Benson 1997, 4–18).
The pace of development was relatively leisurely, the funds were limited, and the government
acquirer had a “hands-off” development approach. Government acquisition was limited to
fixed-price contracts and testing of small numbers of experimental aircraft, rather than detailed testing on delivered items and involvement with development (Benson 1997, 12).
As a result of the limited government involvement in development, the need for technical review by government agencies was limited. A few sample pre-production military aircraft or scale models were delivered by contractors such as Boeing to the Army Air Corps for
a nominal series of three “technical inspections”: Mock-up inspection (after R&D and before first prototype); Development Engineering Inspection (before a second prototype), and
a Contract Technical Compliance Inspection (before production) (Johnson 2002a, 20–21).
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Similarly, before World War II, the Army Air Corps did not have program offices focused on individual aircraft. The Army Air Corps had technical branches focused on technical
components like radios and aerodynamics, as well as test divisions to conduct tests on prototypes. The Navy had similar functional (versus program office) structures to manage procurement (Benson 1997, 4–18). The focus of the limited government technical manpower before
World War II was in testing delivered items and research and monitoring the development of
key technology such as aircraft engines and radios.
Government development practices did change and accelerate during World War II in
the US. A few “project offices” for relatively complex aircraft such as the B-29 were forerunners of the later government program offices (Gorn 1989, 3; Johnson 2002a, 27). There were
increased contacts between the military and scientists as a result of World War II. Large and
successful projects such as the Manhattan Project, the development of the radar, and the German V-2 program pointed to the military potential of complex and ambitious development.
The Manhattan Project, in particular, was extremely influential in changing views of the role
of the government in development due to its geopolitical impact and dramatic leap forward in
technology. However, the academia-derived paradigm of the Manhattan Project had a small
management staff and was a prototype-like effort in comparison to later industrial-scale developments like the ICBM program (Johnson 2002a, 27).
The start of the Cold War and the Korean conflict triggered internal debate on military
procurement. Several boards such as the Scientific Advisory Board (1946) and studies such as
the Ridenour Report (1949) recommended how to restructure research and development to
deal with the complex weapons the US was starting to develop. In the 1950s, General Schriever
created a new ballistic missile program office—the Western Division in Los Angeles—which
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pioneered many early systems engineering processes, including management and integrated
engineering of dozens of subcontractors (Johnson 2002a, 32–40; Booton and Ramo 1984).
The first widely-used systems engineering process standard—USAF 375-5 (AFSC 1966)—
was published in the mid 1960s as part of Air Force efforts to standardize the systems engineering and management methods developed in the 1950s by General Schriever’s ballistic
missile program and successful programs such as the B-52 (Converse 2012, 478–9) and the
Minuteman ICBM program. A contemporary article gives the rationale for AFSCM 375-5 as
addressing a list of problems which seem still-current desiderata for technical reviews and
systems engineering in general:
Past Air Force management surveys among 24 major contracts indicated that there
were a number of problems associated with system engineering. Some of these
problems were: engineering decisions were made unilaterally within design groups
with little regard for total program effects; exact end item configuration of the system was not able to be determined prior to the actual system operation; program
planning for the integrated system was not accomplished until the program came
to an end; the technical documentation was generally late and inadequate for the
Air Force acceptance of an integrated system; contractor analysis of the Air Force
requirements and objectives were in most cases hasty and incomplete; and finally,
engineering recommendations were not supported by detailed analyses and design trade-offs. (Gelbwaks 1967, 6)
AFSCM 375-5 lays out a set of design phases separated by technical reviews which are
largely recognizable and still in use today: a System Requirements Review (following a system
definition phase); a System Design Review (conducted with the selected design contractor
before they conduct preliminary design); Preliminary Design Reviews (conducted for each
contracted item prior to starting detailed design); and Critical Design Reviews (conducted
on each contracted item after detailed design and before production) (AFSC 1966, 14–15).
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The reviews in AFSCM 375-5 (particularly SRR, PDR, and CDR) are present in almost every
subsequent process document.1
Configuration management (CM) was also central to AFSCM 375-5 and its associated
CM standard, AFSCM 375-1 (Thompson 1997). AFSCM 375-5, alongside technical reviews
(SRR, PDR, and CDR), also mandated a configuration management inspection (the First Article Configuration Inspection). This dissertation does not consider configuration control “audits and inspections” as technical reviews (although they often contribute to technical reviews). The history of systems engineering, technical reviews, and configuration management
are intertwined (Raveling 1981; Johnson 2002b, 94–102).
Johnson argues (Johnson 2002b, 2002a) that the critical innovation in the evolution of
systems engineering was the merging of General Schriever’s program office concept (from the
ballistic missile program), with the concept of configuration control (from the B-52 and Minuteman program offices and their industry contractors). The new concept of “configuration
control” included the new concepts of technical reviews and design phases.
Both “configuration control” and the “program office” are innovations that are relevant to technical reviews. General Schreiver’s Western Development Division made a major
contribution in emphasizing program office control of design (Johnson 2002a, 34–35), which
contrasts with technology-focused organizations prior to the ICBM program.2

1. System Design Review is a more complex and less-universally used technical review than
SRR, PDR, and CDR. Many processes include a technical review after contract acceptance and
before preliminary design (e.g., the System Functional Review in IEEE 15288.2 (IEEE 2015)),
but terminology and methods for this review vary more widely than for SRR, PDR, and CDR.
2. There were other influential program offices in the 1950s. See MacKenzie and Spinardi
(1988) for a discussion of the Navy’s Polaris program and the social cross-pollination of practice among US defense contractors and government programs.
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The advent of Schriever’s management methods in the mid-1950s was coincident with
new concepts such as acquisition, design phases including concept formation, and system
life cycles. General Schriever was infamous for his monthly “Black Saturday” reviews of the
ICBM program (Johnson 2002b, 78), but they would now be considered “periodic management reviews” rather than technical reviews at transitions of phases. Schriever’s management concept focused on “concurrency” and what would now be seen as a high risk overlap
in design efforts. Although the centralized control of the system program offices was found
by many studies of the time to be effective, the price of concurrency and heavily-overlapping
phases was simply too high, causing rework and spiraling costs on the ICBM programs (Johnson 2002a; Poole 2014; Brown 2005).
The Minuteman ICBM program’s success was an impetus for General Schriever adopting Minuteman’s management processes for entire ICBM program rather than using the riskier
“concurrency” method (Johnson 2002a). The program manager at the Minuteman project,
Colonel Samuel Phillips, and his subordinate managers at the Minuteman Program Office at
Wright-Patterson AFB in Ohio were proponents of configuration management (and design
phases and reviews) as a means to control program scope and progress (63). However, it is
not clear from the historical record which parts of the “configuration management method”
of phases with reviews came from Boeing (the prime contractor), the government office, or
elsewhere in the Air Force or industry (244).
Later, Colonel Phillips and a set of managers associated with Air Force programs such
as George Mueller3 brought “systems management” concepts and formal technical reviews
3. George Mueller became Associate Administrator of NASA’s Office of Manned Space
Flight. Prior to NASA, he worked at Bell Labs and the Ramo-Wooldridge Western Division
ICBM group (Mueller 1987).
360

to NASA’s Apollo program in 1963. The Air Force management method was intended to resolve issues with lack of cost and control under the prior relatively informal and concurrent
methods used by NASA prior to 1963 (Johnson 2002a, 132–142).
Phillips and Mueller instituted Air Force-style (similar to AFSCM 375-5) reviews at
the Apollo program, including PDRs, CDRs, and other configuration management, despite
significant resistance from NASA managers including Marshall Space Flight Center Director
Werner Von Braun (Johnson 2002a, 140). Multiple historical accounts and contemporary review boards saw the new management system as critical to the Apollo program’s success.
Revealingly, Colonel (later General) Phillips was interviewed in retirement by Martin
Collins on his memories of the development of the management system in the Air Force and
NASA, including the first technical reviews in the modern sense:
Phillips: So there was need for a comprehensive system within the Air Force structure . . . for a
comprehensive structure for program planning and control and for the management of
system engineering and ultimately the system integration of the total system.
The thing that emerged then from that need, in the technical side, largely went under the
name or title of configuration management. The configuration management approach
that was developed in Minuteman, in my mind, largely is the way in which system engineering is managed, and it establishes a process, procedure and structure for the development of the technical specification programs and their evolution, for a systematic
structure of technical reviews, starting with a requirements review and a preliminary
design review and a critical design review. So there was a formalized structure of design
reviews all the way through the program that was established, and a procedure and process for, if you will, freezing the design and then controlling changes to the design, and a
procedure and process for identifying interfaces between and among the contractors and
of documenting and controlling those interfaces. So that was the basic scheme which, as
I said, went under the title generally of configuration management, which to me is the
Bible for managing system engineering. . . .
Collins: You’re saying that was adopted from industry?
Phillips: Yes, largely from industry. In that connection, to give credit where it’s due, at least in
the scheme we worked up in Minuteman, a lot of what we developed in the way of techniques came out of Boeing. What’s the right word—it was quite cooperative insofar as
Boeing was concerned. So a lot of the techniques that we developed and I think perfected
361

through the Minuteman program, for program planning and control, were refinements
of what had been used in the Air Force for years, but a lot of the in-depth material was
really taken from how Boeing did things. Now to finalize that point, in these two major
areas, the system engineering and in the program planning and control, a comprehensive set of practices, techniques, and procedures were developed and evolved over the
years, and those basically were the structures that later I took into NASA, and which
were the basis for managing the Apollo program, and which even today, those still are I
think the main techniques of managing large programs. (Phillips 1989, Tape 2, Side 1)
Essentially, NASA used review processes embodied in AFSCM 375-5 and related texts
(which themselves came from Boeing through the Minuteman ICBM program, as related by
General Phillips above) to manage the complex Apollo space program in the 1960s.
By the early 1970s, NASA as well as DoD required contractors to conduct design reviews. Reviews became more standardized across DoD after the 1983 Defense Science Board
recommendations (DSB 1983) led to the re-publication of the Air Force’s MIL-STD-1521 (ESD
1972) as the DoD-mandated MIL-STD-1521B (DoD 1985).
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